area handbook series 

South Korea 

a country study 



South Korea 

a country study 




Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Andrea Matles Savada 
and William Shaw 
Research Completed 
luneJ 990 



On the cover: North Watchtower, Suwon Castle 



Fourth Edition, First Printing, 1992. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

South Korea : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library 
of Congress ; edited by Andrea Matles Savada and William 
Shaw. — 4th ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) (DA 
pam ; 550-41) 

' ' Research completed July 1 990 . ' ' 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 347-375) and index. 
ISBN 0-8444-0736-4 

1. Korea (South). I. Savada, Andrea Matles, 1950- 
II. Shaw, William, 1944- . III. Library of Congress. Federal 
Research Division. IV. Series. V. Series: DA pam ; 550-41. 
DS902.S68 1992 91-39109 
951.95— dc20 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-41 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 204-02 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by 
the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under 
the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program sponsored by the 
Department of the Army. The last page of this book lists the other 
published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



This edition supercedes South Korea: A Country Study published 
in 1982. The authors wish to acknowledge their use of portions 
of that edition in the preparation of the current book. 

Various members of the staff of the Federal Research Division 
of the Library of Congress assisted in the preparation of the book. 
Sandra W. Meditz made helpful suggestions during her review of 
all parts of the book. Robert L. Worden also reviewed parts of the 
book and made numerous suggestions and points of clarification. 
Timothy L. Merrill assisted in the preparation of some of the maps, 
checked the content of all of the maps, and reviewed the sections 
on geography and telecommunications. Thanks also go to David P. 
Cabitto, who designed the cover and chapter art and provided 
graphics support; Marilyn L. Majeska, who managed editing and 
production and edited portions of the manuscript; Andrea T. 
Merrill, who provided invaluable assistance with regard to tables 
and figures; and Barbara Edgerton, Alberta Jones King, and Izella 
Watson, who performed word processing. 

The authors also are grateful to individuals in various United 
States government agencies who gave their time and special 
knowledge to provide information and perspective. These individ- 
uals include Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country Studies- 
Area Handbook Program for the Department of the Army; Cho 
Sung Yoon, Far Eastern Law Division, Library of Congress, who re- 
viewed the sections of the manuscript on the judiciary and the legal 
system; and John Merrill of the Department of State, who reviewed 
the text and also offered suggestions and points of clarification. 

The editors are also grateful to several academic experts on 
Korea: Gari K. Ledyard, Robert Ramsey, and Donald N. Clark. 
Although they provided advice on specific issues, they are in no 
way responsible for the views found in the book. In addition, the 
editors wish to thank various members of the staff of the Embassy 
of the Republic of Korea in Washington for their assistance. 

Others who contributed were Harriett R. Blood and Greenhorne 
and O'Mara, who assisted in the preparation of maps and charts; 
Katherine Young, who edited portions of the manuscript; Catherine 
Schwartzstein, who performed final prepublication editorial review, 
and Joan C. Cook, who prepared the index. Linda Peterson and 
Malinda B. Neale of the Library of Congress Composing Unit pre- 
pared camera-ready copy, under the direction of Peggy Pixley. The 
inclusion of photographs was made possible by the generosity of 
various individuals and public and private agencies. 



v 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile xv 

Introduction xxiii 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Chong-Sik Lee 

ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN NATION 3 

THE THREE KINGDOMS PERIOD 4 

THE EVOLUTION OF KOREAN SOCIETY 7 

Silla 7 

Koryo 7 

THE CHOSON DYNASTY 9 

CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIETY UNDER 

THE DYNASTIES 15 

Cultural Expression 15 

Korean Identity 18 

Political and Social Institutions 19 

KOREA UNDER JAPANESE RULE 20 

WORLD WAR II AND KOREA 24 

SOUTH KOREA UNDER UNITED STATES 

OCCUPATION, 1945-48 25 

Economy and Society 29 

Establishment of the Republic of Korea 30 

THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-53 31 

THE SYNGMAN RHEE ERA, 1948-60 33 

The Political Environment 33 

Society under Rhee 35 

The Postwar Economy 36 

THE DEMOCRATIC INTERLUDE 36 

SOUTH KOREA UNDER PARK CHUNG HEE, 

1961-79 38 

The Military in Politics 39 

Economic Development 43 

Society under Park 45 

Foreign Relations 50 



vii 



THE TRANSITION 52 

The Democratic Republican Party 53 

The New Democratic Party 53 

STUDENTS IN 1980 54 

GENERAL CHUN DOO HWAN TAKES OVER 54 

The Kwangju Uprising 55 

The Chun Regime 56 

The 1980 Constitution 57 

Purges 57 

Chun's "Cultural Revolution" 58 

Economic Performance 59 

Foreign Policy 59 

The Demise of the Chun Regime 61 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 67 

Donald M. Seekins 

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 70 

Land Area and Borders 70 

Topography and Drainage 71 

Climate 72 

POPULATION 75 

Population Trends 77 

Population Settlement Patterns 79 

Urbanization 81 

Koreans Living Overseas 86 

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND VALUES 88 

Traditional Social Structure 91 

The Emergence of a Modern Society 94 

Social Classes in Contemporary South Korea 96 

Traditional Family Life 99 

Family and Social Life in the Cities 102 

Changing Role of Women 104 

CULTURAL IDENTITY 108 

Korea and Japan 109 

The Korean Language Ill 

EDUCATION 114 

Primary and Secondary Schools 116 

Higher Education 118 

College Student Activism 121 

RELIGION 122 

Religious Traditions 122 

Religion in Contemporary South Korea 127 

PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 128 

Health Conditions 129 



vin 



Health Care and Social Welfare 130 

Chapter 3. The Economy 135 

Daniel Metraux 

THE JAPANESE ROLE IN KOREA'S ECONOMIC 

DEVELOPMENT 139 

THE GOVERNMENT ROLE IN ECONOMIC 

DEVELOPMENT 140 

Industrial Policies 143 

Economic Plans 144 

Revenues and Expenditures 145 

THE GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 

CORPORATIONS 146 

The Origins and Development of Chaebol 147 

The Role of Public Enterprise 149 

Pohang Iron and Steel Company 150 

Korea Electric Power Corporation 152 

FINANCING DEVELOPMENT 153 

INDUSTRY 155 

Steel 156 

Electronics 157 

Shipbuilding 157 

Automobiles and Automotive Parts 158 

Armaments 160 

Construction 160 

Textiles and Footwear 161 

Chemicals 161 

ENERGY 162 

AGRICULTURE 163 

Major Crops 165 

Forestry and Fishing 167 

The Agricultural Crisis of the Late 1980s 168 

Prospects 170 

SERVICE INDUSTRIES 170 

Money and Banking 171 

Small and Medium-Sized Businesses 174 

THE LABOR FORCE 175 

Wages and Living Conditions 176 

Industrial Safety 178 

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS ... 178 

Roads 178 

Subways and Railroads 181 

Civil Aviation 182 



IX 



Telecommunications 182 

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 183 

Aid, Loans, and Investment 183 

Foreign Trade Policy 188 

Exports and Imports 188 

KOREA IN THE YEAR 2000 190 

The Setting 190 

The Role of Science and Technology 191 

The Economic Future 193 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 197 

William Shaw 

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 200 

THE GOVERNMENT 205 

The Legislature 205 

The Executive 206 

The State Council 208 

The Presidential Secretariat 210 

The Judiciary 210 

The Civil Service 211 

Local Administration 214 

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 215 

Compromise and Reform: July-December 1987 215 

Events in 1988 219 

Returning to the Politics of National 

Security, 1989 225 

Parties and Leaders 228 

Interest Groups 233 

POLITICAL EXTREMISM AND POLITICAL 

VIOLENCE 239 

HUMAN RIGHTS 243 

THE MEDIA 246 

Roy U.T. Kim 

FOREIGN POLICY 250 

Organization and Operation 250 

Basic Goals and Accomplishments 251 

Relations with the United States 255 

Relations with the Soviet Union , 256 

Relations with Japan 259 

Relations with China 260 

Relations with North Korea 261 

Relations with International Organizations and 

the Third World 263 

Future Prospects 264 



x 



Chapter 5. National Security 267 

Rodney P. Katz 

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES 271 

Koguryo, Silla, and Koryo Kingdoms 271 

The Choson Dynasty and the Japanese 

Colonial Period 272 

The South Korean Army after World War II 274 

War on the Korean Peninsula 275 

South Korea's Response to the North Korean 

Military Buildup 276 

THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN SOCIETY 279 

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF THE 

ARMED FORCES 281 

Army 281 

Air Force 285 

Navy and Marine Corps 286 

Reserve and Civil Defense Forces 287 

Recruitment, Training, and Conditions of Service . . . 288 

Officers and Noncommissioned Officers 290 

Enlisted Personnel 291 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 291 

DEFENSE SPENDING AND MILITARY 

PRODUCTION 293 

Defense Spending 293 

Military Production 295 

STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR WAR 297 

United States Forces in Korea 298 

South Korean and United States Cooperation 302 

Guy R. Arrigoni 

INTERNAL SECURITY 303 

The Threat from the North 303 

Seoul's Response 305 

INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 311 

The Agency for National Security Planning 311 

The Defense Security Command 314 

KOREAN NATIONAL POLICE 317 

CRIMINAL JUSTICE 322 

Crime 325 

Criminal Procedure 325 

Appendix. Tables 333 

Bibliography 347 

Glossary 377 



xi 



Index 381 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of South Korea, 1990 xxii 

2 Korea During the Three Kingdoms Period, Fifth to 

Sixth Centuries A.D 6 

3 South Korea in Its Asian Setting, 1990 26 

4 Topography and Drainage 74 

5 Average Annual Rainfall 76 

6 Population Growth Rate, Selected Years, 1949-85 80 

7 Rural and Urban Population Distribution, Selected 

Years, 1955-85 82 

8 Increase in Licensed Health Care Personnel, Selected 

Years, 1955-85 132 

9 Selected Industrial and Mining Activity, 1988 164 

10 Employment by Sector, 1980 and 1988 166 

11 Transportation System, 1988 180 

12 Structure of the Government, 1989 208 

13 Comparative Growth of the Armed Forces of South 

Korea and North Korea, 1950-90 278 

14 Deployment of South Korean and United States Forces 

in South Korea, 1990 282 

15 Officer and Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1990 292 

16 Comparison of Defense Expenditures, South Korea 

and North Korea, 1978-88 294 

17 Organization of South Korean and United States Forces 

in South Korea, 1988 300 

18 Organization of the Korean National Police, 1989 320 



xii 



Preface 



Like its predecessor, this study attempts to review the history 
and treat in a concise and objective manner the dominant social, 
political, economic, and military aspects of South Korea. Under 
Roh Tae Woo, who was elected president of the Sixth Republic 
in 1987 (as well as under the previous president, Chun Doo Hwan, 
1980-87), South Korea has been struggling to maintain its eco- 
nomic successes. Movement in more democratic directions has been 
much slower than economic development. Political unrest, labor 
strikes, and student agitation continued to challenge the govern- 
ment in the early 1990s. 

Sources of information included books, scholarly journals, for- 
eign and domestic newspapers, official reports of governments and 
international organizations, and numerous periodicals on Korean 
and East Asian affairs. Chapter bibliographies appear at the end 
of the book, and brief comments on some of the more valuable 
sources recommended for further reading appear at the end of each 
chapter. A Glossary also is included. 

Spellings of place-names used in the book are in most cases those 
approved by the United States Board on Geographic Names. 
However, the generic parts appended to some geographic names 
have been dropped and their English equivalents substituted: for 
example, Cheju Island, not Cheju-do, and South Ch'ungch'ong 
Province, not Ch'ungch'ong-namdo. The name South Korea has 
been used where appropriate in place of the official name, Repub- 
lic of Korea. The McCune-Reischauer system of transliteration 
has been employed, except in cases of the names of some promi- 
nent national figures, internationally recognized corporations, and 
the city of Seoul, where the more familiar journalistic equivalent 
is used. The names of Korean authors writing in English are spelled 
as given. 

Measurements are given in the metric system. A conversion table 
is provided to assist those readers who are unfamiliar with metric 
measurements (see table 1, Appendix). 

The body of the text reflects information available as of June 
1990. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been up- 
dated: the Introduction discusses significant events that have oc- 
curred since the completion of research, and the Bibliography 
includes recently published sources thought to be particularly helpful 
to the reader. 



Xlll 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Republic of Korea. 
Short Form: South Korea. 
Term for Citizens: Korean(s). 
Capital: Seoul. 

Date of Independence: August 15, 1948. 

Geography 

Location and Size: Strategic location in waters of the Sea of Japan, 
Korea Strait, and Yellow Sea. Total land area of Korean Peninsula, 
including islands, 220,847 square kilometers; approximately 98,477 
square kilometers (44.6 percent) constitutes territory of South Korea. 



xv 



Land Boundary: 238 kilometers with North Korea. 

Disputes: Demarcation Line with North Korea; Liancourt Rocks 
claimed by Japan. 

Topography and Drainage: Approximately 70 percent of land area 
mountains and uplands. Principal ranges — T'aebaek and Sobaek 
range and Chiri Massif. Tallest mountain — Mount Halla at 1,950 
meters, a volcanic cone located on Cheju Island. Longest rivers — 
Naktong River, 521 kilometers; Han River, which flows through 
Seoul, 514 kilometers; and Kum River, 401 kilometers. 

Climate: Long, cold, dry winters; short, hot, humid summers with 
late monsoon rains, flooding. Seoul's January mean temperature 
- 5°C to - 2.5°C; July, 22.5°C to 25°C. Cheju Island warmer, 
milder weather than other parts of South Korea. Annual rainfall 
varies from year to year but usually averages more than 100 cen- 
timeters; two- thirds of precipitation falls between June and Sep- 
tember. Droughts, particularly in southwest; approximately one 
every eight years. 

Society 

Population: 1980 census reports total population of 37,448,836. 
January 1989 estimate 42.2 million. Population in 1985 of two larg- 
est cities, Seoul and Pusan, 9.6 million and 3.5 million, respec- 
tively. Population growth rate in late 1980s less than 1 percent. 

Language: Korean the national language. No significant linguis- 
tic minorities. Regional dialects of Korean mutually intelligible with 
exception of that spoken on Cheju Island. Written language uses 
Chinese characters and Korean han'gul script, or han'gul alone. 

Education and Literacy: Adult literacy rate in late 1980s approx- 
imately 93 percent. Primary school education compulsory (grades 
one through six). Approximately 95 percent of population age-group 
in secondary schools (middle and high schools); 83 percent in aca- 
demic high schools; 17 percent in vocational high schools in 1987. 
About 35 percent of student age-group attended colleges and univer- 
sities in 1989 — one of world's highest rates. 

Religion: Great diversity of religious traditions include Buddhism, 
Confucianism, Ch'ondogyo, Catholicism, and Protestantism, and 
as many as 300 new religions incorporating elements of these main- 
stream religions. Shamanism, oldest religious tradition. 

Health: Increase in life expectancy from 51.1 years for men and 
54.2 years for women in late 1950s to 66 years for men and 73 



xvi 



years for women in 1990 reflects dramatic improvements in health 
conditions. Death rate declined significantly from 13.8 deaths per 
1 ,000 in late 1950s to 6 per 1 ,000 in 1990. Infant mortality 23 deaths 
per 1,000 live births as of mid- 1990. Health personnel and facili- 
ties largely concentrated in large cities, particularly Seoul and 
Pusan. Serious public health problems caused by environmental 
pollution and poor sanitation. No unified national health insur- 
ance system but medical insurance benefits available to almost all 
South Koreans. 

Economy 

General Character: Export oriented although domestic market in- 
creasing source of growth in late 1980s; real growth 12.5 percent 
1986-88; 6.5 percent, 1989. Dominated by chaebol, or business con- 
glomerates. Most industries, except mining, in urban areas of north- 
west and southeast. Heavy industry generally in south. World's 
tenth largest steel producer in 1989. Major electronics producer. 
Automobiles and automotive parts major domestic growth and ex- 
port industry of 1980s. Armaments also manufactured for domes- 
tic use and export. Construction critical source of foreign currency 
and invisible export earnings. Textiles, clothing, and leather 
products important. Growing labor movement affects production 
and costs. 

Gross National Product (GNP): In 1989 US$204 billion, 
US$4,830 per capita, 6.5 percent annual growth rate. 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): US$211.9 billion at market 
prices, 1989; real annual growth 6.1 percent. Average growth 6.1 
percent 1986-90; high, 12.4 percent in 1986; low, 6.1 percent in 
1989. 

Industry: Main growth sector, produced 46 percent of GDP and 
employed 35 percent of work force in 1988. 

Resources: Minimal resources. Mineral deposits mostly small, ex- 
cept for tungsten. Anthracite coal most important mineral product 
by volume and value, but also imported. Most energy needs met 
by nuclear power, coal, and crude petroleum imports. 

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing: Employed approximately 21 
percent of work force in 1989; generated 10.2 percent of GDP. Rela- 
tive importance declining since mid-1960s; production grew 5.9 
percent in first half of 1989. Major crops rice and barley, also mil- 
let, corn, sorghum, buckwheat, soybeans, and potatoes. Fishery 



xvn 



products popular food and important export commodity. Inade- 
quate forestry resources. 

Foreign Trade: Annual trade in 1988 more than US$100 billion; 
first time world's tenth largest trading nation. Major trading part- 
ners United States and Japan. Main exports textiles, clothing, elec- 
tronic and electrical equipment, footwear, machinery, steel, ships, 
automobiles and automotive parts, rubber tires and tubes, plywood, 
and fishery products. Main imports machinery, electronics and elec- 
tronic equipment, petroleum and petroleum products, steel, grains, 
transport equipment, raw materials, chemicals, machinery, tim- 
ber and pulp, raw cotton, and cereals. Balance of payments af- 
fected by oil imports and raw materials needs; surplus of US$4.6 
billion in 1989, but deficit of US$1.9 billion, 1990. 

Currency and Exchange Rate: January 1990, US$1 = 683.4 won (W). 

Fiscal Year: January 1 through December 31. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Roads: 51,000 kilometers of roadways; 46.3 percent paved in 1988; 
1,539 kilometers express highways, more under construction; 
845,000 passenger cars and 748,000 commercial vehicles in 1987. 
Intercity bus system; subway system in Seoul. 

Railroads: State-run Korean National Railroad with 
6,340-kilometer network; 761.8 kilometers double track; 1,023 
kilometers electric railroads. Suburban lines connect to Seoul sub- 
way system. 

Major Ports: Pusan, Inch'on, Kunsan, Mokp'o, and Ulsan. 

Civil Aviation: International airports at Seoul, Pusan, and Cheju. 
Two airlines serve major domestic cities: Asiana Airlines and 
Korean Air. Korean Air international service includes routes to 
Japan, North America, Middle East, Soviet Union, and Western 
Europe. 

Telecommunications: Adequate domestic and international ser- 
vices; approximately 9.2 million telephones in 1987; 42 million radio 
receivers; by 1989 there were 79 AM and 46 FM radio stations; 
256 television stations (57 of 1 kilowatt or greater) and 8.6 million 
television sets; four satellite earth stations. 

Government and Politics 

System of Government: Constitution of Sixth Republic approved 
October 1987; effective February 1988. Strong presidency; president 



xvm 



elected for one five-year- term by direct popular vote. 224 members 
of 299-member National Assembly elected by popular vote for four- 
year- term in April 1988; rest appointed by political parties according 
to proportional formula. 

Justice: Administration of justice as function of courts established 
under Constitution and amended Court Organization Law of 1949. 
Supreme Court highest organ of court system; appellate courts and 
district courts. Constitution Court decides constitutionality of a law, 
dissolution of a political party, impeachment, petitions relating to 
Constitution, disputes between state agencies, or between state 
agencies and local governments. Family Court adjudicates domestic 
affairs and juvenile delinquency. Courts-martial have jurisdiction 
over offenses committed by armed forces personnel and civilian 
military employees. 

Administrative Divisions: Nine provinces and six provincial-level 
cities. Provinces divided into counties and ordinary cities; coun- 
ties into townships and towns; townships into villages. Mostly part 
of central government; increasing self-government. 

Politics: Multiparty system, but political parties with contrary aims 
or activities may be dissolved by Constitution Court. 

Foreign Affairs: Member of most international organizations but 
no formal membership in United Nations in mid- 1990. Mutual 
defense treaty with United States, which along with Japan, one 
of two most important foreign policy partners. Relations with 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) treated as 
"internal" rather than "foreign"; public and private contacts in- 
creasing. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Active-duty personnel 650,000 (June 1989). Com- 
ponent services: army, 575,000 (including 25,000 marines); air 
force, 40,000; navy, 35,000. Reserve forces about 1.2 million in 
1990. Compulsory service in army, navy, and air force, thirty to 
thirty- six months. 

Combat Units and Major Equipment: Ground Forces: three army 
headquarters; equipment inventory includes 1,560 tanks and 1,550 
armored personnel carriers, 12 surface-to-surface missiles. Air 
Force: includes twenty- two ground attack/intercept squadrons and 
one reconnaissance squadron; inventory includes 500 combat air- 
craft. Navy: three fleet commands, one aviation command, one 
amphibious command with minisubmarines, destroyers, frigates, 



xix 



missile-attack craft, minesweepers, patrol boats, and amphibious 
craft. 

Military Budget: 5 percent GNP, US$10 billion, 1989 estimate. 

Military Production: Domestic defense industry begun in early 
1970s provides approximately 70 percent of weapons, ammunition, 
communication and other equipment, vehicles, clothing, and other 
supplies to armed forces. 

Internal Security Forces: Agency for National Security Planning 
(ANSP), Defense Security Command, Korean National Police col- 
lect domestic intelligence. Korean National Police strength 130,000 
in 1989. 

Foreign Military Treaties: Signatory to Republic of Korea-United 
States of America Mutual Defense Treaty (1954). 



xx 



'Korea 
(Bay 



Jetton) 
.33 Sea 



126 



128 



NORTH KOREA 



-34 



o: 



Inch 



Demarcation fine 
1 68roiHtariZ9d_gor>s 



\ 

*S® Ch'unch'dn 

4 KANGWON 

t Seoul ? 

KYONGGI ) 

®Suwon 





Province boundary 


® 


National capital 


® 


Province capital 


® 


Directly governed city 




and province capital 


■ 


Directly governed city 





25 50 Kilometers 





25 50 Miles 



CH' 



r- r NORThT V 
^DH'UNGCh^G 

UTH ( ® Ch'drfgju 

ICH'ONG 7 M ADTU 

Taejon®^ i NORTH 

f ^ KYONGSANG 

® Taegu 

/VA SOUTH 



? NORTH 

~a ®Chonju /"^ >v 

CHOLLA .» 



Japan 



36- 



X KYONGSANG 

®Kwangju V 

SOUTH 

jholla -^-^ ^ 



c^ 



726 



CHEjy. 

Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 




34- 



JAPAN 



Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of South Korea, 1990 



xxn 



Introduction 



FOR NEARLY A HALF-CENTURY, the Republic of Korea 
(South Korea) and the United States have maintained a close rela- 
tionship. Since the mid-1980s, South Korea has been the seventh 
or eighth largest trading partner of the United States, and the 
United States has ranked as South Korea's first or second trading 
partner. In 1990, nearly four decades after the end of the Korean 
War (1950-53), Washington retained more than 45,000 troops on 
the Korean Peninsula committed to the defense of South Korea. 
During the 1991 conflict in the Persian Gulf, Seoul joined other 
coalition partners of the United States and provided a military med- 
ical team and several hundred million dollars in support of the cam- 
paign to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. 

Ties between the two countries extend to language, education, 
and culture. In 1991 English was the primary foreign language 
studied in South Korea, and for some time it has been popularly 
said that more Ph.Ds from American universities work for the South 
Korean government than for the United States government. 
Hundred of thousands of United States servicemen, businessmen, 
Peace Corps volunteers, and missionaries have lived and worked 
in South Korea, and as many as 1 .5 million South Koreans — one 
fourth of all overseas Koreans — have emigrated to the United States. 

The Korean Peninsula has been inhabited since paleolithic times, 
and Korean historians trace the ethnic roots of the Korean people 
at least as far back as the pottery-using cultures of the fourth and 
third centuries B.C. Early tribal groups formed numerous federa- 
tions, and over the centuries these combined into larger state-like 
entities. Sometime before the fourth century B.C., at least one of 
these entities had begun to refer to its leaders by the Chinese title 
for king, wang. Three of these states, boasting an aristocratic so- 
cial structure and centralized institutions of government, had come 
to dominate Korea by the early centuries of the present era, con- 
ducting trade and intermittent warfare with each other and with 
China. Stretching down from Manchuria in the north was the king- 
dom of Koguryo; in the southwest and southeast, respectively, the 
kingdoms of Paekche and Silla held sway. Korean political, cul- 
tural, and linguistic unity dates back to the unification of these three 
kingdoms under Silla in the seventh century A.D., making Korea, 
despite its present temporary division into two states, one of the 
oldest unified nations in the world. 



xxin 



Geographically poised between China and Japan, Korea devel- 
oped its own social and cultural patterns. More deeply influenced 
than Japan by Chinese culture, Korea adopted the Chinese model 
of monarchy and successive dynasties, rather than developing a 
single imperial line from its early tribal federations. Yet Korea re- 
tained its native preference for a strongly aristocratic social order 
based on hereditary lineages. Korea also served as one of several 
cultural bridges between its two regional neighbors, taking pride 
in passing along advanced Chinese political, philosophical, reli- 
gious, and literary ideas and models to what Koreans consistently 
perceived as a less well-developed Japan. 

Korea's geographic position often made it a focal point for re- 
gional conflict. Recovering from two Japanese invasions in the late 
sixteenth century and Manchu incursions several decades later, 
Korea's last traditional dynasty — the kingdom of Choson (1392- 
1910) — withdrew into self-protective isolation, stricdy regulating 
travel and commerce with Japan while maintaining its tributary 
status with China. This policy was increasingly challenged, how- 
ever, during the nineteenth century, when Western diplomats, 
traders, and adventurers sought to open all of East Asia, includ- 
ing what they termed the Korean "Hermit Kingdom," to 
European-style trade and diplomatic relations. In the end, Japan 
forced open the Korean door, imposing a Western-style "unequal 
treaty" on Korea in 1876. 

At the turn of the century, Korea was the object of two wars 
as China and Japan in turn fought to maintain footholds on the 
peninsula and to exclude a Russia keenly interested in Korea's 
warm- water ports. In the first half of the twentieth century, Korea 
was victimized by several decades of colonization by Japan 
(1910-45), becoming by the 1930s a stepping stone and industrial 
base for Japanese military expansion into Manchuria and north- 
ern China. Although many Koreans fought for independence from 
Japanese rule, Korea's liberation in 1945 was brought about not 
by Korean efforts but by the Allied victory over Japan and by the 
division of Korea into two zones of occupation by the United States 
and the Soviet Union. In the southern zone, the United States Army 
Military Government in Korea lasted for three years before the 
establishment of the Republic of Korea. South Korea's immedi- 
ate postwar fate was dominated not only by the Cold War antago- 
nism of the two great powers but also by seemingly irreconcilable 
political differences among Koreans themselves. Separate and an- 
tagonistic states controlled the two halves of the peninsula by 1948, 
setting the stage for the considerable civil conflict that led to the 
Korean War (1950-53). 



XXIV 



Given the tragic and bitter legacy of the loss of national indepen- 
dence under Japanese colonial rule, the experience of national par- 
tition in 1945, and the ensuing civil war, educational authorities 
in South Korea have emphasized areas of national identity in school- 
book treatments of Korean history and language. Despite many 
differences among South Koreans, this carefully nourished national 
consciousness centered perceptions on national independence and 
the place of Korea on the stage of world history. Such thinking 
underlies much of the vigorously pursued economic development 
of the past three decades and also carried on a long tradition of 
modern Korean thought. For example, after Japan seized control 
of Korean foreign relations and military affairs in 1905, Korean 
historian Ch'oe Nam-son compared the nation's parlous condition 
with the glories of ancient Korean dynasties and asked, "How long 
will it take us to accomplish the goal of flying our sacred national 
flag above the world? ' ' As energetic national preparations for the 
1988 Seoul Olympics — under the slogan "Korea to the world, the 
world to Korea" — demonstrated, toward the end of the century 
South Koreans still were striving for national success and an in- 
ternational reputation in response to that same impulse. 

South Korean urbanization — which increased by a rate of more 
than 4 percent annually during the 1960s and 1970s — continued 
at a slightly slower rate of 3 percent per year in the 1980s. Accord- 
ing to the 1990 census, Seoul was one of the world's largest cities. 
Its more than 10.6 million people accounted for almost one quarter 
of the country's 43.5 million people. The concentration of the popu- 
lation in Seoul prompted efforts by city planners to decentralize 
government and other functions by moving some ministries and 
agencies to Taejon. The growth of Seoul and other cities, although 
partly caused by interurban migration, also was accompanied by 
a reduction of the rural farming population, especially in the poorer 
areas of the southwest. This migration was reflected in Seoul by 
the numerous restaurants that offered regional specialties and by 
the electoral districts that produced bloc votes for presidential can- 
didates from one or another province in the December 1987 
presidential election. 

Another social change with political implications was the in- 
creased emphasis on higher education during the 1980s. When army 
General Chun Doo Hwan took power in 1980, he approved a plan 
to double college and university enrollments within four years. 
Perhaps, as some observers said, the change was intended to sub- 
merge traditional student protest in a sea of aspiring professionals 
and white-collar workers. Yet planners also knew that broader edu- 
cation was vital to continued economic growth, inasmuch as the 



xxv 



country's exports faced increasing competition from labor-rich 
Third World countries and Seoul sought to shift to knowledge- 
intensive and high-technology industries. By 1990, according to 
a Ministry of Education study, one South Korean in four was a 
student. The number of South Koreans in college by the late 1980s 
comprised some 35 percent of the relevant age-group, a higher per- 
centage than Japan or any country in the world except the United 
States and the Philippines. 

The changes in higher education corroded old political patterns 
and in several ways may have set the stage for the political and 
constitutional reforms of the late 1980s. With the spread of scien- 
tific and technical education and the continued growth of a new 
managerial elite, the military's claim — heard especially in the high- 
growth years of the 1960s and early 1970s — to managerial and tech- 
nical leadership became increasingly irrelevant. The more educated 
populace also seemed less tolerant of press censorship and other 
authoritarian practices. Meanwhile, increasing student enrollments 
and the consequent rise in the number of college graduates in the 
job pool created even greater discontent among many unemployed 
and underemployed graduates and provided a setting in which a 
small but increasingly radical student dissident movement — often 
financed with sizable student association fees — could find its voice. 

The steady modernization and urbanization of society were ac- 
companied by a continued growth in nostalgia for Korea's past. 
Even in the countryside, the 1980s saw a continuation of the late 
1970s revival of folk arts, often supported by generous government 
subsidies for regional festivals and * 'living cultural treasures" — 
experts in traditional technologies, crafts, and arts, such as architec- 
ture, temple painting, or traditional p 'ansori folk opera. Shaman- 
ism, ignored by modernizing elites in the 1950s and 1960s, was 
much more openly practiced in the 1970s and 1980s, when it was 
not unusual to see a new office building or major tourist hotel for- 
mally opened with shamanistic rites. Many urban professionals en- 
joyed taking their children to visit the Folk Village near Seoul where 
they could examine a well- scrubbed reconstruction of nineteenth- 
century country life and try to imagine a quieter, less hurried time. 
The revival of traditional culture in the 1970s and 1980s cut across 
class and political lines. It had a political dimension as well, seen 
both in dissident student adaptations of traditional anti- aristocratic 
mask dramas that lampooned the social and political establishment 
and in government promotion of school trips to the shrine of 
sixteenth-century naval hero Yi Sun- sin. 

Religious commitment was strong for many South Koreans, 
nearly half of whom were affiliated with an organized religious 



xxvi 



community in the 1980s. About 20 percent of the population was 
Buddhist, whereas a somewhat larger and more rapidly growing 
Christian community gave South Korea the second largest propor- 
tion of Christians in Asia, following the Philippines. Although con- 
servative on the whole, the country's Christian population also 
included some of the most active elements of the political dissident 
movement. 

Confucianism was dominant during the last dynasty (1392-1910) 
but declined in force as a political philosophy following the loss 
of independence to Japan in 1910. Nevertheless, it retained a lin- 
gering impact on social relations even in the early 1990s. Attempts 
to revive Confucian ethical values, whether through the Park Chung 
Hee government's campaign for filial piety and loyalty in the 1970s 
or in occasional public seminars or newspaper editorials through 
the early 1990s, reflected both a decline in the practice of Confu- 
cianism as a living creed and the feeling of many South Koreans 
that rapid modernization and the growth of materialism had created 
an ethical vacuum. 

Population policies begun in the 1960s continued their momen- 
tum through the 1980s. Tax and medical insurance benefits for 
smaller families, for example, provided additional incentives for 
family planning in the early 1980s. The government also distributed 
posters, such as one featuring an attractive young couple and the 
slogan, "Have one child and raise it well." The effect of such ef- 
forts continued to be felt in a decline in the number of primary 
and middle school students; the number of middle school students 
alone dropped by half a million during the 1980s. The success of 
the family planning program was suggested by the desire of other 
Asian countries to send officials to Seoul for training. 

As the number of births per couple reached 1 .9 in 1990, the popu- 
lation growth rate dropped to just over 0.9 percent from almost 
1.6 a decade earlier, causing the Economic Planning Board to 
predict serious labor shortages and to authorize importing increased 
numbers of foreign workers. Many factories already had been com- 
pensating for such shortfalls by hiring illegal immigrants (1,000 
such workers were deported in 1990), or by breaking prevailing 
patterns to hire married women in substantial numbers. By 1991 
South Koreans also were beginning to reflect on the social and policy 
implications of two emerging problems: a possible male-female im- 
balance by the end of the 1990s, resulting from a continuing prefer- 
ence for sons and use of family planning techniques; and projections 
of a steadily increasing proportion of elderly in the population over 
the coming two decades. 



xxvii 



South Korea's economic growth continued to be driven by the 
import of raw materials and semi-finished components (the latter 
proportionally declining in the late 1980s) and the export of finished 
industrial products. Manufacturing accounted for more than 30 
percent of the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary), aided 
by the rapid modernization of technology and the continuous rein- 
vestment of trade proceeds. By the end of the 1980s, the Republic 
of Korea was the world's tenth largest steel producer and had made 
major strides in mastering the production technologies required 
for the home electronics and semiconductor industries. South 
Korean-made televisions, personal computers, videocassette record- 
ers, and microwave ovens increasingly became known under their 
own brand names, although dependence on Japan for key compo- 
nents and some assembly production for Japanese companies also 
continued. 

The automotive industry gained a firmer footing under close 
government direction following overexpansion in the late 1970s. 
Most of the growth in the early 1980s was fueled by overseas sales, 
which began to boom in 1985, but also was stabilized by a rapidly 
growing domestic market by the end of the decade. Textiles and 
construction, both staples among the export industries in the 1970s, 
continued to play an important role through the 1980s. As South 
Korea's comparative advantage in labor became increasingly subject 
to challenge from developing economies in Asia and elsewhere, 
however, planners looked to even greater social investment in high- 
technology fields, such as materials science, biotechnology, elec- 
tronics, and aerospace, and to an economy that would become 
technology-intensive sometime during the 1990s. 

Growth in the service sector, comprising real estate, supply ser- 
vices, entertainment, the hotel industry, and other services, con- 
tinued in the late 1980s, outpacing increases in manufacturing. The 
number of workers in service industries increased by 8 percent be- 
tween 1988 and 1989, amounting to more than twice the rate of 
increase in manufacturing-sector employees during the same period. 
In the first half of 1990, the total number of workers in manufac- 
turing declined for the first time since the early 1960s. In 1990 the 
Economic Planning Board, concerned over this trend and a pro- 
jected shortfall of 69,000 new manufacturing workers for the year, 
announced its Industrial Manpower Supply Program. The pro- 
gram was designed to stem the exodus of skilled manpower from 
manufacturing industries by offering long-term workers preferred 
admission to college and university night-school programs. The 
government also prepared to use tax penalties and higher utility 
rates to slow the growth in what it viewed as unproductive " con- 
sumption industries." 



xxvin 



As South Korea continued to industrialize and urbanize during 
the 1980s, the agricultural sector drifted into stepchild status. Offi- 
cial support for rice prices dropped behind the rate of inflation in 
the mid-1980s as Seoul attempted to reduce government costs. 
Urban growth contributed to a series of problems. Young people 
were sent to the cities for education or left the farms to seek em- 
ployment and left behind a smaller and increasingly older farm 
population. Young bachelor farmers had greater difficulty in finding 
wives willing to undergo the rigors of rural life. Productivity gains 
failed to keep up with changes in population, leading to greater 
imports of wheat and soybeans. Rising land prices caused by the 
housing squeeze and commercial and industrial construction gave 
an impression of increased farmers' assets, even as modern 
machinery costs and increased use of consumer credit contributed 
to higher farm indebtedness. Tenancy increased from 21 percent 
to more than 30 percent during the decade, as urban investors and 
the larger scale farming encouraged by the government absorbed 
increasingly scarce and costly farm lands. Average farm incomes 
had fallen well below urban incomes by the end of the decade. By 
1 990 many farmers could agree with the statement of the founder 
of a matchmaking center for bachelor farmers that it was "time 
to turn the government's attention to farmers' life and welfare." 

Part of increasing farm indebtedness during the second half of 
the 1980s was used to finance consumer durables that brought farm 
families closer to national standards, even as the gap between rural 
and urban incomes was increasing. A 1990 report of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries indicated that more than 90 percent 
of rural households had refrigerators, electric rice cookers, and pro- 
pane gas ranges. Even more significant were major increases in 
rural ownership of consumer goods, such as telephones and color 
television sets, which served to link rural families with national and 
international developments and issues. Such linkage, in turn, may 
have contributed both to an increasing awareness of the growing 
rural-urban gap and to the politicization of farmers' movements 
in response to foreign pressures to liberalize agricultural markets. 

In political life, South Korea began the 1980s with an old pat- 
tern. For the third time in two decades, a military leader or former 
military leader declared a state of political crisis, rewrote the con- 
stitution, and drove prominent civilian politicians from govern- 
ment through farfetched legal charges or under the guise of 
"political purification." Re-elected president in electoral college 
voting in February 1981, former General Chun Doo Hwan con- 
solidated his control through dominance over the court system, use 



xxix 



of the state security apparatus, and tight restriction of the media. 
By the second half of the decade, however, Chun's government 
had lost considerable political capital. In the National Assembly 
elections of 1985, Chun's Democratic Justice Party was able to re- 
tain control of the legislature only through a system of proportion- 
ality that converted its scant 35 percent of the popular vote into 
54 percent of the seats. Polls taken in 1986 showed that only 41 
percent of people queried expressed confidence in political leaders 
and that less than 50 percent of respondents were satisfied with 
the kind of society in which they lived. Dissatisfaction with govern- 
ment control of the media was especially strong and was evident 
in newspaper editorials and a popular campaign to withhold pay- 
ment of compulsory viewers' fees to the state-run television network. 

The gradual reemergence of banned political figures, such as 
Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, began in 1985 and culmi- 
nated in the full restoration of political rights to all former politi- 
cians in a political compromise between the ruling and opposition 
political parties that followed severe civil disturbances in June 1987. 
Subsequent events marked a watershed in South Korean politics. 
First, the government removed virtually all restrictions on the 
media. Next, in late 1987, the Constitution was revised — the first 
constitutional revision since 1960 that was drafted through a process 
of multiparty discussions. The 1987 revision promised substantial 
changes in the unequal power relationships among the three 
branches of government that had prevailed at least since the in- 
ception of theyusin constitution in 1972. Under the new fundamen- 
tal law, the president lost the power to rule through emergency 
decrees and to dissolve the legislature. The National Assembly 
gained new rights to investigate state affairs, to hold longer an- 
nual sessions, and to approve Supreme Court appointments. These 
and other constitutional provisions pointed to more potential au- 
tonomy for the legislature, the court system, and for the constitu- 
tional review of legislation. 

The presidential election of December 1987 placed a former army 
general, Roh Tae Woo of the ruling Democratic Justice Party, in 
the Blue House, or presidential mansion. A minority president, 
he won only 36 percent of the votes cast. Kim Young Sam and 
Kim Dae Jung, who together accounted for 54 percent of the votes, 
accused Roh's party of election fraud, while apologizing to the pub- 
lic for their failure to agree between themselves on a unified oppo- 
sition candidacy. The charge of fraud on a scale great enough to 
have swung the election was undermined at the time by the frag- 
mentary and anecdotal evidence presented and by the insistence 
of each of the two Kims that he was the one who would have 



xxx 



prevailed in the absence of government misconduct. In 1990, 
however, the government admitted to one serious legal breach — 
the diversion of more than US$14 million dollars from the 1987 
national budget to support Roh's election campaign. For some ob- 
servers, it remained an open question whether other large-scale 
irregularities may have occurred, or what further steps the govern- 
ment might have taken to ensure victory had the two major oppo- 
sition candidates been unified. 

In the National Assembly elections held in April 1988, the rul- 
ing party lost a working majority for the first time in South Korea's 
history. The new balance of forces in the legislature made a re- 
ality of the separation of powers provided for in the new Constitu- 
tion when opposition assembly members joined forces to reject 
President Roh's first appointment for chief justice of the Supreme 
Court in the summer of 1988. Through the rest of 1988 and 1989, 
additional signs of the new order were seen in the distribution of 
committee chairmanships among the ruling and opposition par- 
ties and in the process of compromise, as floor leaders of the four 
principal parties periodically met to negotiate working agendas for 
the legislature and its committees. As 1989 ended, Roh's party was 
engaged in secret negotiations with two of the three opposition par- 
ties to bring this process of compromise under firmer control. 

As a result of these talks, Roh's party merged with Kim Young 
Sam's Reunification Democratic Party and Kim Chong-p'il's New 
Democratic Republican Party to create a new Democratic Liberal 
Party (DLP) in January 1990. Some observers likened the result- 
ing coalition to Japan's Liberal Democratic Party. Each of the 
former opposition party leaders clearly hoped to become an im- 
portant power broker within the ruling party and perhaps also to 
become the party's candidate for the 1992 presidential election. 

In the short term, the formation of the DLP provided the presi- 
dent with a substantial majority in the National Assembly, while 
politically isolating his most uncompromising political opponent, 
Kim Dae Jung. Seen in longer-term perspective, the merger cur- 
tailed the broader processes of compromise and cooperation in the 
National Assembly that had included even Kim's Party for Peace 
and Democracy (PPD) in 1988 and 1989. It further put the new 
ruling party in the awkward position of having to pass important 
legislation in the absence of opposition politicians, who boycotted 
the legislature on several occasions during 1990. The merger also 
complicated factional politics within the ruling party. 

Although politicians were permitted to change parties under the 
1987 Constitution and related laws, Kim Dae Jung immediately 
labelled the move a "coup d'etat against representative politics" 



xxxi 



and called, unsuccessfully, for new elections. A small number of 
legislators from Kim Young Sam's party also objected to the new 
super-party and eventually formed the small Democratic Party. 
Kim Dae Jung's isolated Party for Peace and Democracy spent 
much of 1990 and early 1991 fulminating against the DLP and 
attempting to embarrass the government politically by boycotting 
National Assembly sessions or attempting to resign. The disengage- 
ment of the PPD often seemed to leave it marginalized and unable 
to contribute to major legislation or even to influence issues in which 
it had an immediate political interest, such as the scheduling of 
small district local elections in March 1991 . Awareness of the costs 
of intransigence may have prompted a more moderate approach 
in the second half of 1991. In private talks with President Roh in 
September, Kim Dae Jung successfully lobbied for several regional 
development projects in the Cholla region. 

By mid- 1991 the DLP coalition was beginning to show signs of 
strain, brought about by differences over questions such as the tim- 
ing of the upcoming 1992 presidential and National Assembly elec- 
tions and disagreement over how the party's presidential candidate 
would be chosen. On most such issues, Kim Chong-p'il and Presi- 
dent Roh formed a mini-coalition within the party, opposed by 
Kim Young Sam and his followers. Competition for the party's 
presidential nomination reintensified after National Assembly elec- 
tions in March 1992, in which the DLP won slightly less than 50 
percent of the seats. The DLP was able to recover a bare majority 
by absorbing several members who had run as independents. 

Kim Dae Jung's party encountered major defeats in local 
elections in March and June 1991 . It subsequently absorbed small 
numbers of opposition lawmakers, becoming in turn the New 
Democratic Party and finally, under Kim's joint leadership with 
Yi Ki-t'aek, the Democratic Party (DP) in September. The DP, 
which included some members from outside the Cholla region, con- 
tinued to fight the ruling DLP across a variety of issues, including 
tax and budget policy, hyperinflation in urban land prices, and 
corruption. Like the Kim Young Sam faction within the DLP, the 
DP opposed possible revision of the Constitution to create a 
parliamentary system of government. In National Assembly elec- 
tions in March 1992, the DP won a respectable 31.1 percent of 
the seats. 

Outside the world of the parties, other features of political life 
changed during the 1980s. Professional associations and interest 
groups, long under the domination of the state, began to strive for 
more autonomy. Farmers' associations — traditionally little more 
than mechanisms for communicating government policies — began 



xxxn 



to proliferate and to protest trade liberalization measures. Profes- 
sional associations of university teachers, journalists, and lawyers 
also became increasingly outspoken on political issues. The major 
business conglomerates — chaebol — sought a greater role in economic 
policy formation. The voices of industrial associations were heard 
more clearly as the respective economic ministries began to gain 
influence within a less centralized state planning structure. At the 
fringes of politics, an extremist wing of the leftist student move- 
ment conducted sporadic violence through the 1980s. The violence 
peaked in dozens of arson or Molotov cocktail assaults against 
government offices, commercial establishments, police boxes, and 
United States diplomatic and cultural facilities in late 1988 and 
1989. 

South Korea's diplomacy during the 1980s, while remaining 
oriented toward the West, also aggressively pursued closer ties with 
China, the Soviet Union, and East European countries. Trade with 
these countries, obscured by Seoul's nonpublication of the rele- 
vant import-export statistics, continued to grow throughout the de- 
cade, and was matched by a variety of other contacts, culminating 
in the participation of the Soviet Union, China, and all the major 
East European countries in the 1988 Seoul Olympics. These ef- 
forts, which South Korea termed pukpang chongch'aek, meaning 
"Nordpolitik" or northern policy, were intended to diversify the 
country's global trade relations and to give Seoul greater leverage 
in its difficult relationship with the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea (North Korea). 

Seoul's northern policy alone would probably have accomplished 
little without the dramatic liberalizing reforms in East European 
countries, which made it possible for South Korea to establish diplo- 
matic relations with all nations of Eastern Europe by the end of 
the 1980s. The opening of diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union in September 1990 followed a series of high-level bilateral 
meetings in 1989 and early 1990. 

South Korea's two-way trade with communist countries increased 
by one-third in 1990 to reach an estimated US$5.6 billion. Increased 
trade relations with the Soviet Union followed closely on the heels 
of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, driven by Moscow's perception that 
South Korea could play an important role in the development of 
the Soviet Far East. As with other East European countries, South 
Korea's exports to the Soviet Union were heavily concentrated in 
electrical and electronic appliances. During 1990 and early 1991, 
news of bilateral exchanges, civil aviation agreements, and pend- 
ing commercial deals between the chaebol and the Soviet Union filled 
the South Korean press. By the end of 1991 , South Korea had paid 



xxxiii 



or approved slightly more than half of a promised US$3 billion 
package of loans, commodity credits, and project assistance to the 
Soviet Union, and it was expected that Seoul's aid program would 
continue with the new Commonwealth of Independent States. 

Trade with China, which began with quiet transactions in the 
late 1970s, was estimated to have reached US$1 billion in 1985 
and more than US$5 billion in 1991 . The importance of the Seoul- 
Beijing economic relationship was demonstrated in the establish- 
ment of trade offices with limited consular functions in the two cap- 
itals in October 1991 and a trade agreement two months later, in 
which South Korea and China exchanged most-favored-nation sta- 
tus. The political component in such trade remained prominent, 
as evidenced in Seoul's tolerance for sustained balance of payments 
deficits. In the case of trade with China, such deficits grew from 
US$1.2 billion in 1989 to a projected US$2 billion for 1991. 

Probably because China remained more sensitive than the Soviet 
Union to North Korea's reactions, progress in moving toward diplo- 
matic relations between Seoul and Beijing was slower than the 
moves establishing formal trade ties. In the mid-1980s, the two 
countries had increased quasi-diplomatic contacts to include a num- 
ber of negotiations to resolve a series of sea and air incidents, and 
China permitted South Korea's attendance at international con- 
ferences and meetings of United Nations organizations in China. 
The two countries also participated jointly in a variety of athletic 
competitions and sports exchanges. In September 1990, China ex- 
tended courtesy diplomatic status to South Korean athletic offi- 
cials attending the Asian Games in Beijing; and by mutual 
agreement senior diplomats in the trade representative offices held 
formal diplomatic immunities and privileges under the Vienna Con- 
vention, reportedly performing consular as well as commercial 
duties. Beijing sent a vice foreign minister to the Seoul meeting 
of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific in April 1991; South Korean-Chinese discussions 
during the meeting provided the highest level official contact to 
that date between the two countries. In May 1991, when it be- 
came clear that China would no longer support its North Korean 
ally by vetoing South Korea's membership in the United Nations, 
some observers believed that the two countries had moved even 
closer to establishing formal diplomatic ties. 

Over the past two decades, South Korea's relations with North 
Korea have been characterized by alternating periods of tension 
and dialogue. A joint communique issued by the two countries on 
July 4, 1972, agreed to continue discussions concerning political 
and military questions and confidence-building measures to be 



xxxiv 



implemented through a North-South Coordinating Committee and 
Red Cross channels. Through the 1970s, however, further discus- 
sions stalled as each side reaffirmed its position in an effort to claim 
and retain the initiative and to deny legitimacy to the other side. 

In early 1980, the two countries for the first time referred to each 
other by their official names and agreed to work toward prime 
ministers' talks. By the following year, negotiations stalled again 
after P'yongyang made a number of political demands on the Chun 
Doo Hwan government — including withdrawal of United States 
troops from South Korea — as a precondition for further talks and 
also sponsored an abortive attempt to have Chun assassinated by 
two Canadian gangsters. A second attempt — a bombing in October 
1983 — failed to kill the South Korean president but killed four cabi- 
net ministers and thirteen other officials during a state visit to Ran- 
goon, Burma. In 1984 Seoul rejected Pyongyang's proposals for 
three-way talks that would have included Washington but excluded 
South Korea from key discussions on military topics. Bilateral dis- 
cussions during the same year concerning a joint Olympics team 
failed to achieve results in time for the Los Angeles Olympics in 
July. 

After South Korean acceptance of North Korean rice, cement, 
and medicine for southern flood victims in September 1984, the 
two sides conducted talks and some exchanges on a range of issues 
for a sixteen-month period through early 1986. These discussions 
in the mid-1980s were sometimes acrimonious and frequently in- 
terrupted, each side presenting proposals, as one observer noted, 
that almost seemed intended to provoke rejection by the other or 
to play to the galleries of world opinion. In retrospect, however, 
it can be seen that the mid-1980s discussions were successful in 
establishing institutions for dialogue on both sides and in laying 
down multiple channels of contact and communication that con- 
tinued to function through the early 1990s. 

A series of talks to reunite families separated by national divi- 
sion and the war took dozens of Red Cross representatives and even 
more journalists from each side across the Demarcation Line dur- 
ing three visits in 1984. In September 1985, several dozen North 
Koreans and South Koreans met with separated family members, 
and a similar number of folk art performers from each side gave 
concerts in the two capitals. 

In the area of economic cooperation, vice-ministerial level con- 
ferences met at P'anmunjom on a number of occasions during 1984 
and 1985, exploring for the first time specific trade, transporta- 
tion, and other joint projects. South Korean and North Korean 
legislators met twice in July 1985 to explore political issues. Bilateral 



XXXV 



discussions began in 1984 concerning a North Korean proposal 
to cohost the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. After an interlude fol- 
lowing the North Korean bombing of a South Korean airliner over 
the Andaman Sea in November 1987, Olympic talks continued 
through mid- 1988, when they broke down in disagreement over 
the number of games to be hosted in P'yongyang. 

The two Koreas continued to talk past each other concerning 
broader political issues during much of 1988 and 1989. President 
Ron's July 1988 proposal for freer contacts and expanded exchanges 
between the two Koreas and the eventual establishment of a Korean 
commonwealth was met with North Korean reiteration of Kim II 
Sung's 1972 proposal for a transitional Democratic Confederal 
Republic of Korea. Meanwhile, Seoul began to disclose the exis- 
tence of a quiet trade relationship between the two countries and 
in early 1989 allowed a major industrialist to travel to P'yongyang 
to discuss additional forms of economic cooperation. North Korea 
generally welcomed these steps but also continued to demand abro- 
gation of South Korea's National Security Act, under which Seoul 
prosecuted several unauthorized South Korean travellers to North 
Korea. 

An important breakthrough in relations between the two Koreas 
began in 1990, which saw the beginning of a series of prime 
ministerial talks. Held alternately in Seoul and P'yongyang, these 
garnered substantial publicity but little progress until mid- 1991, 
when it became clear that Seoul had won China's support for its 
plan to have both Koreas simultaneously admitted to the United 
Nations. That event took place in September. During the fourth 
round of prime ministers' talks in P'yongyang in October, the two 
Koreas agreed to work on a nonaggression accord. This document, 
the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchange and 
Cooperation, was signed in Seoul on December 13, 1991. It took 
effect in mid- February 1992, at the time of the sixth round of prime 
ministerial talks in P'yongyang. In late December 1991, the two 
Koreas signed a separate agreement barring either side from hav- 
ing or using nuclear weapons. 

Although the new agreement was in itself a landmark, observers 
noted that it was essentially a promissory note, in which the two 
Koreas pledged to cease negative actions toward each other and to 
continue to work toward resolution of several important issues. These 
issues included a declaration of nonaggression, a separate peace 
treaty, and measures to promote free travel and correspondence. 
The question of mutual inspection of nuclear facilities, which South 
Korea held to be of overriding importance, still was being discussed 
by working-level negotiators in late March 1992. 



xxxvi 



South Korea's relationship with the United States increasingly 
was focused on bilateral economic issues, spurred by a current ac- 
count surplus that began in the mid-1980s and increasing United 
States pressures to open South Korean markets for agricultural and 
industrial products as well as telecommunications and finance ser- 
vices. These issues posed a problem not only for South Korean 
diplomacy, but also contributed to often tumultuous domestic criti- 
cism of Seoul whenever it appeared to show signs of weakness in 
negotiations with Washington. 

An important issue in South Korean-United States relations dur- 
ing the 1980s was the joint security relationship. This relationship 
not only encompassed technical issues such as the size, composi- 
tion, financial support, and legal status of United States forces sta- 
tioned in South Korea, but also included a psychological dimension 
because of the popularly perceived role of the joint United States- 
Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command in the brutal kill- 
ings of civilians in Kwangju in May 1980 during the coup d'etat 
of Chun Doo Hwan. Facts surrounding the Kwangju incident — 
deliberately distorted under Chun Doo Hwan's martial law 
authorities — remained unclarified until the United States govern- 
ment issued a detailed statement on the subject in 1989. The state- 
ment, prepared in response to a South Korean National Assembly 
query, showed that the United States had not approved the coup 
and that the troops used in Kwangju in 1980 were not under oper- 
ational control of the Combined Forces Command but had taken 
their orders from South Korean army authorities under General 
Chun. 

The Korean War permanently enhanced the role of the mili- 
tary in South Korean society and politics as well as in the defense 
of the nation. Although South Korean military officers did not seek 
to intervene actively in politics under the rule of President Syng- 
man Rhee (1948-60), the coups d'etat of generals Park Chung Hee 
in 1961 and Chun Doo Hwan in 1980 demonstrated that some ele- 
ments in the army believed that the nation's security demanded 
periodic corrections in the course of politics as well as prepared- 
ness against North Korea. The army's influence on society and 
politics during the 1980s continued to be seen in the laws that 
prevented the news media from freely covering political-military 
issues, mandatory student participation in the college-level Stu- 
dent Defense Corps, the custom of preferential placement of re- 
tired senior officers in the civil service and in state-run corporations, 
and in the frequent practice of punitively drafting students expelled 
for demonstrating against the government. At an even broader level, 
harsh discipline within the military probably provided the most 



xxxvn 



significant political socialization for the more than 75 percent of 
South Korean males who served in the regular army, the reserves, 
or the Homeland Reserve Force. 

Many of these practices were the subject of reforms outlined in 
the Ministry of National Defense White Paper in 1988, when the 
Roh administration abolished the Student Defense Corps and made 
efforts to standardize conscription practices and to provide some 
protection to the rights of recruits. As opinion surveys conducted 
in 1990 indicated, however, the public continued to support re- 
forms that would improve conditions of service, eliminate preferen- 
tial placement of retired military officers in the civil service, and 
move military installations away from populated areas. In the same 
year, the government promulgated additional regulations intended 
to reduce the more severe aspects of military life and protect the 
basic rights of recruits. 

As the 1990s began, however, some observers believed that 
change in many military practices would come slowly. One of the 
most outspoken criticisms, voiced in a South Korean army publi- 
cation in 1990, was by an army major general who charged that 
"a trend characterized by assaults, abusive language and torture 
prevails in the barracks." He called upon the army to reform it- 
self to regain the trust of the public. The charges were given addi- 
tional credence two months later when a former marine corps officer 
was convicted on charges of torturing a subordinate. In October 
1990, the minister of national defense was relieved of his position 
after a former undercover agent of the Defense Security Command 
disclosed that the military counterintelligence organization had con- 
tinued to maintain dossiers and conduct surveillance on some 1 ,300 
prominent civilians, including politicians, clergymen, and jour- 
nalists. The government pledged its efforts to return the Defense 
Security Command to its original function. The following year, 
however, the government admitted as true new media charges that 
the DSC was investigating several student activists. 

Under President Chun Doo Hwan's force modernization pro- 
gram, military spending increased dramatically during the 1980s, 
exceeding estimated North Korean military spending during most 
of the decade and nearly doubling to US$10 billion a year by 1990. 
As a result of improvements in the defense industrial base that began 
in the mid-1970s, 70 percent of the equipment and weaponry used 
by the armed forces was being produced by domestic defense in- 
dustries by the late 1980s. 

At the end of the 1980s, the armed forces numbered about 
650,000. The army continued to divide responsibilities among three 
commands. The First Army and the Third Army defended the 



xxxviii 



country from the threat of North Korean attack in their positions 
along the Demilitarized Zone. The Second Army, positioned well 
south of Seoul, was charged with logistical and training responsi- 
bilities and managing the military reserve system. Some of the coun- 
try's forward defense was also provided by the marine corps, which 
was charged with defense of the Han River estuary and five is- 
lands located close to North Korea. Specialized army units, such 
as the Capital Defense Command, defended the seat of govern- 
ment, while the Defense Security Command in Seoul was respon- 
sible for military counterintelligence and monitoring politics within 
and outside of the military. 

The air force expanded its fighter squadrons during the 1980s, 
operating almost 700 combat, transport, and training aircraft under 
its three commands. In wartime, it assumed control of civilian air- 
ports and sections of major highways adapted for use as runways. 
During the 1980s, the air force added the F-16 and the Republic 
of Korea-United States coproduced F-5 to its fighter inventory. 
The smaller navy also modernized during the decade, focusing on 
antisubmarine warfare and the deployment of new, domestically 
produced submarines, frigates, fast-attack craft, and patrol boats. 

In 1 990 Roh moved the headquarters of the army and air force 
(with navy to follow) to Taejon in an effort to promote more effec- 
tive interservice cooperation and more efficient command and con- 
trol of the armed forces during wartime. In that same year, the 
armed forces began a three- to five-year plan to reorganize the com- 
mand structure. Under the Armed Forces Organization Act passed 
in July and promulgated in October, the joint chiefs of staff sys- 
tem in use since the Korean War would be replaced with a more 
centralized Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters in which operational 
control of the military forces would be centralized in the hands of 
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The new Joint Chiefs 
of Staff structure was designed to give Seoul a wartime command 
structure separate from the United States-Republic of Korea Com- 
bined Forces Command. 

Fundamental to the restructuring was the separation of the oper- 
ational and administrative functions immediately below the minister 
of national defense. Under the reorganization, which took effect 
on Armed Forces Day, October 1, 1990, the minister of national 
defense defined military policy, consolidated planning, and allo- 
cated resources. The newly invigorated Joint Chiefs of Staff had 
the authority to employ military units of all the military services, 
including task forces organization for joint operations. Unified oper- 
ations, strategic planning, intelligence, and logistic directorates con- 
solidated functions previously controlled by the separate services, 



xxxix 



and the service headquarters were reduced to maintenance, sup- 
port, logistics, personnel, and administrative functions. The ser- 
vices were to have reduced intelligence organizations, but most of 
their intelligence assets were to be transferred to the newly created 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Defense Intelligence Command. 

The 45,000 United States troops in Korea in 1990 included a 
small contingent at P'anmunjom with the United Nations Com- 
mand, some 32,000 United States Army members under the Eighth 
Army, and 12,000 United States Air Force personnel under the 
Seventh Air Force. Military issues relating to the Combined Forces 
Command and other topics were discussed in annual bilateral Secu- 
rity Consultative Meetings and in other joint talks. In April 1990, 
the United States Department of Defense announced a program 
to shift gradually the United States military presence in South Korea 
to a smaller and more supportive role as international political con- 
ditions and strengthened South Korean defense capabilities per- 
mitted. As part of this program, the United States and South Korea 
also agreed to disband the United States-Republic of Korea Com- 
bined Field Army and to separate the Ground Component Com- 
mand from the Combined Forces Command during the 1991-93 
period. The two countries further agreed to appoint a South Korean 
senior officer as commander of the Ground Component Command 
and to replace the senior member of the United Nations Command 
to the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) — who had been a 
United States officer since the signing of the armistice in 1953 — with 
a South Korean general. The appointment of a South Korean army 
major general to the senior MAC position was made in March 1991 . 

At the twenty-second Security Consultative Meeting in Novem- 
ber 1990, Seoul agreed to increase its financial support for United 
States forces stationed in South Korea from US$2.7 billion in 1990 
to US$2.8 billion the following year. This figure includes valua- 
tions for contributions in real estate, logistics support, discounted 
costs, and tax. Other issues discussed included Seoul's requests for 
eased United States restrictions on its exports of coproduced mili- 
tary hardware and improved terms for United States Foreign Mili- 
tary Sales to South Korea. Discussions also occurred concerning 
possible reductions in the Team Spirit exercise scheduled for 1991, 
in part because of United States military commitments in the Per- 
sian Gulf and in part because of budgetary reasons. The exercise 
was reduced in scale in 1990 and 1991 and cancelled in 1992 

In January 1991, South Korea and the United States signed an 
amended Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) governing the legal 
position of United States forces in South Korea. This agreement, the 
first major revision of the 1966 SOFA, expanded Seoul's criminal 



xl 



jurisdiction over United States personnel. Other provisions of the 
agreement concerned customs procedures and the disposition of 
property no longer used by United States forces in South Korea. 

In 1991 President Bush announced that the United States would 
withdraw its nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula, and later 
in the year, in a statement accepted by United States authorities, 
President Roh Tae Woo declared that the country was free of such 
weapons. In 1989 the United States had stated that North Korea 
had a plutonium reprocessing facility theoretically capable of sup- 
porting nuclear weapons development. By mid- 1991, United States, 
Japanese, and South Korean estimates held that North Korea was 
much closer to producing a nuclear weapon than previously real- 
ized. By the end of the year, North Korea, which had signed the 
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1985, still 
had not set a date for on-site inspections of nuclear facilities by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency. In the joint statement 
issued after the close of the twenty-third United States-Republic 
of Korea Security Consultative Meeting in November 1991, both 
countries declared that they had "agreed to postpone the second 
stage reduction of United States forces in Korea until such time 
as the North Korean threat and uncertainties of developing nuclear 
weapons have disappeared and the security in this region is fully 
guaranteed." This fact meant that withdrawals would stop once 
United States forces were drawn down to the 36,000 target for stage 
one. It was also confirmed at the meeting that the United States- 
Republic of Korea Combined Field Army would be dissolved and 
that a Korean general would be made Combined Forces Command 
ground component commander in 1992, further decreasing the 
United States profile. 



March 31, 1992 William Shaw 



xli 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




Panghwasuru Pavilion, port of Suwon Castle 



A SMALL COUNTRY, approximately the size of Britain, Korea 
is located on a peninsula that protrudes southward from the north- 
eastern corner of the Asian continent. It is an old country, whose 
people evolved as one nation from the seventh century until 1945, 
when the country was divided by the United States and the Soviet 
Union at the end of World War II. The ensuing cold war created 
two Korean governments, one in the north known as the Demo- 
cratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and another in the south 
known as the Republic of Korea (ROK). The two Koreas engaged 
in a bitter war between 1950 and 1953 and remained divided as 
of 1990, even though the two governments began to talk to each 
other in 1971. 

South Korea and North Korea took distinctly different paths of 
development after they were divided. By 1990 North Korea had 
emerged as a staunch communist society, while South Korea was 
evolving into a liberal democracy after many years of military dic- 
tatorship. The two societies, however, shared a common tradition 
and culture. 

Origins of the Korean Nation 

As is true of all countries, Korea's geography was a major fac- 
tor in shaping its history; geography also influenced the manner 
in which the inhabitants of the peninsula emerged as a people shar- 
ing the common feeling of being Koreans (see Physical Environ- 
ment, ch. 2). The Korean Peninsula protrudes southward from 
the northeastern corner of the Asian continent and is surrounded 
on three sides by large expanses of water. Although Japan is not 
far from the southern tip of this landmass, in ancient times events 
on the peninsula were affected far more by the civilizations and 
political developments on the contiguous Asian continent than by 
those in Japan (see fig. 1). 

Because the Yalu and Tumen rivers have long been recognized 
as the border between Korea and China, it is easy to assume that 
these rivers have always constituted Korea's northern limits. But 
such was not the case in the ancient period. Neither of the rivers 
was considered to be sacrosanct by the ancient tribes that dotted 
the plains of Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula. Because the 
rivers freeze in the winter, large armies were able to traverse them 
with ease. Even when the rivers were not frozen, armies equipped 
with iron tools could easily build ships to cross them. 



3 



South Korea: A Country Study 

The Korean people trace their origins to the founding of the state 
of Choson. Choson rose on the banks of the Taedong River in the 
northwestern corner of the peninsula and prospered as a civiliza- 
tion possessing a code of law and a bronze culture. The Choson 
people gradually extended their influence not only over other tribes 
in the vicinity, but also to the north, conquering most of the Liao- 
dong Basin. However, the rising power of the feudal state of Yen 
in northern China (1122-225 B.C.) not only checked Choson's 
growth, but eventually pushed it back to the territory south of the 
Ch'ongch'on River, located midway between the Yalu and Taedong 
rivers. The Chinese had discovered iron by this time and used it 
extensively in farming and warfare; the Choson people were not 
able to match them. Yen became established in the territory vacated 
by Choson. 

Meanwhile, much of what subsequentiy came to constitute China 
proper had been unified for the first time under Qin Shi Huangdi. 
Subsequently, Yen fell to the Qin state; the Qin Dynasty (221-207 
B.C.) was in turn replaced by a new dynasty, the Han (206 B.C. - 
A.D. 220). In 195 B.C. a former officer of Yen took over the throne 
of Choson by trickery, after which he and his descendants ruled 
the kingdom for eighty years; but in 109-108 B.C. China attacked 
Choson and destroyed it as a political entity. The Han Chinese 
then ruled the territory north of the Han River as the Four Eastern 
Districts; the original territory of Choson became Lolang (or Nang- 
nang in Korean). (North Korean historians have argued that the 
Lolang District was located more to the northwest of the Korean 
Peninsula, perhaps near Beijing. This theory, however, has not 
been universally accepted.) Until the Han period, the Korean 
Peninsula had been a veritable Chinese colony. During some 400 
years, Lolang, the core of the colony, had become a great center 
of Chinese art, philosophy, industry, and commerce. Many Chinese 
immigrated into the area; the influence of China extended 
beyond the territory it administered. The tribal states south of the 
Han River paid tribute to the Chinese and patterned much of their 
civilization and government after Chinese models. 

The Three Kingdoms Period 

The territory south of the Han River is relatively distant from 
the Asian continent; hence, the people living there were initially 
able to develop independently, without much involvement with 
events on the continent. The early settlers of this region gradually 
organized themselves into some seventy clan states that were in 
turn grouped into three tribal confederations known as Chinhan, 
Mahan, and Pyonhan. Chinhan was situated in the middle part of 



4 



Historical Setting 



the peninsula, Mahan in the southwest, and Pyonhan in the 
southeast. Their economies were predominantly agricultural, and 
their level of development was such that they built reservoirs and 
irrigation facilities. These tribal states began to be affected by what 
was happening in the region north of the Han River around the 
first century B.C. 

About the middle of the third century A.D., the Chinese threat 
began to serve as a unifying political force among the loose con- 
federations of tribes in the southern part of the peninsula. Adopt- 
ing the Chinese political system as a model, the tribes eventually 
merged into two kingdoms, thereby increasing their chances of sur- 
vival against Chinese expansionism. The two kingdoms eventually 
came to play an important role in Korean history. 

Geographic features of the southern parts of the land, in partic- 
ular the configuration of mountain ranges, caused two kingdoms 
to emerge rather than one. In the central part of Korea, the main 
mountain range, the T'aebaek Range, runs north to south along 
the edge of the Sea of Japan, which lies off the east coast of the 
peninsula. Approximately three-fourths of the way down the penin- 
sula, however, at roughly the thirty- seventh parallel, the moun- 
tain range veers southwest, dividing the peninsula almost in the 
middle. This extension, the Sobaek Range, proved politically sig- 
nificant; the tribes west of it were not shielded by any natural bar- 
riers against the Chinese-occupied portion of the peninsula, whereas 
those to the southeast were protected. Moreover, the presence of 
the mountains prevented the tribes in the two regions from estab- 
lishing close contacts. 

The tribal states in the southwest were the first to unite, calling 
their centralized kingdom Paekche. This process occurred in the 
mid-third century A.D., after the Chinese army of the Wei Dy- 
nasty (A.D. 220-65), which controlled Lolang, threatened the tribes 
in A.D. 245. The Silla Kingdom evolved in the southeast. Silla 
historians traced the kingdom's origin to 57 B.C., but contemporary 
historians regard King Naemul (A.D. 356-402) as having been the 
earliest ruler. Some of the tribal states in the area of the lower Nak- 
tong River, along the south central coast of the peninsula, did not 
join either of these kingdoms. Under the name Kaya, they formed 
a league of walled city-states that conducted extensive coastal trade 
and also maintained close ties with the tribal states in western Japan. 
Sandwiched between the more powerful Silla and Paekche, Kaya 
eventually was absorbed by its neighbors during the sixth century 
(see fig. 2). 

The northern kingdom of Koguryo emerged from among the 
indigenous people along the banks of the Yalu River. The Han 



5 



South Korea: A Country Study 




ca. A.D. 475 


ca. A.D. 575 


— — — Kingdom boundary 


50 100 150 Kilometers 


• Populated place 


25 50 100 150 Miles 



Figure 2. Korea During the Three Kingdoms Period, Fifth to Sixth Cen- 
turies A.D. 



Chinese seized the area in 108 B.C., but from the beginning 
Chinese rulers confronted many uprisings against their rule. Start- 
ing from a point along the Hun River (a tributary of the Yalu), 
the rebels expanded their activities to the north, south, and 
southeast, increasingly menacing Chinese authority. By A.D. 53 
Koguryo had coalesced into an independent centralized kingdom; 
the subsequent fall of the Han Dynasty and ensuing political divi- 
sions in China enabled Koguryo to consolidate and extend its power. 
Despite repeated attacks by Chinese and other opposition forces, 
by 391 the kingdom's rulers had achieved undisputed control of 
all of Manchuria east of the Liao River as well as of the northern 
and central regions of the Korean Peninsula. Koguryo 's best-known 
ruler, King Kwanggaet'o — whose name literally means "broad ex- 
pander of territory" — lived to be only thirty-nine years of age, but 
reigned twenty-one years, from 391 to 412. During that period, 
Kwanggaet'o conquered 65 walled cities and 1,400 villages, in ad- 
dition to aiding Silla when it was attacked by the Japanese. His 
accomplishments are recorded on a monument erected in 414 in 
southern Manchuria. Koguryo moved its capital to P'yongyang in 
427 and ruled the territory north of the Han River. But Koguryo 's 



6 



Historical Setting 



expansion caused it to come into conflict with the Sui Dynasty of 
China (581-617) in the west and Silla, which was beginning to ex- 
pand northward, in the south. 

Although Koguryo had been strong enough to repulse the forces 
of the Sui Dynasty, combined attacks by Silla and the Tang Dy- 
nasty of China (618-907) proved too formidable. Koguryo' s ally 
in the southwest, Paekche, fell before Tang and Silla in 660; the 
victorious allies continued their assault on Koguryo for the next 
eight years and eventually vanquished the weary kingdom, which 
had been suffering from a series of famines and internal strife. 

Silla thus unified Korea in 668, but the kingdom's reliance on 
China's Tang Dynasty had its price. Eventually Silla had to forcibly 
resist the imposition of Chinese rule over the entire peninsula, which 
Silla' s rulers did, but their strength did not extend beyond the Tae- 
dong River. Much of the former Koguryo territory was given up 
to the Chinese and to other tribal states. It remained for later dy- 
nasties to push the border northward to the Yalu and Tumen rivers. 

The Evolution of Korean Society 

After the Three Kingdoms period, Korea witnessed the rise and 
fall of three dynasties— unified Silla (668-935), Koryo (918-1392), 
and Choson (1392-1910). Each of these dynasties was marked by 
initial periods of consolidation, the flourishing of civilization, and 
eventual decline. 

Silla 

The first 215 years of the Silla Dynasty were marked by the estab- 
lishment of new political, legal, and education institutions of con- 
siderable vigor. Domestic and foreign trade (with Tang China and 
Japan) prospered. Scholarship in Confucian learning, mathematics, 
astronomy, and medicine also flourished. Buddhism, introduced to 
the peninsula in A.D. 372, reached its zenith (see Religion, ch. 2). 

Silla began to decline, however, in the latter part of the eighth 
century when rebellions began to shake its foundations. By the latter 
half of the ninth century, two rivals had emerged. The chaotic sit- 
uation eventually led to the emergence of a new Koryo Dynasty 
in 918 under a former officer, Wang Kon. 

KoryO 

The founder of Koryo and his heirs consolidated control over 
the peninsula and strengthened its political and economic founda- 
tions by more closely following the bureaucratic and land- grant 
systems of Tang China. The rise of the Kitan Liao tribe in the 
north, however, threatened the new dynasty. The Liao invaded 



7 



South Korea: A Country Study 

in 1010; Koryo was engulfed in devastating wars for a decade. After 
peace was restored, Koryo' s inhabitants witnessed nearly a century 
of thriving commercial, intellectual, and artistic activities parallel 
to those taking place under the Song Dynasty (960-1279) in China. 
The Koryo leaders actively sought to imitate the Song's advanced 
culture and technology. In turn, the Song looked upon Koryo as 
a potential ally against the tribal invaders to whom it had been 
forced to abandon northern China in 1127. Stimulated by the rise 
of printing in Song China, Koryo also made great headway in print- 
ing and publication, leading to the invention of movable metal type 
in 1234, two centuries before the introduction of movable type in 
Europe. 

By the twelfth century, Koryo was plagued by internal and ex- 
ternal problems. Power struggles and avariciousness among the 
ruling classes led to revolts by their subjects. The situation was ag- 
gravated by the rise in the north of the Mongols, who launched 
a massive invasion in 1231. The Koryo armies put up fierce 
resistance but were no match for the highly organized mounted 
troops from the north, whose forces swept most of the Eurasian 
continent during this period. 

The Mongol Empire under Khubilai Khan enlisted Koryo in 
its expeditions against Japan, mustering thousands of Korean men 
and ships for ill-fated invasions in 1274 and 1281 . In each instance, 
seasonal typhoons shattered the Mongol-Koryo fleets, giving rise 
to the myth of kamikaze, or the " divine wind." Korea, in the mean- 
time, was completely under Mongol domination. Koryo kings mar- 
ried Mongol princesses. Only in the early fourteenth century, when 
the Mongol Empire began to disintegrate and the Ming Dynasty 
(1368-1644) — founded by a former Chinese peasant — pushed the 
Mongols back to the north, did Koryo regain its independence. 
In 1359 and 1361, however, Koryo suffered invasions by a large 
number of Chinese rebel armies, known as the Red Banner Ban- 
dits, who sacked and burned the capital at Kaesong, just north of 
the mouth of the Han River. The country was left in ruins. 

As the Mongols retreated to the north and the Ming established 
a garrison in the northeastern part of the Korean Peninsula, the 
Koryo court was torn between pro-Ming and pro-Mongol factions. 
General Yi Song-gye, who had been sent to attack the Ming forces 
in the Liaodong region of Manchuria, revolted at the Yalu and 
turned his army against his own capital, seizing it with ease. Yi took 
the throne in 1392, founding Korea's most enduring dynasty. The 
new state was named Choson, the same name used by the first 
Korean kingdom fifteen centuries earlier, although the later entity 



8 



Fifth- or sixth- century gold 
crown excavated from a 
Silla Dynasty tomb 
Courtesy Embassy of the 
Republic of Korea, Washington 



usually has been called simply the Choson Dynasty or the Yi Dy- 
nasty. The capital of Choson was at Seoul. 

The ChosOn Dynasty 

The Koryo Dynasty had suffered from a number of internal 
problems; Yi and his followers implemented drastic reforms to place 
the new dynasty on firmer ground. One of these problems revolved 
around the deterioration of land administration, a basic issue in 
a predominantly agrarian society. Contrary to the law specifying 
public (governmental) ownership of land, powerful clans and Bud- 
dhist temples had acquired a sizable proportion of farmland. By 
exacting a disproportionate share of crops in the form of rents, the 
"landlords" were causing economic destitution and social discon- 
tent among the peasants. By illicitly removing the farms from tax 
rolls, these clans and temples reduced the government's income, 
thus straining the treasury. Yi had sided with reformists even be- 
fore he took power, hence it was natural for him to rectify past 
inequities after ascending to the throne. 

The reform of the land system, however, had direct repercus- 
sions on the practice of Buddhism because Buddhist temples and 
monks had been among those exacerbating the land problem. The 
economic influence of the temples was eliminated when they lost 
vast lands. The rectification went beyond economic reform, 
however, because the dominant forces in the new dynasty were 



9 



South Korea: A Country Study 

devout Confucianists who regarded Buddhism as a false creed. The 
fact that Buddhist monks had wielded a strong influence in poli- 
tics, the economy, and society during the latter part of the Koryo 
Dynasty — and that many of them had been corrupted by power 
and money — strengthened the opposition to Buddhism. Accord- 
ingly, the new dynasty launched a sweeping attack on Buddhism 
and its institutions, an attack that had profound and enduring ef- 
fects on the character of civilization on the peninsula. 

Many of the outstanding temples were permitted to remain in- 
tact; indeed, a few Choson monarchs were devout Buddhists. 
Nevertheless, Buddhism exerted little influence over the religious 
life of Korea under the Choson Dynasty; nor did any organized 
religion replace it. Although many people adhered to shamanism, 
geomancy, fortunetelling, and superstitions, Korea effectively be- 
came a secular society. 

The Choson Dynasty had an auspicious beginning. During the 
reign of the fourth monarch, King Sejong (1418-50), a Buddhist, 
enormous strides were made in the arts, science, and technology. 
The Korean script, known as han'gul (see Glossary), which even- 
tually came into common usage in the twentieth century, was de- 
veloped by scholars at that time. 

After Sejong, however, the dynasty fell into the hands of lesser 
men, and in the late fifteenth century the country began a long 
decline. Succession to the throne often caused long and bitter strug- 
gles, particularly when a ruler did not leave behind an heir who 
had reached the age of majority. Members of the Confucian- 
educated, scholar-official elite yangban (see Glossary) class quarreled 
over minor points of Confucian ritual and etiquette, especially the 
proper period of mourning upon the death of a royal personage. 
Factional groups began vying for power, frequently going to the 
extreme of exterminating the members of defeated factions. The 
civil service examination became a sham, and corruption ran ram- 
pant. Royal relatives and members of powerful factions increased 
their landholdings, which became exempt from taxes and thereby 
reduced the dynasty's sources of revenue. The farmers suffered 
more and more from tax burdens and other extractions imposed 
by greedy officials and landlords. In short, the country was not 
being effectively governed. To make matters worse, Japanese at- 
tacks in 1592 and 1597 and Manchu assaults in 1627 and 1636 
ravaged the country's economy and turned much of the farmland 
to waste for a long period thereafter. 

The resulting social and economic depression of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries fostered the rise of a new intellectual move- 
ment advocating the practical use of human knowledge. Pioneered 



10 



Historical Setting 



by a Confucian scholar named Yi Su-kwang, the new thought — 
soon to be called Sirhak (practical learning) — was partly inspired 
by the firsthand knowledge of occidental sciences that Yi Su-kwang 
had acquired while on official visits to Beijing. As historian Ki- 
baik Lee has noted, Sirhak thought encompassed a variety of in- 
tellectual activities and several diverse viewpoints. These included 
proposals for refinement of the traditional administrative and land 
systems, advocacy of commercial and manufacturing activity, and 
a renewed interest in Korean history and language. Brought to 
maturity in the late eighteenth century by Chong Yag-yong, the Sir- 
hak Movement was supported by a group of discontented schol- 
ars, petty officials, former bureaucrats, and commoners. 

The Sirhak Movement found itself in direct confrontation with 
the dominant trend in neo-Confucian thought, which stressed the 
metaphysical and abstract teachings of the renowned Chinese 
philosopher Zhu Xi (see Traditional Social Structure, ch. 2). Nei- 
ther the efforts of such wise and able kings as Yongjo (1725-75) and 
Chongjo (1776-1800), nor those of the Sirhak scholars, were able to 
reverse the trend against empirical studies and good government. 

Western ideas, including Christianity, reached Korea through 
China in the seventeenth century. By 1785, however, the govern- 
ment had become incensed over the rejection of ancestor worship 
by Roman Catholic missionaries, and it banned all forms of Western 
learning. Western ships began to approach Korean shores after 
1801, seeking trade and other contacts, but the government rejected 
all overtures from abroad. When news of the Opium War in China 
(1839-42) reached Korea, the dynasty had all the more reason to 
shut the doors tighdy against Western "barbarians." In the mean- 
time, the Choson Dynasty suffered from a series of natural calam- 
ities including floods, famines, and epidemics, as well as large-scale 
revolts of the masses in the northwest (1811-12) and southwest (1862 
and 1894-95). 

The expansion of Western powers in East Asia in the nineteenth 
century significantly altered the established order, in which Korea 
had been dominated by China. China under the Qing Dynasty 
(1644-191 1) was in decline; its power waned rapidly under the con- 
certed attacks of such Western nations as France, Britain, and Rus- 
sia. Stimulated by these events, Japan proceeded to modernize after 
having been forced to open its ports by Commodore Matthew C. 
Perry of the United States Navy in 1853-54. Korea, however, re- 
mained dormant, having closed itself to all outside contacts in the 
early eighteenth century. 

The Japanese were the first foreign power in recent history to 
succeed in penetrating Korea's isolation. After a warlike Japanese 



11 



South Korea: A Country Study 



provocation against Korea in 1875 (when China failed to come to 
Korea's aid), the Japanese forced an unequal treaty on Korea in 
February 1876. The treaty gave Japanese nationals extraterritorial 
rights and opened up three Korean ports to Japanese trade. In retali- 
ation, China sought to counter Japan by extending Korea's exter- 
nal relations and playing off one Western power against another. 
Accordingly, Korea signed treaties with the United States, Britain, 
Italy, Russia, and other countries within the decade after the one 
with Japan. 

Internally, the Korean court split into rival pro- Chinese, pro- 
Japanese, and pro-Russian factions, the latter two having more 
reformist and modernizing orientations. In 1895 the Japanese 
minister to Korea masterminded the assassination of the Korean 
queen, who with her clan had opposed reform-oriented, Japanese- 
supported leaders. The Korean king, however, rejected not only 
Japan but also the various reform measures and turned for sup- 
port to one of Japan's adversaries — Russia. The king fled to the 
Russian legation in Seoul to avoid possible Japanese plots against 
him and conducted the nation's business from there. The Japanese 
blunder had served the Russians well. 

In the meantime, under the leadership of So Chae-p'il, who had 
exiled himself to the United States after participating in an unsuc- 
cessful palace coup in 1884, a massive campaign was launched to 
advocate Korean independence from foreign influence and con- 
trols. As well as supporting Korean independence, So also advo- 
cated reform in Korea's politics and customs in line with Western 
practices. Upon his return to Korea in 1896, So published Tong- 
nip simmun (The Independent), the first newspaper to use the han- 
gul writing system and the vernacular language, which attracted 
an ever-growing audience (see The Korean Language, ch. 2). He 
also organized the Independence Club to introduce Korea's elite 
to Western ideas and practices. Under his impetus and the influence 
of education provided by Protestant mission schools, hundreds of 
young men held mass meetings on the streets and plazas demand- 
ing democratic reforms and an end to Russian and Japanese domi- 
nation. But the conservative forces proved to be too deeply 
entrenched for the progressive reformers, who trashed the paper's 
offices. The reformers, including Syngman Rhee, then a student 
leader, were jailed. So was compelled to return to the United States 
in 1898, and under one pretext or another the government sup- 
pressed both the reform movement and its newspaper. 

The revolt of 1894-95, known as the Tonghak Rebellion, had 
international repercussions. Like the Taiping rebels in China thirty 
years earlier, the Tonghak (see Glossary) participants were fired 



12 



Statue of King Sejong (1418-50), Toksu Palace, Seoul 

Courtesy Oren Hadar 



13 



South Korea: A Country Study 

by religious fervor as well as by indignation about the corrupt and 
oppressive government. The rebellion spread from the southwest 
to the central region of the peninsula, menacing Seoul. The Korean 
court apparendy felt unable to cope with the rebels and invited Chi- 
na to send troops to quell the rebellion. This move gave Japan a 
pretext to dispatch troops to Korea. The two countries soon en- 
gaged in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), which accelerat- 
ed the demise of the Qing Dynasty in China. 

The victorious Japanese established their hegemony over Korea 
via the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) and dictated to the Korean 
government a wide-ranging series of measures to prevent further 
domestic disturbances. In response, the government promulgated 
various reforms, including the abolition of class distinctions, the 
liberation of slaves, the abolition of the ritualistic civil service ex- 
amination system, and the adoption of a new tax system. 

Russian influence had been on the rise in East Asia, in direct 
conflict with the Japanese desire for expansion. In alliance with 
France and Germany, Russia had just forced Japan to return the 
Liaodong Peninsula to China (which Japan had seized during the 
First Sino-Japanese War) and then promptly leased the territory 
from China. The secret Sino-Russian treaty signed in 1896 also 
gave the Russians the right to build and operate the Chinese Eastern 
Railway across northern Manchuria, which served as a link in the 
Russian Trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostok. Russia proceed- 
ed to acquire numerous concessions over Korea's forests and mines. 

The strategic rivalry between Russia and Japan exploded in the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, won by Japan. Under the peace 
treaty signed in September 1905, Russia acknowledged Japan's 
' 'paramount political, military, and economic interest" in Korea. 
A separate agreement signed in secret between the United States 
and Japan at this time subsequentiy aroused anti- American senti- 
ment among Koreans. The Taft-Katsura Agreement was cynical 
by modern standards, exchanging what amounted to a lack of in- 
terest and military capability in Korea on the part of the United 
States (Japan was given a free hand in Korea) for a lack of interest 
or capability in the Philippines on the part of Japan (Japanese im- 
perialism was diverted from the Philippines). Given the diplomatic 
conventions of the times, however, the agreement was a much weak- 
er endorsement of the Japanese presence in Korea than either the 
Russo-Japanese peace treaty or a separate Anglo-Japanese accord. 
Two months later, Korea was obliged to become a Japanese pro- 
tectorate. Thereafter, a large number of Koreans organized them- 
selves in education and reform movements, but by then Japanese 



14 



Historical Setting 



dominance in Korea was a reality. Japan annexed Korea as a colony 
on August 22, 1910. 

Characteristics of Society under the Dynasties 
Cultural Expression 

Koreans, like the other East Asian peoples, have a highly devel- 
oped aesthetic sense and over the centuries have created a great 
number of paintings, sculptures, and handicrafts of extraordinary 
beauty. Among the very earliest are the paintings found on the 
walls of tombs of the Koguryo Kingdom (located in what is now 
North Korea) and around the China-North Korea border area. 
These paintings are colorful representations of birds, animals, and 
human figures that possess remarkable vitality and animation. Simi- 
lar, though less spectacular, tombs are found around the old capi- 
tals of the kingdoms of Paekche and Silla in present-day South 
Korea. A number of gold objects, including a gold crown of great 
delicacy and sophistication dating from the Three Kingdoms period, 
have been found in South Korea. 

Buddhism was the dominant artistic influence during the later 
Three Kingdoms period and the Silla and Koryo dynasties. Themes 
and motifs that had originated in India passed to Korea through 
Central Asia and China. A number of bronze images of Buddha 
and the Bodhisattvas were made during the sixth, seventh, and 
eighth centuries. The images are not mere copies of Indian or north 
Chinese models, but possess a distinctly ' 'Korean" spirit that one 
critic has described as 4 'as indifference to sophistication and ar- 
tificiality and a predisposition toward nature." The striking stone 
Buddha found in the Sokkuram Grotto, a cave temple located near 
Kyongju in North Kyongsang Province, was carved during the Silla 
Dynasty and is considered to be the finest of Korean stone carvings. 
During the centuries of Buddhism's ascendancy, a large number 
of stone pagodas and temples were built, one of the most famous 
being the Pulguksa Temple near Koyngju. 

The Koryo Dynasty is best remembered for its celadons, or 
bluish- green porcelains, considered by many specialists to be the 
best in the world, surpassing even the Chinese porcelains upon 
which they were originally modeled. Many have intricate designs 
of birds, flowers, and other figures rendered in light and dark- 
colored clay on the blue-green background; some are delicately 
formed into the shapes of flowers, animals, and objects. Choson 
Dynasty pottery tended to be simpler and more rustic and had a 
great influence on the development of Japanese artistic appreciation 
from the late sixteenth century on. After the attempted Japanese 



15 



South Korea: A Country Study 

invasions of Korea in the 1590s, Korean potters were taken back 
to Japan. 

During the Choson Dynasty, Buddhism was no longer a source 
of artistic inspiration. The art, music, and literature of the yangban 
were deeply influenced by Chinese models, yet exhibited a distinc- 
tively Korean style. Korean scholar-officials cultivated their skills 
in the arts of Confucian culture — Chinese poetry, calligraphy, and 
landscape painting. Poetry was considered to be the most impor- 
tant of these arts; men who lacked poetic ability could not pass the 
civil service examinations. Scholars were expected to refine their 
skill in using the brush both in calligraphy, the ornamental writ- 
ing of Chinese characters that was considered an art in itself, and 
in landscape painting, which borrowed Chinese themes and styles. 
However, scholarly calligraphers and landscape painters were con- 
sidered amateurs. Professional artists were members of the chung- 
in (see Glossary) class and were of low status, not only because their 
painting tended to diverge from the style favored by the upper class 
but because it was too realistic. Particularly among the yangban, 
Chinese dominance of cultural expression was assured by the fact 
that Korean intellectual discourse was largely dependent on Chinese 
loanwords. Scholars preferred to write in Chinese rather than in 
native Korean script. 

One uniquely Korean style of painting that developed during 
this period was found in the usually anonymous folk-paintings (min- 
hwa), which depicted the daily life of the common people and used 
genuine Korean rather than idealized or Chinese settings. Other 
folk paintings had shamanistic themes and frequentiy depicted her- 
mits and mountain deities. 

A distinctive position in traditional Korean literature is occupied 
by a type of poem known as the sijo — a poetic form that began to 
develop in the twelfth century. It is composed of three couplets and 
characterized by great simplicity and expressiveness: 

My body is mortal, commonly mortal. 
My bones end in dust, soul or no soul. 
My lord owns my heart, though, and that cannot 
change. 

This poem is by Chong Mong-ju (1337-92), a Koryo Dynasty 
loyalist who was assassinated at the foundation of the Yi Dynasty. 
The poet refers to his political choice not to side with the new 
government. 

Many of these poems reveal a sensitivity to the beauties of na- 
ture, delight in life's pleasures, and a tendency toward philosophical 



16 



Historical Setting 



contemplation that together produce a sense of serenity and, some- 
times, loneliness. Frequently the poems reveal a preoccupation with 
purity, symbolized by whiteness: 

Do not enter, snowy heron, in the valley where the 

crows are quarreling. 
Such angry crows are envious of your whiteness, 
And I fear that they will soil the body you have 

washed in the pure stream. 

The development of a Korean alphabet (today known as han 'gul) 
in the fifteenth century gave rise to a vernacular, or popular, liter- 
ature. Although the native alphabet was looked down upon by the 
yangban elite, historical works, poetry, travelogues, biographies, and 
fiction written in a mixed script of Chinese characters and han 'gul 
were widely circulated. Some vernacular literature had what could 
be interpreted as social protest themes. Probably the earliest of these 
was The Tale of Hong Kil-tong hy Ho Kyun. The protagonist, Hong 
Kil-tong, was the son of a nobleman and his concubine; his ambi- 
tion to become a great official was frustrated because of his mother's 
lowly background. He became a Robin Hood figure, stole from 
the rich to give to the poor, and eventually left Korea in order to 
establish a small kingdom in the south. Other vernacular writers 
included Kim Man-jung, who wrote The Nine Cloud Dream, which 
dealt with Buddhist themes of karma and destiny, and The Story 
of Lady Sa. Pak Chi-won's Tale of a Yangban gave a realistic account 
of social life in eighteenth- century Korea. In 1980 Korean schol- 
ars discovered a nineteenth-century vernacular novel that told of 
the complicated relationships among members of four yangban and 
commoner clans over five generations in a very detailed and realistic 
manner. At 235 volumes, this work is one of the longest novels 
ever written. 

P'ansori combine music and literary expression in ballad-form 
stories, which are both recited and sung by a performer accompa- 
nied by a drummer who sets the rhythms — a kind of "one-man 
opera" in the words of one observer. P'ansori usually are inspired 
by myths or folk tales and have Confucian, Buddhist, or folkloric 
themes. In the 1970s and 1980s, dissident students often drew on 
the techniques of traditional folk drama to satirize contemporary 
politics. 

Korean folk tales are closely tied to religious traditions and usually 
have shamanistic, Buddhist, or Confucian themes. While Confucian 
tales tend to be moralistic and didactic, Buddhist and shamanistic 
tales are highly imaginative and colorful, depicting the relationships 



17 



South Korea: A Country Study 

among spirits, ghosts, gods, and men in many different and often 
humorous ways. 

Korean Identity 

That the Korean kingdoms were strongly affected by Chinese 
civilization and its institutions was not surprising. Not only were 
the Chinese far more numerous and often more powerful militarily 
than the Koreans, but they also had a more advanced technology 
and culture. Chinese supremacy in these realms was acknowledged 
not only by the Koreans, who were militarily inferior, but also by 
those who were powerful enough to conquer China, such as the 
Kitan Liao, who ruled parts of northern China, Manchuria, and 
Mongolia between 907 and 1127; the Mongols who ruled China 
from 1279 to 1368; the Jurchen tribes, who later seized northern 
Manchuria; and the Manchus, who ruled China between 1644 and 
1911. The adoption of Chinese culture was more than simply an 
expression of submission to China, it also was the indispensable 
condition of being civilized in the East Asian context. This situa- 
tion continued until the inroads of Western civilization substan- 
tially altered the political and cultural map of Asia in the latter part 
of the nineteenth century. 

The adoption of Chinese culture and institutions by the Korean 
kingdoms, however, did not obliterate the identity of the Korean 
people. Koguryo had risen against the Chinese conquerors, and 
Silla had stubbornly resisted Chinese attempts to turn it into a 
colony. While Silla and subsequent dynasties were obliged to pay 
tribute to the various Chinese, Mongol, and Jurchen dynasties, 
and although Korea was subjected to direct overlordship by the 
Mongols for a century, the Korean kingdoms were able to survive 
as independent entities, enabling their citizens to maintain an iden- 
tity as a separate people. 

Further contributing to the maintenance of this identity was the 
Korean language, which linguists generally agree belongs to the 
Altaic language family of Inner Asia. There is no doubt that the 
indigenous language was deeply affected by the country's long con- 
tact with China. Not only did its written form rely on Chinese 
characters until the fifteenth century, but about half of its vocabu- 
lary was of Chinese origin. Nevertheless, the language is very differ- 
ent from Chinese in its lexicon, phonology, and grammar. Although 
at one time the ruling classes were set apart from the rest of the 
population by their knowledge of Chinese characters and their abil- 
ity to use Chinese in its written form, since the unification of the 
peninsula by the Silla Dynasty all Koreans have shared the same 
spoken language. 



18 



Historical Setting 



Political and Social Institutions 

Despite the fact that Korea would undergo numerous reforms, 
palace coups, and two dynastic changes after the Silla period, many 
of the political and social systems and practices instituted during 
the Silla Dynasty persisted until the nineteenth century. Their 
Chinese inspiration, of course, had much to do with the durability 
of these systems. One lasting principle was that of centralized rule. 
From the time of the Koguryo, Paekche, and Silla states of the Three 
Kingdoms period, royal houses always governed their domains 
directly, without granting autonomous powers to local adminis- 
trators. The effectiveness of the central government varied from 
dynasty to dynasty and from period to period, but the principle 
of centralization — involving a system of provinces, districts, towns, 
and villages — was never modified. 

Another feature that endured for centuries was the existence of 
a stratified social system characterized by a clear distinction be- 
tween the rulers and the ruled. Under the Silla Dynasty, society 
was rigidly organized into a hereditary caste system. The Koryo 
Dynasty, which succeeded Silla, instituted a system of social class- 
es according to which the rest of the population was subordinate 
to an elite composed of scholar-officials. By passing the higher civil 
service examination and becoming a government official a com- 
moner could become a member of the elite, but since examina- 
tions presupposed both the time and wealth for education, upward 
mobility was not the rule. This system continued during the Cho- 
son Dynasty. The strength of the aristocratic tradition may have 
been one factor contributing to the relative weakness of the Korean 
monarchy, in which the king usually presided over a council of 
senior officials as primus inter pares, rather than governing as ab- 
solute ruler. 

During the Choson Dynasty, family and lineage groups came 
to occupy tremendous importance. Because one's social and polit- 
ical status in society was largely determined by birth and lineage, 
it was only natural that a great deal of emphasis was placed on 
family. Each family maintained a genealogical table with meticulous 
care. Only male offspring could prolong the family, and clan lines 
and theirs were the only names registered in the genealogical ta- 
bles; therefore, the birth of a son was regarded as an occasion of 
great joy. The Confucian stress on the family reinforced the im- 
portance Koreans attached to the family. 

The Confucian principle of Five Relationships (see Glossary) 
governing social behavior became the norm of Korean society. 
Righteousness toward the sovereign, filial piety, deference to older 



19 



South Korea: A Country Study 

and superior persons, and benevolence to the younger and inferior 
became inviolable rules of conduct. Transgressors of these rules 
were regarded as uncultured beings unfit to be members of society. 
Whether in the family or society at large, people in positions of 
authority or occupying superior status commanded respect. 

Still another enduring feature of traditional society under the 
Choson Dynasty was the dominance of the yangban class. The yangban 
not only held power but also controlled the national wealth in the 
form of land. The court permitted the yangban to collect revenues 
on the land as remuneration for their services. Because much com- 
mercial activity was related to tributary missions to China or to 
government procurements, the wealth of the merchants often was 
dependent upon the discretion of the yangban. 

Finally, because under the Choson Dynasty one could enter into 
the scholar-official elite by passing examinations based on Confu- 
cian writings and penmanship, the entire society stressed classical 
education. The arts of war were accorded a lesser status, even 
though the founders of both the Koryo and Choson dynasties were 
generals and despite the fact that the country had suffered from 
numerous foreign invasions. 

Korea under Japanese Rule 

Korea underwent drastic changes under Japanese rule. Even be- 
fore the country was formally annexed by Japan in 1910, the 
Japanese caused the last ruling monarch, King Kojong, to abdi- 
cate the throne in 1907 in favor of his feeble son, who was soon 
married off to a Japanese woman and given a Japanese peerage. 
Japan then governed Korea under a residency general and subse- 
quently under a governor general directly subordinate to Japanese 
prime ministers. All of the governor generals were high-ranking 
Japanese military officers. 

In theory the Koreans, as subjects of the Japanese emperor, en- 
joyed the same status as the Japanese; but in fact the Japanese 
government treated the Koreans as a conquered people. Until 1921 
they were not allowed to publish their own newspapers or to or- 
ganize political or intellectual groups. 

Nationalist sentiments gave rise to a Korean student demonstra- 
tion in Japan, and on March 1, 1919, to a Proclamation of In- 
dependence by a small group of leaders in Seoul. With the 
consolidation of what became known as the March First Move- 
ment, street demonstrations led by Christian and Ch'ondogyo (a 
movement that evolved from Tonghak) groups erupted through- 
out the country to protest Japanese rule. 



20 



Kyongbok Palace, Seoul 
Courtesy Oren Hadar 



In the wake of the protest, Japan granted considerable latitude 
to Korea. As historians have noted, the ensuing intellectual and 
social ferment of the 1920s marked a seminal period in modern 
Korean history. Many developments of the period, including the 
organization of labor unions and other social and economic move- 
ments, had continuing influence into the postliberation period. In 
the 1930s, however, the ascendancy of the military in Japanese poli- 
tics reversed the change. Particularly after 1937, when Japan 
launched the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) against China, 
the colonial government decided on a policy of mobilizing the entire 
country for the cause of the war. Not only was the economy reor- 
ganized onto a war footing, but the Koreans were to be totally assim- 
ilated as Japanese. The government also began to enlist Korean 
youths in the Japanese army as volunteers in 1938 and as conscripts 
in 1943. Worship at Shinto shrines became mandatory, and every 
attempt at preserving Korean identity was discouraged. 

The Korean economy also underwent significant change. Japan's 
initial colonial policy was to increase agricultural production in 
Korea to meet Japan's growing need for rice. Japan had also be- 
gun to build large-scale industries in Korea in the 1930s as part 
of the empire-wide program of economic self-sufficiency and war 
preparation. Between 1939 and 1941, the manufacturing sector 



21 



South Korea: A Country Study 

represented 29 percent of Korea's total economic production. The 
primary industries — agriculture, fishing, and forestry — occupied 
only 49.6 percent of total economic production during that period, 
in contrast to having provided 84.6 percent of total production be- 
tween 1910 and 1912. 

The economic development taking place under Japanese rule, 
however, brought little benefit to the Koreans. Virtually all indus- 
tries were owned either by Japan-based corporations or by Japanese 
corporations in Korea (see The Japanese Role in Korea's Economic 
Development, ch. 3). As of 1942, Korean capital constituted only 
1 .5 percent of the total capital invested in Korean industries. Korean 
entrepreneurs were charged interest rates 25 percent higher than 
their Japanese counterparts, so it was difficult for Korean enter- 
prises to emerge. More and more farmland was taken over by the 
Japanese, and an increasing proportion of Korean farmers either 
became sharecroppers or migrated to Japan or Manchuria. As 
greater quantities of Korean rice were exported to Japan, per capita 
consumption of rice among the Koreans declined; between 1932 
and 1936, per capita consumption of rice declined to half the level 
consumed between 1912 and 1916. Although the government im- 
ported coarse grains from Manchuria to augment the Korean food 
supply, per capita consumption of food grains in 1944 was 35 per- 
cent below that of 1912 to 1916. 

Under Japanese rule, intellectual influences different from tradi- 
tional Buddhist, Confucianist, and shamanistic beliefs flooded the 
country. Western-style painting was introduced, and literary trends, 
even among writers who emphasized themes of social protest and 
national independence, tended to follow Japanese and European 
models, particularly those developed during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. The works of Russian, German, French, 
British, American, and Japanese authors were read by the more 
educated Koreans, and Korean writers increasingly adopted 
Western ideas and literary forms. Social and political themes were 
prominent. Tears of Blood, the first of the "new novels," published 
by Yi In-jik in serial form in a magazine in 1906, stressed the need 
for social reform and cultural enlightenment, following Western 
and Japanese models. Yi Kwang-su's The Heartless, published in 
1917, stressed the need for mass education, Western science, and 
the repudiation of the old family and social system. Ch'ae Man- 
sik's Ready Made Life, published in 1934, protested the injustices 
of colonial society. 

In the 1920s and 1930s, socialist ideas began to influence the 
development of literature. In 1925 left-wing artists, rejecting the 
romanticism of many contemporary writers, established the Korean 



22 



Japan's Residency General 
Courtesy Carpenter Collection, Library of Congress 

Proletarian Artists' Federation, which continued until it was sup- 
pressed by Japanese authorities in 1935. One of the best represen- 
tatives of this group was Yi Ki-yong, whose 1936 novel Home tells 
of the misery of villagers under Japanese rule and the efforts of 
the protagonist, a student, to organize them. Poets during the coloni- 
al period included Yi Sang-hwa, Kim So-wol, and Han Yong-un. 
But the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War marked a 
period of unprecedented repression in the cultural sphere by 
Japanese authorities, which continued until Korea's liberation in 
1945. 

From the late 1930s until 1945, the colonial government pur- 
sued a policy of assimilation whose primary goal was to force the 
Koreans to speak Japanese and to consider themselves Japanese 
subjects. In 1937 the Japanese governor general ordered that all 
instruction in Korean schools be in Japanese and that students not 
be allowed to speak Korean either inside or outside of school. In 
1939 another decree "encouraged" Koreans to adopt Japanese 
names, and by the following year it was reported that 84 percent 
of all Korean families had done so. During the war years, Korean- 
language newspapers and magazines were shut down. Belief in 
the divinity of the Japanese emperor was encouraged, and Shinto 
shrines were built throughout the country. Had Japanese rule not 



23 



South Korea: A Country Study 



ended in 1945, the fate of indigenous Korean language, culture, 
and religious practices would have been extremely uncertain (see 
Korea and Japan, ch. 2). 

Japanese rule was harsh, particularly after the Japanese militarists 
began their expansionist drive in the 1930s. Internal Korean 
resistance, however, virtually ceased in the 1930s as the police and 
the military gendarmes imposed strict surveillance over all people 
suspected of subversive inclinations and meted out severe punish- 
ment against recalcitrants. Most Koreans opted to pay lip service 
to the colonial government. Others actively collaborated with the 
Japanese. The treatment of collaborators became a sensitive and 
sometimes violent issue during the years immediately following 
liberation. 

World War II and Korea 

On August 8, 1945, during the final days of World War II, the 
Soviet Union declared war against Japan and launched an inva- 
sion of Manchuria and Korea. By then, Japan had been depleted 
by the drawn-out war against the United States and its Allies, and 
Japanese forces were in no position to stave off the Soviets. The 
dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 
6 and August 9, respectively, had led the Japanese government 
to search for ways to end the war. On August 15, 1945, Japan sur- 
rendered unconditionally. 

The Japanese surrender and the Soviet landing on the Korean 
Peninsula totally altered the history of contemporary Korea. At 
the Cairo Conference of December 1943, the Allies had decided 
to strip Japan of all the territories it had acquired since 1894, the 
beginning of Japan's expansionist drive abroad. The United States, 
China, and Britain had agreed at Cairo that Korea would be allowed 
to become free and independent in due course after the Allied vic- 
tory. The Soviet Union agreed to the same principle in its decla- 
ration of war against Japan. 

Although the United States president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
and Marshal Josef V. Stalin of the Soviet Union had agreed to 
establish an international trusteeship for Korea at the Yalta Con- 
ference of February 1945, no decision had been made on the exact 
formula for governing the nation in the aftermath of Allied victory. 
The landing of Soviet forces, however, compelled the United States 
government to improvise a formula for Korea. Unless an agree- 
ment were reached, the Soviets could very well occupy the entire 
peninsula and place Korea under their control. Thus, on August 
15, 1945, President Harry S Truman proposed to Stalin the divi- 
sion of Korea at the thirty-eighth parallel. The next day Stalin 



24 



Historical Setting 



agreed. Evidently Stalin did not wish to confront the United States 
by occupying the entire peninsula. He may also have hoped that 
the United States, in return, would permit the Soviet Union to 
occupy the northern half of the northernmost major Japanese is- 
land, Hokkaido (see fig. 3). 

The Allied foreign ministers subsequently met in Moscow on 
December 7, 1945, and decided to establish a trusteeship for a five- 
year period, during which a Korean provisional government would 
prepare for full independence; they also agreed to form a joint 
United States-Soviet commission to assist in organizing a single 
4 'provisional Korean democratic government." The trusteeship 
proposal was immediately opposed by nearly all Koreans, espe- 
cially the Korean right under Syngman Rhee, who used the issue 
to consolidate his domestic political base. The Korean communists 
objected at first, but quickly changed their position under Soviet 
direction. 

The joint commission met intermittently in Seoul from March 
1946 until it adjourned indefinitely in October 1947. The Soviet 
insistence that only those "democratic" parties and social organi- 
zations upholding the trusteeship plan be allowed to participate in 
the formation of an all- Korean government was unacceptable to 
the United States. The United States argued that the Soviet for- 
mula, if accepted, would put the communists in controlling posi- 
tions throughout Korea. 

South Korea under United States Occupation, 
1945-48 

The three-year occupation by the United States of the area ap- 
proximating present-day South Korea, following the liberation of 
Korea from Japan, was characterized by uncertainty and confu- 
sion. This difficult situation stemmed largely from the absence of 
a clearly formulated United States policy for Korea, the intensifi- 
cation of the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, and the polarization of Korean politics between left and 
right. Although the United States had maintained diplomatic ties 
with the Choson Dynasty between 1882 and 1905, Korea in 1945 
still was a remote country known only to a small number of mis- 
sionaries and adventurous businessmen, holding little importance 
in the official scheme of things. And although the United States 
had proposed the thirty-eighth parallel as a dividing line between 
the two occupation armies, United States policymakers still were 
unsure of the strategic value of South Korea. United States policy 



25 




Figure 3. South Korea in Its Asian Setting, 1990 



toward Korea became more uncertain after the deadlock of the 
United States-Soviet joint commission. While United States officials 
were pessimistic about resolving their differences with the Soviet 
Union, they remained committed to the December 1945 decision 



26 



Historical Setting 



of the Allied foreign ministers (made during their Moscow meet- 
ing) that a trusteeship under four powers, including China, should 
be established with a view toward Korea's eventual independence. 
Thus, United States officials were slow to draw up long-range 
alternative plans for South Korea. 

Moreover, as the Soviet Union consolidated its power in North 
Korea and the Nationalist Party (Guomindang or Kuomintang — 
KMT) government of Chiang Kai-shek began to falter in China, 
United States strategists began to question the long-run defensibility 
of South Korea. By 1947 it appeared that South Korea would become 
the only area of mainland Northeast Asia not under communist con- 
trol. According to one highly placed official, this was an "exposed, 
unsound military position, one that [was] doing no good." 

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, commander of the United 
States occupation forces in Korea, was obliged to work under a 
severe handicap — a mission of maintaining peace and order until 
the international conflict over Korea was resolved. Possessing very 
limited resources, Hodge was expected to pursue the "ultimate 
objective" of fostering "conditions which would bring about the 
establishment of a free and independent nation." 

General Hodge had to contend with hostile Korean political 
groups. Before United States forces had landed in Korea in Sep- 
tember 1945, the Koreans had established self-governing bodies, 
or people's committees. The leaders of these committees had organ- 
ized the Central People's Committee, which proclaimed the estab- 
lishment of the "Korean People's Republic" on September 6, 1945. 
Exiles abroad, mainly in China, had organized the "Korean Provi- 
sional Government" in Shanghai as early as 1919 and had sus- 
tained a skeletal organization in other parts of China until 1945. 

The United States recognized neither the republic nor the provi- 
sional government. The provisional government was headed by 
Syngman Rhee, its first president, and Kim Ku and Kim Kyu- 
sik, premier and vice premier, respectively. The United States 
would not recognize any group as a government until an agree- 
ment was reached among the Western Allies. The exiles were mol- 
lified by the favorable treatment they received when they returned 
to South Korea, but were incensed by the order to disband issued 
by the United States Army Military Government in Korea. The 
military government that administered the American-occupied zone 
proceeded to disband the local people's committees and impose 
direct rule, assigning military personnel who lacked language skills 
and knowledge of Korea as governors at various levels. 

The Korean Communist Party, resuscitated in October 1945, 
had been a major force behind the Central People's Committee 



27 



South Korea: A Country Study 

and the "Korean People's Republic" and quickly built a substan- 
tial following among the workers, farmers, and students. The party 
eventually changed its stance on trusteeship and came out in sup- 
port of it on January 3, 1946. Because the party was under the 
control of the Soviet command in P'yongyang, it came into direct 
confrontation with the United States Army military government. 

The situation was exacerbated in December 1945 when the de- 
cision to establish a trusteeship was announced. To the Koreans, 
who had anticipated immediate independence, the decision to 
implement a five-year trusteeship was humiliating, and the initially 
warm welcome to United States troops as liberators cooled. By early 
1946, the United States Army military government had come to 
rely heavily on the advice and counsel of ideologically conserva- 
tive elements, including landlords and other propertied persons. 

The United States initially supported the returned exiles and the 
conservative elements, but between May 1946 and April 1947, the 
military government tried to mobilize support behind a coalition 
between the moderate left represented by Yo Un-hyong (or Lyuh 
Woon Hyung), who had been the figurehead of the Central People's 
Committee, and the moderate right, represented by Kim Kyu-sik, 
vice premier of the exiled government. This attempt only intensi- 
fied splits within the left-wing and right-wing camps without produc- 
ing any positive results. The moderates' argument that the Koreans 
should oppose the trusteeship was unacceptable to the other par- 
ties. Communist leaders, on the other hand, were driven under- 
ground in May 1946 after the discovery of a currency-counterfeiting 
operation run by the party. The left-wing and right-wing groups, 
in the meantime, frequently engaged in violent clashes not only 
on ideological grounds, but also because of their opposing views 
about the trusteeship decision. 

In December 1946, the military government established the South 
Korean Interim Legislative Assembly to formulate draft laws to 
be used as "the basis for political, economic, and social reforms." 
South Korea's problems, however, required solutions at a much 
higher level. The left-wing political groups, consolidated under the 
rubric of the South Korean Workers' Party, ignored the assem- 
bly. The conservative Korean Democratic Party, supported by land- 
lords and small-business owners, opposed the assembly because their 
principal leaders were excluded from it. Although many of the as- 
sembly's forty-five elected members were conservatives, most of 
the forty-five appointed members were moderates nominated by 
Kim Kyu-sik, who had emerged as Hodge's choice for political 
leadership. Unfortunately, Kim lacked dynamism and broad sup- 
port among the masses. 



28 



Historical Setting 



Economy and Society 

These circumstances had thrown South Korea's economy into 
complete chaos. Even if the occupation forces had arrived with a 
carefully laid economic plan, the situation would have been difficult 
because the Japanese had developed Korea's economy as an in- 
tegral part of their empire, linking Korea to Japan and Manchuria. 

The division of Korea into two zones at an arbitrary line fur- 
ther aggravated the situation. There were many inherent problems 
in building a self-sufficient economy in the southern half of the 
peninsula. Most of the heavy industrial facilities were located in 
northern Korea — the Soviet zone — including the chemical plants 
that produced necessary agricultural fertilizers. Light industries in 
southern Korea had been dependent on electricity from the hydrau- 
lic generators located on the Yalu River on the Korean- Manchurian 
border; electric generating facilities in the south supplied only 9 
percent of the total need. Railroads and industries in the south also 
had been dependent upon bituminous coal imported from Man- 
churia, Japan, and the north (although the south had been exporting 
some excess anthracite to the north). 

The problems were compounded by the fact that most of Korea's 
mines and industries had been owned and operated by Japan. As 
the United States Army military government let the 700,000 
Japanese depart from South Korea in the months following the start 
of the American occupation, almost all of the mines and factories — 
now enemy properties vested in the military government — were 
without managers, technicians, and capital resources. This situa- 
tion led to severe problems of unemployment and material 
shortages. 

The months after the arrival of occupation forces also witnessed 
a vast inflow of population. South Korea's population, estimated 
at just over 16 million in 1945, grew by 21 percent during the next 
year. By 1950 more than 1 million workers had returned from 
Japan, 120,000 from China and Manchuria, and 1 .8 million from 
the north. The annual rate of increase of births over deaths con- 
tinued at about 3.1 percent. Since rural areas were inhospitable 
to newcomers, most of the refugees settled in urban areas; Seoul 
received upwards of one-third of the total. The situation was fur- 
ther aggravated by scarcities of food and other commodities and 
by runaway inflation, caused in part by the fact that the departing 
Japanese had flooded Korea with newly printed yen. 

The social unrest created by these developments can be easily 
surmised. By 1947 only about half the labor force of 10 million 
was gainfully employed. Labor strikes and work stoppages were 



29 



South Korea: A Country Study 



recurrent phenomena, and demonstrations against the United States 
Army military government's policies drew large crowds. Temporary 
stoppages of electricity — supplied from the northern areas — in the 
early part of 1946 and late 1947 plunged the southern region into 
darkness on each occasion, deepening the despair of the populace. 
The disillusioned and disconcerted people paid keen atten- 
tion to political leaders of various persuasions who offered new ways 
of solving the Korean problem. 

Establishment of the Republic of Korea 

In this atmosphere, the United States scuttled an earlier plan 
to provide US$500 million over five years for South Korean devel- 
opment. It then submitted the Korean problem to the United 
Nations (UN) in September 1947. In November the UN General 
Assembly recognized Korea's claim to independence and made 
preparations for the establishment of a government and the with- 
drawal of occupation forces. The United Nations Temporary Com- 
mission on Korea arrived to supervise the election of a national 
assembly, which was held in May 1948. The Soviet Union, 
however, objected to the UN resolution and refused to admit the 
commission to the Soviet-controlled zone in the north. It was becom- 
ing increasingly clear that two separate regimes would be estab- 
lished on the peninsula. 

The prospect of perpetuating the division of Korea catapulted 
some of the southern political leaders to action, significantly alter- 
ing the political configuration there. The choice they faced was be- 
tween immediate independence at the price of indefinite division, 
or postponement of independence until the deadlock between the 
United States and the Soviet Union was resolved. Rhee had cam- 
paigned actively within Korea and the United States for the first 
alternative since June 1946. Other major figures in the right-wing 
camp, including Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik, decided to oppose the 
"separate elections" in the south, hoping to resolve the interna- 
tional impasse by holding talks with their northern counterparts. 
The group led by the two Kims made their way to P'yongyang, 
the future capital of North Korea, in April 1948, boycotted the 
May 1948 elections, and were discredited when P'yongyang cut 
off electricity, leaving Rhee a clear field although he lacked grass 
roots support apart from the Korean Democratic Party. By this 
time, the communists in the south had lost much of their political 
following, particularly after a serious riot in October 1946; most 
of their leaders congregated in the north. The moderate left-wing 
camp was in disarray after their leader, Yo Un-hyong, was assas- 
sinated in July 1947. Kim Kyu-sik had been the clear choice of the 



30 



Historical Setting 



United States Army military government, but he could not be dis- 
suaded from his fruitless trip to P'yongyang. 

The National Assembly elected in May 1948 adopted a consti- 
tution setting forth a presidential form of government and specifying 
a four-year term for the presidency. Syngman Rhee, whose sup- 
porters had won the elections, became head of the new assembly. 
On this basis, when on August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea 
(South Korea) was proclaimed, Rhee assumed the presidency. Four 
days after the proclamation, communist authorities completed the 
severing of north-south ties by shutting off power transmission to 
the south. Within less than a month, a communist regime, the Demo- 
cratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), was proclaimed 
under Premier Kim II Sung, who claimed authority over the entire 
country by virtue of elections conducted in the north and the under- 
ground elections allegedly held in the south. Rhee scarcely had time 
to put his political house in order before North Korea launched 
its attack on South Korea in June 1950. 

The South Korean army had come into being in September 1948 
(see The South Korean Army after World War II, ch. 5). A commu- 
nist-led revolt of army regiments in the southern part of the penin- 
sula in October of the same year, known as the Yosu-Sunch'on 
rebellion, had consumed much of the army's attention and 
resources, however, and a massive purge in the aftermath of that 
revolt weakened the entire military establishment. Given South 
Korea's precarious future and the communist victory in China, 
the United States was not eager to provide support. By June 29, 
1949, United States occupation forces had been withdrawn, save 
for a handful of military advisers, and Korea had been placed out- 
side of the United States defense perimeter. 

The Korean War, 1950-53 

In the meantime, the communists had built a formidable politi- 
cal and military structure in North Korea under the aegis of the 
Soviet command. They had created a regional Five-Province Ad- 
ministrative Bureau in October 1945, which was reorganized into 
the North Korean Provisional People's Committee in February 1946 
and shed the "Provisional" component of its name twelve months 
later. The communists also expanded and consolidated their party's 
strength by merging all of the left-wing groups into the North 
Korean Workers' Party in August 1946. Beginning in 1946, the 
armed forces also were organized and reinforced. Between 1946 
and 1949, large numbers of North Korean youths — at least 
10,000 — were taken to the Soviet Union for military training. A 
draft was instituted, and in 1949 two divisions — 40,000 troops — 



31 



South Korea: A Country Study 

of the former Korean Volunteer Army in China, who had trained 
under the Chinese communists and had participated in the Chinese 
civil war (1945-49), returned to North Korea. 

By June 1950, North Korean forces numbered between 150,000 
and 200,000 troops, organized into ten infantry divisions, one tank 
division, and one air force division. Soviet equipment, including 
automatic weapons of various types, T-34 tanks, and Yak fighter 
planes, had also been pouring into North Korea in early 1950. 
These forces were to fight the ill-equipped South Korean army of 
less than 100,000 men — an army lacking in tanks, heavy artillery, 
and combat airplanes — plus a coast guard of 4,000 men and a police 
force of 45,000 men. 

The events following the June 1950 invasion proved the superi- 
ority of North Korean military forces and the soundness of their over- 
all invasion strategy. South Korea's army was simply overwhelmed; 
Seoul fell within three days. By early August, South Korean forces 
were confined in the southeastern corner of the peninsula to a terri- 
tory 140 kilometers long and 90 kilometers wide. The rest of the ter- 
ritory was completely in the hands of the North Korean army. 

The only unforeseen event complicating North Korea's strategy 
was the swift decision by the United States to commit forces in sup- 
port of South Korea. On June 26, 1950, Truman ordered the use 
of United States planes and naval vessels against North Korean 
forces, and on June 30 United States ground troops were dispatched. 
The United States, fearing that inaction in Korea would be inter- 
preted as appeasement of communist aggression elsewhere in the 
world, was determined that South Korea should not be over- 
whelmed and asked the UN Security Council to intervene. When 
Douglas MacArthur, the commanding general of the United 
Nations forces in Korea, launched his amphibious attack and landed 
at Inch'on on September 15, the course of the war changed 
abruptly. Much of North Korea was taken by United States and 
South Korean forces before Chinese "volunteers" intervened in 
October, enabling North Korea to eventually restore its authority 
over its domain. The war lasted until July 27, 1953, when a cease- 
fire agreement was signed at P'anmunjom. By then, the war had 
involved China and the Soviet Union, which had dispatched air 
force divisions to Manchuria in support of North Korea and had 
furnished the Chinese and North Koreans with arms, tanks, mili- 
tary supplies, fuel, foodstuffs, and medicine. Fifteen member- 
nations of the United Nations had contributed armed forces and 
medical units to South Korea. 

The war left indelible marks on the Korean Peninsula and the 
world surrounding it. The entire peninsula was reduced to rubble; 



32 



Historical Setting 



casualties on both sides were enormous. The chances for peaceful 
unification had been remote even before 1950, but the war dashed 
all such hopes. Sizable numbers of South Koreans who either had 
been sympathetic or indifferent to communism before the war be- 
came avowed anticommunists afterwards. The war also intensi- 
fied hostilities between the communist and noncommunist camps 
in the accelerating East- West arms race. Moreover, a large num- 
ber of Chinese volunteer troops remained in North Korea until 
October 1958, and China began to play an increasingly important 
role in Korean affairs. Because tension on the Korean Peninsula 
remained high, the United States continued to station troops in 
South Korea over the strenuous objections of North Korean leaders. 
The war also spurred Japan's industrial recovery and the United 
States' decision to rearm Japan. 

The Syngman Rhee Era, 1948-60 
The Political Environment 

Even though Syngman Rhee had been handily elected president 
by the National Assembly in 1948 — with 180 of the 196 votes cast 
in his favor — he quickly ran into difficulties. South Korean poli- 
tics during Rhee's regime (1948-60) essentially revolved around 
Rhee's struggle to remain in power and the opposition's efforts 
to unseat him. Constitutional provisions concerning the presidency 
became the focal point. 

Because Rhee's four-year term of office was to end in August 
1952 under the 1948 constitution, and because he had no prospect 
of being reelected by the National Assembly, he supported a con- 
stitutional amendment, introduced in November 1951, to elect the 
president by popular vote. The proposal was resoundingly defeated 
by a vote of 143 to 19, prompting Rhee to marshal his supporters 
into the Liberal Party. Four months later, in April 1952, the opposi- 
tion introduced another motion calling for a parliamentary form 
of government. Rhee declared martial law in May, rounded up 
the assembly members by force, and called for another vote. His 
constitutional amendment to elect the president by popular vote 
was railroaded through, passing with 163 votes of the 166 assem- 
bly members present. In the subsequent popular election in August, 
Rhee was reelected by 72 percent of the voters. 

The constitution, however, limited the president to only two 
terms. Hence, when the end of Rhee's second term of office ap- 
proached, the constitution again was amended (in November 1954) 
by the use of fraudulent tactics that allowed Rhee to succeed him- 
self indefinitely. 



33 



South Korea: A Country Study 

In the meantime, South Korea's citizens, particularly the urban 
masses, had become more politically conscious. The press frequently 
exposed government ineptitude and corruption and attacked Rhee's 
authoritarian rule. The Democratic Party capitalized on these par- 
ticulars; in the May 1956 presidential election, Rhee won only 55 
percent of the votes, even though his principal opponent, Sin Ik-hiii, 
had died of a heart attack ten days before the election. Rhee's run- 
ning mate, Yi Ki-bung, fared much worse, losing to the Democratic 
Party candidate, Chang Myon (John M. Chang). Since Rhee was 
already eighty-one years old in 1956, Chang's victory caused a 
major tremor among Rhee's supporters. 

Thereafter, the issue of Rhee's age and the goal of electing Yi 
Ki-bung became an obsession. The administration became increas- 
ingly repressive as Liberal Party leaders came to dominate the 
political arena, including government operations, around 1958. Yi, 
formerly Rhee's personal secretary, and his wife (Mrs. Rhee's con- 
fidant and a power-behind-the-scenes) had convinced the child- 
less Rhee to adopt their son as his legal heir. For fear that Rhee's 
health might be impaired, he was carefully shielded from all infor- 
mation that might upset him. Thus, the aged and secluded pres- 
ident became a captive of the system he had built, rather than its 
master. 

In March 1960, the Liberal Party managed to reelect Rhee and 
to elect Yi Ki-bung vice president by the blatant use of force. Rhee 
was reelected by default because his principal opponent had died 
while receiving medical treatment in the United States just before 
the election. As for Yi, he was largely confined to his sickbed — a 
cause of public anger — but "won" 8.3 million votes as against 1.8 
million votes for Chang Myon. The fraudulent election touched 
off civil disorders, known and celebrated as the April 19 Student 
Revolution, during which 142 students were killed by the police. 
As a result, Rhee resigned on April 26, 1960. The next day all 
four members of the Yi family died in a suicide pact. This account 
has been challenged by some who believed Yi's family was killed 
by his bodyguards in hopes of enabling Rhee to stay on. 

Rhee, a self-righteous man convinced of his indispensability to 
Korea, loathed his critics and opponents and equated criticism with 
treason. Although his record as a national hero and his skill in han- 
dling United States-Korean relations won him admiration during 
the immediate years after the Korean War, Rhee became a cap- 
tive of the people surrounding him. In the late 1950s, his policies 
were largely without results as rapid changes in the economy and 
society deeply affected South Korea's system. 



34 



Historical Setting 



Society under Rhee 

The transformation of South Korean society during the Rhee 
era was of revolutionary proportions because of the convergence 
of a number of forces. A major impetus for social change was the 
greatly enhanced opportunity for education. Although Japan had 
introduced a modern education system to Korea, opportunities for 
Koreans were purposely limited, particularly at the secondary and 
university levels. Educational opportunities were greatly expand- 
ed immediately after the Japanese defeat, and the trend continued 
through the Korean War and afterwards. Higher education provided 
more opportunities for upward mobility to a large number of young 
people. This opening also meant greater political awakening among 
the young, particularly in view of the strong emphasis placed on 
democratic values and ideas by teachers and intellectuals. For the 
first time, Korean youths were provided open access to democratic 
ideas both at school and through the mass media. These Western 
ideas became the norm against which to judge the government in 
power when the exigencies of the war period were removed. 

A land reform law enacted in June 1949 also had a leveling effect 
on Korean society. Under this law, nearly 1 million sharecroppers, 
or approximately 40 percent of total farm households, became small 
landowners. The reform also brought about the decline of the land- 
lord class that had formed the backbone of traditional Korean society 
for centuries. Because big business and industrial groups did not 
emerge until the late 1950s and early 1960s, almost everyone in soci- 
ety was placed on an equal footing. 

The Korean War had the most significant effect on the social 
system. The movement of large armies up and down the length of 
the peninsula was accompanied by civilian refugees. People of diverse 
backgrounds intermingled for prolonged periods, deeply affecting 
everyone's way of life. The indiscriminate destruction of property 
during the war also had the effect of homogenizing Korean society. 

The war caused hundreds of thousands of young men from rural 
areas to enlist in the army, exposing them to modern organiza- 
tion, technologies, and a new world outlook. The war also gave 
rise to a large officer corps that later developed into an increasingly 
significant social group. 

Better education and the government's postwar economic poli- 
cies contributed to accelerated urbanization. Reconstruction projects 
created jobs in the cities, while the government's effort to control 
the prices of farm products made it unprofitable to till small farm 
plots. The urban population increased rapidly from 11.6 percent 



35 



South Korea: A Country Study 

in 1940 to 24.4 percent in 1955 and 28.3 percent in 1960. These 
changes had a direct impact on politics because the better-educated 
and urbanized elements became increasingly vocal and more in- 
dependent in their political judgments. 

The Postwar Economy 

The war had destroyed most of South Korea's production facil- 
ities. The South Korean government began rehabilitation as soon 
as the battle zone near the thirty-eighth parallel stabilized in 1952. 
The United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency and members 
of the UN, principally the United States, also provided badly needed 
financial assistance. Seoul depended heavily on foreign aid, not 
only for defense, but also for other expenditures. Foreign aid con- 
stituted a third of total budget in 1954, rose to 58.4 percent in 1956, 
and was approximately 38 percent of the budget in 1960. The first 
annual United States economic aid bill after the armistice was 
US$200 million; aid peaked at US$365 million in 1956 and was 
then maintained at the US$200 million level annually until the 
mid-1960s. 

The scarcity of raw materials and the need to maintain a large 
army caused a high rate of inflation, but by 1958 prices had stabi- 
lized. The government also intensified its effort to increase indus- 
trial production, emphasizing power generation and textile and 
cement production. In order to reduce dependence on imports, such 
principal items as fertilizer and steel began to be produced domes- 
tically. 

The average rise in the gross national product (GNP — see Glos- 
sary) was 5.5 percent from 1954 through 1958. Industrial produc- 
tion led the advance, growing by nearly 14 percent per year. The 
tightening of fiscal and monetary policies in 1958, coupled with 
the phasing out of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction 
Agency program and the reduction in direct aid from the United 
States in 1957, caused a shortage of raw materials for import- 
dependent industries and led to an overall economic decline. By 
1958 Liberal Party leaders paid more attention to political survival 
than to economic development. The government adopted a com- 
prehensive Seven-Year Economic Development Plan in January 
1960, but before the plan could be implemented, the student revo- 
lution brought down the government. 

The Democratic Interlude 

Rhee's resignation left a political void subsequently filled by Ho 
Chong, whom Rhee had appointed foreign minister the day be- 
fore he resigned. Although Ho was a lifelong friend of Rhee, he had 



36 



Historical Setting 



maintained amicable relations with Democratic Party leaders and 
thus was acceptable to all concerned. Between April and July 1960, 
Ho's transitional government maintained order, exiled Rhee and 
his wife to Hawaii, and prepared for a new general election of the 
National Assembly in July. That body revised the constitution on 
June 15, instituting a parliamentary form of government with a 
bicameral legislature. In the July election, the Democratic Party 
won 175 of the 233 seats in the lower house of the National Assem- 
bly. The second largest group, the independents, won forty-nine 
seats. The Liberal Party won only two seats. In the upper house, 
the Democratic Party won thirty-one of the fifty-eight seats. 

The Democratic Party had been a coalition of two divergent ele- 
ments that had merged in 1955 to oppose Rhee. When the com- 
mon enemy — Rhee and his Liberal Party — had been removed from 
the scene and opportunities for power were presented, each group 
sought to obtain the spoils for itself. 

The Democratic Party candidate for the presidency in the March 
1960 election, Cho Pyong-ok, died of illness shortly before the elec- 
tion, just as his predecessor, Sin Ik-hui, had in 1956. The two 
groups openly struggled against each other during the July elec- 
tions for the National Assembly. Although they agreed on Yun 
Po-son as presidential candidate and Chang Myon as their choice 
for premier, neither had strong leadership qualities nor commanded 
the respect of the majority of the party elite. Yun and Chang could 
not agree on the composition of the cabinet. Chang attempted to 
hold the coalition together by reshuffling cabinet positions three 
times within a five-month period. In November 1960, the group 
led by Yun left the Democratic Party and formed the New 
Democratic Party (Simmindang) . 

In the meantime, the tasks confronting the new government were 
daunting. The economy suffered from mismanagement and cor- 
ruption. The army and police needed to be purged of the political 
appointees who had buttressed the dictatorship. The students, to 
whom the Democratic Party owed its power, filled the streets almost 
daily, making numerous wide-ranging demands for political and 
economic reforms, but the Democratic Party had no ready-made 
programs. Law and order could not be maintained because the 
police, long an instrument of the Rhee government, were demoral- 
ized and totally discredited by the public. Continued factional wran- 
gling caused the public to turn away from the party. 

This situation provided a fertile ground for a military coup. 
Whereas Rhee had been able to control the military because of 
his personal prestige, his skill in manipulating the generals, and 
the control mechanisms he had instituted, Chang lacked all these 



37 



South Korea: A Country Study 

advantages. When the demands of the young army officers under 
Major General Park Chung Hee were rebuffed, and as political 
power appeared to be increasingly hanging in the balance with no 
one clearly in charge, the army carried out a coup d'etat on May 
16, 1961. Chang's own army chief of staff, Chang To-yong, joined 
the junta, and Chang's fragile government was toppled. (The junta 
subsequently tried and convicted General Chang for attempting 
to take over the junta.) The young officers' initial complaint had 
been that Chang Myon had not kept a campaign pledge to weed 
out corrupt generals from the South Korean army, and some 
Korean sources attributed this failure to the intervention of high- 
ranking United States military officers, who feared the weakening 
of South Korea's national security. 

Yun Po-son sided with the junta and persuaded the United States 
Eighth Army and the commanders of various South Korean army 
units not to interfere with the new rulers. Yun stayed on as presi- 
dent for ten months after the military junta took over power, thereby 
legitimizing the coup. A small number of young officers command- 
ing 3,600 men had succeeded in toppling a government with 
authority over an army of 600,000. 

South Korea under Park Chung Hee, 1961-79 

The junta under Park Chung Hee quickly consolidated its power, 
removed those it considered corrupt and unqualified from govern- 
ment and army positions, and laid plans for the future. The thirty- 
two-member Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) 
became all-powerful. 

The Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was created 
in June 1961 to prevent a countercoup and to suppress all poten- 
tial enemies. It was to have not only investigative power, but also 
the power to arrest and detain anyone suspected of wrongdoing 
or harboring antijunta sentiments. The KCIA extended its power 
to economic and foreign affairs under its first director, Colonel (re- 
tired) Kim Chong-p'il, a relative of Park, and one of the original 
planners of the coup against Chang. 

In May 1961 , the junta pledged to make an all-out effort to build 
a self-reliant economy and to carry out a " great human revolu- 
tion" by wiping out all corruption and evil practices in the govern- 
ment and by introducing a "fresh and clean morality." The 
National Assembly was dissolved, and high-level civilian officials 
were replaced by military officers. By 1963 the junta's economic 
policies had not produced any favorable results. 

The KCIA under Kim Chong-p'il was involved in a number 
of scandals that considerably tarnished the junta's image. The 



38 



Historical Setting 



military leaders had worked actively to establish a political party, 
later known as the Democratic Republican Party (DRP), which 
existed from 1963 to 1980, in preparation for the return of politics 
to the civilians. Former politicians, however, were prohibited from 
engaging in organizational activities. Although Park had announced 
in February 1963 that he would not participate in civilian politics, 
the following month he announced a popular referendum to decide 
whether the junta should extend its rule for another four years. 
Facing stiff opposition from both the South Korean public and the 
United States, the plan for a referendum was canceled. 

The Military in Politics 

The junta had drawn up a new constitution and had put it before 
a popular referendum in December 1962, receiving 78.8 percent 
of the vote. Under the new constitution, the president was to be 
elected by direct popular vote and have strong powers — including 
the authority to appoint the premier and cabinet members without 
legislative consent and to order emergency financial and economic 
measures. Under United States pressure, Park, who had held the 
position of acting president following Yun's resignation in March 
1962, retired from the army as a four-star general and ran as the 
DRP candidate in the October 1963 presidential election. He was 
elected by a narrow margin, winning 46.6 percent of the vote, as 
compared with 45. 1 percent for Yun Po-son, the New Democratic 
Party candidate. In the subsequent election for the unicameral legis- 
lature, held in November 1963, the government won 110 of the 
175 seats. 

Until 1971 South Korea operated under the political framework 
it had adopted in 1963. Even though Park imposed some restric- 
tions on members of the press, intellectuals, and opposition politi- 
cians, these groups were permitted considerable latitude to criticize 
the government and to engage in organizational activities. Although 
there were numerous student demonstrations, particularly in 1965 
when the government normalized its relations with Japan and sent 
45,000 combat troops to support the Republic of Vietnam in 
response to a request from the United States, the students were 
controlled and there were no casualties in confrontations with the 
police. The presidential and National Assembly elections in 1967 
and 1971 were closely contested but won by Park. In order to suc- 
ceed himself for the third time in 1971, Park amended the consti- 
tution in 1969. 

In December 1971, Park again tightened his control over the 
country. He proclaimed a national emergency and forced through 
the National Assembly a bill granting him complete power to 



39 



South Korea: A Country Study 

control, regulate, and mobilize the people, the economy, the press, 
and everything else in the public domain. In October 1972, he 
proclaimed martial law, dissolved the National Assembly, closed 
all universities and colleges, imposed strict press censorship, and 
suspended political activities. Within a few days he "submitted" 
a new draft constitution — designated the yusin (revitalization) 
constitution — to a national referendum. The 1972 constitution al- 
lowed Park to succeed himself indefinitely, to appoint one- third 
of the National Assembly's members, and to exercise emergency 
powers at will. The president was to be chosen by the more than 
2,000 locally elected deputies of the supposedly nonpartisan National 
Conference for Unification, who were to cast their votes as an elec- 
toral college without debate. 

Students and intellectuals conducted a national campaign to 
revise the 1972 constitution in the fall of 1973. As the student cam- 
paign began to gather momentum, the president issued his first 
emergency decree in January 1974 outlawing all such campaigns. 
Successive emergency measures imposed further restrictions on 
other segments of society, but the harshest and most comprehen- 
sive restrictions were imposed by Emergency Measure Number 
Nine, issued in May 1975, which made it a crime either to criti- 
cize the constitution or to provide press coverage of such an activity, 
subject to a penalty of more than a year's imprisonment. Student 
participation in politics or coverage of student political activities 
in the press were subject to the same punishment. The president 
justified the harsh measures by citing the need for national unity 
in the face of an alleged threat of attack from North Korea. 

Having concentrated all power around himself, Park suppressed 
his opponents harshly. KCIA agents abducted Kim Dae Jung, 
Park's opponent in the 1971 presidential elections, from a hotel 
in Tokyo in August 1973, precipitating a major crisis in South 
Korean-Japanese relations. Kim had been abroad after the elec- 
tion and remained there after Park declared martial law, traveling 
between Japan and the United States and conducting anti-Park 
activities. Students demonstrating against the yusin constitution were 
summarily incarcerated. In March 1976, prominent political lead- 
ers, including former President Yun and presidential candidate 
Kim, issued the Democratic Declaration calling for the restoration 
of democracy. Park had them arrested and sentenced to five to eight 
years in prison. 

In the meantime, Park narrowly avoided an assassination at- 
tempt by a South Korean youth (resident in Japan), whose stray 
bullets killed the president's wife instead in August 1974. After this 
incident, Park became more reclusive and came to rely more and 



40 



Historical Setting 



more on his chief bodyguard, Ch'a Chi-ch'ol, of the Presidential 
Security Force. 

Force alone could not sustain the authoritarian system. Park's 
strongest defense against his critics had been the high rate of eco- 
nomic growth under his leadership (see The Government Role in 
Economic Development, ch. 3). By 1978, however, the growth rate 
had begun to decline, and inflation had become a serious problem. 
Seoul successfully weathered the first "oil shock" when Middle 
Eastern suppliers drastically raised prices in 1973, but was hard 
hit by the second shock in 1978-79. In December 1978, Park be- 
latedly adopted a stabilization plan to cool down the economy, but 
the plan caused a serious recession, leading to a succession of 
bankruptcies and increased unemployment. 

The first overt manifestation of workers' discontent appeared 
in August 1979 with demonstrations by 200 women employees of 
the Y.H. Industrial Company, which had just gone bankrupt. 
Women workers occupied the headquarters of the opposition New 
Democratic Party and demanded the right to manage the compa- 
ny themselves. When the workers refused to obey the government's 
order to disperse, some 1,000 riot policemen raided the building. 
Pandemonium occurred, and one of the workers died — it was 
unknown whether she had jumped, was pushed, or was jostled to 
her death. Despite the government's efforts, the "Y.H. Incident" 
became a rallying cry of the opposition. 

Aside from the visible social unrest caused by political suppres- 
sion and economic recession, the opposition camp had reason to 
become emboldened in its criticism of the government in 1979. Dis- 
affection was particularly severe in urban areas. Although the New 
Democratic Party was suffering from internal dissension, it won 
a plurality in the December 1978 general elections for the Nation- 
al Assembly, the first general elections to be held since 1973. In 
the 1978 elections, the Democratic Republican Party won only 30.9 
percent of the popular vote, a decline of 7.8 percent from 1973. 
In contrast, the opposition obtained 34.7 percent, an increase of 
2.2 percent from 1973. Independent candidates won 27.2 percent 
of the vote (twenty-two seats in the National Assembly); fifteen of 
the twenty-two subsequently joined the New Democratic Party, 
although three were "persuaded" to switch to the government 
party. Because one-third of the National Assembly's members were 
government- appointed, the opposition could not command a 
majority. 

The new leader of the New Democratic Party, Kim Young 
Sam, began his challenge to the government in June 1979. He an- 
nounced to the foreign press his readiness to meet with Kim II Sung, 



41 



South Korea: A Country Study 

the North Korean president, to discuss matters relating to unifi- 
cation and delivered a scathing attack on the government in the 
National Assembly. He argued that the government had been in 
power too long and had been clearly discredited by the elections; 
that Emergency Measure Number Nine suffocated peoples' free- 
dom and was clearly unconstitutional; that Seoul had colluded with 
hoodlums to assault the New Democratic Party headquarters and 
to harass him; that the suppression of human rights had become 
an international disgrace; that the people should be permitted to 
elect their own president through direct elections and be allowed 
to live without fear; and that a fair distribution of wealth should 
be permitted without government interference. The government 
immediately retaliated and ousted Kim from the National Assem- 
bly. In a show of solidarity, all opposition members of the Nation- 
al Assembly resigned on October 13, 1979. 

The Y.H. Incident and the harsh confrontation between the 
government and the opposition parties agitated the college students. 
Students in Taegu and Seoul staged campus rallies and demon- 
strations in September 1979. In mid-October, students in Pusan 
poured into the streets and clashed with police, leading the govern- 
ment to declare martial law in that city. In late October, students 
in Masan launched a demonstration. The government placed the 
city under 4 'garrison decree, ' ' and the army took over the respon- 
sibility for public order. 

Close Park associates such as Kim Chong-p'il were reported to 
have counseled the president to meet some of the student demands 
and reduce repression, but were opposed by presidential security 
chief Gh'a Chi-ch'ol. Ch'a also sharply disagreed with Kim Chae- 
gyu, the director of the KCIA, who had counseled moderation in 
the government's handling of the student protesters. On October 
26, 1979, the nation's most powerful figures — Park, Ch'a, and Kim 
Chae-gyu — met in a KCIA safe house restaurant for dinner to dis- 
cuss, among other things, the Pusan situation. In the sharply divided 
discussion that followed, Kim gunned down Park, Ch'a, and their 
bodyguards. 

It could be argued that Park had created his own dilemma by 
instituting the yusin constitution and by assuming unlimited pow- 
ers. If he had loosened control, however, the demand for reforms 
might have spread, proving impossible to contain. The system had 
provided for neither a pressure-release valve nor an escape hatch. 

In his eighteen years in power (1961-79), Park had been obsessed 
with ushering the country into the ranks of developed nations, had 
pursued his goal relentlessly, and had achieved considerable results. 
Having been trained under the Japanese, he closely patterned his 



42 



Historical Setting 



development strategies after Japan's, where a feudal society had 
been turned into a modern nation between the 1860s and 1930s. 

The Japanese leaders of the Meiji era (1868-1912), however, 
possessed two advantages over Park. First, they had operated in 
a period when the masses were less politically conscious and 
authoritarian control was more easily accepted. This was not the 
situation in South Korea, where students had already toppled a 
government in 1960. Second, the Japanese also had a built-in sys- 
tem of checks and balances because the top-echelon leaders oper- 
ated in a council where different leaders interacted among 
themselves as equals. Park, by contrast, operated on a one-man- 
rule basis, unchecked by constraints on his own decision-making 
powers. 

Economic Development 

South Korea's economy grew rapidly under Park. The military 
leaders, with little previous political or administrative experience, 
and lacking a developmental program, later turned to the 
economists and planners for assistance. The Economic Planning 
Board was established in 1961. A program of rapid industrializa- 
tion based on exports was launched. The shift in orientation was 
reflected in the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan 
(1962-66), and the subsequent second (1967-71), third (1972-76), 
and fourth (1977-81) five-year economic development plans. 

Park's policies encouraged private entrepreneurs. Businesses were 
given powerful incentives to export, including preferential treat- 
ment in obtaining low-interest bank loans, import privileges, per- 
mission to borrow from foreign sources, and tax benefits. Some 
of these businesses later became the chaebol (see Glossary; The Ori- 
gins and Development of Chaebol, ch. 3). 

Toward these ends, the currency was drastically devalued in 1961 
and 1964, and import quotas for raw materials eased. Private saving 
was encouraged by raising interest rates, and funds were borrowed 
from abroad. Exports also were encouraged by direct subsidies; 
all taxes and restrictions on the import of intermediate goods that 
were to be used to produce export products were removed. As the 
existing industries — textiles, clothing, and electrical machinery, 
among others — had been stagnant because of a lack of imported 
raw materials, these policies produced immediate results. 

These developmental programs required enormous amounts of 
capital. As the level of United States assistance stabilized, the Park 
regime turned to "financial diplomacy" with other countries. The 
normalization of relations with Japan in 1965 brought Japanese 
funds in the form of loans and compensation for the damages 



43 



South Korea: A Country Study 

suffered during the colonial era. Park made a state visit to the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany in 1964 that resulted in the extension 
of government aid and commercial credits. The availability of funds 
and the increasing level of exports elevated Seoul's credit rating, 
making it possible to increase borrowing in the open international 
market. Further, the conflict in Indochina stimulated economic 
growth. Seoul's export drive also owed much to the availability 
of an educated labor force and a favorable international market. 

South Korean businesses discovered that they could successfully 
compete abroad. As idle capacity was used up and the demand for 
new manufacturing investment rose, increasing numbers of for- 
eign investors were attracted to South Korea. 

Foreign exchange earnings improved as export and foreign 
receipts rose. The government also took steps to increase tax 
revenues and stabilize consumer prices. Much of the price stabiliza- 
tion program was carried out at the expense of farmers, who were 
forced to accept the government's policy of low grain prices. Agricul- 
tural development lagged behind until 1971, when the government 
shifted to a policy of high grain prices and inaugurated the Sae- 
maul undong (New Community Movement) aimed at improving 
the farm village environment and increasing agricultural produc- 
tion and income (see The Agricultural Crisis of the Late 1980s, 
ch. 3). 

Official statistics indicated rapid economic growth. Substantial 
successes were achieved under the first two five-year economic devel- 
opment plans. The manufacturing sector provided the main stimu- 
lus, growing by 15 percent and 21 percent, respectively, during 
the two plans. Domestic savings rates grew and exports expanded 
significantly (see Economic Plans, ch. 3). A new economic strategy 
emphasizing diversification in production and trade proved gener- 
ally successful in the 1970s. Under the third plan, the government 
made a bold move to expand South Korea's heavy and chemical 
industries, investing in steel, machinery, shipbuilding, electron- 
ics, chemicals, and nonferrous metals. South Korea's capability 
for steel production and oil refining rose most notably. Refineries 
for zinc and copper and modern shipbuilding facilities were con- 
structed; automobiles began to be exported to a few markets. The 
plan sought to better prepare South Korea for competition in the 
world market and to facilitate domestic production of weaponry. 

The quadrupling of oil prices beginning in 1973 severely threat- 
ened the South Korean economy, which depended heavily on 
imported oil for energy production. Construction contracts in the 
Middle East, however, provided the necessary foreign exchange 



44 



Historical Setting 



to forestall a balance-of-payments crisis and to continue the high 
rate of growth. 

The growth-oriented economic strategy emphasizing exports in- 
evitably produced side effects. Although the government previously 
had been able to manage these side effects and effectively surmount 
various economic crises, the situation began to deteriorate in 1978. 
The emphasis on exports had produced a shortage of domestic con- 
sumer goods that was exacerbated by the increasing demands 
brought about by rising wages and the advance in living standards. 
Price controls imposed on producers of consumer goods discouraged 
the manufacture of these goods. Meanwhile, the inflow of dollars 
rapidly expanded the money supply and inflation became a seri- 
ous problem. According to a Bank of Korea report, consumer prices 
rose only 14.4 percent in 1978, but most observers agreed that the 
actual rate was near 30 percent. 

The high rate of inflation continued into 1979. According to a 
report issued by the Economic Planning Board in August 1979, 
the average household's cost of living had gone up 26.3 percent 
from the previous year. Although wages had been rising rapidly 
during the previous several years — spurred by shortages of skilled 
and semiskilled workers — the rise in wages began to slow down. 
The average wage increased 1 2 percent during the year preceding 
August 1979. 

To address these ills, Park had replaced the economic team in 
the cabinet in December 1978 and adopted stabilization measures 
entailing the lowering of the growth rate: a stringent tight-money 
policy; a switch of investment capital planned for heavy industries 
to light industries producing consumer products; a reduction of 
price controls to encourage more production of consumer goods; 
and assistance for the poor. But these measures caused a reces- 
sion, produced a succession of bankruptcies among small and medi- 
um loan-dependent enterprises, and increased unemployment. 

Society under Park 

The rapid pace of industrialization not only changed much of 
the South Korean landscape, as farmlands were converted into high- 
ways and factory sites, but also profoundly modified social struc- 
ture, social values, and behavior. As late as 1965, some 58.7 percent 
of the labor force was engaged in agriculture and fishery, but the 
percentage declined to 50.4 percent in 1970 and 38.4 percent in 
1978. The percentage of workers engaged in secondary industries, 
including mining and manufacturing, rose from 10.3 percent in 
1965 to 35.2 percent in 1970 and 38.4 percent in 1978. Industri- 
alization led to a rapid increase in South Korea's urban population, 



45 



South Korea: A Country Study 

which rose from 28.3 percent of the total in 1960 to 54.9 percent 
in 1979. Rapid urbanization compounded the problems of hous- 
ing, transportation, sanitation, and pollution, and exacerbated other 
social problems. 

Improved living standards and ever-increasing job opportuni- 
ties accelerated the desire among South Koreans for education, par- 
ticularly at secondary schools and institutions of higher learning. 
In 1960 about one-third of children between twelve and fourteen 
years of age attended middle schools; that proportion increased to 
53.3 percent in 1970 and 74.0 percent in 1975. In 1960 some 19.9 
percent of the population between fifteen and seventeen years of 
age attended high schools; that proportion increased to 29.3 per- 
cent in 1970 and 40.5 percent in 1975. By 1970 about 9.3 percent 
of college-age youths attended colleges and universities, and the 
number of university graduates exceeded 30,000 a year. Eight years 
later, 41,680 students graduated from four- year institutions of 
higher learning (see Education, ch. 2). 

Most workers with higher education qualifications were absorbed 
by the rapidly growing industrial and commercial sectors, joining 
the ranks of the growing middle class. Demands and rewards for 
people in the more prestigious fields — doctors, lawyers, economists, 
scientists, and managers — were increasing. The number of white- 
collar workers in commerce, industry, banking, civil service, and 
the teaching profession also rose, as did the number of small en- 
trepreneurs and retailers. 

A high proportion of those people who regarded themselves as 
middle class resided in Seoul, the locale for much of the nation's 
wealth, talent, and many of its cultural resources. As beneficiaries 
of the rapidly expanding economy, much of the middle class either 
was content with its situation or indifferent to politics. Many highly 
educated persons in this group who found themselves in less well- 
paid positions than they would have liked remained dissatisfied, 
and together with students and intellectuals they formed the core 
of opposition to the Park regime. 

Rural villages also underwent changes of revolutionary propor- 
tions, particularly after 1971. As the government had emphasized 
industrial growth and slighted the agrarian sector, agricultural 
production lagged; its annual rate of growth during the 1967-72 
period was only about 2.5 percent. With overall GNP growing at 
over 10 percent a year during the same period, the rural economy 
steadily lost ground, until by 1969 farm income was only a little 
more than half that earned by urban workers. This situation con- 
tributed to the high rate of migration to the cities and eroded po- 
litical support for the president (see Agriculture, ch. 3). 



46 



Historical Setting 



This situation led the government to take active measures to in- 
crease farm productivity and income in 1971. Government subsi- 
dies to farmers were increased by setting relatively high prices for 
grains. Higher-yield rice varieties were introduced. Advanced 
agricultural technology was made more widely available through 
extension services, and more fertilizers and credits were provided. 
As a result of these measures, farm productivity and farm income 
increased very rapidly during the ensuing years, and the rate of 
emigration to the cities tapered off. 

The Saemaul Movement was instituted with great fanfare by 
Park in the fall of 1971 . The movement was envisioned as a higlily 
organized, intensively administered campaign to improve the ' 'en- 
vironment" quality of rural life through projects undertaken by the 
villagers themselves with government assistance. The bureaucracy, 
particularly at the regional and local levels, was mobilized on a 
massive scale to ensure that the program would be carried through 
to completion in all 36,000 villages. The initial emphasis was on 
improving village roads and bridges and replacing thatch with tile 
or composition roofs. 

The momentum was maintained and increased in subsequent 
years as the Saemaul Movement evolved into a major ideological 
campaign aimed at the psychological mobilization of the entire coun- 
try in support of "nation building." During the first two or three 
years, emphasis continued to be on improving the village environ- 
ment, but later focus was shifted toward projects designed to raise 
agricultural productivity and farm income. 

As local government officials were jolted out of their traditional 
lethargy by the continuing insistence of higher authorities that 
essential services be delivered to farmers, the farmers began to have 
ready access to agricultural extension services, rural credit, and 
market information. The result of improved services and increased 
resource allocation was that farmers became more confident of their 
ability to improve the village environment through their own 
cooperative efforts and became more convinced of the usefulness 
of outside official help. As a result of the Saemaul Movement, about 
85 percent of villages had electricity, and about 60 percent of farm 
households had television sets by the late 1970s. Some 85 percent 
of rural children continued from free, obligatory primary school- 
ing to middle school, and over 50 percent of these middle school 
pupils were entering high schools. Many farmers also acquired 
modern amenities that had been available only to city dwellers just 
a decade earlier, such as sewing machines, radios, irons, and wall 
clocks. 



47 




49 



South Korea: A Country Study 

Foreign Relations 

Relations with North Korea 

Even though the Korean War ended in a truce agreement in 
July 1953, a high level of tension remained between the two coun- 
tries. Although North Korea presented numerous proposals for 
peaceful unification after signing the truce, none was premised on 
the notion of the continuation of the existing South Korean govern- 
ment, which made the proposals unacceptable to Seoul. 

Throughout the Park era, relations with North Korea were 
marked by mutual distrust and discord, with only a brief respite 
between July 1972 and June 1973 when the two sides engaged in 
high-level negotiations. Hopes were raised that tensions might be 
reduced and a way toward unification of the divided nation found. 
Entrenched suspicions made the contentious issues separating the 
two sides even more difficult to solve, and the talks were broken 
off (see Relations with North Korea, ch. 4). Meanwhile, the armed 
confrontation continued (see The Threat from the North, ch. 5). 

The continuing failure of the negotiations reflected the depth of 
the gap separating the two Koreas — particularly noteworthy in view 
of the mellowing international environment evidenced, for exam- 
ple, by China's much-improved relations with both the United 
States and Japan. There were indications that both China and the 
United States exerted considerable influence on the Korean negoti- 
ations, but without marked effect. Leaders in the north and the 
south found their ideologies and aims totally incompatible. South 
Korea's leaders were determined to keep their society free from 
communism, while North Korea's leaders were committed to the 
cause of bringing "people's democratic revolution" to the south. 

Relations with Japan 

The most important development in South Korea's diplomacy 
under Park was the normalization of relations with Japan. Although 
South Korea had traded with Japan since 1948 and the two coun- 
tries had engaged in negotiations since 1951, disagreement on a 
number of issues had prevented diplomatic ties. The junta under 
Park actively sought to normalize relations. Negotiations resumed 
in October 1961 , culminating in an agreement in June 1965 to es- 
tablish diplomatic relations (see Relations with Japan, ch. 4). Park 
settled for a fraction of the "reparations" earlier demanded by 
Rhee, and Japanese fishermen were given access to South Korean 
waters outside of the three-mile territorial limit (Rhee had prohib- 
ited Japanese fishermen from coming any closer than the medial 
line between Japan and Korea). Under the treaty, the Japanese 



50 



Historical Setting 



government was to provide the capital necessary for an industri- 
alization program and to open up ever- increasing loans, invest- 
ments (both public and private), and trade (see Foreign Economic 
Relations, ch. 3). The treaty normalizing relations was denounced 
as a sellout by the opposition and the intellectuals and touched off 
prolonged, widespread student demonstrations. 

South Korean-Japanese relations since normalization have been 
amicable, but were considerably strained by the abduction from 
Tokyo of Kim Dae Jung in August 1973, which resulted in long 
and embarrassing negotiations. In 1979 South Korean-Japanese 
relations entered a new era as the two countries began informal 
ties on defense matters, such as the establishment of the Korean- 
Japanese Parliamentary Conference on Security Affairs. 

Relations with the United States 

South Korea continued to depend on United States military as- 
sistance. In spite of initial United States hesitation about support- 
ing Park in 1961, the two countries maintained close economic, 
military, and diplomatic ties. South Korea dispatched combat troops 
to the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) in 1965 to augment 
United States forces there, and President Lyndon B. Johnson paid 
a personal visit to Seoul in October 1966 to show his appreciation. 

Friction began to develop in the Washington- Seoul relationship 
after the United States withdrew one of its two divisions from South 
Korea in 1971 and intensified after Park instituted rigorous authori- 
tarian measures under his 1972 constitution. This tension led to 
an accelerated effort by the Park government to gain support in 
the United States Congress. The methods used by Seoul's lobbyists 
ultimately resulted in the embarrassing "Koreagate" affair of 1977, 
involving former Ambassador Kim Dong-jo and rice dealer Park 
Tong Sun. Investigations by the Ethics Committee and by the Sub- 
committee on International Organizations of the Committee on 
International Relations of the United States House of Represen- 
tatives received much press coverage and weakened United States 
support for South Korea. 

During his presidential election campaign in 1976, Jimmy Carter 
pledged, if elected, to withdraw all combat troops from South Korea. 
His victory aggravated United States-South Korean relations con- 
siderably (see Relations with The United States, ch. 4). In March 
1977, the United States decided to withdraw its ground combat 
forces over a four-to-five year period. Some 3,600 troops subse- 
quently were withdrawn, but further reductions were suspended 
in 1979. In the meantime, President Carter and the Congress con- 
tinued to press for the improvement of the human rights climate 



51 



South Korea: A Country Study 

in South Korea. Relations between the two countries were at a low 
point in 1979, just before Park's assassination. In early 1981, Presi- 
dent Ronald Reagan's administration announced that further with- 
drawals were not being considered. 

The Transition 

Soon after Park's October 26, 1979 assassination, South Korea 
went through kaleidoscopic changes — intense and open competi- 
tion for power, student upheavals, a military takeover, a gruesome 
massacre, and the emergence of a new authoritarian order. Since 
Park had concentrated virtually all political power around him- 
self, his assassination created a political vacuum. One of his main 
pillars of power, the director of the Presidential Security Force, 
was assassinated with him; the director of the other major political 
instrument, the KCIA, was quickly arrested by the Martial Law 
Command for conducting the assassinations. In addition, the 
National Assembly, one-third of its members presidential appoin- 
tees, had been rendered impotent by the yusin constitution. 

Ch'oe Kyu-ha, premier under Park, was elected president in 
December 1979 by the National Conference for Unification, a rub- 
ber stamp electoral college. Ch'oe had no independent political base. 
He reaffirmed the need for a new constitution in his December 
21 inaugural speech, stating that a new constitution supported by 
a majority of the people would be adopted within a year and that 
a fair general election would be held soon afterward. 

Even before his inauguration, Ch'oe, as acting president, had 
abolished Emergency Measure Number Nine. Several hundred in- 
dividuals serving prison terms or being investigated on charges of 
violating that decree were released on December 8. One of those 
benefiting from the release was Kim Dae Jung, who had been un- 
der house arrest and whose civil rights were to be restored on Febru- 
ary 29, 1980. Also affected were student activists who had been 
arrested for staging campus demonstrations. 

Lieutenant General Chun Doo Hwan, the head of the Defense 
Security Command, was responsible for conducting the investiga- 
tion of Park's assassination. Chun used the factionalism rife with- 
in the military to assert his control over the army on December 
12, 1979. He promptly set about uprooting the Park-era power 
elite and building a new political base. This power play, combined 
with increasing social and labor unrest, economic instability, and 
the factionalism within and between the ruling and opposition par- 
ties, set the scene for the military's consolidation of power and cul- 
minated in Chun's assumption of the presidency in August 1980. 

Politics in South Korea in 1980 mainly revolved around framing 



52 



Historical Setting 



a new constitution. The principal opposition party, the New 
Democratic Party under Kim Young Sam, advocated concluding 
the process by August 15, but President Ch'oe, evidently under 
military pressure, was not ready to expedite the constitutional 
process. The scheduling issue led to a major student upheaval in 
May 1980, followed by a military takeover. 

The Democratic Republican Party 

In the meantime, the country underwent a brisk process of poli- 
tical realignment. Although Park had organized and headed the 
Democratic Republican Party in 1963 to mobilize mass support 
behind his regime, by 1972 he had discarded it when he imposed 
the yusin constitution. As a result, the DRP had only a nominal 
existence at the time of Park's death. It was incumbent upon the 
new president of the DRP, Kim Chong-p'il, to revive the party. 
The DRP had suffered a disastrous loss in the December 1978 Na- 
tional Assembly elections. This situation led to a call for "rectifi- 
cation" (chongp'ung) within the party, which meant removing certain 
top leaders who had attracted notoriety for illicit wealth and un- 
democratic political behavior. 

The New Democratic Party 

The New Democratic Party (NDP), the principal opposition 
party, also had its share of problems. Kim Young Sam was elected 
as NDP leader for three years in 1979, so his position would have 
been secure had not the Ch'oe government restored Kim Dae 
Jung's civil rights. Even though Kim Dae Jung, the NDP presiden- 
tial candidate in 1971 , had been out of the political arena for more 
than seven years, he commanded a large political following. Be- 
cause the NDP was expected to win the forthcoming election by 
a wide margin, the presidency of the republic was at stake in the 
negotiations for Kim Dae Jung's reinstatement in the party. In 
the end, negotiations broke off, and on April 7, 1980, Kim Dae 
Jung declared that he would no longer seek to rejoin the NDP. 

Although Kim Young Sam and his supporters had waged a fierce 
political struggle against President Park toward the end of his rule, 
many of those in leadership positions in the NDP had tended to 
be accommodating to the Park regime. Kim Dae Jung and his fol- 
lowers, on the other hand, represented the active dissident students, 
intellectuals, and progressive Christians who had engaged in direct 
struggle against the Park regime. The chaeya serydk (literally, forces 
in the field, but the term also means an opposing political force) 
were more radical in orientation. Kim Dae Jung and his group 



53 



South Korea: A Country Study 

wished to expedite the process of restoring democracy, even if it 
meant forcing the hands of Ch'oe and his supporters. 

Students in 1980 

While professional politicians engaged in the struggle for realign- 
ment, college students were restless for action. The students ini- 
tially were concerned with campus affairs. As soon as the new 
semester began in March 1980, students on various campuses began 
to demand the removal of professors with close ties to the Park 
regime and of university owner-presidents who had amassed for- 
tunes by operating their institutions. They also demanded autonomy 
from government control. The students held rallies and on-campus 
demonstrations and in some cases occupied college offices. As a 
result of the unrest, many university presidents resigned. 

In early May 1980, however, the students' slogans began to 
change. Students demanded that martial law be lifted immediately 
and that the "remnants of the yusin system," including Chun, be 
removed. They also demanded the guarantee of labor rights, the 
removal of "compradore capital," and the protection of farmers' 
rights. Although student demonstrations had been confined to their 
campuses when the issues raised concerned institutional matters, 
they now began to spill out into the streets. 

The massive demonstrations by the students continued until May 
16, when Premier Sin Hyon-hwak promised that the government 
would attempt to speed up the process of adopting a new constitu- 
tion. Ch'oe even shortened his Middle Eastern trip by a day and 
returned home on the evening of May 1 7 . Student demonstrations 
paralyzed the nation and sent politicians and government leaders 
to their council meetings. According to an unconfirmed report, Sin 
even offered his resignation to the president upon his return and 
advised the president to remove Chun. 

General Chun Doo Hwan Takes Over 

Whatever counsel the civilian leaders may have offered Ch'oe, 
the military's position prevailed. Chun Doo Hwan, as head of the 
Defense Security Command, had already replaced the army chief 
of staff in December 1979 and had taken the command of the KCIA 
in April 1980. 

Chun's methodical and speedy actions after May 17 clearly re- 
vealed that he had a well-laid plan. He issued a decree closing down 
the colleges and universities and prohibiting all political gather- 
ings. All publications and broadcasts were to receive prior censor- 
ship, criticism of the incumbent and past presidents was outlawed, 
and the manufacture and spreading of rumors were forbidden. 



54 



Historical Setting 



Chun's plan aimed not only at quelling demonstrations but also 
at destroying the power base of all existing political figures and 
groups. 

The arrest of Kim Dae Jung and other arch enemies of Park 
was to be expected as soon as the military stepped in on May 1 7 . 
But the arrest of Kim Chong-p'il and other people who had been 
influential under Park came as a total surprise. 

The Kwangju Uprising 

Chun's hard-line policy led to a confrontation in Kwangju, a 
city of 600,000 people located 170 miles south of Seoul, in South 
Cholla Province, the scene of an uprising and bloodbath between 
May 18 and 27. As noted in a report issued by the Martial Law 
Command, the students and ''hot-blooded young soldiers" con- 
fronted each other; angry citizens joined in, driven by alleged 
rumors that the ■ 1 soldiers of Kyongsang Province origin came to 
exterminate the seeds of the Cholla people." 

The Kwangju massacre was to became an important landmark 
in the struggle for South Korean democracy. It heightened provin- 
cial hostility and marked the beginning of the rise of anti-American 
sentiment in South Korea. 

According to the report, the sequence of events was triggered 
by student demonstrations on the morning of May 18 in defiance 
of the new edict. Some 200 Chonnam University students began 
demonstrating in the morning, and by 2:00 P.M. they had been 
joined by more than 800 additional demonstrators. City police were 
unable to control the crowd. At about 4:00 P.M., the Martial Law 
Command dispatched a Special Forces detachment consisting of 
paratroopers trained for assault missions. The report did not men- 
tion it, but the paratroopers killed a large number of people. 

On May 20, some 10,000 people demonstrated in Kwangju. On 
May 21, the Special Forces were withdrawn, and the city was left 
to the rioters. A memorial service was held on May 24, with ap- 
proximately 15,000 citizens in attendance. 

On May 25, approximately 50,000 people gathered for a rally 
and adopted a resolution calling for the abolition of martial law 
and the release of Kim Dae Jung. A committee of leading citizens 
was organized on May 23 to try to settle the impasse, but "im- 
pure elements" and "maneuverers behind the scene" allegedly ob- 
structed an effective solution. On May 27, at 3:30 A.M., an army 
division that had been circling the city for three days launched an 
attack. After light skirmishes, the army quashed the revolt in less 
than two hours. The army arrested 1 ,740 rioters, of whom 730 were 
detained for investigation. 



55 



South Korea: A Country Study 

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the Martial Law 
Command's account. The uprising started with student demon- 
strations. The Martial Law Command dispatched assault troops 
whose random killings angered citizens who had not participated 
in the initial student demonstrations. According to later reports 
by the command, nearly 200 persons were killed, including 22 sol- 
diers and 4 policemen; of the civilians killed, only 17 died on the 
final day of assault. And, regardless of who spread the "wanton 
rumors," they evidently were credible enough to prompt the gather- 
ing of 50,000 Kwangju citizens. 

Chun, touring the city after the revolt had ended, told the peo- 
ple of Kwangju not to make an issue of what had happened, but 
to learn from it. The specter of Kwangju, however, was to haunt 
him for years to come. 

There were several aftereffects resulting from the Kwangju in- 
cident. It deepened the chasm that had existed between the Kyong- 
sang provinces (from which Park and Chun originated) and the 
Cholla provinces, of which Kwangju is a capital and from which 
the opposition leader Kim Dae Jung came (see Population Settle- 
ment Patterns, ch. 2). The United States' role also was controver- 
sial. General John A. Wickham, Jr. had released South Korean 
troops from the South Korea-United States Combined Forces Com- 
mand to end the rebellion, and President Reagan had strongly en- 
dorsed Chun's actions (see Relations with the United States, ch. 4). 

The Chun Regime 

Having suppressed the Kwangju uprising with brute force, 
General Chun Doo Hwan further tightened his grip on the govern- 
ment. He and three of his close associates served as the core of 
the junta committee, known as the Special Committee for National 
Security Measures. The three were Lieutenant General Ch'a Kyu- 
hon (deputy chief of staff of the army), Major General Roh Tae 
Woo (commander of the Capital Garrison Command), and Major 
General Chong Ho-yong (commander of the Special Forces). The 
junta vested in itself the authority to pass laws and to make all de- 
cisions affecting the state until a new National Assembly came into 
being. 

On August 5, 1980, Chun promoted himself from lieutenant 
general to full general in preparation for retiring from the army 
on August 22. On August 27 he was elected president by the 
National Conference for Unification, receiving 2,524 of the 2,525 
votes cast. The single dissenting vote was invalidated for an 
unknown reason. 



56 



Historical Setting 



Chun presented his objective at his September 1 , 1980, inaugu- 
ration: to create a new society where all past corrupt practices would 
be replaced by mutual trust and justice. In order to accomplish 
this goal, he planned to remove the old politicians from the scene; 
only those certified as "clean" would be permitted to participate 
in building the new order. 

In the economic field, Chun intended to do away with excessive 
protection of industries and to encourage creativity. An increase 
in employment opportunities would be facilitated, and coopera- 
tion and coprosperity between labor and management would be 
brought about. Farmers' income would be increased by continu- 
ing the Saemaul Movement. 

The 1980 Constitution 

One of Chun's inaugural promises was the promulgation of a 
new constitution and the holding of a national referendum to ap- 
prove it. On September 29, 1980, the government announced the 
draft of a constitution that in many ways was the most democratic 
South Korea had ever had — except for the supplementary provi- 
sions and the procedure for presidential election. The guarantee 
of peoples' democratic rights was absolute, including the right to 
privacy in communications, the prohibition of torture, and the in- 
admissability in court trials of confessions obtained by force. The 
president, who was to be elected by an electoral college and to serve 
a single seven-year term, was given strong powers, including the 
right to dissolve the National Assembly, which in turn could bring 
down cabinets but not the president. In the event that the consti- 
tution was amended to extend the president's term of office, such 
changes were not to be applied to the incumbent. The document 
received the overwhelming approval of the voters — 91 .6 percent — at 
the national referendum held on October 22, 1980. 

The constitution, however, was a "promissory note." Until the 
new National Assembly was elected and inaugurated, the Legisla- 
tive Council for National Security, to be appointed by Chun, would 
enact all laws. A supplementary provision in the constitution also 
called for the dissolution of all existing political parties. In effect, 
by offering to bring in a democratic government by June 1981, 
Chun had obtained a mandate to change the political landscape 
in whatever form he chose. The new constitution placed South 
Korea under a constitutional dictatorship from October 1980 to 
June 1981. 

Purges 

Chun zealously pushed his campaign to weed out corruption. 



57 



South Korea: A Country Study 

The clean-up campaign began in May 1980 when Kim Chong- 
p'il and others were forced to give up their wealth and retire from 
politics. In June some 300 senior KCIA agents were dismissed. 
In July 1980, more than 230 senior officials, including former cabi- 
net officers, were dismissed on corruption charges. The ax also fell 
on 4,760 low-level officials in the government, state-owned firms, 
and banks, with the proviso that the former officials not be rehired 
by such firms within two years. The Martial Law Command ar- 
rested 1 7 prominent politicians of both the government and oppo- 
sition parties for investigation and removed some 400 bank officials, 
including 4 bank presidents and 21 vice presidents. The govern- 
ment also announced the dismissal of 1 ,819 officials of public enter- 
prises and affiliated agencies, including 39 (some 25 percent) of 
the presidents and vice presidents of such enterprises and banks 
and 128 board directors (more than 22 percent). 

The "clean-up campaign" also extended to the mass media. On 
July 31 , 1980, the 172 periodicals that allegedly caused "social decay 
and juvenile delinquency" were summarily abolished, among them 
some of the finest intellectual magazines of liberal inclination and 
prestigious journals for general audiences. This action resulted in 
the dismissal of hundreds of journalists and staff. The daily 
newspapers not affected by the purge also were directed to weed 
out "corrupting," that is, liberal writers (see The Media, ch. 4). 

Chun's "Cultural Revolution" 

In the wake of Chun's purge, the government also launched a 
massive reeducation program for the nation's elites. High govern- 
ment officials, judges, prosecutors, business executives, college 
professors, and their spouses — 32,000 persons in all — were brought 
together for an intensive three-day training program at Saemaul's 
New Community Training Centers in Suwon and elsewhere. The 
training regimen included morning exercises, environmental 
cleanup, lectures on the New Community Movement, and discus- 
sion sessions on "the proper way of life." 

This training program, initiated under Park's regime, eventu- 
ally was to be extended to the general public. In August 1980, the 
government launched another massive propaganda campaign, or- 
ganizing "Bright Society Rallies" in major cities where tens of thou- 
sands of citizens were mobilized to hear speeches. In addition, 
"Cleansing Committees" were established at all levels of govern- 
ment down to the local ward (ri and dong) levels (see Local Ad- 
ministration, ch. 4). 



58 



Historical Setting 



Economic Performance 

The new regime inherited an economy suffering from all the side 
effects of Park's export-oriented development program and policy 
of expanding heavy and chemical industries (see Economic Develop- 
ment, this ch.; Industrial Policies, ch. 3). The international eco- 
nomic environment of the early 1980s was extremely unfavorable, 
a situation that further restricted South Korea's exports. It was 
necessary, therefore, for the Chun regime to concentrate on stabili- 
zation, and it devoted its first two years to controlling inflation while 
attempting to bring about economic recovery. Investment was 
redirected from the capital-intensive heavy and chemical industries 
towards labor-intensive light industries that produced consumer 
goods. Import restrictions were lifted. 

The economy began to improve in 1983 because of stringent anti- 
inflationary measures and the upturn in the world economy. While 
South Korea had suffered a negative growth rate in 1980, it at- 
tained an 8.1 percent growth rate in 1983. Exports began increas- 
ing in mid- 1983 and the economy began to gain strength. A good 
harvest in 1983 also helped. South Korea attained its 1983 export 
target of US$23.5 billion, a 7.6 percent increase from 1982. 

In December 1983, Seoul unveiled its revised Fifth Five- Year 
Economic and Social Development Plan. The plan called for steady 
growth for the next three years, low inflation, and sharply reduced 
foreign borrowing. Exports were to rise by 15 percent a year, infla- 
tion was projected to be held at 1.8 percent, and per capita GNP 
was to rise to US$2,325 by 1986. The annual growth rate was plan- 
ned to average 7.5 percent though the actual performance was 
higher. The real GNP growth rate was 7 percent in 1985, but for 
the next three years 12.9 percent, 12.8 percent, and 12.2 percent, 
respectively. 

Foreign Policy 

United States 

One of the most salient elements of the Chun regime was its close 
ties with the Reagan administration. The ties were in sharp con- 
trast to the strained Washington-Seoul relationship under presi- 
dents Carter and Park, when the United States government had 
criticized Park's dictatorial policies and attempted to implement 
Carter's campaign pledge to withdraw United States ground combat 
troops from South Korea. The relationship also had been strained 
because of the 1977 Koreagate scandal. 

Reagan provided unmitigated support to Chun and to South 



59 



South Korea: A Country Study 

Korea's security. Chun was Reagan's first official guest in the White 
House. Reagan reaffirmed his support of Chun by visiting Seoul 
in November 1983. 

While Reagan's support considerably buttressed Chun's stature 
in domestic politics and the international arena, it also fueled the 
subculture of anti- Americanism. The opposition forces in South 
Korea, suffering from the government's stringent suppression, 
denounced United States' support for the Chun regime as a cal- 
lous disregard for human rights and questioned the United States' 
motives in Korea. The past image of the United States as a staunch 
supporter of democracy in South Korea was replaced with that of 
defender of its own interests, a policy impervious to injustices com- 
mitted in South Korea. This view was accentuated by the fact that 
Chun's White House visit occurred only several months after the 
Martial Law Command had brutally suppressed the student up- 
rising in Kwangju. (It was later revealed by Richard V. Allen, Na- 
tional Security Advisor to President Reagan, that Chun's visit was 
part of Washington's diplomatic effort to spare the life of Kim Dae 
Jung, who had been sentenced to death.) This atmosphere led some 
of South Korea's radical elements to take extreme measures, such 
as arson committed at the United States Information Service build- 
ing in Pusan in March 1982 and the occupation of the United States 
Information Service Library in Seoul in May 1985. Students who 
demonstrated against the Chun government invariably carried anti- 
American slogans. 

Japan 

The Chun government also brought about a significant change 
in South Korea's relations with Japan. In 1981 Chun utilized the 
United States' support and its strategy of allocating greater respon- 
sibility to Japan in the East Asian region to persuade Tokyo to 
grant Seoul a large public loan. The negotiations lasted until early 
1983 and aroused many conflicting emotions in both countries. 
However, Chun was able to obtain a US$4 billion low-interest loan 
that significantiy contributed to boosting South Korea's credit rating 
and to accelerating its economic recovery; Seoul's foreign debt had 
reached US$41 billion at the end of 1983 and was badly in need 
of an improved credit rating. Japanese prime minister Nakasone 
Yasuhiro capped the negotiation process by paying a state visit to 
Seoul in January 1983. Whereas other Japanese prime ministers 
had visited Seoul for inaugurations or funerals, this was the first 
state visit to South Korea by a Japanese leader since the country 
was liberated from Japan in 1945. 



60 



Historical Setting 



China and the Soviet Union 

Chun continued Park's policy of improving relations with Chi- 
na and the Soviet Union and attached considerable importance to 
these two countries, long the allies of North Korea. Beijing and 
Moscow were thought to have much influence in charting the fu- 
ture of the Korean Peninsula and were thus a part of Nordpolitik 
(see Relations with the Soviet Union; Relations with China, ch. 4). 

Seoul's official contact with Beijing was facilitated by the land- 
ing of a hijacked Chinese civilian airliner in May 1983. China sent 
a delegation of thirty-three officials to Seoul to negotiate the return 
of the airliner, marking the beginning of frequent exchanges of per- 
sonnel. For example, in March 1984, a South Korean tennis team 
visited Kunming for a Davis Cup match with a Chinese team. In 
April 1984, a thirty-four-member Chinese basketball team arrived 
in Seoul to participate in the Eighth Asian Junior Basketball Cham- 
pionships. Some Chinese officials reportedly paid quiet visits to 
South Korea to inspect its industries, and South Korean officials 
visited China to attend various international conferences. Since Chi- 
na and South Korea began indirect trade in 1975, the volume has 
steadily increased (see Foreign Trade Policy, ch. 3). 

The Soviet Union's unofficial relationship with South Korea be- 
gan in 1973, when it permitted South Koreans to attend an inter- 
national conference held in the Soviet Union. In October 1982, 
a Soviet official attended an international conference in South Korea 
on the preservation of cultural relics. The uproar following the 
Korean Air (KAL) 007 incident in September 1983, when the Soviet 
air force shot down the KAL passenger airplane, brought about 
a hiatus in contacts, but the unofficial relationship resumed in 1988. 

The Demise of the Chun Regime 

Even though Chun Doo Hwan's government had attained con- 
siderable results in economy and diplomacy, his government failed 
to win public trust or support. In spite of Chun's lofty pronounce- 
ments, the public basically regarded Chun as a usurper of power 
who had deprived South Korea of its opportunity to restore 
democracy. Chun lacked political credentials; his access to power 
derived from his position as the head of the Defense Security 
Command — the army's nerve center of political intelligence — and 
his ability to bring together his generals in the front lines. 

Chun and his military followers failed to overcome the stigma 
of the Kwangju incident, and the new "just society" that he 
promised did not materialize. In fact, between 1982 and 1983, at 
least two of the major financial scandals in South Korea involved 



61 



South Korea: A Country Study 

Chun's in-laws. The Chun government's slogans became hollow. 
While Park had gained respect and popularity through the record- 
breaking pace of economic development, Chun could not repeat 
such a feat. In the 1985 National Assembly elections, opposition 
parties together won more votes than the government party, clearly 
indicating that the public wanted a change. Moreover, increasing 
numbers of people had become more sympathetic to the students, 
who presented increasingly radical demands. 

One of the most serious problems the government faced was that 
the argument for restricting democracy became less and less credi- 
ble. The people had long been tolerant of various restrictions im- 
posed by succeeding governments because of the perceived threat 
from the north, but the consensus eroded as the international en- 
vironment moderated. More and more people became cynical about 
repeated government pronouncements, viewing them as self-serving 
propaganda by those in power. This tendency was particularly 
pronounced among the post-Korean War generation that constitut- 
ed a majority of the South Korean population. 

The unpopular Chun regime and its constitutional framework 
was brought down in 1987 largely by the student agitation that 
beset the regime. Student activists set the tone and agenda of the 
society as a whole because the government and the government- 
controlled press had lost their credibility. The opposition parties 
worked with the students, although they disagreed on the ultimate 
aim — the politicians wanted reform, while the students demanded 
revolution. The opposition politicians wanted constitutional reform 
to replace the existing system of electing the president through the 
handpicked electoral college with direct popular election. The stu- 
dents attacked not only the military leaders in power but also the 
entire socio-political and economic establishment. 

A small number of confirmed radicals led the student movement. 
They argued that the basic cause for the political and social malaise 
in South Korea was "American imperialism," which they believed 
had dominated South Korea ever since it was liberated from Japan 
in 1945. In their view, "American imperialism" buttressed the 
military dictatorship and the exploitative capitalist system; the strug- 
gle against the military dictatorship and American imperialism was 
inseparable. This position was the same argument that North Korea 
had been advancing since 1946, but a more important source of 
intellectual persuasion came from the revisionist school of histori- 
ography that swept United States academia during the 1970s. 

The revisionist argument was very similar to that of Lenin on 
imperialism. The Cold War was seen as the inevitable outcome of 
the United States capitalist system's need for continuous economic 



62 



Historical Setting 



expansion abroad. United States participation in the Korean War 
and the subsequent stationing of United States forces in South Korea 
satisfied such a need, according to this perspective. For the revi- 
sionists, it was irrelevant that the United States had decided to aban- 
don Korea in September-October 1947, or that the United States 
had withdrawn its occupation forces from South Korea in 1949. 
The communist countries, whether the Soviet Union or North 
Korea, were seen as passive entities reacting against the aggres- 
sive actions of ' 'American imperialists' ' rather than pursuing their 
own goals. The fact that the United States had interjected itself 
into the Korean War in 1950, and that it continued to station its 
troops in South Korea after the war, was evidence enough. 

The revisionist arguments found a fertile soil among the univer- 
sity students. The inquisitive students had long viewed the one- 
sided anticommunist propaganda emanating from official and 
established sources as stifling and as leaving too many questions 
unanswered. The new arguments sounded logical and convincing, 
particularly when some of the revisionists took liberty with histor- 
ical evidence. Increasing numbers of students took to the streets 
to denounce the military dictatorship and American imperialism. 

Initially, the public was apathetic to the confrontation between 
the student demonstrators and government, but the daily fracas 
on the streets and the never-ending smell of tear gas aroused their 
ire. The news about the torture and death of a student, Pak Chong- 
ch'ol, by the police touched the sore nerves of the people. Presi- 
dent Chun attempted to squash the opposition by issuing a decla- 
ration on April 13, 1987, to suspend the ''wasteful debate" about 
constitutional reform until a new government was installed at the 
end of his seven-year term. The declaration was, instead, his re- 
gime's swan song. Chun wanted to have his successor "elected" 
by his handpicked supporters; the public greeted the declaration 
with universal outrage. Even the Reagan administration, which 
had been taciturn about South Korea's internal politics, urged the 
Chun government not to ignore the outrage. Finally, on June 29, 
1987, Roh Tae Woo, the government party's choice as Chun's suc- 
cessor, made a dramatic announcement in favor of a new democratic 
constitution that embodied all the opposition's demands. 

* * * 

Extensive literature is available in English on all the subjects co- 
vered in this chapter. Ki-baik Lee's A New History of Korea is the 
best account of Korean history available in English. The follow- 
ing sources are also helpful: Han Woo-kuen's The History of Korea; 



63 



South Korea: A Country Study 

William Henthorn's A History of Korea; The History of Korea by Sohn 
Pow-key, Kim Chol-choon, and Hong Yi-sup; and East Asia: Tra- 
dition and Transformation, coauthored by John K. Fairbank, Edwin 
O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig. 

Aspects of the Choson Dynasty are dealt with in JaHyun Kim 
Haboush's^l Heritage of Kings, William Shaw's Legal Norms in a Con- 
fucian State, and Young-ho Ch'oe's The Civil Examinations and the 
Social Structure in Early Yi Dynasty Korea. Late nineteenth-century 
developments are covered in Vipan Chandra's Imperialism, 
Resistance, and Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century Korea, James B. 
Palais 's Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea, and C.I. Eugene Kim 
and Han-Kyo Kim's Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876-1910. 

Various aspects of Japanese rule are detailed in Andrew J. Graj- 
danzev's Modern Korea and Chong-Sik Lee's Japan and Korea: The 
Political Dimension. Korea's reaction to Japanese colonialism is re- 
counted in Chong-Sik Lee's The Politics of Korean Nationalism. 
George McAfee McCune's Korea Today is particularly valuable for 
the period between 1945 and 1948. The period of Japanese colonial 
rule is also treated in Dennis L. McNamara's The Colonial Origins 
of Korean Enterprise and Michael Edson Robinson's Cultural Nation- 
alism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925. 

Among the numerous works that have taken advantage of declas- 
sified documents concerning the period leading up the Korean War 
are James Irving Matray's The Reluctant Crusade, the second volume 
of Bruce Cuming's work on that period, Hie Roaring of the Cataract, 
1947-50, and Peter Lowe's The Origins of the Korea War. 

Information about Korea under Syngman Rhee can be found 
in Gregory Henderson's book, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex; in 
Joungwon Alexander Kim's Divided Korea: The Politics of Develop- 
ment, 1945-1972; and in Chi-young Pak's Political Opposition in Korea, 
1945-1960. Robert T. Oliver, a close associate of Rhee, explains 
Rhee's actions in Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 
1942-1960. Lee Hahn-Been's Korea: Time, Change, and Administra- 
tion analyzes governmental performance under Rhee and subse- 
quent regimes. Han Sung-Joo's The Failure of Democracy in South 
Korea provides an incisive analysis of both the Rhee regime and 
the Chang Myon government. 

A number of books treat Korea in the modern era, although most 
of them emphasize the political aspect of the society. Gregory 
Henderson's book is particularly valuable for its treatment of 
modern and contemporary periods through the late 1960s. The 1961 
coup d'etat and the government under Park Chung Hee are dis- 
cussed in Kim Se-Jin's The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea, 



64 



Historical Setting 



John Kie-Chiang Oh's Korea: Democracy on Trial, David C. Cole 
and Princeton N. Lyman's Korean Development: The Interplay of 
Politics and Economics, Young Whan Kihl's Politics and Policies in Divi- 
ded Korea, Sung Chul Yang's Korea and Two Regimes, and The Eco- 
nomic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea by Edward S. 
Mason and others. For the government under Chun Doo Hwan, 
see Harold C. Hinton's Korea under New Leadership; for South 
Korea's foreign policy, see Youngnok Koo and Sung-joo Han's 
Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea and Byung Chul Koh's The For- 
eign Policy Systems of North and South Korea. South Korea's relations 
with North Korea are treated in detail by Robert A. Scalapino and 
Chong-Sik Lee's Communism in Korea and Ralph N. Clough's Em- 
battled Korea. 

Studies on Korea: A Scholar's Guide, edited by Kim Han-Kyo, lists 
numerous books and articles; many items are annotated. Far Eastern 
Economic Review, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Asian Wall Street 
Journal, and Asian Survey regularly provide analyses of South Korea's 
politics and economy. A comprehensive source of publications deal- 
ing with Korean history is the Association for Asian Studies' an- 
nual Bibliography of Asian Studies. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



65 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 



North Watergate, Suwon Castle, has a stone bridge with 
seven arches spanning the Namch'on River. 



FEW SOCIETIES HAVE CHANGED as rapidly or as dramati- 
cally since the end of World War II as that of the Republic of Korea 
(South Korea). When the war ended in 1945, the great majority 
of the people living in the southern half of the Korean Peninsula 
were poor peasants. The Japanese colonial regime from 1910 to 
1945 had promoted modernization of the economy and society. The 
regime's efforts, however, had a limited, and mainly negative, im- 
pact on most Koreans inasmuch as the main intent of the modern- 
ization program was to serve Japan. The poverty and distress of 
the South Koreans were deepened by the Korean War of 1950-53 
when numerous people died and cities and towns were devastated. 
During the next four decades, however, South Korea evolved into 
a dynamic, industrial society. By 1990 educational and public health 
standards were high, most people lived in urban areas, and a com- 
plex structure of social classes had emerged that resembled the social 
structures of developed Western countries or Japan. The country 
also was making substantial progress in its evolution from a mili- 
tary dictatorship similar to that of many Third World regimes to 
a democratic, pluralistic political system. In the mid-1950s, few 
observers could have imagined that Seoul, the country's capital, 
would emerge from the devastation of war to become one of the 
world's most vibrant metropolitan centers — rivaling Tokyo, Hong 
Kong, and Los Angeles. 

Colonial occupation, war, and the tragedy of national division 
fostered abrupt social changes. Rapid economic growth engendered 
profound changes in values and human relationships. Yet there 
also was continuity with the past. Confucian and neo-Confucian 
ideas and institutions, which flourished during the Choson Dynasty 
(1392-1910), continued to have an important impact in 1990. The 
Confucian influence was most evident in the tremendous value 
placed on education, a major factor in South Korea's economic 
progress. Equally evident was the persistence of hierarchical, often 
authoritarian, modes of human interaction that reflected neo- 
Confucianism's emphasis on inequality. 

The complex kinship structures of the past, sanctified by Con- 
fucianism, had eroded because of urbanization but did not disap- 
pear. In 1990 Koreans were more likely to live in nuclear families 
than their parents or grandparents, but old Confucian ideas of filial 
piety still were strong. At the same time, contemporary social values 
were influenced by traditional but non-Confucian Korean values, 



69 



South Korea: A Country Study 

such as shamanism and Buddhism, and by ideas brought into the 
country from the West and Japan. 

The population of the Korean Peninsula, sharing a common lan- 
guage, ethnic identity, and culture, was one of the world's most 
homogeneous. Although there were significant regional differences 
even within the relatively small land area of South Korea, neither 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) nor 
South Korea had significant non-Korean ethnic minorities. This 
homogeneity, and the sense of a shared historical experience that 
it promoted, gave the people of South Korea a strong sense of 
national purpose. However, the years of Japanese colonial rule, 
the division of the peninsula after World War II, the establishment 
of two antagonistic states in the north and south, and the profound 
changes in the economy and society caused by industrialization and 
urbanization since the 1950s led many South Koreans to search 
anew for their national identity and place in the world. Often, the 
concern for identity expressed itself as xenophobia, the creation 
of a "national mythology" that was given official or semiofficial 
sanction, or the search for the special and unique "essence" of 
Korean culture. 

Physical Environment 
Land Area and Borders 

The Korean Peninsula extends for about 1,000 kilometers south- 
ward from the northeast part of the Asian continental landmass. 
The Japanese islands of Honshu and Kyushu are located some 200 
kilometers to the southeast across the Korea Strait; the Shandong 
Peninsula of China lies 190 kilometers to the west. The west coast 
of the peninsula is bordered by the Korea Bay to the north and 
the Yellow Sea to the south; the east coast is bordered by the Sea 
of Japan (known in Korea as the East Sea). The 8,640-kilometer 
coastline is highly indented. Some 3,579 islands lie adjacent to the 
peninsula. Most of them are found along the south and west coasts. 

The northern land border of the Korean Peninsula is formed 
by the Yalu and Tumen rivers, which separate Korea from the 
provinces of Jilin and Liaoning in China. The original border 
between the two Korean states was the thirty-eighth parallel of lati- 
tude. After the Korean War, the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ — see 
Glossary) formed the boundary between the two. The DMZ is a 
heavily guarded, 4, 000-meter- wide strip of land that runs along 
the line of cease-fire, the Demarcation Line (see Glossary), from 
the east to the west coasts for a distance of 241 kilometers (238 kilo- 
meters of that line form the land boundary with North Korea). 



70 



The Society and Its Environment 



The total land area of the peninsula, including the islands, is 
220,847 square kilometers. Some 44.6 percent (98,477 square 
kilometers) of this total, excluding the area within the DMZ, con- 
stitutes the territory of the Republic of Korea. The combined ter- 
ritories of North Korea and South Korea are about the same size 
as the state of Minnesota. South Korea alone is about the size of 
Portugal or Hungary and is slightly larger than the state of Indiana. 

The largest island, Cheju, lies off the southwest corner of the 
peninsula and has a land area of 1,825 square kilometers. Other 
important islands include Ullung in the Sea of Japan and Kangh- 
wa Island at the mouth of the Han River. Although the eastern 
coastline of South Korea is generally unindented, the southern and 
western coasts are jagged and irregular. The difference is caused 
by the fact that the eastern coast is gradually rising, while the 
southern and western coasts are subsiding. 

Lacking formidable land or sea barriers along its borders and 
occupying a central position among East Asian nations, the Korean 
Peninsula has served as a cultural bridge between the mainland 
and the Japanese archipelago. Korea contributed greatly to the de- 
velopment of Japan by transmitting both Indian Buddhist and 
Chinese Confucian culture, art, and religion. At the same time, 
Korea's exposed geographical position left it vulnerable to inva- 
sion by its stronger neighbors. When, in the late nineteenth cen- 
tury, British statesman Lord George Curzon described Korea as 
a "sort of political Tom Tiddler's ground between China, Rus- 
sia, and Japan," he was describing a situation that had prevailed 
for several millennia, as would be tragically apparent during the 
twentieth century. 

Topography and Drainage 

Early European visitors to Korea remarked that the land resem- 
bled "a sea in a heavy gale" because of the large number of suc- 
cessive mountain ranges that crisscross the peninsula. The tallest 
mountains are in North Korea. The tallest mountain in South 
Korea is Mount Halla (1,950 meters), which is the cone of a vol- 
canic formation constituting Cheju Island. There are three major 
mountain ranges within South Korea: the T'aebaek and Sobaek 
ranges and the Chiri Massif (see fig. 4). 

Unlike Japan or the northern provinces of China, the Korean 
Peninsula is geologically stable. There are no active volcanoes, and 
there have been no strong earthquakes. Historical records, however, 
describe volcanic activity on Mount Halla during the Koryo Dy- 
nasty (918-1392 A.D.). 



71 



South Korea: A Country Study 

Over the centuries, Korea's inhabitants have cut down most of 
the ancient Korean forests, with the exception of a few remote, 
mountainous areas. The disappearance of the forests has been a 
major cause of soil erosion and flooding. Because of successful 
reforestation programs and the declining use of firewood as a source 
of energy since the 1960s, however, most of South Korea's hills 
in the 1980s were amply covered with foliage. South Korea has 
no extensive plains; its lowlands are the product of mountain ero- 
sion. Approximately 30 percent of the area of South Korea con- 
sists of lowlands, with the rest consisting of uplands and mountains. 
The great majority of the lowland area lies along the coasts, particu- 
larly the west coast, and along the major rivers. The most important 
lowlands are the Han River plain around Seoul, the P'yongt'aek 
coastal plain southwest of Seoul, the Kum River basin, the Nak- 
tong River basin, and the Yongsan and the Honam plains in the 
southwest. A narrow littoral plain extends along the east coast. 

The Naktong is South Korea's longest river (521 kilometers). 
The Han River, which flows through Seoul, is 514 kilometers long, 
and the Kum River is 401 kilometers long. Other major rivers in- 
clude the Imjin, which flows through both North Korea and South 
Korea and forms an estuary with the Han River; the Pukhan, a 
tributary of the Han that also flows out of North Korea; and the 
Somjin. The major rivers flow north to south or east to west and 
empty into the Yellow Sea or the Korea Strait. They tend to be 
broad and shallow and to have wide seasonal variations in water 
flow. 

News that North Korea was constructing a huge multipurpose 
dam at the base of Mount Kumgang (1,638 meters) north of the 
DMZ caused considerable consternation in South Korea during 
the mid-1980s. South Korean authorities feared that once it was 
completed, a sudden release of the dam's waters into the Pukhan 
River during north- south hostilities could flood Seoul and para- 
lyze the capital region. During 1987 the Kumgang-san Dam was 
a major issue that Seoul sought to raise in talks with P'yongyang. 
Although Seoul completed a "Peace Dam" on the Pukhan River 
to counteract the potential threat of Pyongyang's dam project 
before the 1988 Olympics, the North Korean project apparently 
still was in its initial stages of construction in 1990. 

Climate 

Part of the East Asian monsoonal region, South Korea has a tem- 
perate climate with four distinct seasons. The movement of air mass- 
es from the Asian continent exerts greater influence on South 
Korea's weather than does air movement from the Pacific Ocean. 



72 




m 


National capital 


i 


T'aebaek Range 


ii 


Charyong Range 


in 


Sobaek Range 


▲ 


Spot elevations 
in meters 





25 50 75 Kilometers 





1 ( ( , 
25 50 75 Miles 



A 



Sea of Japan 




The Society and Its Environment 



Winters are usually long, cold, and dry, whereas summers are short, 
hot, and humid. Spring and autumn are pleasant but short in du- 
ration. Seoul's mean temperature in January is - 5°C to - 2.5°C; 
in July the mean temperature is about 22.5°C to 25°C. Because 
of its southern and seagirt location, Cheju Island has warmer and 
milder weather than other parts of South Korea. Mean tempera- 
tures on Cheju range from 2.5°C in January to 25°C in July. 

The country generally has sufficient rainfall to sustain its agricul- 
ture. Rarely does less than 75 centimeters of rain fall in any given 
year; for the most part, rainfall is over 100 centimeters. Amounts 
of precipitation, however, can vary from year to year. Serious 
droughts occur about once every eight years, especially in the rice- 
producing southwestern part of the country. About two-thirds of 
the annual precipitation occurs between June and September. 

South Korea is less vulnerable to typhoons than Japan, Taiwan, 
the east coast of China, or the Philippines. From one to three 
typhoons can be expected per year. Typhoons usually pass over 
South Korea in late summer, especially in August, and bring tor- 
rential rains (see fig. 5). Flooding occasionally causes considera- 
ble damage. In September 1984, record floods caused the deaths 
of 190 people and left 200,000 homeless. This disaster prompted 
the North Korean government to make an unprecedented offer of 
humanitarian aid in the form of rice, medicine, clothes, and building 
materials. South Korea accepted these items and distributed them 
to flood victims. 

Population 

Although a variety of different Asian peoples had migrated to 
the Korean Peninsula in past centuries, very few have remained 
permanentiy. Hence, by 1990 both South Korea and North Korea 
were among the world's most ethnically homogeneous nations. The 
number of indigenous minorities was negligible. In South Korea, 
people of foreign origin, including Westerners, Chinese, and 
Japanese, were a small percentage of the population, whose resi- 
dence was generally temporary. Like their Japanese neighbors, 
Koreans tend to equate nationality or citizenship with member- 
ship in a single, homogeneous ethnic group or "race" (minjok, in 
Korean). A common language and culture also are viewed as impor- 
tant elements in Korean identity. The idea of multiracial or mul- 
tiethnic nations, like India or the United States, strikes many 
Koreans as odd or even contradictory. Consciousness of homogenei- 
ty is a major reason why Koreans on both sides of the DMZ viewed 
their country's division as an unnatural and unnecessary tragedy. 



75 



South Korea: A Country Study 



NORTH KOREA 

Demarcation am and 



® 


National capital 


• 


Populated place 





25 50 Kilometers 





25 50 Miles 



I rich 'c 



Seoul 



O 



Taejon* 




Sea 

of 
Japan 



.Taequ 



Under 1 ,200 
millimeters 



□ 1,200-1,400 
millimeters 

FZZ]Over 1,400 
Y//A millimeters 



4 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 




Figure 5. Average Annual Rainfall 



Against the background of ethnic homogeneity, however, sig- 
nificant regional differences exist. Within South Korea, the most 
important regional difference is between the Kyongsang region, 
embracing North Kyongsang and South Kyongsang provinces in 
the southeast, and the Cholla region, embracing North Cholla and 
South Cholla provinces in the southwest. The two regions, sepa- 
rated by the Chiri Massif, nurture a rivalry said to reach back to 
the Three Kingdoms Period, which lasted from the fourth century 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



to the seventh century A.D., when the kingdoms of Paekche and 
Silla struggled for control of the peninsula (see The Origins of the 
Korean Nation, ch. 1; fig. 2). Observers noted that interregional 
marriages are rare, and that as of 1990 a new four-lane highway 
completed in 1984 between Kwangju and Taegu, the capitals of 
South Cholla and North Kyongsang provinces, respectively, had 
not been successful in promoting travel between the two areas. 

South Korea's political elite, including presidents Park Chung 
Hee, Chun Doo Hwan, and Roh Tae Woo, have come largely from 
the Kyongsang region. As a result, Kyongsang has been a special 
beneficiary of government development assistance. By contrast, 
the Cholla region has remained comparatively rural, undeveloped, 
and poor. Chronically disaffected, its people righdy or wrongly have 
a reputation for rebelliousness. Regional bitterness was intensified 
by the May 1980 Kwangju incident, in which about 200 and 
perhaps many more inhabitants of the capital of South Cholla 
Province were killed by government troops sent to quell an insur- 
rection. Many of the troops reportedly were from the Kyongsang 
region (see Students in 1980, ch. 1; United States Forces in South 
Korea, ch. 5). 

Regional stereotypes, like regional dialects, have been breaking 
down under the influence of centralized education, nationwide me- 
dia, and the several decades of population movement since the 
Korean War. Stereotypes remain important, however, in the eyes 
of many South Koreans. For example, the people of Kyonggi 
Province, surrounding Seoul, are often described as being cultured, 
and Ch'ungch'ong people, inhabiting the region embracing North 
Ch'ungch'ong and South Ch'ungch'ong provinces, are thought 
to be mild-mannered, manifesting trueyangban virtues (see Tradi- 
tional Social Structure, this ch.). The people of Kangwon Province 
in the northeast are viewed as poor and stolid, whereas Koreans 
from the northern provinces of P'yongan, Hwanghae, and Ham- 
gyong, now in North Korea, are perceived as being diligent and 
aggressive. Cheju Island is famous for its strong-minded and in- 
dependent women. 

Population Trends 

The population of South Korea has grown rapidly since the 
republic's establishment in 1948. In the first official census, taken 
in 1949, the total population of South Korea was calculated at 
20,188,641 people. The 1985 census total was 40,466,577. Popu- 
lation growth was slow, averaging about 1 . 1 percent annually during 
the period from 1949 to 1955, when the population registered at 
21.5 million. Growth accelerated between 1955 and 1966 to 29.2 



77 



South Korea: A Country Study 

million or an annual average of 2.8 percent, but declined signifi- 
cantly during the period 1966 to 1985 to an annual average of 1.7 
percent (see fig. 6). Thereafter, the annual average growth rate 
was estimated to be less than 1 percent, similar to the low growth 
rates of most industrialized countries and to the target figure set 
by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs for the 1990s. As of 
January 1, 1989, the population of South Korea was estimated to 
be approximately 42.2 million. 

The proportion of the total population under fifteen years of age 
has risen and fallen with the growth rate. In 1955 approximately 
41.2 percent of the population was under fifteen years of age, a 
percentage that rose to 43.5 percent in 1966 before falling to 38.3 
percent in 1975, 34.2 percent in 1980, and 29.9 percent in 1985. 
In the past, the large proportion of children relative to the total 
population put great strains on the country's economy, particu- 
larly because substantial resources were invested in education fa- 
cilities (see Primary and Secondary Schools, this ch.). With the 
slowdown in the population growth rate and a rise in the median 
age (from 18.7 years to 21.8 years between 1960 and 1980), the 
age structure of the population has begun to resemble the colum- 
nar pattern typical of developed countries, rather than the pyra- 
midal pattern found in most parts of the Third World. 

The decline in the population growth rate and in the proportion 
of people under fifteen years of age after 1966 reflected the success 
of official and unofficial birth control programs. The government 
of President Syngman Rhee (1948-60) was conservative in such 
matters. Although Christian churches initiated a family planning 
campaign in 1957, it was not until 1962 that the government of 
Park Chung Hee, alarmed at the way in which the rapidly increas- 
ing population was undermining economic growth, began a nation- 
wide family planning program. Other factors that contributed to 
a slowdown in population growth included urbanization, later mar- 
riage ages for both men and women, higher education levels, a 
greater number of women in the labor force, and better health stan- 
dards (see Public Health and Welfare, this ch.). 

Public and private agencies involved in family planning included 
the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, the Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea, and the 
Korea Institute of Family Planning. In the late 1980s, their activi- 
ties included distribution of free birth control devices and infor- 
mation, classes for women on family planning methods, and the 
granting of special subsidies and privileges (such as low-interest 
housing loans) to parents who agreed to undergo sterilization. There 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 

were 502,000 South Koreans sterilized in 1984, as compared with 
426,000 in the previous year. 

The 1973 Maternal and Child Health Law legalized abortion. 
In 1983 the government began suspending medical insurance 
benefits for maternal care for pregnant women with three or more 
children. It also denied tax deductions for education expenses to 
parents with two or more children. 

As in China, cultural attitudes pose problems for family plan- 
ning programs. A strong preference for sons — who in Korea's Con- 
fucian value system are expected to care for their parents in old 
age and carry on the family name — means that parents with only 
daughters usually continue to have children until a son is born. 
The government has encouraged married couples to have only one 
child. Such encouragement has been a prominent theme in public 
service advertising, which stresses "have a single child and raise 
it well." 

Total fertility rates (the average number of births a woman will 
have during her lifetime) fell from 6.1 births per female in 1960 
to 4.2 in 1970, 2.8 in 1980, and 2.4 in 1984. The number of live 
births, recorded as 711,810 in 1978, grew to a high of 917,860 in 
1982. This development stirred apprehensions among family plan- 
ning experts of a new "baby boom." By 1986, however, the number 
of live births had declined to 806,041. 

Given the size and age structure of the population in 1990, 
however, substantial increases are expected over the next few de- 
cades. According to the government's Economic Planning Board, 
the country's population will increase to between 46 and 48 mil- 
lion by the end of the twentieth century, with growth rates rang- 
ing between 0.9 and 1.2 percent. The population is expected to 
stabilize (that is, cease to grow) in the year 2023 at around 52.6 
million people. In the words of Asiaweek magazine, the "stabilized 
tally will approximate the number of Filipinos in 1983, but squeezed 
into less than a third of their [the Philippines'] space." 

Population Settlement Patterns 

South Korea was one of the world's most densely populated coun- 
tries, with an estimated 425 people per square kilometer in 
1989 — over sixteen times the average population density of the Unit- 
ed States in the late 1980s. By comparison, China had an estimat- 
ed 1 14 people, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) 
246 people, and Japan 323 people per square kilometer in the late 
1980s. Because about 70 percent of South Korea's land area is 
mountainous and the population is concentrated in the lowland 
areas, actual population densities were in general greater than the 



79 



South Korea: A Country Study 




80 



The Society and Its Environment 



average. As early as 1975, it was estimated that the density of South 
Korea's thirty-five cities, each of which had a population of 50,000 
or more inhabitants, was 3,700 people per square kilometer. Be- 
cause of continued migration to urban areas, the figure was doubt- 
less higher in the late 1980s. 

In 1988 Seoul had a population density of 17,030 people per 
square kilometer as compared with 13,816 people per square kilo- 
meter in 1980. The second largest city, Pusan, had a density of 
8,504 people per square kilometer in 1988 as compared with 7,272 
people in 1980. Kyonggi Province, which surrounds the capital and 
contains Inch'on, the country's fourth largest city, was the most 
densely populated province; Kangwon Province in the northeast 
was the least densely populated province. 

The extreme crowding in South Korea in 1990 was a major fac- 
tor not only in economic development and in the standard of liv- 
ing but also in the development of social attitudes and human 
relationships. More than most other peoples, South Koreans have 
had to learn to live peacefully with each other in small, crowded 
spaces, in which the competition for limited resources, including 
space itself, is intense. Continued population growth means that 
the shortage of space for living and working will grow more se- 
vere. According to the government's Economic Planning Board, 
the population density will be 530 people per square kilometer by 
2023, the year the population is expected to stabilize. 

Urbanization 

Like other newly industrializing economies, South Korea ex- 
perienced rapid growth of urban areas caused by the migration of 
large numbers of people from the countryside. In the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, Seoul, by far the largest urban settle- 
ment, had a population of about 190,000 people. There was a strik- 
ing contrast with Japan, where Edo (Tokyo) had as many as 1 
million inhabitants and the urban population comprised as much 
as 10 to 15 percent of the total during the Tokugawa Period 
(1600-1868). During the closing years of the Choson Dynasty and 
the first years of Japanese colonial rule, the urban population of 
Korea was no more than 3 percent of the total. After 1930, when 
the Japanese began industrial development on the Korean Penin- 
sula, particularly in the northern provinces adjacent to Manchuria, 
the urban portion of the population began to grow, reaching 11.6 
percent for all of Korea in 1940. 

Between 1945 and 1985, the urban population of South Korea 
grew from 14.5 percent to 65.4 percent of the total population (see 
fig. 7). In 1988 the Economic Planning Board estimated that the 



81 



South Korea: A Country Study 



1955 
21,526,374 



All other cities 
12.2% 




1975 
34,706,620 



Pusan 
7.1% 




Note: Percentages may not add to 

100 because of rounding. 51.5% 



Source: Based on information from Korea Institute for Population and Health, Journal of 
Population and Health Studies [Seoul], 8, No. 2, December 1988, 19, 22. 



Figure 7. Rural and Urban Population Distribution, Selected Years, 1955-85 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



1980 
37,448,836 




1985 
40,466,577 




83 



South Korea: A Country Study 

urban portion of the population will reach 78 . 3 percent by the end 
of the twentieth century. Most of this urban increase was attributa- 
ble to migration rather than to natural growth of the urban popu- 
lation. Urban birth rates have generally been lower than the national 
average. The extent of urbanization in South Korea, however, is 
not fully revealed in these statistics. Urban population was defined 
in the national census as being restricted to those municipalities 
with 50,000 or more inhabitants. Although many settlements with 
fewer than 50,000 inhabitants were satellite towns of Seoul or other 
large cities or mining communities in northeastern Kangwon 
Province, which would be considered urban in terms of the living 
conditions and occupations of the inhabitants, they still were offi- 
cially classified as rural. 

The dislocation caused by the Korean War accounted for the 
rapid increase in urban population during the early 1950s. 
Hundreds of thousands of refugees, many of them from North 
Korea, streamed into the cities. During the post-Korean War period, 
rural people left their ancestral villages in search of greater economic 
and educational opportunities in the cities. By the late 1960s, migra- 
tion had become a serious problem, not only because cities were 
terribly overcrowded, but also because the rural areas were losing 
the most youthful and productive members of their labor force. 

In the early 1970s, the Park Chung Hee government launched 
the Saemaul undong (New Community Movement) as a rural 
reconstruction and self-help movement to improve economic con- 
ditions in the villages, close the wide gap in income between rural 
and urban areas, and stem urban migration — as well as to build 
a political base. Despite a huge amount of government- sponsored 
publicity, especially during the Park era, it was not clear by the 
late 1980s that the Saemaul undong had achieved its objectives. 
By that time many, if not most, farming and fishing villages con- 
sisted of older persons; relatively few able-bodied men and women 
remained to work in the fields or to fish. This trend was apparent 
in government statistics for the 1986-87 period: the proportion of 
people fifty years old or older living in farming communities grew 
from 28.7 percent in 1986 to 30.6 percent in 1987, whereas the 
number of people in their twenties living in farming communities 
declined from 11.3 percent to 10.8 percent. The nationwide per- 
centages for people fifty years old or older and in their twenties 
were, in 1986, 14.9 percent and 20.2 percent, respectively (see 
Agriculture, ch. 3). 

In 1985 the largest cities were Seoul (9,645,932 inhabitants), Pusan 
(3,516,807), Taegu (2,030,672), Inch'on (1,387,491), Kwangju 
(906,129), and Taejon (866,695). According to government statistics, 



84 



The Society and Its Environment 



the population of Seoul, one of the world's largest cities, surpassed 
10 million people in late 1988. Seoul's average annual population 
growth rate during the late 1980s was more than 3 percent. Two- 
thirds of this growth was attributable to migration rather than to 
natural increase. Surveys revealed that "new employment or seek- 
ing a new job," "job transfer," and "business" were major rea- 
sons given by new immigrants for coming to the capital. Other 
factors cited by immigrants included "education" and "a more 
convenient area to live." To alleviate overcrowding in Seoul's 
downtown area, the city government drew up a master plan in the 
mid-1980s that envisioned the development of four "core zones" 
by 2000: the original downtown area, Yongdungp'o-Yoido, Yong- 
dong, and Ch'amsil. Satellite towns also would be established or 
expanded. In the late 1980s, statistics revealed that the daytime 
or commuter population of downtown Seoul was as much as six 
times the officially registered population. If the master plan is suc- 
cessful, many commuters will travel to work in a core area nearer 
their homes, and the downtown area's daytime population will 
decrease. Many government ministries have been moved out of 
Seoul, and the army, navy, and air force headquarters have been 
relocated to Taejon. 

In 1985 the population of Seoul constituted 23.8 percent of the 
national total. Provincial cities, however, experienced equal and, 
in many cases, greater expansion than the capital. Growth was par- 
ticularly spectacular in the southeastern coastal region, which en- 
compasses the port cities of Pusan, Masan, Yosu, Chinhae, Ulsan, 
and P'ohang. Census figures show that Ulsan 's population increased 
eighteenfold, growing from 30,000 to 551,300 inhabitants between 
1960 and 1985. With the exception of Yosu, all of these cities are 
in South Kyongsang Province, a region that has been an especial- 
ly favored recipient of government development projects. By com- 
parison, the population of Kwangju, capital of South Cholla 
Province, increased less than threefold between 1960 and 1985, 
growing from 315,000 to 906,129 inhabitants. 

Rapid urban growth has brought familiar problems to developed 
and developing countries alike. The construction of large numbers 
of high-rise apartment complexes in Seoul and other large cities 
alleviated housing shortages to some extent. But it also imposed 
hardship on the tens of thousands of people who were obliged to 
relocate from their old neighborhoods because they could not af- 
ford the rents in the new buildings. In the late 1980s, squatter areas 
consisting of one-story shacks still existed in some parts of Seoul. 
Housing for all but the wealthiest was generally cramped. The con- 
centration of factories in urban areas, the rapid growth of motorized 



85 



South Korea: A Country Study 



traffic, and the widespread use of coal for heating during the severe 
winter months have caused dangerous levels of air and water pol- 
lution. Although environmental awareness is increasing, a polluted 
environment will adversely affect the quality of life in the cities for 
some time to come. 

Koreans Living Overseas 

Large-scale emigration from Korea began around 1904 and con- 
tinued until the end of World War II. During the Japanese colonial 
occupation, many Koreans emigrated to Manchuria (present-day 
China's northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilong- 
jiang), other parts of China, the Soviet Union, Hawaii, and the 
continental United States. Most emigrated for economic reasons; 
employment opportunities were scarce, and many Korean farm- 
ers lost their land after the Japanese introduced a system of land 
registration and private land tenure, imposed higher land taxes, 
and promoted the growth of an absentee landlord class charging 
exorbitant rents. Koreans from the northern provinces of Korea 
went mainly to Manchuria, China, and Siberia. Many people from 
the southern provinces went to Japan. Koreans were conscripted 
into Japanese labor battalions or the Japanese army, especially dur- 
ing World War II. In the 1940-44 period, nearly 2 million Koreans 
lived in Japan, 1.4 million in Manchuria, 600,000 in Siberia, and 
130,000 in China. An estimated 40,000 Koreans were scattered 
among other countries. At the end of World War II, approximately 
2 million Koreans were repatriated from Japan and Manchuria. 

More than 4 million ethnic Koreans lived outside the peninsula 
during the early 1980s. The largest group, about 1.7 million peo- 
ple, lived in China. Most had assumed Chinese citizenship. The 
Soviet Union had about 430,000 ethnic Koreans. One observer 
noted that Koreans had been so successful in running collective 
farms in Soviet Central Asia that being Korean was often associated 
by other Soviets with being rich. 

By contrast, many of Japan's approximately 700,000 Koreans 
had below-average standards of living. This situation occurred part- 
ly because of discrimination by the Japanese majority and partly 
because of the fact that a large number of resident Koreans, loyal 
to the North Korean regime of Kim II Sung, preferred to remain 
separate from and hostile to the Japanese mainstream. The pro- 
North Korea Chosen soren (General Association of Korean Resi- 
dents in Japan) initially was more successful than the pro-South 
Korea Mindan (Association for Korean Residents in Japan) in at- 
tracting adherents among residents in Japan. Since diplomatic re- 
lations were established between Seoul and Tokyo in 1965, however, 



86 




Typical housing outside the city wall, Seoul, 1904 
Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress 

Typical housing, Seoul, 1989 
Courtesy Oren Hadar 



87 



South Korea: A Country Study 

the South Korean government has taken an active role in promot- 
ing the interests of their residents in Japan in negotiations with 
the Japanese government (see Relations with Japan, ch. 4). It also 
has provided subsidies to Korean schools in Japan and other com- 
munity activities. 

By the end of 1988, there were over 2 million South Korean over- 
seas residents. North America was the preferred destination — the 
choice of over 1.2 million of these residents. Korean immigrants 
in the United States and Canada gained a reputation for hard work 
and economic success. South Koreans also were overseas residents 
of Japan (at least 680,000), Central America and South America 
(85,000), the Middle East (62,000), Western Europe (40,000), other 
Asian countries (27,000), and Africa (25,000). A limited number 
of South Korean government- sponsored migrants setded in Chile, 
Argentina, and other Latin American countries. Because of South 
Korea's rapid economic expansion, an increasing number of its 
citizens resided abroad on a temporary basis as business execu- 
tives, technical personnel, foreign students, and construction work- 
ers. A small number of overseas South Koreans had migrated back 
to South Korea, primarily because of the much improved economic 
conditions and the difficulties in adjusting to living abroad. 

Social Structure and Values 

The social values of contemporary South Korea reflect the syn- 
thesis and development of diverse influences, both indigenous and 
foreign. Probably the most important of these is the neo-Confucian 
doctrine of the Chinese philosopher Zhu Xi (1130-1200), first in- 
troduced into Korea during the closing years of the Koryo Dynasty 
(918-1392). The rulers of the Choson Dynasty (1392-1910) adopted 
it as their state ideology. The most important Korean neo- 
Confucian philosopher, Yi Hwang, also known as Yi T'oe-gye 
(1501-70), had a great influence on later generations of Confu- 
cianists not only in Korea but also in Japan. 

Neo-Confucianism combines the social ethics of the classical 
Chinese philosophers Confucius (Kong Zi, 551-479 B.C.) and 
Mencius (Meng Zi, 372-289 B.C.) with Taoist, or Daoist, and 
Buddhist metaphysics. One of the doctrine's basic ideas is that the 
institutions and practices of the ideal human community are an 
expression of the immutable principles or laws that govern the move- 
ments of the cosmos. Through correct social practice, as defined 
by the Confucian sages and their commentators, individuals can 
achieve a kind of spiritual unity with heaven. Neo-Confucianism 
defines formal social relations on all levels of society. Social relations 
are not conceived of in terms of the happiness or satisfaction of 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



the individuals involved, but in terms of the harmonious integra- 
tion of individuals into a collective whole that mirrors the harmo- 
ny of the natural order. 

Neo-Confucianism in Korea was becoming rigid and increasingly 
conservative by the mid-1 500s. The practice of neo-Confucianism 
emphasized hierarchy in human relations and self-control on the 
individual level. Society was defined in terms of the Five Relation- 
ships (o ryun in Korean; w u lun in Chinese) that had been formulated 
by classical Chinese thinkers, such as Mencius, and subsequently 
sanctified by the neo-Confucian metaphysicians: "between father 
and son there should be affection; between ruler and minister there 
should be righteousness; between husband and wife there should 
be attention to their separate functions; between old and young 
there should be a proper order; and between friends there should 
be faithfulness." Only the last was a relationship between equals. 
The others were based on authority and subordination, including 
the first relationship, which involved not so much mutual love as 
the unquestioning subordination of the son to the will of his father. 

Throughout traditional Korean society, from the royal palace 
and central government offices in Seoul to the humblest household 
in the provinces, the themes of hierarchy and inequality were per- 
vasive. Persons were expected to nurture "sincere" attitudes, which 
meant not so much expressing what one "really" felt as "reflect- 
ing on" or "clarifying" one's thoughts and feelings until they con- 
formed to traditional norms. There was no concept of the rights 
of the individual. The ideal man or woman was one who controlled 
his or her passions or emotions in order to fulfill to the letter a host 
of exacting social obligations. 

In the context of wider society, a well-defined elite of scholar- 
officials versed in neo-Confucian orthodoxy was legitimized in terms 
of the traditional ethical distinction between the educated "superior 
man" or "gentieman" and the "small man" who seeks only profit. 
The distinction was a central theme in the writings of Confucius 
and Mencius. Confucianism as a political theory proposed a benevo- 
lent paternalism: the masses had no role in government, but the 
scholar-officials were supposed to look after them as fathers look 
after their children. 

Just as the father commanded unquestioning obedience in the 
household and the scholar-official elite did so in the nation as a 
whole, there was also a hierarchy in international relations. China, 
the homeland of neo-Confucianism and the most powerful nation 
in the region, was the center of Choson Korea's cultural universe 
for most of the dynasty's duration. 

Foreign observers have been impressed with the diversity of the 



89 



South Korea: A Country Study 

Korean character as expressed in day-to-day human relations. 
There is, on one hand, the image of Koreans as self- controlled, 
deferential, and meticulous in the fulfillment of their social obli- 
gations; on the other hand, there is the Korean reputation for vola- 
tility and emotionalism, for being the "Irish of the East." The 
ecstasy and euphoria of shamanistic religious practices, one of 
Korea's most characteristic cultural expressions, contrasts sharply 
with the austere self-control of Confucian ancestor rituals (see 
Religion, this ch.). 

Although relatively minor themes in the history of Korean ethics 
and social thought, the concepts of equality and respect for individu- 
als are not entirely lacking. The doctrines of Ch'ondogyo (see Glos- 
sary), an indigenous religion that originated in the nineteenth 
century and combines elements of Buddhism, Taoism, shaman- 
ism, Confucianism, and Catholicism, teach that every human 
"bears divinity" and that one must "treat man as god." 

Western social and political values such as democracy, individua- 
lism, the equality of the sexes (also seen in Ch'ondogyo), and na- 
tional self-determination were introduced by late nineteenth-century 
Korean reformers and by West European and North American mis- 
sionaries, who had a profound effect upon the development of Korean 
education and political values. These concepts have played an in- 
creasingly prominent role in South Korean life in recent decades. 

Although by no means democratic, the Confucian tradition it- 
self contains anti- authoritarian themes. Mencius taught that the 
sovereign and his officials must concern themselves with the wel- 
fare of the people and that a king who misuses his power loses the 
right to rule — the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven. In Korean 
as well as Chinese history, there were many Confucian statesmen 
who, often at the cost of their own lives, opposed the misuse of 
power by those in authority. The tradition of political protest in 
South Korea, particularly by university students, owes as much 
to this aspect of the Confucian tradition as it does to democratic 
and Marxist concepts imported from the West. Just as out-of-power 
"rustic literati," or sarim, pursued purely moral and academic 
studies and disdained government service at various times during 
the Choson period, so modern-day university students, claiming 
to be the "conscience of the nation, ' ' have opposed the bureaucratic 
and professional elite in government and private business. 

Thus, to depict traditional Korean social values in terms of an 
authoritarian Confucian tradition is overly simplistic. A more com- 
prehensive account of social values might describe them in terms 
of interacting dualities, a kind of yin-yang opposition and synthe- 
sis. There is the tension, for example, between self-control and 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



solemnity, on the one hand, and almost explosive volatility at the 
level of individual behavior, on the other; between the duty-bound 
austerity of Confucian family life and ritualism, and the ecstasy 
and abandon of shamanistic rites; between the conservatism of 
agricultural villages and the looser social organization of fishing 
communities; between the orthodox concept of male supremacy 
and the reality of much "hidden" female power; between the 
"higher" rationalized, humanistic, or scientific culture imported 
from China, Japan, or the West, and much older indigenous or 
native cultural themes; between hierarchy and equality; and be- 
tween slavish deference to authority and principled resistance. 

Traditional Social Structure 

In Choson Dynasty Korea, four rather distinct social strata de- 
veloped: the scholar-officials, collectively referred to as the yang- 
ban; the chungin (literally "middle people"), technicians and ad- 
ministrators subordinate to theyangban; the sangmin, or commoners, 
a large group composed of farmers, craftsmen, and merchants; and 
the ch'ommin (despised people)," at the bottom of society. To en- 
sure stability, the government devised a system of personal tallies 
in order to identify people according to their status. 

In the strictest sense of the term, yangban referred to government 
officials or officeholders who had passed the civil service examina- 
tions that tested knowledge of the Confucian classics and their neo- 
Confucian interpreters. They were the Korean counterparts of the 
scholar-officials, or mandarins, of imperial China. The termyang- 
ban, first used during the Koryo Dynasty, means literally "two 
groups," that is, civil and military officials. Over the centuries, 
however, its usage became rather vague, so that the term can be 
said to have several overlapping meanings. Strictly speaking, ayang- 
ban lineage was one that consistently combined examination suc- 
cess with appointments to government office over a period of some 
generations. During the Choson period, examination candidates 
had to show several generations of such ancestry on both sides to 
be admitted to the civil service examinations. A broader use of the 
term included within the yangban two other groups that could be 
considered associated with, but outside of, the ruling elite. The 
first group included those scholars who had passed the preliminary 
civil service examination and sometimes the higher examinations 
but had failed to secure government appointment. In the late Cho- 
son Dynasty, there were many more successful examination candi- 
dates than there were positions. The second group included the 
more remote relatives and descendants of government officials. 
Even if these people were poor and did not themselves serve in the 



91 



South Korea: A Country Study 

government, they were considered members of a "yangban family" 
and thus shared the aura of the elite as long as they retained Con- 
fucian culture and rituals. 

An interesting development in the social history of the Choson 
Dynasty occurred after the government began to sell honorary 
patents of office to people who were not yangban to raise revenue 
following the dislocations of the Hideyoshi invasions. Wealthy com- 
moners sometimes went beyond such status symbols to commis- 
sion forged genealogies or to take on other trappings of yangban 
status. This form of social climbing was highly irritating to tradi- 
tional yangban families of the types mentioned above. Probably even 
more common were former yangban families that had drifted down 
into genteel poverty and commoner status. Both developments show 
that the Choson Dynasty class system was beginning to lose some 
of its rigidity on the eve of the momentous changes of the late 
nineteenth century. 

Yangban serving as officials could enrich themselves because they 
were given royal grants of land and had many opportunities for 
graft; but unemployed scholars and local gentry often were poor. 
They were a kind of "twilight elite" that was both feared and yet 
often mocked in peasant entertainments. In his satirical Tale of a 
Yangban, the writer Pak Chi-won (1737-1805) describes the life of 
a yangban, however poor, as one of enforced idleness, exacerbated 
by the need to maintain appearances. A yangban had to study Con- 
fucian literature and pass at least the preliminary examinations. 
He was prohibited from engaging in manual labor or commerce 
and had to present an image of poise and self-control. A yangban 
could not, among other things, "poke and play with his chopsticks," 
"eat raw onions, ' ' or "puff hard on his pipe, pulling in his cheeks. ' ' 
Yet he exercised much arbitrary power in his own village. In prin- 
ciple, the yangban were a meritocratic elite. They gained their po- 
sitions through educational achievement. Certain groups of persons 
(artisans, merchants, shamans, slaves, Buddhist monks, and others) 
were prohibited from taking the higher civil service examinations, 
but these formed only a small minority of the population. In the- 
ory, the examinations were open to the large majority of people 
who were farmers. In the early years of the Choson Dynasty, some 
commoners may have been able to attain high positions by pass- 
ing the examinations and advancing on sheer talent. In later years, 
talent was a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite for entry into 
the core elite because of the surplus of successful examinees. In- 
fluential family connections were virtually indispensable for ob- 
taining high official positions. Moreover, special posts called 
"protection appointments" were inherited by descendants of the 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



Choson royal family and certain high officials. Despite the emphasis 
on educational merit, the yangban became in a very real sense a 
hereditary elite. 

Below theyangban yet superior to the commoners were the chung- 
in, a small group of technical and administrative officials. They 
included astronomers, physicians, interpreters, and professional 
military officers, as well as artists. Local functionaries, who were 
members of a lower hereditary class, were an important and fre- 
quentiy oppressive link between theyangban and the common people. 
They were often the de facto rulers of a local region. 

The commoners, or sangmin, composed about 75 percent of the 
total population. These farmers, craftsmen, and merchants alone 
bore the burden of taxation and were subject to military conscrip- 
tion. Farmers had higher prestige than merchants, but lived a hard 
life. Below the commoners, the ''base people," or ch'dmmin, did 
what was considered vile or low-prestige work. They included ser- 
vants and slaves in government offices and resthouses, jailkeepers 
and convicts, shamans, actors, female entertainers (kisaeng), profes- 
sional mourners, shoemakers, executioners, and, for a time at least, 
Buddhist monks and nuns. Also included in this category were the 
paekchong, apparentiy descended from Inner Asian nomads, who 
dealt with meat and the hides of animals, were considered "un- 
clean," and lived in segregated communities. Slaves were treated 
as chattels but could own property and even other slaves. Although 
numerous at the beginning of the Choson Dynasty, their numbers 
had dwindled by the time slavery was officially abolished at the 
end of the nineteenth century. 

During their invasions in 1592 and 1597, the armies of the 
Japanese warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi destroyed many genealogical 
records, making it difficult to determine who was and who was not a 
member of & yangban family. Also, as Japanese armies were approach- 
ing Seoul, slaves in the capital rose up and burned documentary 
evidence of their servitude. By the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, the old social distinctions were breaking down. During 
the early Choson Dynasty, commoners did not have family names 
or class affiliations (see Traditional Family Life, this ch.). However, 
they began to adopt names in order to avoid the stigma of low sta- 
tus. Counterfeit genealogies could frequendy be purchased, and 
commoners sometimes attached their names to yangban genealogies 
to avoid military service taxes. Other late Choson Dynasty social 
changes included the gradual shift of agricultural labor from slave 
status to contractual arrangements and the emergence of "en- 
trepreneurial farmers" — commoners who earned small surpluses 
through innovative agricultural techniques. 



93 



South Korea: A Country Study 

The Emergence of a Modern Society 

In 1894 a program of social reforms, known as the Kabo Re- 
forms, was initiated by pro-Japanese Korean officials. Yangban and 
commoners were made equal before the law, the old Confucian 
civil service examinations were abolished, and slavery and ch'dm- 
min status was ended. Modern forms of government and adminis- 
tration, largely borrowed from Japan, were adopted. In the years 
before annexation, a self- strengthening movement and government 
reforms attempted to regain Korean control of the pace and direc- 
tion of change. However, it was only following the Japanese annex- 
ation in 1910 that the rapid social transformation of Korea began. 

Rural society was radically transformed. Traditionally, all land 
belonged to the king and was granted by him to his subjects. 
Although specific parcels of land tended to remain within the same 
family from generation to generation (including communal land 
owned by clans and lineages), land occupancy, use, and owner- 
ship patterns often were legally ambiguous and widely divergent 
from one part of the country to another. There was no institution 
of private property during the Choson Dynasty. The Japanese, 
however, conducted a comprehensive land survey between 1910 
and 1920 in order to place landownership on a modern legal foot- 
ing. Farmers whose families had tilled the same soil for genera- 
tions but could not prove ownership in a way satisfactory to the 
colonial authorities had their land confiscated. Such land came into 
the hands of the colonial government, to be sold to Japanese land 
companies, such as the Oriental Development Company, or to 
Japanese immigrants. As research by Edward Graegert has shown, 
however, the survey also helped to confirm, or in some cases even 
to improve, the position of some members of the existing Korean 
landlord class. Many were former yangban who cooperated with the 
Japanese. Those yangban who remained aloof from their country's 
new overlord often fell into poverty. The farmers themselves either 
became tenants or were forced to leave the land. During the depres- 
sion of the 1930s, thousands emigrated to the cities or overseas. 
Many others fled to the hills to become 'Tire-field" (slash-and-burn) 
farmers, living under extremely harsh and primitive conditions. 
By 1936 this last group numbered more than 1.5 million people. 

The Japanese built railroads, highways, schools, and hospitals 
and established a modern system of administration. These changes 
were intended to link the colonial economy more effectively to that 
of Japan. The new, modern sector required technically trained ex- 
perts. Although the top positions were invariably occupied by 
Japanese, Koreans worked on the lower levels as secondary technical 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



and administrative personnel. Thus, while the number of Korean 
high officials in the colonial administration increased from only 354 
to 442 people between 1915 and 1942, the number of junior offi- 
cials increased from 15,543 to 29,998 in the same period. Japan's 
industrial development policies during the 1930s and 1940s, 
although concentrated in the northern half of the peninsula adja- 
cent to Manchuria, created a new class of workers and lower-level 
industrial managers who played an important role in the industrial 
development of South Korea after 1945. 

The great majority of Koreans suffered under Japanese rule. A 
large number of farmers were forced off their land after 1910; in- 
dustrial workers and miners working for Japanese-owned firms were 
often treated little better than slaves. Under colonial agricultural 
policies, rice cultivation was maximized, although most rice was 
grown for consumption in Japan. 

Nevertheless, development under Japanese colonial rule provided 
some foundation, however unintentionally, for South Korea's im- 
pressive post- 1945 economic growth (see Korea under Japanese 
Rule, ch. 1). A small group of Korean entrepreneurs emerged who 
fostered close ties with the colonial government, and Japanese busi- 
ness interests established family-held firms that were the precursors 
of South Korea's present-day chaebol, or business conglomerates. 
It is a tribute to their acumen that these entrepreneurs were able 
to survive and prosper in a colonial economy dominated overwhelm- 
ingly by Japanese capital. 

Three developments after 1945 were particularly important for 
South Korea's social modernization. The first was the land reform 
carried out by United States and South Korean authorities between 
1945 and 1950. The institution of private property was retained, 
but the American occupation authorities confiscated and redistribut- 
ed all land held by the Japanese colonial government, Japanese 
companies, and individual Japanese colonists. The Korean govern- 
ment also carried out a reform whereby Koreans with large land- 
holdings were obliged to divest most of their land. A new class of 
independent, family proprietors was created. 

The second development was the great influx from North Korea 
and other countries of repatriates and refugees. In the 1945-49 peri- 
od, between 1.5 million and 2 million Koreans returned to South 
Korea from Japan, the northeast provinces of China, and other 
foreign countries. With the establishment of a communist state in 
North Korea, a large number of refugees fled to South Korea and 
were joined by many more during the Korean War. A conservative 
estimate of the total number of refugees from the north is 1 .2 million. 



95 



South Korea: A Country Study 



Most of the northerners settled in the cities — new recruits for the 
country's industrial labor force. 

The third development was a direct result of the Korean War. 
Traditionally Koreans, like their Chinese and unlike their Japanese 
neighbors, considered the military to be a low-status occupation. 
Korea did not have its own armed forces during the colonial peri- 
od, although some Koreans served in the Japanese military, espe- 
cially after 1941, and a handful, such as former President Park 
Chung Hee, received officer's training. The North Korean inva- 
sion of June 1950 and the three years of fighting that followed cast 
the South Korean military establishment into the role of savior of 
the country. And since the coup d'etat of May 1961 that estab- 
lished Park Chung Hee, the military establishment has held con- 
siderable political power. Roh Tae Woo, elected president in 1987, 
was a retired general with close connections to the military elite. 

Universal military conscription of men has played an important 
role in South Korea's development, both in political socialization 
and in integrating a society divided by strong regional prejudices. 
It also has exposed the nation's young men to technical training 
and to a disciplined way of life. 

During the three decades after Park's 1961 coup d'etat, the goal 
of the military elite was to create a harmonious, disciplined society 
that was both technically advanced and economically efficient. Eco- 
nomic modernization, however, has brought social changes — 
especially in education and urbanization — that have had a corro- 
sive effect on the military's authoritarian view of society and have 
promoted the emergence of a more contentious, pluralistic society 
than many in the military have found desirable. 

Social Classes in Contemporary South Korea 

Rapid economic growth, industrialization, and urbanization have 
caused a profound transformation in the class structure of South 
Korean society since the end of the Korean War. One of the most 
important changes has been the emergence of a "new" middle class 
consisting of civil servants, salaried white-collar workers in large 
private companies, and professionals with specialized training, such 
as engineers, health care professionals, university professors, archi- 
tects, and journalists. The number of factory workers also has grown 
impressively. According to figures provided by Kim Kyong-Dong, 
a sociologist at Seoul National University, the portion of the popula- 
tion that can be labeled "new middle class" (excluding self- 
employed professionals) grew from 6.6 percent to 17.7 percent 
between 1960 and 1980. The proportion of industrial workers 
expanded from 8.9 percent to 22.6 percent of the labor force during 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



the same period. Independent farmers and members of the rural 
lower class, including agricultural laborers, experienced correspond- 
ing declines in percentage: together, they accounted for 64 per- 
cent of the population in 1960 but only 31.3 percent in 1980. 

The urban lower class, consisting to a great extent of recent arri- 
vals from rural parts of the country living in squatter areas, com- 
posed an estimated 6.6 percent of the population in 1960 and 5.9 
percent in 1980. An "old" middle class consisting of shopkeepers 
and small business proprietors in urban and rural areas, self- 
employed professionals, and self-employed craftsmen grew modestiy 
from 13 percent to 20.8 percent of the population between 1960 
and 1980. Kim's figures also include what he euphemistically calls 
an "upper-middle" class — the country's economic and social elites, 
whose numbers grew from 0.9 percent to 1 .8 percent of the popu- 
lation between 1960 and 1980. 

Another way of viewing contemporary South Korean society is 
to consider the sources of social inequality. In a 1988 article, Korea 
specialist David I. Steinberg focused on several of these sources, 
which include the disparity in living standards between urban and 
rural areas — the main motivation behind sustained urban migra- 
tion. Although the Saemaul Movement was successful in narrowing 
the gap between rural and urban incomes during the mid-1970s, 
disparities subsequently reemerged. Steinberg also noted that 
despite the land reform of the late 1940s, tenancy has grown, and 
that by 1981 as many as 46 percent of all farmers were "full or 
partial tenants." 

Discrimination on both the community and individual levels 
against the people of North C holla and South C holla provinces re- 
mains a second important source of inequality. Disparities in per 
capita income between Seoul and the provinces of North and South 
Kyongsang had virtually disappeared by the early 1980s, but per 
capita incomes in the capital were still 1 .8 times those in the Chol- 
la region in 1983. As in most other Asian (and most Western) coun- 
tries, gender differences remain another source of major inequalities 
(see Changing Role of Women, this ch.). 

Government control of the financial system has created substan- 
tial inequalities between the favored chaebol, which at least until 
the late 1980s had access to credit at low rates, and capital- starved 
smaller businesses that had to rely on nonbank sources of credit. 
Official support of the chaebol as the engines of South Korean eco- 
nomic growth and industrialization was clearly reflected in the dif- 
ferences between salaries and working conditions of employees in 
large and small enterprises. Also, the Park and Chun regimes' 
hostile policies toward labor unions kept workers' wages low — and 



97 



South Korea: A Country Study 

internationally competitive. In Steinberg's words, "The Korean 
worker has been asked to suffer for the good of society as a 
whole . . . . " Activists who tried to organize independent unions 
were harassed, arrested, imprisoned, and frequently tortured by 
the authorities. During the liberalization that began in 1987, 
however, the government permitted the establishment of indepen- 
dent labor unions and assumed a new attitude, at times approaching 
neutrality in labor-management disputes (see Interest Groups, ch. 4). 

Education remained the single most important factor affecting 
social mobility in the 1990s. With the exception of the military, 
whose top echelons were educated at the Korea Military Academy, 
the postwar elites of South Korea shared one characteristic: they 
were graduates of the most prestigious universities. There was a 
well-defined hierarchy of such schools, starting with Seoul National 
University at the top and followed by Yonse University and Koryo 
University (more commonly known as Korea University in En- 
glish). Ehwa Woman's University was the top institution for women 
(see Education, this ch.). 

A survey conducted in the mid-1970s by the Korea Develop- 
ment Institute, a research organization funded by the government 
but having considerable operational independence, revealed that 
25 percent of a sample of entrepreneurs and 35 percent of a sam- 
ple of higher civil servants had attended Seoul National Universi- 
ty. The university's control of entry into the government and 
business elites is comparable to that exercised by the University 
of Tokyo in Japan. One major difference, however, is that for a 
Japanese student an extended period of study or residence abroad 
is not considered advisable because it interrupts one's career 
"track" within a single bureaucracy or corporation; many promi- 
nent South Koreans, however, obtain advanced degrees at univer- 
sities in the United States and in Western Europe. 

The social importance of education is one of the major continui- 
ties between traditional and contemporary Korea. People at the 
top require blue-ribbon educational backgrounds, not only because 
education gives them the cultural sophistication and technical ex- 
pertise needed to manage large, complex organizations, but also 
because subordinates will not work diligently for an uneducated 
person — especially if subordinates are educated themselves. "Old 
school ties" are also increasingly necessary for advancement in a 
highly competitive society. At the bottom of the steep higher- 
education pyramid are low-prestige "diploma mills" whose gradu- 
ates have little chance of breaking into elite circles. Yet gradua- 
tion even from these institutions confers a sort of middle-class status. 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 



Despite impressive increases in university enrollments, the cen- 
tral importance of education credentials for social advancement has 
tended to widen the gap between the middle and lower classes. In- 
come distribution is more unequal than in Japan or Taiwan, with 
pronounced disparities between college and secondary- school gradu- 
ates. Many workers know that their comparatively low wages make 
it virtually impossible for them to give their children a college edu- 
cation, a heavy financial burden even for middle-class families. 

In the workplace, men and women with a middle- school or 
secondary-school education are often treated with open contempt 
by university graduate managers. The latter address them with rude 
or abrupt words whose impact is amplified by the status-sensitive 
nature of the Korean language (see The Korean Language, this 
ch.). The result has been bitter resentment and increasing labor 
militancy bordering on political opposition to the status quo. 

During the 1980s, the concept of minjung (the masses) became 
prominent in the thinking and rhetoric of radical students, mili- 
tant labor unionists, activists identified with the Christian churches, 
and progressive but generally non-Marxist intellectuals. Although 
its meaning is vague, minjung encompasses not only the urban 
proletariat in the Marxist sense but also the groups, including farm- 
ers, small bourgeoisie, students, and skilled craftsmen, who allegedly 
have been exploited by the country's numerically small ruling class 
(the military elite, top bureaucrats, and big business). National 
elites were viewed as collaborating with foreign (particularly United 
States and Japanese) capitalists in order to create a situation of per- 
manent dependence on foreign capital. The emphasis on neo- 
colonialist themes by minjung spokespeople drew deeply on South 
Korean populist, nationalist, and xenophobic sentiments to place 
the origin of social evils outside the Korean race. 

Traditional Family Life 

Filial piety {hyo in Korean; xiao in Chinese), the second of the 
Five Relationships, defined by Mencius as affection between father 
and son, traditionally has been the normative foundation of Korean 
family life. Though its influence has diminished over time, this rela- 
tionship remains vitally important in contemporary South Korea. 
Entailing a large number of reciprocal duties and responsibilities 
between the generations of a single family, it generally has been 
viewed as an unequal relationship in which the son owed the father 
unquestioning obedience. Neo-Confucianists thought that the 
subordination of son to father was the expression, on the human 
level, of an immutable law of the cosmos. This law also imposed 
a rigidity on family life. 



99 



South Korea: A Country Study 

Family and lineage continuity traditionally was, and to a great 
extent remains, a supremely important principle. This principle 
reflects Mencius's view that of all possible unfilial acts, to deprive 
one's parents of posterity is the worst. Historically, the Korean 
family has been patrilineal. The most important concern for the 
family group was producing a male heir to carry on the family line 
and to perform ancestor rituals in the household and at the family 
gravesite. The first son customarily assumed leadership of the fam- 
ily after his father's death and inherited his father's house and a 
greater portion of land than his younger brothers. This inheritance 
enabled him to carry out the ritually prescribed obligations to his 
ancestors. 

Ancestor worship was, simultaneously, a social ethic and a 
religion. In some ways, it was the most optimistic of faiths. It taught 
that deceased family members do not pass into oblivion, to an after- 
life, or, as the Buddhists believe, to rebirth as humans or animals 
in some remote place, but remain, in spiritual form, securely within 
the family circle. For traditionally minded Koreans, the presence 
of the deceased could be an intensely real and personal one. Fear 
of death was blunted by the consoling thought that even in the grave 
one would be cared for by one's own people. Succeeding genera- 
tions had the obligation of remembering the deceased in a yearly 
cycle of rituals and ceremonies. 

Traditionally, the purpose of marriage was to produce a male 
heir to carry on the family line rather than to provide mutual com- 
panionship and support for husband and wife. Marriages were 
arranged. A go-between or matchmaker, usually a middle-aged 
woman, carried on the negotiations between the two families in- 
volved who, because of a very strict law of exogamy, sometimes 
did not know each other and often lived in different communities. 
The bride and groom met for the first time at the marriage cere- 
mony, a practice that ended in the cities by the 1930s. 

The traditional Korean kinship system, defined by different obli- 
gations in relation to ancestor worship, was complex. Anthropolo- 
gists generally view it in terms of four separate levels, beginning 
with the household on the lowest level and reaching to the clan, 
which included a large number of persons often spread over an 
extensive geographical area. The household, chip or jip (see Glos- 
sary) in Korean, consisted of husband and wife, their children, and 
if the husband were the eldest son, his parents as well. The eldest 
son's household, the stem family, was known as the "big house" 
(k'unjip), whereas that of each of the younger sons, a branch family 
containing husband, wife and children only, was known as the "little 
house" (chagunjip). It was through the stem family of the eldest son 



100 



"Spring Time, " a traditional 
dance performance 
Courtesy Robert L. Worden 



that the main line of descent was traced from generation to gener- 
ation. The eldest son was responsible for rituals in honor of the 
ancestors, and his wife was responsible for producing the all- 
important male heir. 

The second level of kinship was the "mourning group" (tangnae), 
which consisted of all those descendants of a common patrilineal 
forbearer up to four generations back. Its role was to organize 
ceremonies at the grave site. These rites included the reading of 
a formal message by the eldest male descendant of the tangnae pro- 
genitor and the offering of elaborate and attractive dishes to the 
ancestral spirits. 

Similar rituals were carried out at the third level of kinship or- 
ganization, the lineage (p'a — see Glossary). A lineage might com- 
prise only a handful of households, but in some cases included 
hundreds and even thousands of households. The lineage was 
responsible for the rites honoring ancestors of the fifth generation 
or above, performed at a common grave site. During the Choson 
Dynasty, the lineage commonly possessed land, grave sites, and 
buildings. Croplands were allocated to support the ancestral ceremo- 
nies. The lineage also performed other functions: the aid of poor 
or distressed lineage members, the education of children at schools 
maintained by the p 'a, and the supervision of the behavior of youn- 
ger lineage members. Because most villagers were members of a 
common lineage during the Choson Dynasty, the p'a performed 



101 



South Korea: A Country Study 

many of the social services on the local level that are now provided 
by public schools, police, and social welfare agencies. 

The fourth and most inclusive kinship organization was the clan, 
or, more accurately, the tongjok (surname origin group). Among 
ordinary South Koreans, this group was commonly known as the 
pongwan, or "clan seat." Members of the same tongjok shared both 
a surname and origins in the generally remote past. Unlike mem- 
bers of the smaller kinship groups, however, they often lacked strong 
feelings of solidarity. Important tongjok include the Chonju Yi, whose 
lineage seat was in Chonju in North Cholla Province and who 
claimed as their progenitor the founder of the Choson Dynasty, 
Yi Song-gye; and the Kimhae Kim, whose lineage seat was in Kim- 
hae in South Kyongsang Province and who claimed as their com- 
mon ancestor either the founder of the ancient kingdom of Kaya 
or one of the kings of the Silla Dynasty (A.D. 668-935). 

Approximately 249 surnames were used by South Koreans in 
the late 1980s. The most common were Kim (about 22 percent of 
the population), Li or Yi (15 percent of the population), Pak or 
Park (8.5 percent), Ch'oe (4.8 percent), and Chong (4.2 percent). 
There are, however, about 150 surname origin groups bearing the 
name Kim, 95 with the name Yi, 35 with the name Pak, 40 with 
the name Ch'oe, and 27 with the name Chong. 

In many if not most cases, the real function of the tongjok was 
to define groups of permissible marriage partners. Because of the 
strict rule of exogamy, people from the same tongjok were not per- 
mitted to marry, even though their closest common ancestors in 
many cases might have lived centuries ago. This prohibition, which 
originated during the Choson Dynasty, had legal sanction in 
present-day South Korea. An amendment to the marriage law pro- 
posed by women's and other groups in early 1990 would have 
changed this situation by prohibiting marriages only between per- 
sons who had a common ancestor five generations or less back. 
However, the amendment was strongly opposed by conservative 
Confucian groups, which viewed the exogamy law as a crystalli- 
zation of traditional Korean values. Among older South Koreans, 
it is still commonly thought that only uncivilized people marry 
within their clan group. 

Family and Social Life in the Cities 

Contemporary urban family and social life in South Korea at 
the start of the 1990s exhibits a number of departures from tradi- 
tional family and kinship institutions. One example is the tenden- 
cy for complex kinship and family structures to weaken or break 
down and be replaced by structurally simpler two- generation, 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 



nuclear families. Another closely related trend is the movement 
toward equality in family relations and the resulting improvement 
in the status of women. Thirdly, there is a movement away from 
lineage- and neighborhood-based social relations toward functionally 
based relations. People in the cities no longer work among their 
relatives or neighbors in the fields or on fishing boats, but among 
unrelated people in factories, shops, and offices. Finally, there is 
an increasing tendency for an individual's location and personal 
associations to be transitory and temporary rather than permanent 
and lifelong, although the importance of school ties is pivotal. There 
is greater physical mobility as improved transportation facilities, 
superhighways, and rapid express trains make it possible to travel 
between cities in a few hours. Subsidiary transportation networks 
have broken down barriers between once-isolated villages and the 
urban areas (see Transportation and Telecommunications, ch. 3). 
Mobility in human relations also is becoming more apparent as 
people change their residences more frequently, often because of 
employment, and an increasing proportion of the urban popula- 
tion lives in large, impersonal apartment complexes. 

Matchmaking was a big business in Seoul and other cities in con- 
temporary society; coffee shops and lounges often were crowded 
on weekends. In a change from traditional society, prospective 
brides and grooms held scores of interviews, sonpogi, before deciding 
on the companion they would like to date-for-marriage. Many of 
these young men and women changed their minds after these dates, 
and the process began again. Yonae, or "love match" marriages, 
occurred with increasing frequency. 

Contrary to the Confucian ideal, the nuclear family consisting 
of a husband, wife, and children is becoming predominant in con- 
temporary South Korea. It differs from the traditional "branch 
family," or "little house" (chagunjip), for two reasons: the conju- 
gal relationship between husband and wife tends to take precedence 
over the relationship between the son and his parents, and the 
nuclear family unit is becoming increasingly independent, both eco- 
nomically and psychologically, of larger kinship groups. These 
developments have led to greater equality among the family units 
established by the eldest and younger sons. Whereas the isolated 
nuclear family was perceived in the past as a sign of poverty and 
misfortune, the contemporary nuclear family is often viewed as the 
result of a conscious choice made by those who do not wish their 
privacy invaded by intrusive relatives. 

Economic relations between the generations of a single family 
changed radically in the transition from traditional rural to modern 
urban society. In the past, the male head of the patrilineal family 



103 



South Korea: A Country Study 



controlled all the property, usually in the form of land, and was 
generally the sole provider of economic support. With the develop- 
ment of modern industry and services, however, each adult gener- 
ation and nuclear family unit has become more or less economi- 
cally independent, although sons might depend upon their parents 
or even their wife's parents for occasional economic assistance — 
for example, in purchasing a house. Because urban families usually 
live apart from their paternal in-laws, even when the householder 
is the eldest son, the wife no longer has to endure the domination 
of her mother-in-law and sister-in-law. In many cases, the family 
is closer to the wife's parents than to the husband's. The modern 
husband and wife often are closer emotionally than in the old fam- 
ily system. They spend more time together and even go out so- 
cially, a formerly unheard-of practice. Yet the expectation still 
remains that elderly parents will live with one of their children, 
preferably a son, rather than on their own or in nursing homes. 
This expectation could change in the last decade of the century, 
however, with the expansion of health care and social welfare fa- 
cilities. 

Outside the nuclear family, blood relationships still are impor- 
tant, particularly among close relatives, such as members of the 
same tangnae, or mourning group. Relations with more distant rela- 
tives, such as members of the same lineage, tend to be weak, espe- 
cially if the lineage has its roots in a distant rural village, as most 
do. Ancestor rites are practiced in urban homes, although for few- 
er generations than formerly: the majority of urban dwellers seem 
to conduct rites only in honor of the father and mother of the fam- 
ily head. As a result, there are far fewer ancestors to venerate and 
far fewer occasions on which to hold the household ceremonies. 
In some ways, however, increased geographical mobility has helped 
to preserve family solidarity. In the late 1980s, during New Year's, 
Hansik (Cold Food Day in mid- April), and Ch'usok (the Autumn 
Harvest Festival in mid- September), the airplanes, trains, and high- 
ways were jammed with people traveling to visit both living rela- 
tives and grave sites in their ancestral communities. 

Changing Role of Women 

During the Koryo and early Choson Dynasties, it was customary 
for the married couple to live in the wife's parents' household. This 
arrangement suggests that the status of women was then higher 
than it was later during most of the Choson Dynasty. Neo- 
Confucian orthodoxy dictated that the woman, separated from her 
parents, had a primary duty of providing a male heir for her hus- 
band's family. According to Confucian custom, once married, a 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



woman had to leave her parents' household permanently and then 
occupy the lowest position in her husband's family. She was often 
abused and mistreated by both her mother-in-law and sisters-in- 
law — at least until the birth of a son gave her some status in her 
husband's family. The relationship between wife and husband was 
often, if not usually, distant, aptiy described by the Korean proverb: 
"By day, like seeing a stranger; by night, like seeing a lover." Cho- 
son Dynasty law prohibited widows from remarrying, although a 
similar prohibition was not extended to widowers. Further, the sons 
and grandsons of widows who defied the ban, like children of second- 
ary wives, were not allowed to take the civil service examinations 
and become scholar-officials. 

The duty of a woman to her husband, or rather to her husband's 
family, was absolute and unquestionable. In the traditional society, 
only men could obtain a divorce. A husband could divorce his spouse 
if she were barren — barrenness being defined simply as the inabili- 
ty to bear sons. Even if a husband did not divorce his wife, he had 
the right to take a second wife, although the preferred solution for 
a man without a son during the Choson Dynasty was to adopt a 
son of one of his brothers, if available. The incompatibility 
of a wife and her in-laws was also grounds for divorce. 

In contemporary society, both men and women have the right 
to obtain a divorce. Social and economic discrimination, however, 
makes the lot of divorced women more difficult. The husband may 
still demand custody of the children, although a revision of the Family 
Law in 1977 made it more difficult for him to coerce or to deceive 
his wife into agreeing to an unfair settlement. The rate of divorce 
in South Korea is increasing rapidly. In 1975 the number of divorces 
was 17,000. In the mid-1980s, the annual number of divorces was 
between 23,000 and 26,000, and in 1987 there were 45,000 divorces. 

The tradition of total female submission persisted in Korean vil- 
lages until relatively recent times. One Korean scholar who came 
from the conservative Ch'ungch'ong region south of Seoul recalled 
that when a high school friend died of sickness during the 1940s, 
his young bride committed suicide. Her act was commemorated in 
her own and the surrounding communities as an outstanding ex- 
ample of devotion to duty. 

Traditionally, men and women were strictiy segregated, both in- 
side and outside the house. Yangban women spent most of their lives 
in seclusion in the women's chamber. It is said that the traditional 
pastime of nolttwigi, a game of jumping up and down on a seesaw- 
like contraption, originated among bored women who wanted to 
peek over the high walls of their family compounds to see 



105 



South Korea: A Country Study 

what the outside world was like. Economic necessity gave women 
of the lower classes some freedom as they participated in farm work 
and sometimes earned supplemental income through making and 
selling things. 

A small minority of women played an active role in society and 
even wielded political influence. These people included female sha- 
mans (mudang), who were called upon to cure illnesses, tell fortunes, 
or in other ways enlist the help of spirits in realizing the wishes 
of their clients. Despite its sponsorship of neo-Confucianism, the 
Ghoson Dynasty had an office of shamanism, and female shamans 
often were quite influential in the royal palace. The female physi- 
cians who treated female patients (because male physicians were 
forbidden to examine them) constituted another important group 
of women. Sometimes they acted as spies or policewomen because 
they could get into the female quarters of a house. Still another 
group of women were the kisaeng. Some kisaeng, or entertainers, 
were merely prostitutes; but others, like their Japanese counter- 
parts the geisha, were talented musicians, dancers, painters, and 
poets and interacted on nearly equal terms with their male patrons. 
The kisaeng tradition perpetuated one of the more dubious legacies 
of the Confucian past: an extreme double standard concerning the 
sexual behavior of married men and women that still persists. In 
the cities, however, many middle class women have begun to break 
with these traditions. 

An interesting regional variation on traditional female roles con- 
tinued in the late 1980s. In the coastal villages of Cheju Island, 
women divers swam in search of seaweed, oysters, and other ma- 
rine products and were economically self-sufficient. Often they 
provided the main economic support for the family while the hus- 
band did subsidiary work — took care of the children and did house- 
hold chores — in sharp contrast to the Confucian norm. The number 
of women divers was dwindling, however, and men were increas- 
ingly performing jobs in service industries. Confucian ancestor wor- 
ship was rarely practiced; female-centered shamanistic rites, 
however, were widespread. 

The factories of South Korea employ hundreds of thousands of 
young women on shop floors and assembly lines making, among 
other things, textiles and clothes, shoes, and electronic components. 
South Korea's economic success was bought in large measure with 
the sweat of these generally overworked and poorly paid female 
laborers. In the offices of banks and other service enterprises, young 
women working as clerks and secretaries are indispensable. Un- 
like their sisters on Cheju Island, however, the majority of these 
women work only until marriage. 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 

Although increasing numbers of women work outside the home, 
the dominant conception, particularly for the college-educated mid- 
dle class, is that the husband is the "outside person," the one whose 
employment provides the main source of economic support; the 
wife is the "inside person," whose chief responsibility is main- 
tenance of the household, Women tend to leave the labor force when 
they get married. Many women manage the family finances, and 
a large number join kye, informal private short-term credit associ- 
ations that give them access to funds that might not be obtainable 
from a conventional bank. Probably the most important responsi- 
bility of married women is the management of their children's 
education. 

On the surface, Korean women often appear docile, submissive, 
and deferential to the wishes of their husbands and in-laws. Yet 
behind the scenes, there is often considerable "hidden" female pow- 
er, particularly within the private sphere of the household. In areas 
such as household finances, South Korean husbands usually defer 
to their wives' judgment. Public assertion of a woman's power, 
however, is socially disapproved, and a traditional wife maintained 
the image, if not the reality of submissiveness. And, as in other 
male-dominated societies, Korean men often jokingly complain that 
they are henpecked. 

In traditional Korean society, women received little formal edu- 
cation. Christian missionaries began establishing schools for girls 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ehwa 
Woman's University, the most prestigious women's institution, 
began as a primary school established by Methodist missionaries 
in 1886 and achieved university status after 1945. Chongsin Girls' 
School and Paehwa Girls' School were founded in 1890 and 1898, 
respectively, in Seoul. Songui Girls' School was established in 1903 
in P'yongyang. By 1987 there were ten institutions of higher edu- 
cation for women, including universities, colleges, and junior col- 
leges; women accounted for approximately 28 percent of total en- 
rollment in higher education. There were approximately 262,500 
women students in colleges and universities in 1987. However, only 
about 16 percent of college and university teachers were women 
in 1987. 

The growing number of women receiving a college education 
has meant that their sex role differs from that of their mothers and 
grandmothers. Many college-educated women plan independent 
careers and challenge the right of parents to choose a marriage part- 
ner. The often fierce battles between university students and police 
during the late 1980s included female participants. A correspon- 
dent for the Far Eastern Economic Review quoted a male student leader 



107 



South Korea: A Country Study 

as saying that "short girls make great demonstrators, as they're 
very tough and very hard to catch. ' ' Whether politically active South 
Korean university women will follow their Japanese counterparts, 
who demonstrated during the 1960s and 1970s, into a world of child- 
raising and placid consumerism remains to be seen. The number 
of employed married women, however, increased by approximately 
12.6 percent annually in the years since 1977. 

In 1983, 51.8 percent of women living in rural areas were em- 
ployed as compared with 37.8 percent of women living in urban 
areas. Most of the women working in rural areas were over the 
age of thirty, as young females (and males) tended to move to, and 
seek employment in, cities and industrial areas. 

Official South Korean statistics indicated that 43.6 percent of 
women were in the work force by 1988. Prospects for lower class 
women, however, were frequendy grim. In some cases, they were 
obliged to become part of the "entertainment industry" in order 
to survive economically. According to one estimate, brothels, bars, 
massage parlors, discos, and what are known as "Taiwan style" 
barbershops (that is, those often employing a greater number of 
masseuses than barbers) employed as many as 1 million women, 
though not all were prostitutes. This underworld of abuse, exploi- 
tation, and bitter shame had begun to be criticized and exposed 
by women's activists. 

Cultural Identity 

South Korea's homogeneous population shares a common eth- 
nic, cultural, and linguistic heritage. National self-image is, on one 
level, unambiguously defined by the convergence of territorial, eth- 
nic, linguistic, and cultural identities (see Population, this ch.). Yet 
intense feelings of nationalism, so evident in athletic events like 
the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games held in Seoul, 
revealed anxiety as well as pride concerning South Korea's place 
in the world. More than Western peoples and even more than the 
Japanese, South Korean individuals are inclined to view themselves 
as a tightly knit national community with a common destiny. In 
a rapidly changing world, however, it is often difficult for them 
to define exactly what being a South Korean is. To outsiders, the 
intense concern with identity is perhaps difficult to understand; 
it reflects a history of subordinate relations to powerful foreign states 
and the tragedy of national division after World War II. 

Many modernized, urban-dwelling South Koreans embark on a 
search for the "essence" of their culture, which commonly expresses 
itself as hostility to foreign influences. For example, the poet Kim 
Chi-ha, whose opposition to the Park regime in the 1970s was a 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



model for a younger generation of dissidents, attacked the govern- 
ment as much for its neglect of traditional values as for its antidemo- 
cratic tendencies. 

Seoul has not been slow to employ traditionalism for its own ends. 
In 1987 the government adopted guidelines for the revision of his- 
tory textbooks, instructing publishers to describe the foundation 
of the Korean nation by Tan 'gun in 2333 B.C. as "a reflection 
of historical facts" rather than simply a myth. The legendary Tan- 
gun was, according to the myth, the son of god and a bear- woman. 
According to a Far Eastern Economic Review commentator, "... peo- 
ple ranging from reputable university scholars to chauvinist mys- 
tics regard Tan 'gun as the personification of ethics and values that 
emphasize a native Korean identity against the foreign religions 
and philosophies of Buddhism, neo-Confucianism, Christianity and 
Marxism that have otherwise dominated Korean history and 
thought. ' ' Tan'gun's legendary kingdom is older than China's first 
legendary dynasty, the Xia (2205-1766 B.C.), and its antiquity 
asserts Korea's cultural autonomy in relation to its largest neigh- 
bor. There have been proposals that the government subsidize the 
rites of the numerically small community of believers in Taejong- 
gyo and other cults that worship Tan 'gun. 

Problems of cultural identity are closely connected to the trage- 
dy of Korea's division into two hostile states. Many members of 
the younger generation of South Koreans born after the Korean 
War fervently embrace the cause of t'ongil, or reunification, and 
believe that it is the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet 
Union, who are to blame for Korea's national division. The South 
Korean government's dependence on the United States has been 
cited as one of the principal reasons for the lack of improvement 
in north-south ties. While a majority of South Koreans remain sus- 
picious of the North Koreans, many South Koreans also share the 
sentiments expressed by Kim Chi-ha: "Our name is division, and 
this soiled name, like an immovable destiny, oppresses all of us." 
When parts of the wall dividing East Berlin and West Berlin were 
knocked down in November 1989, Koreans reflected sadly that 
breaching the DMZ would not be such a simple task. 

Korea and Japan 

National or ethnic groups often need an "other," a group of 
outsiders against whom they can define themselves. While Western 
countries with their individualistic and, from a Confucian perspec- 
tive, self-centered ways of life provide important images of "other- 
ness" for South Koreans, the principal source of such images for 
many years has been Japan. Attitudes toward Japan as an "other" 



109 



South Korea: A Country Study 

are complex. On the most basic level, there is hostility fed by 
memories of invasion and colonial oppression, present-day economic 
frictions, and the Japanese government's inability or unwilling- 
ness to do anything about discriminatory treatment of the large 
Korean minority in Japan. The two countries have a long history 
of hostility. Admiral Yi Sun-sin, whose armor-plated boats even- 
tually defeated the Japanese navy's damaging attacks in the 1590s, 
is South Korea's most revered national hero. 

The Japanese Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture's 
adoption in the 1980s of revised textbook guidelines, softening the 
language used to describe Japan's aggression during World War 
II, inspired outrage in South Korea as well as in other Asian coun- 
tries. The textbook controversy was a major impetus for a nation- 
al campaign to build an Independence Hall, located about 100 
kilometers south of Seoul, to keep alive memories of Japanese 
colonial exploitation. Opened on August 15, 1987, the anniver- 
sary of Korea's liberation from Japan, the building houses grim 
exhibits depicting the atrocities of the Japanese military against 
Korean nationalists during the colonial period. 

During the colonial period, and particularly during World War 
II, the Japanese initiated assimilation policies designed to turn 
Koreans into obedient subjects of the Japanese emperor. Under 
the slogan "Nissen ittai" (Japan and Korea as One), newspapers 
and magazines published in the Korean language were closed, the 
Korean Language Society was disbanded, and Korean writers were 
forced to publish only in Japanese. Students who spoke Korean 
in school were punished. There was pressure to speak Japanese 
at home, adopt Japanese family and given names, and worship at 
Shinto shrines, the religious basis for which had been transplant- 
ed from the home islands. Korean Christians who refused to show 
reverence to the emperor as a divinity were imprisoned or ostra- 
cized. In the words of historian Ki-baik Lee (called Yi Ki-baek in 
Korean), ''Japan's aim was to eradicate consciousness of Korean 
national identity, roots and all, and thus to obliterate the very ex- 
istence of the Korean people from the face of the earth." 

This shared historical experience has provoked not only hostili- 
ty but also a desire to purge Korean culture of lingering Japanese 
influences. In the late 1980s, the government continued to pro- 
hibit the distribution of Japanese-made movies and popular mu- 
sic within the country in order to prevent unwanted contemporary 
influences from crossing the Korea Strait. 

On a more polite level, depiction of Japan as the "other" in- 
volves contrasting the "essences" of the two countries' cultures. 
This process has spawned a popular literature that compares, among 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



other things, the naturalness and "resonance" of Korean art and 
music and the alleged imitativeness and constriction of their 
Japanese counterparts; the "individualism" (of a non- Western sort) 
of Koreans and the "collectivism" or group consciousness of the 
Japanese; and the lyric contrast between the rose of Sharon, Korea's 
national flower, which blooms robustly all summer long, and the 
Japanese cherry blossom, which has the "beauty of frailty" in 
springtime. 

The search for a cultural "essence" involves serious contradic- 
tions. The literature of Korean cultural distinction is strikingly simi- 
lar to Japanese attempts to prove the "uniqueness" of their own 
cultural heritage, although "proof of Japan's uniqueness is usually 
drawn from examples of Western countries (the significant "other" 
for modernized Japanese). Ironically, official and unofficial spon- 
sorship of the Tan 'gun myth, although a minor theme, bears an 
uncanny resemblance to pre-World War II Japanese policies 
promoting historical interpretations of the nation's founding based 
on Shinto mythology. 

Mixed in with feelings of hostility and competition, however, 
is genuine admiration for Japanese economic, technological, and 
social achievements. Japan has become an important market for 
South Korean manufactured products. Both countries have been 
targets of criticism by Western governments accusing them of un- 
fair trading practices. Friendly interest in South Korea is growing 
among the Japanese public despite old prejudices, and large num- 
bers of young Japanese and South Koreans visit each others' coun- 
tries on school and college excursions. Like South Koreans, 
Japanese liberals have been disturbed by official attempts to re- 
vise wartime history. 

The Korean Language 

Modern Korean language is descended from the language of the 
Silla Kingdom, which unified the peninsula in the seventh centu- 
ry. As Korean linguist Yi Ki-mun notes, the more remote origins 
of the Korean language are disputed, although many Korean lin- 
guists, together with a few western scholars, continue to favor the 
now widely-contested nineteenth-century theory of an Altaic fam- 
ily of languages supposed to include Korean, Japanese, and Mon- 
golian, among other languages. Although a historical relationship 
between Korean and Japanese has not been established, modern 
Korean and Japanese have many similar grammatical features, no 
doubt in part because of close contacts between the two during the 
past century. These similarities have given rise to considerable 
speculation in the popular press. The linguist Kim Chin-wu, for 



111 



South Korea: A Country Study 

example, has hypothesized that Korea and Japan stood at the end 
of two routes of large-scale migration in ancient times: a northern 
route from Inner Asia and a southern route from southern China 
or Southeast Asia. In a variant on the "southern origins" theory 
of some Japanese scholars, he views the two languages as reflect- 
ing disparate "northern' ' and "southern" influences, with Korean 
showing more influence from the northern, Inner Asian strain. 

Both Korean and Japanese possess what is sometimes called "po- 
lite" or "honorific" language, the use of different levels of speech 
in addressing persons of superior, inferior, or equal rank. These 
distinctions depend both on the use of different vocabulary and 
upon basic structural differences in the words employed. For ex- 
ample, in Korean the imperative "go" can be rendered kara when 
speaking to an inferior or a child, kage when speaking to an adult 
inferior, kaseyo when speaking to a superior, and kasipsio when speak- 
ing to a person of still higher rank. The proper use of polite lan- 
guage, or levels of polite speech, is an extremely complex and subde 
matter. The Korean language, like Japanese, is extremely sensi- 
tive to the nuances of hierarchical human relationships. Two per- 
sons who meet for the first time are expected to use the more distant 
or formal terms, but they will shift to more informal or "equal" 
terms if they become friends. Younger people invariably use for- 
mal language in addressing elders; the latter will use "inferior" 
terms in "talking down" to those who are younger. 

The Korean language may be written using a mixture of Chinese 
ideograms (hancha) and a native Korean alphabet known as han 'gul, 
or in han 'gul alone, much as in a more limited way Indo-European 
languages sometimes write numbers using Arabic symbols and at 
other times spell numbers out in their own alphabets or in some 
combination of the two forms. Han' gul was invented by scholars 
at the court of King Sejong (1418-50), not solely to promote liter- 
acy among the common people as is sometimes claimed, but also, 
as Professor Gari K. Ledyard has noted, to assist in studies of 
Chinese historical phonology. According to a perhaps apocryphal 
decree of the king, an intelligent man could learn han 'gul in a morn- 
ing' s time, and even a fool could master it in ten days. As a result, 
it was scorned by scholars and relegated to women and merchants. 
The script, which in its modern form contains forty symbols, is 
considered by linguists to be one of the most scientific ever devised; 
it reflects quite consistently the phonemes of the spoken Korean 
language. 

Because of its greater variety of sounds, Korean does not have the 
problem of the Japanese written language, which some experts have 
argued needs to retain a sizable inventory of Chinese characters 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 



to distinguish a large number of potentially ambiguous homo- 
phones. Since 1948 the continued use of Chinese characters in South 
Korea has been criticized by linguistic nationalists and some edu- 
cators and defended by cultural conservatives, who fear that the 
loss of character literacy could cut younger generations off from 
a major part of their cultural heritage. Since the early 1970s, Seoul's 
policy governing the teaching and use of Chinese characters has 
shifted several times, although the trend clearly has been toward 
writing in han'gul alone. By early 1990, all but academic writing 
used far fewer Chinese characters than was the case in the 1960s. 
In 1989 the Korean Language and Education Research Associa- 
tion, citing the need for Chinese character literacy "at a time when 
the nation is entering into keen competition with Japan and China" 
and noting that Japanese educators were increasing the number 
of Chinese characters taught in elementary schools, recommended 
to the Ministry of Education that instruction in Chinese charac- 
ters be reintroduced at the primary- school level. 

Although the Korean and Chinese languages are not related in 
terms of grammatical structure, more than 50 percent of all Korean 
vocabulary is derived from Chinese loanwords, a reflection of the 
cultural dominance of China over 2 millennia. In many cases there 
are two words — a Chinese loanword and an indigenous Korean 
word — meaning the same thing. The Chinese-based word in 
Korean sometimes has a bookish or formal flavor. Koreans select 
one or the other variant to achieve the proper register in speech, 
or in writing, and to make subtle distinctions of meaning in accor- 
dance with established usage. 

Large numbers of Chinese character compounds coined in Japan 
in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries to translate modern Western 
scientific, technical, and political vocabulary came into use in Korea 
during the colonial period. Post- 1945 United States influence has 
been reflected in a number of English words that have been ab- 
sorbed into Korean. 

Unlike Chinese, Korean does not encompass dialects that are 
mutually unintelligible, with the possible exception of the variant 
spoken on Cheju Island. There are, however, regional variations 
both in vocabulary and pronunciation, the range being compara- 
ble to the differences that might be found between Maine and Ala- 
bama in the United States. Despite several decades of universal 
education, similar variations also have been heard between highly 
educated and professional speakers and Koreans of working class 
or rural backgrounds. Standard Korean is derived from the language 
spoken in and around Seoul. More than forty years of division has 



113 



South Korea: A Country Study 

meant that there are also some divergences in the development of 
the Korean language north and south of the DMZ. 

Education 

Like other East Asian countries with a Confucian heritage, South 
Korea has had a long history of providing formal education. 
Although there was no state- supported system of primary educa- 
tion, the central government established a system of secondary 
schools in Seoul and the provinces during the Choson Dynasty. 
State schools suffered a decline in quality, however, and came to 
be supplanted in importance by the sowon, private academies that 
were the centers of a neo-Confucian revival in the sixteenth cen- 
tury. Students at both private and state-supported secondary schools 
were exempt from military service and had much the same social 
prestige as university students enjoy today in South Korea. Like 
modern students, they were frequently involved in politics. Higher 
education was provided by the Confucian national university in 
the capital, the Songgyungwan. Its enrollment was limited to 200 
students who had passed the lower civil service examinations and 
were preparing for the higher examinations. 

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, modern 
private schools were established both by Koreans and by foreign 
Christian missionaries. The latter were particularly important be- 
cause they promoted the education of women and the diffusion of 
Western social and political ideas. Japanese educational policy af- 
ter 1910 was designed to turn Koreans into obedient colonial sub- 
jects and to teach them limited technical skills. A state university 
modeled on Tokyo Imperial University was established in Seoul 
in 1923, but the number of Koreans allowed to study there never 
exceeded 40 percent of its enrollment; 60 percent of its students 
were Japanese expatriates. 

When United States military forces occupied the southern half 
of the Korean Peninsula in 1 945 , they established a school system 
based on the American model: six years of primary school, six years 
of secondary school (divided into junior and senior levels), and four 
years of higher education. Other occupation period reforms included 
coeducation at all levels, popularly elected school boards in local 
areas, and compulsory education up to the ninth grade. The govern- 
ment of Syngman Rhee reversed many of these reforms after 1948: 
in most cases only primary schools remained coeducational and 
education was compulsory only up to the sixth grade because of 
a lack of resources. The school system in 1990, however, reflects 
the system established under the United States occupation. 



114 



The Society and Its Environment 



During the years when Rhee and Park Chung Hee were in pow- 
er, the control of education was gradually taken out of the hands 
of local school boards and concentrated in a centralized Ministry 
of Education. In the late 1980s, the ministry was responsible for 
administration of schools, allocation of resources, setting of enroll- 
ment quotas, certification of schools and teachers, curriculum de- 
velopment (including the issuance of textbook guidelines), and other 
basic policy decisions. Provincial and special city boards of educa- 
tion still existed. Although each board was composed of seven mem- 
bers who were supposed to be selected by popularly elected 
legislative bodies, this arrangement ceased to function after 1973. 
Subsequently, school board members were approved by the minister 
of education. 

Most observers agree that South Korea's spectacular progress 
in modernization and economic growth since the Korean War is 
largely attributable to the willingness of individuals to invest a large 
amount of resources in education: the improvement of "human 
capital." The traditional esteem for the educated man, originally 
confined to the Confucian scholar as a cultured generalist, now 
extends to scientists, technicians, and others working with special- 
ized knowledge. Highly educated technocrats and economic plan- 
ners could claim much of the credit for their country's economic 
successes since the 1960s. Scientific professions were generally 
regarded as the most prestigious by South Koreans in the 1980s. 

Statistics demonstrate the success of South Korea's national edu- 
cation programs. In 1945 the adult literacy rate was estimated at 
22 percent; by 1970 adult literacy was 87.6 percent, and by the 
late 1980s various sources estimated it at around 93 percent. South 
Korean students have performed exceedingly well in internation- 
al competitions in mathematics and science. Although only primary 
school (grades one through six) was compulsory, percentages of 
age-groups of children and young people enrolled in primary, second- 
ary, and tertiary level schools were equivalent to those found in 
industrialized countries, including Japan. Approximately 4.8 mil- 
lion students in the eligible age-group were attending primary school 
in 1985. The percentage of students going on to optional middle 
school the same year was more than 99 percent. Approximately 
34 percent, one of the world's highest rates of secondary- school 
graduates, attended institutions of higher education in 1987, a rate 
similar to Japan's (about 30 percent) and exceeding Britain's (20 
percent). 

Government expenditure on education has been generous. In 
1975 it was W220 billion (for value of the won — see Glossary), the 
equivalent of 2.2 percent of the gross national product (GNP — see 



115 



South Korea: A Country Study 

Glossary), or 13.9 percent of total government expenditures. By 
1986 education expenditure had reached won 3.76 trillion, or 4.5 
percent of the GNP, and 27.3 percent of government budget 
allocations. 

Social emphasis on education was not, however, without its 
problems, as it tended to accentuate class differences. In the late 
1980s, possession of a college degree was considered necessary for 
entering the middle class; there were no alternative pathways of 
social advancement, with the possible exception of a military career. 
People without a college education, including skilled workers with 
vocational school backgrounds, often were treated as second-class 
citizens by their white-collar, college-educated managers, despite 
the importance of their skills for economic development. Intense 
competition for places at the most prestigious universities — the sole 
gateway into elite circles — promoted, like the old Confucian sys- 
tem, a sterile emphasis on rote memorization in order to pass sec- 
ondary school and college entrance examinations. Particularly after 
a dramatic expansion of college enrollments in the early 1980s, 
South Korea faced the problem of what to do about a large num- 
ber of young people kept in school for a long time, usually at great 
sacrifice to themselves and their families, and then faced with limited 
job opportunities because their skills were not marketable. 

Primary and Secondary Schools 

In the late 1980s, primary schools were coeducational, although 
coeducation was quite rare at the middle-school and high-school 
levels. Enrollment figures for 1987 on the primary- school level were 
4,771,722 pupils in 6,531 schools, with 130,142 teachers. A decline 
from the 1980 figure of 5,658,002 pupils was caused by popula- 
tion trends. Some 54 percent of primary school teachers were male. 

In 1987 there were approximately 4,895,354 students enrolled 
in middle schools and high schools, with approximately 150,873 
teachers. About 69 percent of these teachers were male. The 
secondary- school enrollment figure also reflected changing popu- 
lation trends; there were 3,959,975 students in secondary schools 
in 1979. Given the importance of entry into higher education, the 
majority of students attended general or academic high schools in 
1987: 1 ,397,359 students, or 60 percent of the total, attended general 
or academic high schools, as compared with 840,265 students in 
vocational secondary schools. Vocational schools specialized in a 
number of fields: primarily agriculture, fishery, commerce, trades, 
merchant marine, engineering, and the arts. 

Enrollment in kindergartens or preschools expanded impressively 
during the 1980s. In 1980 there were 66,433 children attending 



116 



The Society and Its Environment 



901 kindergartens or preschools. By 1987 there were 397,020 chil- 
dren in 7,792 institutions. The number of kindergarten and 
preschool teachers rose from 3,339 to 1 1 ,920 during the same peri- 
od. The overwhelming majority of these teachers — approximately 
92 percent — were women. This growth was attributable to several 
factors: Ministry of Education encouragement of preschool edu- 
cation, the greater number of women entering the work force, 
growth in the number of nuclear families without a grandparent 
available to take care of children, and the feeling that kindergar- 
ten might give children an 4 'edge" in later educational competi- 
tion. Kindergartens often paid homage to the expectations of parents 
with impressive graduation ceremonies, complete with diplomas, 
academic caps, and gowns. 

Competitive entrance examinations at the middle-school level 
were abolished in 1968. Although as of the late 1980s, students 
still had to pass noncompetitive qualifying examinations, they were 
assigned to secondary institutions by lottery, or else by location 
within the boundary of the school district. Secondary schools, for- 
merly ranked according to the quality of their students, have been 
equalized, with a portion of good, mediocre, and poor students 
being assigned to each one. The reform, however, did not equal- 
ize secondary schools completely. In Seoul, students who performed 
well in qualifying examinations were allowed to attend better quality 
schools in a "common" district, whereas other students attended 
schools in one of five geographical districts. The reforms applied 
equally to public and private schools, both of whose enrollments 
were strictly controlled by the Ministry of Education. 

Although primary- and secondary- school teachers traditionally 
enjoyed high status, they often were overworked and underpaid 
during the late 1980s. Salaries were less than those for many other 
white-collar professions and even some blue-collar jobs. High school 
teachers, particularly those in the cities, did however, receive siz- 
able gifts from parents seeking attention for their children, but teach- 
ing hours were long and classes crowded (the average class contained 
around fifty to sixty students). 

In May 1989, teachers established an independent union, the 
National Teachers Union (NTU — Chon'gyojo). Their aims includ- 
ed improving working conditions and reforming a school system 
that they regarded as overly controlled by the Ministry of Educa- 
tion. Although the government promised large increases in allo- 
cations for teachers' salaries and facilities, it refused to give the 
union legal status. Because teachers were civil servants, the govern- 
ment claimed they did not have the right to strike and, even if they 
did have the right to strike, unionization would undermine the status 



117 



South Korea: A Country Study 



of teachers as "role models" for young Koreans. The government 
also accused the union of spreading subversive, leftist propaganda 
that was sympathetic to the communist regime in North Korea. 

According to a report in the Asian Wall Street Journal, the union 
claimed support from 82 percent of all teachers. The controversy 
was viewed as representing a major crisis for South Korean edu- 
cation because a large number of teachers (1,500 by November 
1989) had been dismissed; violence among union supporters, op- 
ponents, and police had occurred at several locations; and class 
disruptions had caused anxieties for families of students preparing 
for the college entrance examinations. The union's challenge to 
the Ministry of Education's control of the system and the charges 
of subversion had made compromise seem a very remote possibil- 
ity at the start of 1990. 

Higher Education 

In the late 1980s, the university a South Korean high school 
graduate attended was perhaps the single most important factor 
in determining his or her life chances. Thus, entrance into a pres- 
tigious institution was the focus of intense energy, dedication, and 
self-sacrifice. Prestigious institutions included the state-run Seoul 
National University, originally established by the Japanese as Seoul 
Imperial University in 1923, and a handful of private institutions 
such as Yonse University, Koryo University, and Ehwa Woman's 
University. 

Because college entrance depends upon ranking high in objec- 
tively graded examinations, high school students face an "exami- 
nation hell," a harsh regimen of endless cramming and rote 
memorization of facts that is probably even more severe than the 
one faced by their counterparts in Japan. Unlike the Confucian 
civil service examinations of the C ho son Dynasty, their modern 
reincarnation is a matter of importance not for an elite, but for 
the substantial portion of the population with middle-class aspira- 
tions. In the late 1980s, over one-third of college-age men and wom- 
en (35.2 percent in 1989) succeeded in entering and attending 
institutions of higher education; those who failed faced dramati- 
cally reduced prospects for social and economic advancement. 

The number of students in higher education had risen from 
100,000 in 1960 to 1 .3 million in 1987, and the proportion of college- 
age students in higher-education institutions was second only to 
the United States. The institutions of higher education included 
regular four-year colleges and universities, two-year junior voca- 
tional colleges, four-year teachers' colleges, and graduate schools. 
The main drawback was that college graduates wanted careers that 



118 



University chemistry laboratory 
Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Korea, Washington 

would bring them positions of leadership in society, but there sim- 
ply were not enough positions to accommodate all graduates each 
year and many graduates were forced to accept lesser positions. 
Ambitious women, especially, were frustrated by traditional bar- 
riers of sex discrimination as well as by the lack of positions. 

A college-bound high school student, in the late 1980s, typical- 
ly rose at dawn, did a bit of studying before school began at 7:30 
or 8:00 A.M., attended school until 5:00 P.M., had a quick dinner 
(often away from home), and then attended evening cramming 
classes that could last until 10:00 or 11:00 P.M. Sundays and holi- 
days were devoted to more cramming. Because tests given in high 
school (generally once every two or four weeks) were almost as im- 
portant in determining college entrance as the final entrance ex- 
aminations, students had no opportunity to relax from the study 
routine. According to one contemporary account, a student had 
to memorize 60 to 100 pages of facts to do well on these periodic 
tests. Family and social life generally were sacrificed to the supreme 
end of getting into the best university possible. 

The costs of the ' 'examination hell" have been evident not only 
in a grim and joyless adolescence for many, if not most, young 
South Koreans, but also in the number of suicides caused by the 
constant pressure of tests. Often suicides have been top achievers 



119 



South Korea: A Country Study 

who despaired after experiencing a slump in test performance. In 
addition, the multiple choice format of periodic high school tests 
and university entrance examinations has left students little oppor- 
tunity to develop their creative talents. A "facts only" orientation 
has promoted a cramped and unspontaneous view of the world that 
has tended to spill over into areas of life other than academic work. 

The prospects for basic change in the system — a deemphasis on 
tests — were unlikely in the late 1980s. The great virtue of facts- 
based testing is its objectivity. Although harsh, the system is believed 
to be fair and impartial. The use of nonobjective criteria such as 
essays, personal recommendations, and the recognition of success 
in extracurricular activities or personal recommendations from 
teachers and others could open up all sorts of opportunities for cor- 
ruption. In a society where social connections are extremely impor- 
tant, connections rather than merit might determine entry into a 
good university. Students who survive the numbing regimen of 
examinations under the modern system are at least universally 
acknowledged to have deserved their educational success. Top 
graduates who have assumed positions of responsibility in govern- 
ment and business have lent, through their talents, legitimacy to 
the whole system. 

Following the assumption of power by General Chun Doo Hwan 
in 1980, the Ministry of Education implemented a number of re- 
forms designed to make the system fairer and to increase higher 
education opportunities for the population at large. In a very popu- 
lar move, the ministry dramatically increased enrollment at large. 
The number of high school graduates accepted into colleges and 
universities was increased from almost 403,000 students in 1980 
to more than 1.4 million in 1989. This reform decreased, temporar- 
ily, the acceptance ratio from one college place for every four ap- 
plicants in 1980 to one for every three applicants in 1981 . In 1980 
the number of students attending all kinds of higher educational 
institutions was almost 600,000; that number grew almost 100 per- 
cent to 1,061,403 students by 1983. By 1987 there were 1,340,381 
students attending higher educational institutions. By 1987 junior 
colleges had an enrollment of almost 260,000 students, and col- 
leges and universities had an enrollment of almost 990,000 students. 
Other higher education institutions enrolled the balance. 

A second reform was the prohibition of private, after-school tutor- 
ing. Formerly, private tutors could charge exorbitant rates if they 
had a good "track record" of getting students into the right schools 
through intensive coaching, especially in English and in mathemat- 
ics. This situation gave wealthy families an unfair advantage in 
the competition. Under the new rules, students receiving tutoring 



120 



The Society and Its Environment 



could be suspended from school and their tutors dismissed from 
their jobs. There was ample evidence in the mid-1980s, however, 
that the law had simply driven the private tutoring system under- 
ground and made the fees more expensive. Some underpaid teachers 
and cash-starved students at prestigious institutions were willing 
to run the risk of punishment in order to earn as much as W300,000 
to W500,000 a month. Students and their parents took the risk 
of being caught, believing that coaching in weak subject areas could 
give students the edge needed to get into a better university. By 
the late 1980s, however, the tutorial system seemed largely to have 
disappeared. 

A third reform was much less popular. The ministry established 
a graduation quota system, in which increased freshman enroll- 
ments were counterbalanced by the requirement that each four- 
year college or university fail the lowest 30 percent of its students; 
junior colleges were required to fail the lowest 15 percent. These 
quotas were required no matter how well the lowest 30 or 15 per- 
cent of the students did in terms of objective standards. Ostensi- 
bly designed to ensure the quality of the increased number of college 
graduates, the system also served, for a while to discourage stu- 
dents from devoting their time to political movements. Resentment 
of the quotas was widespread, and family counterpressures were 
intense. The government abolished the quotas in 1984. 

College Student Activism 

Student activism has a long and honorable history in Korea. Stu- 
dents in Choson Dynasty secondary schools often became involved 
in the intense factional struggles of the scholar-official class. Stu- 
dents played a major role in Korea's independence movement, par- 
ticularly the March 1 , 1919, country- wide demonstrations that were 
harshly suppressed by the Japanese military police. Students pro- 
tested against the Rhee and Park regimes during the 1950s, 1960s, 
and 1970s. Observers noted, however, that while student activists 
in the past generally embraced liberal and democratic values, the 
new generation of militants in the 1980s was far more radical. Most 
participants have adopted some version of the minjung ideology that 
was heavily influenced by Marxism, Western "dependence the- 
ory," and Christian "liberation theology," but was also animat- 
ed by strong feelings of popular nationalism and xenophobia. 

The most militant university students, perhaps about 5 percent 
of the total enrollment at Seoul National University and compara- 
ble numbers at other institutions in the capital during the late 1980s, 
were organized into small circles or cells rarely containing more 
than fifty members. Police estimated that there were seventy-two 



121 



South Korea: A Country Study 



such organizations of varying orientation (see Political Extremism 
and Political Violence, ch. 4). 

Religion 

Religious Traditions 

Shamanism 

Koreans, like other East Asians, have traditionally been eclec- 
tic rather than exclusive in their religious commitments. Their re- 
ligious outlook has not been conditioned by a single, exclusive faith 
but by a combination of indigenous beliefs and creeds imported 
into Korea. Belief in a world inhabited by spirits is probably the 
oldest form of Korean religious life, dating back to prehistoric times. 
There is a rather unorganized pantheon of literally millions of gods, 
spirits, and ghosts, ranging from the "god generals" who rule the 
different quarters of heaven to mountain spirits (sansiri). This pan- 
theon also includes gods who inhabit trees, sacred caves, and piles 
of stones, as well as earth spirits, the tutelary gods of households 
and villages, mischievous goblins, and the ghosts of persons who 
in many cases met violent or tragic ends. These spirits are said 
to have the power to influence or to change the fortunes of living 
men and women. 

Korean shamans are similar in many ways to those found in 
Siberia, Mongolia, and Manchuria. They also resemble the yuta 
found on the Ryukyu Islands, in Okinawa Prefecture, Japan. Cheju 
Island is also a center of shamanism. 

Shamans, most of whom are women, are enlisted by those who 
want the help of the spirit world. Female shamans hold hut, or ser- 
vices, in order to gain good fortune for clients, cure illnesses by 
exorcising evil spirits, or propitiate local or village gods. Such ser- 
vices are also held to guide the spirit of a deceased person to heaven. 

Often a woman will become a shaman very reluctantly — after 
experiencing a severe physical or mental illness that indicates "pos- 
session" by a spirit. Such possession allegedly can be cured only 
through performance of a hut. Once a shaman is established in her 
profession, she usually can make a good living. 

Many scholars regard Korean shamanism as less a religion than 
a "medicine" in which the spirits are manipulated in order to 
achieve human ends. There is no notion of salvation or moral and 
spiritual perfection, at least for the ordinary believers in spirits. 
The shaman is a professional who is consulted by clients whenever 
the need is felt. Traditionally, shamans had low social status and 
were members of the ch'dmmin class. This discrimination has con- 
tinued into modern times. 



122 



The Society and Its Environment 



Animistic beliefs are strongly associated with the culture of fish- 
ing villages and are primarily a phenomenon found in rural com- 
munities. Shamans also treat the ills of city people, however, 
especially recent migrants from the countryside who find adjust- 
ment to an impersonal urban life stressful. The government has 
discouraged belief in shamanism as superstition and for many years 
minimized its persistence in Korean life. Yet in a climate of grow- 
ing nationalism and cultural self-confidence, the dances, songs, and 
incantations that compose the hut have come to be recognized as 
an important aspect of Korean culture. Beginning in the 1970s, 
rituals that formerly had been kept out of foreign view began to 
resurface, and occasionally a Western hotel manager or other execu- 
tive could even be seen attending a shamanistic exorcism ritual in 
the course of opening a new branch in Seoul. Some of these aspects 
of hut have been designated valuable cultural properties that should 
be preserved and passed on to future generations. 

The future of shamanism itself was uncertain in the late 1980s. 
Observers believed that many of its functions in the future proba- 
bly will be performed by the psychiatric profession as the govern- 
ment expands mental health treatment facilities. Given the 
uncertainty of social, economic, and political conditions, however, 
it appears certain that shamans will find large numbers of clients 
for some time to come. 

Taoism and Buddhism 

Taoism, which focuses on the individual in nature rather than 
the individual in society, and Buddhism entered Korea from Chi- 
na during the Three Kingdoms period (fourth to seventh centu- 
ries A.D.). Taoist motifs are seen in the paintings on the walls of 
Koguryo tombs. Buddhism was the dominant religious and cul- 
tural influence during the Silla (A.D. 668-935) and Koryo 
(918-1392) dynasties. Confucianism also was brought to Korea from 
China in early centuries, but it occupied a subordinate position 
until the establishment of the Choson Dynasty and the persecu- 
tion of Buddhism carried out by the early Choson Dynasty kings 
(see Social Structures and Values, this ch.). 

Christianity 

Roman Catholic missionaries did not arrive in Korea until 1794, 
a decade after the return of the first baptized Korean from a visit 
to Beijing. However, the writings of the Jesuit missionary, Mat- 
teo Ricci, who was resident at the imperial court in Beijing, had 
been brought to Korea from China in the seventeenth century. It 
appears that scholars of the Sirhak, or practical learning, school 



123 



South Korea: A Country Study 

were interested in these writings. Largely because converts refused 
to perform Confucian ancestor rites, the government prohibited 
the proselytization of Christianity. Some Catholics were executed 
during the early nineteenth century, but the anti-Christian law was 
not stricdy enforced. By the 1860s, there were some 17,500 Roman 
Catholics in the country. There followed a more rigorous persecu- 
tion, in which thousands of Christians died, that continued until 
1884. 

Protestant missionaries entered Korea during the 1880s and, 
along with Catholic priests, converted a remarkable number of 
Koreans. Methodist and Presbyterian missionaries were especially 
successful. They established schools, universities, hospitals, and 
orphanages and played a significant role in the modernization of 
the country. During the Japanese colonial occupation, Christians 
were in the front ranks of the struggle for independence. Factors 
contributing to the growth of Protestantism included the degener- 
ate state of Korean Buddhism, the efforts made by educated Chris- 
tians to reconcile Christian and Confucian values (the latter being 
viewed as purely a social ethic rather than a religion), the encourage- 
ment of self-support and self-government among members of the 
Korean church, and the identification of Christianity with Korean 
nationalism. 

A large number of Christians lived in the northern part of the 
peninsula where Confucian influence was not as strong as in the 
south. Before 1948 P'yongyang was an important Christian center: 
one-sixth of its population of about 300,000 people were converts. 
Following the establishment of a communist regime in the north, 
however, most Christians had to flee to South Korea or face perse- 
cution. 

New Religions 

Ch'ondogyo, generally regarded as the first of Korea's "new 
religions," is another important religious tradition. It is a synthe- 
sis of Confucian, Buddhist, shamanistic, Taoist, and Catholic in- 
fluences. Ch'ondogyo grew out of the Tonghak Movement (also 
called Eastern Learning Movement) established by Ch'oe Che-u, 
a man of yangban background who claimed to have experienced a 
mystic encounter with God, who told him to preach to all the world. 
Ch'oe was executed by the government as a heretic in 1863, but 
not before he had acquired a number of followers and had com- 
mitted his ideas to writing. Tonghak spread among the poor peo- 
ple of Korea's villages, especially in the Cholla region, and was 
the cause of a revolt against the royal government in 1894. While 
some members of the Tonghak Movement — renamed Ch'ondogyo 



124 




Eighth-century granite Buddha, Sokkuram Grotto, near Kyongju 
Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Korea, Washington 



125 



South Korea: A Country Study 



(Teachings of the Heavenly Way) — supported the Japanese annex- 
ation in 1910, others opposed it. This group played a major role, 
along with Christians and some Confucians, in the Korean nation- 
alist movement. In the 1920s, Ch'ondogyo sponsored Kaebyok (Cre- 
ation), one of Korea's major intellectual journals during the colonial 
period (see The Media, ch. 4). 

Ch'ondogyo' s basic beliefs include the essential equality of all 
human beings. Each person must be treated with respect because 
all persons "contain divinity;" there is "God in man." Moreover, 
men and women must sincerely cultivate themselves in order to 
bring forth and express this divinity in their lives. Self-perfection, 
not ritual and ceremony, is the way to salvation. Although Ch'oe 
and his followers did not attempt to overthrow the social order and 
establish a radical egalitarianism, the revolutionary potential of 
Ch'ondogyo is evident in these basic ideas, which appealed espe- 
cially to poor people who were told that they, along with scholars 
and high officials, could achieve salvation through effort. There 
is reason to believe that Ch'ondogyo had an important role in the 
development of democratic and anti-authoritarian thought in Korea. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Ch'ondogyo' s antecedent, the Tonghak 
Movement, received renewed interest among many Korean in- 
tellectuals. 

Apart from Ch'ondogyo, major new religions included Taejong- 
gyo, which has as its central creed the worship of Tan' gun, legend- 
ary founder of the Korean nation. Chungsanggyo, founded in the 
early twentieth century, emphasizes magical practices and the cre- 
ation of a paradise on earth. It is divided into a great number of 
competing branches. Wonbulgyo, or Won Buddhism, attempts to 
combine traditional Buddhist doctrine with a modern concern for 
social reform and revitalization. There are also a number of small 
sects which have sprung up around Mount Kyeryong in South 
Ch'ungch'ong Province, the supposed future site of the founding 
of a new dynasty originally prophesied in the eighteenth century. 

Several new religions derive their inspiration from Christianity. 
The Chondogwan, or Evangelical Church, was founded by Pak 
T'ae-son. Pak originally was a Presbyterian, but was expelled from 
the church for heresy in the 1950s after claiming for himself unique 
spiritual power. By 1972 his followers numbered as many as 700,000 
people, and he built several "Christian towns," established a large 
church network, and managed several industrial enterprises. 

Because of its overseas evangelism, the Hold Spirit Association 
for the Unification of the World Christianity, or Unification Church 
(T'ongilgyo), founded in 1954 by Reverend Sun Myong Moon 
(Mun Son-myong), also a former Christian, is the most famous 



126 



The Society and Its Environment 



Korean new religion. During its period of rigorous expansion during 
the 1970s, the Unification Church had several hundred thousand 
members in South Korea and Japan and a substantial (although 
generally overestimated) number of members in North America 
and Western Europe. Moon claimed that he was the "messiah" 
designated by God to unify all the peoples of the world into one 
"family," governed theocratically by himself. 

Like Pak's Evangelical Church, the Unification Church has been 
highly authoritarian, demanding absolute obedience from church 
members. Moon, for example, has arranged marriages for his youn- 
ger followers; United States television audiences were treated some 
years ago to a mass ceremony at which several hundred young 
"Moonies" were married. Also like Pak, Moon has coupled the 
church's fortunes to economic expansion. Factories in South Korea 
and abroad manufacture arms and process ginseng and seafood, 
artistic bric-a-brac, and other items. Moon's labor force has worked 
long hours and been paid minimal wages in order to channel profits 
into church coffers. Virulently anticommunist, Moon has sought 
to influence public opinion at home and abroad by establishing 
generally unprofitable newspapers such as the Segye ilbo in Seoul, 
the Sekai nippo in Tokyo, and the Washington Times in the United 
States capital and by inviting academics to lavish international con- 
ferences, often held in South Korea. At home, the Unification 
Church was viewed with suspicion by the authorities because of 
its scandals and Moon's evident desire to create a "state within 
a state." His influence, however, had declined by the late 1980s. 

Religion in Contemporary South Korea 

According to government statistics, 42.6 percent or more than 
17 million of South Korea's 1985 population professed adherence 
to an organized religious community. There were at least 8 mil- 
lion Buddhists (about 20 percent of the total population), about 
6.5 million Protestants (16 percent of the population), some 1.9 
million Roman Catholics (5 percent), nearly 500,000 people who 
belonged to Confucian groups (1 percent), and more than 300,000 
others (0.7 percent). Significantly, large metropolitan areas had 
the highest proportions of people belonging to formal religious 
groups: 49.9 percent in Seoul, 46.1 percent in Pusan, and 45.8 
percent in Taegu. The figures for Christians revealed that South 
Korea had the highest percentage of Christians of any country in 
East Asia or Southeast Asia, with the exception of the Philippines. 

Except for the Christian groups, which maintain a fairly clear- 
cut distinction between believers and nonbelievers, there is some 
ambiguity in these statistics. As has been pointed out, there is no 



127 



South Korea: A Country Study 

exact or exclusive criterion by which Buddhists or Confucianists 
can be identified. Many people outside of formal groups have been 
deeply influenced by these traditions. Moreover, there is nothing 
contradictory in one person's visiting and praying at Buddhist tem- 
ples, participating in Confucian ancestor rites, and even consult- 
ing a shaman and sponsoring a kut. Furthermore, the statistics may 
underrepresent the numbers of people belonging to new religions. 
Some sources have given the number of adherents of Ch'ondogyo 
as over 1 million. 

Given the great diversity of religious expression, the role of 
religion in South Korea's social development has been a complex 
one. Some traditions, especially Buddhism, are identified primar- 
ily with the past. Buddhist sites such as the Pulguksa Temple and 
the Sokkuram Grotto in Kyongju and the Haeinsa Temple near 
Taegu are regarded by most South Koreans as important cultural 
properties rather than as places of worship. Confucianism remains 
important as a social ethic; its influence is evident in the immense 
importance Koreans ascribe to education. Christianity is identi- 
fied with modernization and social reform. Many Christians in con- 
temporary South Korea, such as veteran political opposition leader 
Kim Dae Jung, a Catholic, have been outspoken advocates of hu- 
man rights and critics of the government. Christian-sponsored or- 
ganizations such as the Urban Industrial Mission promote labor 
organizations and the union movement. New religions draw on 
both traditional beliefs and on Christianity, achieving a baffling 
variety and diversity of views. It has been estimated that there were 
as many as 300 new religions in South Korea in the late 1980s, 
although many were small and transient phenomena. 

Public Health and Welfare 

Health conditions have improved dramatically since the end of 
the Korean War. Between 1955 and 1960, life expectancy was es- 
timated at 51.1 years for men and 54.2 years for women. In 1990 
life expectancy was sixty- six years for men and seventy-three years 
for women. The death rate declined significantly, from 13.8 deaths 
per 1,000 in 1955-60 to 6 deaths per 1,000 in 1989— one of the 
lowest rates among East Asian and Southeast Asian countries. 

Nevertheless, serious health problems remained in 1990. South 
Korea's infant mortality rate was significandy higher than the rates 
of other Asian countries and territories such as Japan, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and peninsular Malaysia. Although prac- 
tically all the inhabitants of Seoul and other large cities had access to 
running water and sewage disposal in the late 1980s, environmental 



128 



The Society and Its Environment 



pollution and poor sanitation still posed serious threats to public 
health in both rural and urban areas. 

Health Conditions 

The main causes of death traditionally have been respiratory 
diseases — tuberculosis, bronchitis, and pneumonia — followed by 
gastrointestinal illnesses. However, the incidence and fatality of 
both types of illness declined during the 1970s and 1980s. Diseases 
typical of developed, industrialized countries — cancer, heart, liver 
and kidney ailments, diabetes, and strokes— were rapidly becom- 
ing the primary causes of death. The incidence of parasitism, once 
a major health problem in farming communities because of the 
widespread use of night soil as fertilizer, was reported in the late 
1980s to be only 4 percent of what it had been in 1970. Encephali- 
tis, a viral disease that can be transmitted to humans by mosqui- 
toes, caused ninety-four deaths in 1982. To reduce fatalities, the 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs planned to vaccinate 17.2 
million persons against the disease by 1988. 

The tensions and social dislocations caused by rapid urbaniza- 
tion apparently increased the incidence of mental illness. In 1985 
the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs began a large-scale pro- 
gram to expand mental health treatment facilities by opening mental 
institutions and requiring that new hospitals have wards set aside 
for psychiatric treatment. The ministry estimated the number of 
persons suffering from mental ailments at around 400,000. 

South Korea has not been entirely immune from the health and 
social problems generally associated with the West, such as acquired 
immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and addictive drugs. A hand- 
ful of AIDS cases was reported during the late 1980s. Seoul respond- 
ed by increasing the budget for education programs and instituting 
mandatory AIDS testing of prostitutes and employees of entertain- 
ment establishments. An AIDS Prevention Law was promulgated 
in November 1987. In late 1989, the government drafted a law 
requiring AIDS testing of foreign athletes and entertainers intending 
to reside in South Korea without their spouses for more than three 
months. Previously, the majority of those infected with AIDS had 
been prostitutes working near United States military bases, ocean- 
going seamen, and South Koreans working abroad. In the late 
1980s, however, homosexuals began to account for an increasing 
number of those infected with the AIDS virus. The traditional 
Korean attitude toward homosexuality, which was to deny its ex- 
istence, made it extremely difficult to treat this part of the popula- 
tion. The 200-percent annual increase in the number 



129 



South Korea: A Country Study 

of AIDS-infected persons (from one reported case in 1985 to twenty- 
two cases in 1988) worried health officials. 

While the use of heroin and other opiates was rare in South Korea 
and the use of cocaine limited, the use of crystalline methampheta- 
mine, or "ice," known in South Korea as hiroppon, had become 
a serious problem by the late 1980s. Estimates of the number of 
South Korean abusers of this illegal drug (known in the United 
States as speed) ranged from 100,000 to 300,000 people in the late 
1980s. Because use of the drug was believed to involve just low- 
status members of society, such as prostitutes and gangsters, the 
problem of hiroppon abuse had long been ignored in South Korea. 
The problem received greater attention from police and other 
government agencies during the late 1980s as the drug increased 
in popularity among professionals, students, office workers, house- 
wives, entertainers, farmers, and laborers. Some observers sug- 
gested the drug's popularity was caused in part by a high-pressure 
work environment, in which people used hiroppon to cope with long 
working hours. It also has been suggested that the tighter border 
controls imposed by Seoul have resulted in diverting the product 
to the domestic market and contributing to greater domestic con- 
sumption. 

An estimated 2,000 to 4,000 kilograms of methamphetamine were 
produced within South Korea annually, much of this total destined 
for shipment to Taiwan, Japan, and the United States by South 
Korean and Japanese yakuza, or gangsters. Since the majority of 
users injected the drug intravenously (although smoking and snort- 
ing it were becoming popular), South Korean health officials were 
concerned that the drug could contribute to the spread of AIDS. 
In 1989 Seoul established a new antinarcotics division attached to 
the prosecutor general's office and increased almost fourfold the 
number of drug agents. 

Health Care and Social Welfare 

The traditional practice of medicine in Korea was influenced 
primarily, although not exclusively, by China. Over the centuries, 
Koreans had used acupuncture and herbal remedies to treat a wide 
variety of illnesses. Large compilations of herbal and other prescrip- 
tions were published during the Choson Dynasty: the 85-volume 
Hyangyak chipsongbang (Great Collection of Korean Prescriptions) 
published in 1433 and the 365-volume Uibangyuch'wi (Great Col- 
lection of Medicines and Prescriptions) published in 1445. Shops 
selling traditional medicines, including ginseng, a root plant be- 
lieved to have strong medicinal and aphrodisiac qualities, still were 
common in the 1980s. Because of the expense of modern medical 



130 



The Society and Its Environment 



care, people still had to rely largely on such remedies to treat seri- 
ous illnesses until the 1980s, particularly in rural areas. 

The number of physicians, nurses, dentists, pharmacists, and 
other health personnel and the number of hospitals and clinics have 
increased dramatically since the Korean War (see fig. 8). In 1974 
the population per physician was 2,207; by 1983 this number had 
declined to 1 ,509. During the same period, the number of general 
hospitals grew from 36 to 156 and the number of hospital beds tri- 
pled from 19,062 to 59,099. Most facilities, however, tended to 
be concentrated in urban areas, particularly in Seoul and Pusan. 
Rural areas had limited medical facilities because in the past there 
had been little incentive for physicians to work in areas outside 
the cities, where the major of the people could not pay for treat- 
ment. Several private rural hospitals had been established with 
government encouragement but had gone bankrupt in the late 
1980s. The extension of medical insurance programs to the rural 
populace, however, was expected to alleviate this problem to some 
extent during the 1990s. 

The South Korean government committed itself to making med- 
ical security (medical insurance and medical aid) available to vir- 
tually the entire population by 1991 . There was no unified national 
health insurance system, but the Ministry of Health and Social Af- 
fairs coordinated its efforts with those of employers and private in- 
surance firms to achieve this goal. Two programs were established 
in 1977: the Free and Subsidized Medical Aid Program for people 
whose income was below a certain level and a medical insurance 
program that provided coverage for individuals and their immediate 
families working in enterprises of 500 people or more. Expenses 
were shared equally by employers and workers. In 1979 coverage 
was expanded to enterprises comprising 300 or more people, as 
well as to civil servants and teachers in private schools. In 1981 
coverage was extended to enterprises employing 100 or more peo- 
ple and in 1984 to firms with as few as 16 employees. In that year, 
16.7 million persons, or 41 .3 percent of the population, had medi- 
cal insurance. By 1988 the government had expanded medical in- 
surance coverage in rural areas to almost 7.5 million people. As 
of the end of 1988, approximately 33.1 million people, or almost 
79 percent of the population, received medical insurance benefits. 
At that time, the number of those not receiving medical insurance 
benefits totaled almost 9 million people, mostly independent small 
business owners in urban areas. In July 1989, however, Seoul ex- 
tended medical insurance to cover these self-employed urbanites, 
so that the medical insurance system extended to almost all South 
Koreans. Differences in insurance premiums among small business 



131 



South Korea: A Country Study 



TOTAL HEALTH CARE PERSONNEL, 1965: 134,038 



140,000 r 



130,000 = 



120,000 



110,000 



100,000 



90,000 



),000 : 



70,000 : 



60,000 



50,000 



40,000 



30,000 = 



20,000 - 



10,000 



1 PHYSICIANS 

2 DENTISTS 

3 NURSES 

4 PHARMACISTS 

5 TRADITIONAL HERBALISTS 

6 MIDWIVES 



6 




5 




4 




3 




2 




1 





1955 



1965 



1975 



1985 



Source: Based on information from Edward S. Mason et al., The Economic and Social Modern- 
ization of the Republic of Korea, Cambridge, 1980, 402, 404; and The Statesman's Year- 
book, 1988-89, New York, 1988, 775. 



Figure 8. Increase in Licensed Health Care Personnel, Selected Years, 1955-85 



132 



The Society and Its Environment 



owners, government officials and teachers, people in farming and 
fishing areas, and those employed by business firms remained a 
divisive and unresolved issue. 

Medical insurance programs for farming and fishing communi- 
ties, where the majority of people were self-employed or worked 
for very small enterprises, also were initiated by the government. 
In 1981 three rural communities were selected as experimental sites 
for implementation of a comprehensive medical insurance program. 
Three more areas, including Mokp'o in South Cholla Province, 
were added in 1982. Industrial injury compensation schemes were 
begun in the early 1960s and by 1982 covered 3.5 million workers 
in most major industries. 

During the 1980s, government pension or social security insur- 
ance programs covered designated groups, such as civil servants, 
military personnel, and teachers. Private employers had their own 
schemes to which they and workers both contributed. Government 
planners envisioned a public and private system of pensions covering 
the entire population by the early 1990s. In the wake of rapid eco- 
nomic growth, large sums have been allocated for social develop- 
ment programs in the national budget. In FY (fiscal year — see 
Glossary) 1990, total spending in this area increased 40 percent 
over the previous year. Observers noted, however, that serious defi- 
ciencies existed in programs for the handicapped, single-parent 
families, and the unemployed. 

* * * 

A New History of Korea by Ki-baik Lee provides ample coverage 
of social developments during the Three Kingdoms, Silla, Koryo, 
and Choson Dynasty periods and during the Japanese colonial oc- 
cupation. James B. Palais 's Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea 
gives a succinct overview of Choson Dynasty social structure. 
Michael C. Kalton's translation and commentary on Yi T'oe-gye's 
The Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning contains a valuable discussion 
not only of the career of Korea's most noted Confucian scholar, 
but also of the philosophical and ethical fundamentals of neo- 
Confucian orthodoxy. Donald N. Clark's Christianity in Modern Korea 
provides excellent coverage of Christianity in contemporary Korea. 

Vincent S.R. Brandt's A Korean Village and Han Sang-Bok's 
Korean Fishermen remain among the best descriptions of rural Korean 
life during the mid-1960s. Although published in 1971, Lee Hyo- 
jae et al.'s "Life in Urban Korea" remains informative. Korean 
family and kinship organizations are described exhaustively by Lee 
Kwang-Kyu in his two-volume Kinship System in Korea. 



133 



South Korea: A Country Study 

Virtues in Conflict, a collection of essays edited by Sandra Matiel- 
li, and Kim Yung-chung's Women of Korea discuss women's roles 
in Korean society. Female shamans are discussed in Kim Harvey 
Youngsook's Six Korean Women and Laurel Kendall's The Life and 
Hard Times of a Korean Shaman. Kim Chin-wu's The Making of the 
Korean Language provides an informative account of that subject. 

Interesting discussions of South Korea's changing social classes 
are contained in David I. Steinberg's The Republic of Korea and in 
Kim Kyong-Dong's "Social Change and Societal Developments 
in Korea since 1945." Although its 1980 publication date precludes 
discussion of the major changes that have occurred since that year, 
Education and Development in Korea by Noel F. McGinn et al. pro- 
vides excellent background on this important subject. Recent de- 
velopments are covered in some depth by publications such as the 
Far Eastern Economic Review, whose weekly "Arts and Society" sec- 
tion deals extensively with education and other social matters. Other 
periodicals containing discussions of South Korean society, edu- 
cation, and cultural expression include Korea Journal, the Social Science 
Journal, and Korean Studies. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



134 



Southwest Hidden Gate, Suwon Castle, largest of the five hidden gates, 
where a hidden road for transporting military provisions begins 



IN THE FIRST THREE decades after the Park Chung Hee 
government launched the First Five-Year Economic Development 
Plan in 1962, the South Korean economy grew enormously and 
the economic structure was radically transformed. South Korea's 
real gross national product (GNP — see Glossary) expanded by an 
average of more than 8 percent per year, from US$2.3 billion in 
1962 to US$204 billion in 1989. Per capita annual income grew 
from US$87 in 1962 to US$4,830 in 1989. The manufacturing sec- 
tor grew from 14.3 percent of the GNP in 1962 to 30.3 percent 
in 1987. Commodity trade volume rose from US$480 million in 
1962 to a projected US$127.9 billion in 1990. The ratio of domes- 
tic savings to GNP grew from 3.3 percent in 1962 to 35.8 percent 
in 1989. 

The rapid economic growth of the late 1980s, however, slowed 
considerably in 1989. The growth rate was cut almost in half from 
the previous year (to a still-robust approximate 6.5 percent), the 
inflation rate increased as wages soared even higher, and there was 
speculation concerning a small trade deficit in the early 1990s. These 
developments all pointed to a gradual slowing of the expansion of 
the rapidly maturing economy. Nevertheless, it also was clear that 
rapidly rising domestic demand would keep the economy healthy 
(even with a slight drop-off of exports), unless a major political crisis 
were to shock the country. 

The most significant factor in rapid industrialization was the 
adoption of an outward-looking strategy in the early 1960s. This 
strategy was particularly well suited to that time because of South 
Korea's poor natural resource endowment, low savings rate, and 
tiny domestic market. The strategy promoted economic growth 
through labor-intensive manufactured exports, in which South 
Korea could develop a competitive advantage. Government initia- 
tives played an important role in this process. The inflow of for- 
eign capital was greatly encouraged to supplement the shortage of 
domestic savings. These efforts enabled South Korea to achieve 
rapid growth in exports and subsequent increases in income. 

By emphasizing the industrial sector, Seoul's export-oriented de- 
velopment strategy left the rural sector relatively underdeveloped. 
Increasing income disparity between the industrial and agricultural 
sectors became a serious problem by the 1970s and remained a 
problem, despite government efforts to raise farm income and im- 
prove living standards in rural areas. 



137 



South Korea: A Country Study 

By the early 1970s, however, the industrial sector had begun to 
face problems of its own. Up to that time, the industrial structure 
had been based on low value-added and labor-intensive products, 
which faced increasing competition and protectionism from other 
developing countries. The government responded to this problem 
in the mid-1970s by emphasizing the development of heavy and 
chemical industries and by promoting investment in high value- 
added, capital-intensive industries. 

The structural transition to high value-added, capital-intensive 
industries was difficult. Moreover, it occurred at the end of the 
1970s, a time when the industrial world was experiencing a pro- 
longed recession following the second oil price shock of the decade 
and protectionism was resulting in a reduction of South Korean 
exports. By 1980 the South Korean economy had entered a period 
of temporary decline: negative growth was recorded for the first 
time since 1962, inflation had soared, and the balance-of-payments 
position had deteriorated significantly. 

In the early 1980s, Seoul instituted wide-ranging structural re- 
forms. In order to control inflation, a conservative monetary policy 
and tight fiscal measures were adopted. Growth of the money supply 
was reduced from the 30 percent level of the 1970s to 15 percent. 
Seoul even froze its budget for a short while. Government inter- 
vention in the economy was greatly reduced and policies on imports 
and foreign investment were liberalized to promote competition. 
To reduce the imbalance between rural and urban sectors, Seoul 
expanded investments in public projects, such as roads and com- 
munications facilities, while further promoting farm mechanization. 

These measures, coupled with significant improvements in the 
world economy, helped the South Korean economy regain its lost 
momentum in the late 1980s. South Korea achieved an average 
of 9.2 percent real growth between 1982 and 1987 and 12.5 per- 
cent between 1986 and 1988. The double digit inflation of the 1970s 
was brought under control. Wholesale price inflation averaged 2.1 
percent per year from 1980 through 1988; consumer prices increased 
by an average of 4.7 percent annually. Seoul achieved its first sig- 
nificant surplus in its balance of payments in 1986 and recorded 
a US$7.7 billion and a US$11.4 billion surplus in 1987 and 1988 
respectively. This development permitted South Korea to begin 
reducing its level of foreign debt. The trade surplus for 1989, 
however, was only US$4.6 billion dollars, and a small negative 
balance was projected for 1990 (see table 2, Appendix). 

In the late 1980s, the domestic market became an increasing 
source of economic growth. Domestic demand for automobiles and 
other indigenously manufactured goods soared because South 



138 



The Economy 



Korean consumers, whose savings had been buoyed by double- 
digit wage increases each year since 1987 and whose average wages 
in 1990 were about 50 percent above what they had been at the 
end of 1986, had the wherewithal to purchase luxury items for the 
first time. The result was a gradual reorientation of the economy 
from a heavy reliance on exports toward greater emphasis on meet- 
ing the needs of the country's nearly 43 million people. The shifts 
in demand and supply indicated that economic restructuring was 
underway, that is, domestic consumption was rising as net foreign 
demand was falling. On the supply side, the greater growth in ser- 
vices mirrored what the people wanted — more goods, especially 
imports, and many more services. 

By 1990 there was evidence that the high growth rates of the 
late 1980s would slow during the early 1990s. In 1989 real growth 
was only 6.5 percent. One reason for this development was the 
economic restructuring that began in the late 1980s — including 
the slower growth of major export industries that were no longer 
competitive on the world market (for example, footwear) and the 
expansion of those industries that were competitive, such as elec- 
tronics. 

The Japanese Role in Korea's Economic Development 

The Japanese, who dominated Korea from the late 1890s to 1945 
and who governed Korea as a colony from 1910 to 1945, were 
responsible for the initial economic modernization of Korea. Be- 
fore 1900 Korea had a relatively backward agricultural economy. 
According to scholar Donald S. Macdonald, for centuries most 
Koreans lived as subsistence farmers of rice and other grains and 
satisfied most of their basic needs through their own labor or through 
barter. The manufactures of traditional Korea — principally cloth, 
cooking and eating utensils, furniture, jewelry, and paper — were 
produced by artisans in a few population centers. 

Following the annexation of Korea in 1910, Japan thrust a 
modern blend of industrial capitalism onto a feudal agrarian society. 
By the end of the colonial period, Japan had built an extensive in- 
frastructure of roads, railroads, ports, electrical power, and govern- 
ment buildings that facilitated both the modernization of Korea's 
economy and Japan's control over the modernization process. The 
Japanese located various heavy industries — steel, chemicals, and 
hydroelectric power — across Korea, but mainly in the north. 

The Japanese government played an even more active role in 
developing Korea than it had played in developing the Japanese 
economy in the late nineteenth century. Many programs drafted 



139 



South Korea: A Country Study 



in Korea in the 1920s and 1930s originated in policies drafted in 
Japan during the Meiji period (1868-1912). The Japanese govern- 
ment helped to mobilize resources for development and provided 
entrepreneurial leadership for these new enterprises. Colonial eco- 
nomic growth was initiated through powerful government efforts 
to expand the economic infrastructure, to increase investment in hu- 
man capital through health and education, and to raise productivity. 

In some respects, South Korean patterns of development after 
the early 1960s closely followed the methodology introduced by the 
Japanese fifty years earlier — industrialization from above using a 
strong bureaucracy that formulated and implemented economic 
policies. Many of the developments that took place in Chosen, the 
Japanese name for Korea during the period of colonization, had 
also occurred in pre-World War II Japan; they were implementa- 
tion of a strong education system and the spread of literacy; the 
rise of a strong, authoritarian government that combined civilian 
and military administration to govern the state with strict discipline; 
the fostering and implementation of comprehensive economic pro- 
grams by the state through its control of the huge national 
bureaucracy; the close collaboration between government and busi- 
ness leaders; and the development of industries by the major 
Japanese zaibatsu (commercial conglomerates). 

Some political analysts, for example, Bruce Cumings and Gavan 
McCormick, have been impressed with the common elements in 
prewar and postwar economic growth in South Korea and espe- 
cially with top-down government management of the economy. 
Economists, such as Paul W. Kuznets, however, also draw atten- 
tion to the dysfunctional aspects of the colonial legacy and find some 
of the discontinuities important. 

Between the end of World War II and Park Chung Hee's ascen- 
sion to power in 1961 , South Korea's political and economic links 
to the Japanese colonial period were ruptured. There was consider- 
able disruption after 1945 because of plant exhaustion; the loss of 
linkages with Japanese capital and with upstream and downstream 
industrial facilities; the loss of technical expertise, distribution sys- 
tems, and markets; and the subsequent obliteration of the indus- 
trial plant during the Korean War (1950-53). 

The Government Role in Economic Development 

In 1961 General Park Chung Hee overthrew the popularly elected 
regime of Prime Minister Chang Myon. A nationalist, Park wanted 
to transform South Korea from a backward agricultural nation into 



140 



The Economy 



a modern industrial nation that would provide a decent way of life 
for its citizens while at the same time defending itself from outside 
aggression. Lacking the anti-Japanese nationalist credentials of Syng- 
man Rhee, for example, Park sought both legitimacy for his regime 
and greater independence for South Korea in a vigorous program 
of economic development that would transform the country from 
an agricultural backwater into a modern industrial nation. 

Park's government was the beneficiary of the Syngman Rhee 
administration's decision to use foreign aid from the United States 
during the 1950s to build an infrastructure that included a nation- 
wide network of primary and secondary schools, modern roads, 
and a modern communications network. The result was that by 
1961, South Korea had a well-educated young work force and a 
modern infrastructure that provided Park with a solid foundation 
for economic growth. 

The Park administration decided that the central government 
must play the key role in economic development because no other 
South Korean institution had the capacity or resources to direct 
such drastic change in a short time. The resulting economic sys- 
tem incorporated elements of both state capitalism and free enter- 
prise. The economy was dominated by a group of chaebol (see 
Glossary), large private conglomerates, and also was supported by 
a significant number of public corporations in such areas as iron 
and steel, utilities, communications, fertilizers, chemicals, and other 
heavy industries. The government guided private industry through 
a series of export and production targets utilizing the control of 
credit, informal means of pressure and persuasion, and tradition- 
al monetary and fiscal policies (see The Origins and Development 
of Chaebol, this ch.). 

The government hoped to take advantage of existing technolo- 
gy to become competitive in areas where other advanced industri- 
al nations had already achieved success. Seoul presumed that the 
well-educated and highly motivated work force would produce low- 
cost, high-quality goods that would find ready markets in the United 
States and the rest of the industrial world. Profits generated from 
the sale of exports would be used to further expand capital, pro- 
vide new jobs, and eventually pay off loans. 

In 1961 Park extended government control over business by na- 
tionalizing the banks and merging the agricultural cooperative 
movement with the agricultural bank. The government's direct con- 
trol over all institutional credit further extended Park's command 
over the business community. The Economic Planning Board was 
created in 1961 and became the nerve center of Park's plan to 



141 



South Korea: A Country Study 

promote economic development. It was headed by a deputy prime 
minister and staffed by bureaucrats known for their high intellec- 
tual capability and educational background in business and eco- 
nomics. Beginning in the 1960s, the board allocated resources, 
directed the flow of credit, and formulated all of South Korea's 
economic plans. In the late 1980s, the power to allocate resources 
and credit was restored to the functional ministries. In 1990 the 
Economic Planning Board primarily was charged with economic 
planning; it also coordinated and often directed the economic func- 
tions of other government ministries, including the Ministry of 
Finance. The board was complemented by the Korea Development 
Institute, an independent economic research organization funded 
by the government. Other government bodies directing the econ- 
omy included the Office of the President, which included a senior 
secretary for economic affairs; the Ministry of Finance; the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry; the Ministry of Labor; and the Bank of 
Korea, which was controlled by the Ministry of Finance. 

Park's first major goal, which was immediately successful, was 
to establish a self-reliant industrial economy independent of the 
massive waves of United States aid that had kept South Korea afloat 
during the Rhee years. Modernizing the economy and maintain- 
ing overall sustained growth were additional goals in the 1970s. 
Significant economic policies included strengthening key industries, 
increasing employment, and developing more effective manage- 
ment systems. Because South Korea was dependent on imports of 
raw materials, such as oil, a major government objective was to sig- 
nificantly increase the level of exports, which meant stressing greater 
international competitiveness and higher productivity. The early 
economic plans emphasized agriculture and infrastructure, the latter 
were closely tied to construction. Later, the emphasis shifted consecu- 
tively to light industry, electronics, and heavy and chemical indus- 
tries. Using these strategies, an export-driven economy developed. 

The government combined a policy of import substitution with 
the export-led approach. Policy planners selected a group of stra- 
tegic industries to back, including electronics, shipbuilding, and 
automobiles. New industries were nurtured by making the impor- 
tation of such goods difficult. When the new industry was on its 
feet, the government worked to create good conditions for its ex- 
port. Incentives for exports included a reduction of corporate and 
private income taxes for exporters, tariff exemptions for raw materi- 
als imported for export production, business tax exemptions, and 
accelerated depreciation allowances. 

The export-led program took off in the 1960s; during the 1970s, 
some estimates indicate, Seoul had the world's most productive 



142 



Woman worker, 
Hyundai Corporation 
Courtesy Embassy of the 
Republic of Korea, Washington 




economy. The annual industrial production growth rate was about 
25 percent; there was a fivefold increase in the GNP from 1965 to 
1978. In the mid-1970s, exports increased by an average of 45 per- 
cent a year. 

Industrial Policies 

The major issue facing the Park regime in the early 1960s was 
the grinding poverty of the nation and the need for economic poli- 
cies to overcome this poverty. A critical problem was raising funds 
to foster needed industrial development. Domestic savings were very 
low, and there was little available domestic capital. This obstacle 
was overcome by introducing foreign loans and inaugurating attrac- 
tive domestic interest rates that enticed local capital into produc- 
tion. Of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, only 
South Korea financed its economic development with a dramatic 
build-up of foreign debt, debt that totaled US$46.8 billion in 1985, 
making it the fourth largest Third World debtor. Foreign corporate 
investments were primarily of Japanese origin. 

As noted by consultant David I. Steinberg, Seoul administered 
a series of economic development plans. The government mobilized 
domestic capital by encouraging savings, determined what kinds of 
plants could be constructed with these funds, and reviewed the poten- 
tial of the products for export. In this sense, the will of the govern- 
ment to undertake economic development played a crucial role; the 



143 



South Korea: A Country Study 

role of the government, however, was not limited to such mea- 
sures as mobilizing capital and allocating investments. 

Steinberg also pointed out that Park's government restructured 
industries, such as defense and construction, sometimes to stimu- 
late competition and other times to reduce or eliminate it. The Eco- 
nomic Planning Board established export targets that, if met, yielded 
additional government- subsidized credit and further access to the 
growing domestic market. Failure to meet such targets led to Seoul's 
withdrawal of credit. 

Economic Plans 

Economic programs were based on a series of five-year plans 
that began in 1962. The First Five- Year Economic Development 
Plan (1962-66) consisted of initial steps toward the building of a 
self-sufficient industrial structure that was neither consumption 
oriented nor overdependent on oil. Such areas as electrification, 
fertilizers, oil refining, synthetic fibers, and cement were empha- 
sized. The Second Five- Year Economic Development Plan (1967-71) 
stressed modernizing the industrial structure and rapidly building 
import-substitution industries, including steel, machinery, and chem- 
ical industries. The Third Five- Year Economic Development Plan 
(1972-76) achieved rapid progress in building an export-oriented 
structure by promoting heavy and chemical industries. Industries 
receiving particular attention included iron and steel, transport 
machinery, household electronics, shipbuilding, and petrochemicals. 
The developers of heavy and chemical industries sought to supply 
new industries with raw materials and capital goods and to reduce 
or even eliminate dependence on foreign capital. New (and criti- 
cal) industries were to be constructed in the southern part of the 
peninsula, far from the border with North Korea, thus encourag- 
ing economic development and industrialization outside the Seoul 
area and providing new employment opportunities for residents of 
the less developed areas. 

The Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1977-81) 
fostered the development of industries designed to compete effec- 
tively in the world's industrial export markets. These major stra- 
tegic industries consisted of technology-intensive and skilled 
labor-intensive industries such as machinery, electronics, and ship- 
building. The plan stressed large heavy and chemical industries, such 
as iron and steel, petrochemicals, and nonferrous metal. As a result, 
heavy and chemical industries grew by an impressive 51.8 percent 
in 1981; their exports increased to 45.3 percent of total output. These 
developments can be ascribed to a favorable turn in the export per- 
formance of iron, steel, and shipbuilding, which occurred because 



144 



The Economy 



high-quality, low-cost products could be produced in South Korea. 
By contrast, the heavy and chemical industries of advanced coun- 
tries slumped during the late 1970s. In the machinery industries, 
investments were doubled in electric power generation, integrat- 
ed machinery, diesel engines, and heavy construction equipment; 
the increase clearly showed that the industries benefited from the 
government's generous financial assistance program. 

The late 1970s, however, witnessed worldwide recession, rising 
fuel costs, and growing inflation. South Korea's industrial struc- 
ture became somewhat unbalanced, and the economy suffered from 
acute inflation because of an overemphasis on investment in heavy 
industry at a time when many potential customers were not in a 
position to buy heavy industrial goods. 

The Fifth Five- Year Economic and Social Development Plan 
(1982-86) sought to shift the emphasis away from heavy and chem- 
ical industries, to technology-intensive industries, such as preci- 
sion machinery, electronics (televisions, videocassette recorders, 
and semiconductor-related products), and information. More at- 
tention was to be devoted to building high-technology products in 
greater demand on the world market. 

The Sixth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan 
(1987-91) to a large extent continued to emphasize the goals of 
the previous plan. The government intended to accelerate import 
liberalization and to remove various types of restrictions and non- 
tariff barriers on imports. These moves were designed to mitigate 
adverse effects, such as monetary expansion and delays in indus- 
trial structural adjustment, which can arise because of a large sur- 
plus of funds. Seoul pledged to continue phasing out direct assistance 
to specific industries and instead to expand manpower training and 
research and development in all industries, especially the small and 
medium- sized firms that had not received much government atten- 
tion previously. Seoul hoped to accelerate the development of science 
and technology by raising the ratio of research and development 
investment from 2.4 percent of the GNP to over 3 percent by 1991 . 

The goal of the Seventh Five-Year Economic and Social Develop- 
ment Plan (1992-96), formulated in 1989, was to develop high- 
technology fields, such as microelectronics, new materials, fine 
chemicals, bioengineering, optics, and aerospace. Government and 
industry would work together to build high-technology facilities in 
seven provincial cities to better balance the geographic distribu- 
tion of industry throughout South Korea. 

Revenues and Expenditures 

The central government budget has generally expanded, both 



145 



South Korea: A Country Study 

in real terms and as a proportion of real GNP, since the end of 
the Korean War, stabilizing at between 20 and 21 percent of GNP 
during most of the 1980s. Government spending in South Korea 
has been less than that for most countries in the world (excepting 
the other rapidly growing Asian economies of Japan, Taiwan, and 
Singapore). The share of government spending devoted to invest- 
ment and other capital formation activities increased steadily through 
the periods of the first and second five-year plans (1962-71), peaking 
at more than 41 percent of the budget in 1969. Since 1971 invest- 
ment expenditures have remained at less than 30 percent of the 
budget, while the share of the budget occupied by direct govern- 
ment consumption and transfer payments has continued to increase, 
averaging more than 70 percent during the 1980s. 

During the 1980s, the largest areas of government expenditure 
were economic services (including infrastructural projects and 
research and development), national defense, and education. Eco- 
nomic expenditures averaged several percentage points higher than 
defense expenditures, which remained stable at about 22 to 23 per- 
cent of the budget (about 6 percent of GNP) during the decade. 
In 1990 the government was studying plans to lower defense ex- 
penditures to 5 percent of GNP. Some observers noted a trend 
toward a slight increase in the portion of the budget devoted to 
social spending during the 1980s. In 1987 expenditures for social 
services — including health, housing, and welfare — were 16.4 per- 
cent of the budget, up from 13.9 percent in 1980, and slighdy higher 
than 1987 government oudays for education (see table 3, Appendix). 

The government revenue structure was virtually totally depen- 
dent on taxes (see table 4, Appendix). By the early 1980s, nearly 
two-thirds of tax money was collected in the form of indirect taxes. 
Revenues collected by the central government in 1987 rose to 
19,270.3 billion won (for value of the won — see Glossary), up from 
13.197.5 billion won in 1984. 

The Government and Public and Private Corporations 

Following the Korean War, foreign aid became the most im- 
portant source of funds for the reconstruction and rehabilitation 
of the economy. What was left of the Japanese-built industrial plant, 
most of which by the 1950s either was obsolete or had been de- 
stroyed by warfare), generally was turned over to private owners, 
who were chosen more often for their political loyalty than for their 
economic acumen. Moreover, Rhee favored certain businessmen 
and companies with government contracts in exchange for finan- 
cial support of his political endeavors. It was during this period 
that a group of entrepreneurs began companies that later became 



146 



The Economy 



the chaebol, or business conglomerates. The chaebol were groups of 
specialized companies with interrelated management. These group- 
ings of affiliated companies dominated South Korea's economy in 
the late 1980s and often included businesses involved in heavy and 
consumer industries and electric and electronic goods, as well as 
trading companies and real estate and insurance concerns. 

The chaebol were responsible for the successful expansion of South 
Korea's export capacity. According to Steinberg, in 1987 the 
revenues of the four largest chaebol were US$80.7 billion, a figure 
equivalent to two- thirds of Seoul's total GNP. In that year, the 
Samsung Group had revenues of US$24 billion; Hyundai, US$22.7 
billion; Daewoo, US$16 billion; and Lucky-Goldstar, US$18 bil- 
lion. The revenues of the next largest chaebol, Sunkyong, totaled 
US$7.3 billion in 1987. The top ten chaebol represented 40 percent 
of all bank credit in South Korea, 30 percent of value added in 
manufacturing, and approximately 66 percent of the value of all 
South Korean exports in 1987. The five largest chaebol employed 
8.5 percent of the manufacturing work force and produced 22.3 
percent of all manufacturing shipments. Despite a rash of strikes 
against the chaebol beginning in 1987, the chaebol generally had higher 
compensation and better working conditions than their lesser South 
Korean competitors. 

The Origins and Development of Chaebol 

Although South Korea's major industrial programs did not be- 
gin until the early 1960s, the origins of the country's entrepreneur- 
ial elite were found in the political economy of the 1950s. Very 
few Koreans had owned or managed larger corporations during 
the Japanese colonial period. After the departure of the Japanese 
in 1945, some Korean businessmen obtained the assets of some 
of the Japanese firms, a number of which grew into the chaebol of 
the 1990s. These companies, as well as certain other firms that were 
formed in the late 1940s and early 1950s, had close links with Syng- 
man Rhee's First Republic, which lasted from 1948 to 1960 (see 
The Syngman Rhee Era, 1948-60, ch. 1). It was alleged that many 
of these companies received special favors from the government 
in return for kickbacks and other payments. 

When the military took over the government in 1961, military 
leaders announced that they would eradicate the corruption that 
had plagued the Rhee administration and eliminate injustice from 
society. Some leading industrialists were arrested and charged with 
corruption, but the new government realized that it would need 
the help of the entrepreneurs if the government's ambitious plans 
to modernize the economy were to be fulfilled. A compromise was 



147 



South Korea: A Country Study 

reached, under which many of the accused corporate leaders paid 
fines to the government. Subsequentiy, there was increased cooper- 
ation between corporate and government leaders in modernizing 
the economy. 

Government-chaebol cooperation was essential to the subsequent 
economic growth and astounding successes that began in the early 
1960s. Driven by the urgent need to turn the economy away from 
consumer goods and light industries toward heavy, chemical, and 
import-substitution industries, political leaders and government 
planners relied on the ideas and cooperation of the chaebol leaders. 
The government provided the blueprints for industrial expansion; 
the chaebol realized the plans. However, the chaebol-led industriali- 
zation accelerated the monopolistic and oligopolistic concentration 
of capital and economically profitable activities in the hands of a 
limited number of conglomerates. 

Park used the chaebol as a means towards economic growth. Ex- 
ports were encouraged, reversing Rhee's policy of reliance on im- 
ports. Performance quotas were established. 

The chaebol were able to grow because of two factors — foreign 
loans and special favors. Access to foreign technology also was crit- 
ical to the growth of the chaebol through the 1980s. Under the guise 
of 4 'guided capitalism," the government selected companies to un- 
dertake projects and channeled funds from foreign loans. The 
government guaranteed repayment should a company be unable 
to repay its foreign creditors. Additional loans were made avail- 
able from domestic banks. In the late 1980s, the chaebol dominated 
the industrial sector and were especially prevalent in manufactur- 
ing, trading, and heavy industries. 

The chaebol were often compared with Japanese keiretsu (the suc- 
cessor of the zaibatsu), but as David I. Steinberg has noted, there 
were at least three major differences. First, the chaebol were family 
dominated. In 1990, for example, in most cases the family that 
founded the major business in the chaebol remained in control, while 
in Japan the keiretsu were controlled by professional corporate 
management. Second, individual chaebol were prevented from buy- 
ing controlling shares of banks, and in 1990 government regula- 
tions made it difficult for a chaebol to develop an exclusive banking 
relationship. The keiretsu usually worked with an affiliated bank and 
had almost unlimited access to credit. Third, the chaebol often formed 
subsidiaries to produce components for exports, while large 
Japanese corporations often employed outside contractors. 

The tremendous growth that the chaebol experienced, beginning 
in the early 1960s, was closely tied to the expansion of South Korean 
exports. Growth resulted from the production of a diversity of goods 



148 



The Economy 



rather than just one or two products. Innovation and the willing- 
ness to develop new product lines were critical. In the 1950s and 
early 1960s, chaebol concentrated on wigs and textiles; by the 
mid-1970s and 1980s, heavy, defense, and chemical industries had 
become predominant. While these activities were important in the 
early 1990s, real growth was occurring in the electronics and high- 
technology industries. The chaebol also were responsible for turn- 
ing the trade deficit in 1985 to a trade surplus in 1986. The cur- 
rent account balance, however, fell from more than US$14 billion 
in 1988 to US$5 billion in 1989. 

The chaebol continued their explosive growth in export markets 
in the 1980s. By the late 1980s, the chaebol had become financially 
independent and secure — thereby eliminating the need for further 
government-sponsored credit and assistance. By 1990 the chaebol 
also had begun to produce for a growing domestic market. 

The chaebol were powerful independent entities acting in the econ- 
omy and politics, but sometimes they cooperated with the govern- 
ment in the areas of planning and innovation. The government 
worked hard to encourage competition among the chaebol in cer- 
tain areas and to avoid total monopolies. 

Another reason for the success of the chaebol was their access to 
foreign technology. Rather than having to develop new areas 
through research and technology, South Korean firms could pur- 
chase foreign patents and technology and produce the same goods 
made elsewhere at lower costs. Hyundai cars, for example, used 
an engine developed by the Mitsubishi Corporation of Japan. 

The role of big business extended to the political arena. In 1988 
a member of a chaebol family, Chong Mong-jun, president of Hyun- 
dai Heavy Industries, successfully ran for the National Assembly. 
Other business leaders also were chosen to be members of the Na- 
tional Assembly through the proportional representation system. 

The Role of Public Enterprise 

A government-led economic development policy during the 1960s 
was necessary because the less experienced and capital-poor pri- 
vate entrepreneurs lacked the wherewithal to develop several crit- 
ical industries that were necessary to the nation's economic growth. 
The government determined that establishing public corporations 
to develop and manage these highly strategic industries was the 
fastest and most efficient way to foster growth in a variety of key 
areas. 

During the 1960s, public enterprises were concentrated in such 
areas as electrification, banking, communications, and manufac- 
turing. In 1990 these enterprises were, in many cases, efficient 



149 



South Korea: A Country Study 

revenue-producing concerns that produced essential goods and ser- 
vices at low costs, but which also produced profits that were used 
for new capital investments or to produce funds for public use else- 
where. In the 1980s, Seoul was slowly privatizing a number of these 
firms by selling stocks, but the government remained the principal 
stockholder in each company. In the 1980s, an important func- 
tion of public enterprises was the introduction of new and expen- 
sive technology ventures. 

In 1985 the public enterprise sector consisted of about 90 enter- 
prises employing 305,000 workers, or 2.7 percent of total employ- 
ment in the nonagricultural sector. There were four categories of 
public enterprises: government enterprises (staffed and run by 
government officials), government-invested enterprises (with at least 
50 percent government ownership), subsidiaries of government- 
invested enterprises (usually having indirect government funding), 
and other government-backed enterprises. Government-invested 
public enterprises, such as the Korea Electric Power Corporation 
(KEPCO) and the Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO), 
represented the core of the new enterprises established during Park's 
regime. In the late 1980s, roughly 30 percent of the revenues 
produced by public enterprises came from the manufacturing sec- 
tor and the other 70 percent from such service sectors as the elec- 
trical, communications, and financial industries. 

Pohang Iron and Steel Company 

In the 1960s, the Park government concluded that self-sufficiency 
in steel and the construction of an integrated steelworks were es- 
sential to economic development. Because South Korea had not 
had a modern steel plant before 1968, many foreign and domestic 
businesses were skeptical of Seoul's decision to invest heavily in 
constructing a steel plant. Despite the skepticism, however, POSCO 
began production in 1972, just four years after the company's in- 
auguration in April 1968 with only thirty-nine employees. 

Japan provided the money for the construction of the initial plant, 
following an agreement made at the Third South Korea-Japan 
Ministerial Meeting in 1969. Financing included US$73.7 million 
in government grants and loans, US$50 million in credit from the 
Japan Export-Import Bank, and technical assistance from Nippon 
Steel and other corporations. This cooperation was one consequence 
of the normalization of relations with Japan in 1965 and reflected 
the view of the government of Japan as noted in the Nixon-Sato 
communique of November 21, 1969, that "the security of the 
Republic of Korea is essential to the security of Japan." 



150 



Fresh produce at the market, Seoul 
Courtesy Oren Hadar 



It'aewon shopping district 
and entertainment center, Seoul 
Courtesy Oren Hadar 



South Korea: A Country Study 

POSCO is located in the southeastern port city of P'ohang. Previ- 
ously a fishing port whose major industry was processing fish and 
marine products, P'ohang is now a major industrial center with 
almost 250,000 people. In addition to the huge integrated steel mill, 
P'ohang has an industrial complex housing companies that 
manufacture finished steel products of raw materials provided by 
POSCO. 

POSCO first began to sell plate products in 1972 and focused 
its sales policies on the domestic market to improve steel self- 
sufficiency at home. Special efforts were made to supply quality 
iron and steel to related domestic companies at below export price 
to strengthen their international competitiveness. 

POSCO's growth has been immense. By the late 1980s, POSCO 
was the fifth biggest steel company in the noncommunist world, 
with an annual production approaching 12 million tons worth 3 
trillion won. The further expansion of POSCO's productivity and 
size, however, was sought at a time when the steel industries of 
the United States and Japan were declining. POSCO's second- 
phase mill at Kwangyang was completed in August 1988. A third- 
phase mill was expected, by the early 1990s, to further increase 
crude steel production to a total output of approximately 17.2 mil- 
lion tons a year. In terms of productivity, POSCO was rated the 
world's best steel manufacturer throughout the late 1980s and also 
was rated at the top in terms of facilities. 

In 1987 Seoul announced that it was going to transform POSCO 
into a private company in line with the government's new policy 
of privatizing state-run corporations. The government planned to 
retain a majority share of the stock; initial reports in the South 
Korean press in 1988 indicated that the sale of public shares was 
going slower than anticipated. 

Korea Electric Power Corporation 

KEPCO is a government agency whose goal is to provide abun- 
dant electric power and to develop reliable power resources. The 
south of Korea traditionally had received its electric power from 
power stations in present-day North Korea, but the Pyongyang 
government cut off power to South Korea in 1948. The catastrophes 
of the Korean War also posed electrical supply problems. The sit- 
uation had not improved greatly by 1961 when the new military 
junta merged three smaller electric companies to form the Korea 
Electric Company (KECO). Seoul invested heavily in KECO, 
realizing that adequate sources of power were a basic prerequisite 
to industrialization. In 1982 KECO was reorganized as a public 
corporation and became known as KEPCO. All shares were owned 



152 



The Economy 



by the government. In 1988 Seoul decided to sell 30 percent of all 
shares to the public. 

KEPCO, one of the largest public corporations in South Korea, 
with 30,289 employees, serviced about 99.8 percent of the populace 
in 1988. It derived about 12 percent of its electricity from hydro- 
electric sources, 50 percent from thermal sources (coal, oil, and 
gas-fired), and the rest from a growing number of nuclear power 
plants. It was hoped that nuclear power would be developed fur- 
ther to lower reliance on oil, gas, and coal imports. KEPCO offi- 
cials pronounced their nuclear power plants safe from any potential 
nonmilitary accidents and said that extraordinary measures had 
been taken to protect the plants in case of a North Korean attack. 

Financing Development 

Financing South Korea's economic development in the 1990s 
was expected to differ from previous decades in two main respects: 
greater reliance on domestic sources and more emphasis on equity 
relative to debt. Beginning in the 1960s, foreign credit was used 
to finance development, but the amount of foreign debt had 
decreased since the mid-1980s. According to the Sixth Five- Year 
Economic and Social Development Plan (1987-91), an average an- 
nual growth rate of 8 percent was expected, together with account 
surpluses of about US$5 billion a year through 1991. 

To realize these growth targets, South Koreans needed the gross 
domestic savings rate to exceed the domestic investment rate; ad- 
ditionally, they needed the financing of future economic growth 
to come entirely from domestic sources. Such a situation would 
involve reducing foreign debt by US$2 billion a year; and South 
Korea would become a net creditor nation in the mid-1990s. 
Through the promotion and reform of the securities markets, es- 
pecially the stock market, and increased foreign investment, the 
sixth plan encouraged the diversification of sources and types of 
corporate finance, especially equity finance. 

Domestic savings were very low before the mid-1960s, equiva- 
lent to less than 2 percent of GNP in the 1960 to 1962 period. The 
savings rate jumped to 10 percent between 1970 and 1972 when 
banks began offering depositors rates of 20 percent or more on sav- 
ings accounts. This situation allowed banks to compete effectively 
for deposits with unorganized money markets that had previously 
offered higher rates than the banks. The savings rate increased to 
16.8 percent of GNP in 1975 and 28 percent in 1979, but tem- 
porarily plunged to 20.8 percent in 1980 because of the oil price 
rise. After 1980, as incomes rose, so did the savings rate. The 
surge of the savings rate to 36.3 percent in 1987 and 35.8 percent in 



153 



South Korea: A Country Study 



1989 reflected the sharp growth of GNP in the 1980s. The prospects 
for continued high rates of saving were associated with continued 
high GNP growth, which nevertheless declined to 6.5 percent in 
1989. 

According to Donald S. Macdonald, through the early 1980s 
funds for investment came primarily from bilateral government 
loans (mainly from the United States and Japan), international lend- 
ing organizations, and commercial banks. In the late 1980s, 
however, domestic savings accounted for two-thirds or more of total 
investment. 

Throughout the 1980s, the financial sector underwent signifi- 
cant expansion, diversification of products and services, and struc- 
tural changes brought about by economic liberalization policies. 
As noted by Park Yung-chul, financial liberalization eased interest 
ceilings. Deregulation increased competition in financial markets, 
which in turn accelerated product diversification. In the early 1980s, 
securities companies were permitted to sell securities through a 
repurchase agreement. By 1985 banks also were allowed to engage 
in the repurchase agreements of government and public bonds. In 
1981 finance and investment corporations started dealing in large- 
denomination commercial paper. The new form of commercial 
paper was issued in minimum denominations of 10 million won, 
compared to the previous minimum value for commercial paper 
of 1 million won. 

In order to extend their ability to raise cash, investment and 
finance companies introduced a new cash-management account with 
a 4 million won minimum deposit in 1983. Investment and finance 
corporations managed client funds by investing them in commer- 
cial paper corporate bonds and certificates of deposit. Money- 
deposit banks in the mid-1980s began offering similar accounts, 
known as household money-in- trust. Trust business formerly had 
been the exclusive domain of the Bank of Seoul and Trust Com- 
pany; however, after 1983 all money-deposit banks were autho- 
rized to offer trust services. 

The financial system underwent two major structural changes 
in the late 1970s and 1980s. First, money-deposit banks saw a sus- 
tained erosion of their once-dominant market position (from 80 
percent in the 1970 to 1974 period to 55 percent by 1984). One 
reason for this decline was that in the 1970s nonbank financial in- 
termediaries, such as investment trust corporations, finance com- 
panies, and merchant banking corporations, were given preferential 
treatment. Further, because the costs of intermediation at these 
nonbank financial institutions were lower than at banks (with their 
many branches nationwide and their multitudes of small savers and 



154 



The Economy 



borrowers), their cost advantages and higher lending rates allowed 
them a larger market share. 

The second structural change was the rapid increase of commer- 
cial paper and corporate debenture markets. Another development 
was the steady growth of investment trust corporations in the 1980s. 

Because of the introduction of tax and financing incentives by 
the government that encouraged companies to list their shares on 
the stock market, the Korean Stock Exchange grew rapidly in the 
late 1980s. In 1987 more than 350 companies were listed on the 
exchange. There was an average daily trading volume of 10 mil- 
lion shares, with a turnover ratio of 80 percent. In 1989 the stock 
market was tarnished by accusations of insider trading among the 
five major South Korean securities firms. The Securities and Ex- 
change Commission launched an investigation in late 1989. The 
popular index of the market soared to a high of 1,007.77 points 
on April 1, 1989, but plunged back to the 800s in late 1989 and 
early 1990. 

Business financing was obtained primarily through bank loans 
or borrowing on the informal and high-interest "curb market" of 
private lenders. The curb market served individuals who needed 
cash urgently, less reputable businesspeople who engaged in specu- 
lation, and the multitudes of smaller companies that needed oper- 
ating funds but could not procure bank financing. The loans they 
received, often in exchange for weak collateral, had very high in- 
terest rates. The curb market played a critical role in the 1960s 
and 1970s in pumping money into the economy and in assisting 
the growth of smaller corporations. The curb market continued 
to exist, along with the formal banking system, through the 1980s. 

Industry 

The growth of the industrial sector was the principal stimulus 
to economic development. In 1987 manufacturing industries ac- 
counted for approximately 30 percent of the gross domestic product 
(GDP — see Glossary) and 25 percent of the work force. Benefit- 
ing from strong domestic encouragement and foreign aid, Seoul's 
industrialists introduced modern technologies into outmoded or 
newly built facilities at a rapid pace, increased the production of 
commodities — especially those for sale in foreign markets — and 
plowed the proceeds back into further industrial expansion. As a 
result, industry altered the country's landscape, drawing millions 
of laborers to urban manufacturing centers. 

A downturn in the South Korean economy in 1989 spurred by 
a sharp decrease in exports and foreign orders caused deep concern 
in the industrial sector. Ministry of Trade and Industry analysts 



155 



South Korea: A Country Study 

stated that poor export performance resulted from structural 
problems embedded in the nation's economy, including an overly 
strong won, increased wages and high labor costs, frequent strikes, 
and high interest rates. The result was an increase in inventories 
and severe cutbacks in production at a number of electronics, auto- 
mobile, and textile manufacturers, as well as at the smaller firms 
that supplied the parts. Factory automation systems were introduced 
to reduce dependence on labor, to boost productivity with a much 
smaller work force, and to improve competitiveness. It was esti- 
mated that over two- thirds of South Korea's manufacturers spent 
over half of the funds available for facility investments on auto- 
mation. 

In 1990 South Korean manufacturers planned a significant shift 
in future production plans toward high-technology industries. In 
June 1989, panels of government officials, scholars, and business 
leaders held planning sessions on the production of such goods as 
new materials, mechatronics — including industrial robotics, bioen- 
gineering, microelectronics, fine chemistry, and aerospace. This 
shift in emphasis, however, did not mean an immediate decline 
in heavy industries such as automobile and ship production, which 
had dominated the economy in the 1980s. 

Except for mining, most industries were located in the urban 
areas of the northwest and southeast. Heavy industries generally 
were located in the south of the country. Factories in Seoul con- 
tributed over 25 percent of all manufacturing value-added in 1978; 
taken together with factories in surrounding Kyonggi Province, 
factories in the Seoul area produced 46 percent of all manufactur- 
ing that year. Factories in Seoul and Kyonggi Province employed 
48 percent of the nation's 2.1 million factory workers. 

Steel 

In 1989 South Korea was the world's tenth largest steel producer, 
accounting for 2.3 percent of world steel production. South Korea 
continued to expand crude steel production — 19.3 million tons for 
1988, up 14.9 percent over 1987. Domestic demand for steel 
products increased 8.5 percent from 15 million tons to 16.3 mil- 
lion tons over the same period because of the growing demands 
of South Korean industry. Domestic demand accounted for 70 per- 
cent of the total, mostly because of the increased needs of such steel- 
consuming industries as automobiles, shipbuilding, and electronics. 

The steel industry grew in the 1970s after the government con- 
structed the POSCO mill to service Seoul's rapidly growing au- 
tomobile, shipbuilding, and construction industries. In 1988 South 
Korea's steel industry included 200 steel companies. Iron and steel 



156 



The Economy 



production was expected to increase in the early 1990s, given the 
output increases in domestic user industries. Exports were likely 
to be flat or to decline because of decreased international demand. 

Electronics 

In 1989 South Korea was a major producer of electronics, produc- 
ing color televisions, videocassette recorders, microwave ovens, ra- 
dios, watches, personal computers, and videotapes. In 1988 the 
electronics industry produced US$23 billion worth of goods (up 
35 percent from 1987), to become the world's sixth largest manufac- 
turer. The total value of parts and components (including semi- 
conductors) produced in 1988 totaled US$9.7 billion, overtaking 
consumer electronics production (US$9.2 billion) for the first time. 
Manufacture of industrial electronics also grew significantly in 1988 
and totaled US$4.6 billion (20 percent of total production). Elec- 
tronics exports grew rapidly in the late 1980s to more than US$15 
billion in 1988, up 40 percent from 1987 — to become Seoul's leading 
export industry. Although South Korean electronic goods enjoyed 
substantial price competitiveness over Japanese products, the elec- 
tronics industry continued to be heavily dependent on Japanese 
components, an important factor in South Korea's chronic trade 
deficit with Japan. Some South Korean firms formed joint ven- 
tures with foreign concerns to acquire advanced technology. In the 
late 1980s, South Korea's leading electronics firms (Samsung, 
Lucky-Goldstar, and Hyundai) began establishing overseas plants 
in such markets as the Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger- 
many), Britain, Turkey, and Ireland. 

By 1 990 significant shifts were occurring within the electronics 
industry. In 1989 South Korea had lost some of its cost advantage 
to newer consumer electronics producers in Southeast Asia. At the 
same time, production of electronic components and of industrial 
electronics, particularly computers and telecommunications equip- 
ment, continued to expand to such an extent that overall demand 
for South Korean electronics products was expected to increase 
modesdy in the early 1990s. In 1990 Seoul projected that the micro- 
electronics industry would grow at an annual rate of 17.2 percent 
in the early 1990s. 

Shipbuilding 

During the 1970s and 1980s, South Korea became a leading 
producer of ships, including oil supertankers, and oil-drilling plat- 
forms. The country's major shipbuilder was Hyundai, which built 
a 1 -million-ton capacity drydock at Ulsan in the mid-1970s. Daewoo 



157 



South Korea: A Country Study 

joined the shipbuilding industry in 1980 and finished a 1 .2-million- 
ton facility at Okp'o on Koje Island, south of Pusan, in mid-1981 . 
The industry declined in the mid-1980s because of the oil glut and 
because of a worldwide recession. There was a sharp decrease in 
new orders in the late 1980s; new orders for 1988 totaled 3 million 
gross tons valued at US$1.9 billion, decreases from the previous 
year of 17.8 percent and 4.4 percent, respectively. These declines 
were caused by labor unrest, Seoul's unwillingness to provide finan- 
cial assistance, and Tokyo's new low-interest export financing in 
support of Japanese shipbuilders. However, the South Korean ship- 
ping industry was expected to expand in the early 1990s because 
older ships in world fleets needed replacing. 

Automobiles and Automotive Parts 

The automobile industry was one of South Korea's major growth 
and export industries in the 1980s. By the late 1980s, the capacity 
of the South Korean motor industry had increased more than 
fivefold since 1984; it exceeded 1 million units in 1988. Total in- 
vestment in car and car-component manufacturing was over US$3 
billion in 1989. Total production (including buses and trucks) for 
1988 totaled 1.1 million units, a 10.6 percent increase over 1987, 
and grew to an estimated 1.3 million vehicles (predominantly pas- 
senger cars) in 1989. Almost 263,000 passenger cars were produced 
in 1985 — a figure that grew to approximately 846,000 units in 1989. 
In 1988 automobile exports totaled 576,134 units, of which 480,119 
units (83.3 percent) were sent to the United States. Throughout 
most of the late 1980s, much of the growth of South Korea's auto- 
mobile industry was the result of a surge in exports; 1989 exports, 
however, declined 28.5 percent from 1988. This decline reflected 
sluggish car sales to the United States, especially at the less expen- 
sive end of the market, and labor strife at home. 

The industry continued to grow, however, because of a surge 
in domestic demand, up 47 percent during the first half of 1989. 
In 1989, for the first time since car exports had doubled in 1985, 
domestic sales surpassed exports; two-thirds of the cars manufac- 
tured were sold domestically. Most of the domestic demand came 
from first-time car buyers whose savings had been buoyed by 
double-digit wage increases each year since 1987. Other factors lead- 
ing to the growing domestic demand for motor vehicles included 
stable or slightly decreased new car prices because of cuts in spe- 
cial consumption taxes, reduced fuel taxes, and growing econo- 
mies of scale by manufacturers. 

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the automobile industry was 
subject to a series of government controls and directives designed 



158 




Ulsan shipyard, one of the world's largest 
Courtesy Hyundai Corporation 




159 



South Korea: A Country Study 

to nurture the industry and prevent excess competition. For most 
of the 1980s, Hyundai was the only company permitted to manufac- 
ture passenger cars, but in 1989 Kia Motors and Daewoo were 
allowed to reenter the passenger car business. In 1989 Ssangyong 
Motors became South Korea's fourth car manufacturer. 

South Korea's auto parts industry grew rapidly in the late 1980s, 
from US$3.8 billion in 1987 to US$4.6 billion in 1988 (US$4 bil- 
lion produced locally). Automotive parts imports, most of which 
came from Japan, totaled US$610 million in 1988 (down from 
US$700 million in 1987). In 1989 South Korean automobile and 
parts manufacturers planned to spend more than 2 trillion won 
(US$2.8 billion) on facility expansion, research, and development. 

Armaments 

South Korea is an important manufacturer of armaments, both 
for domestic use and for export (see Military Production, ch. 5). 
During the 1960s, South Korea was largely dependent on the United 
States to supply its armed forces, but after the elaboration of Presi- 
dent Richard M. Nixon's policy of Vietnamization in the early 
1970s, South Korea began to manufacture many of its own 
weapons. These included M-16 rifles, artillery, ammunition, tanks, 
other military vehicles, and ships. Aircraft were assembled under 
coproduction arrangements with United States firms. Arms exports, 
including quartermaster goods, vehicles, and weaponry, reached 
nearly US$975 million in 1982 but declined during the rest of the 
decade, reaching only US$50 million in 1988. In 1989 Seoul an- 
nounced that its fledgling aerospace industry was planning to 
produce an indigenously designed high-performance jetfighter for 
its air force within two decades. The South Korean aerospace in- 
dustry also developed a Korean Fighters Program in cooperation 
with McDonnell Douglas of the United States, with the goal of "ac- 
quiring the capacity to design and manufacture supersonic jet- 
fighters." 

Construction 

Construction has been an important South Korean export in- 
dustry since the early 1960s and remains a critical source of for- 
eign currency and "invisible" export earnings. By 1981 overseas 
construction projects, most of them in the Middle East, accounted 
for 60 percent of the work undertaken by South Korean construc- 
tion companies. Contracts that year were valued at US$13.7 bil- 
lion. In 1988, however, overseas construction contracts totaled only 
US$1 .6 billion (orders from the Middle East were US$1 .2 billion), 
a 1 percent increase over the previous year, while new orders for 



160 



The Economy 



domestic construction projects totaled US$13.8 billion, an 8.8 per- 
cent increase over 1987. The result was that South Korean con- 
struction companies concentrated on the rapidly growing domestic 
market in the late 1980s. By 1989 there were signs of a revival of 
the overseas construction market — the Dong Ah Construction Com- 
pany signed a US$5.3 billion contract with Libya for the second 
phase of Libya's Great Man-Made River Project, which, when all 
five phases were completed, was projected to cost US$27 billion. 
South Korean construction companies signed over US$7 billion 
of overseas contracts in 1989. 

Textiles and Footwear 

Textiles, clothing, and leather products made up about 24 per- 
cent of South Korea's manufacturing output in 1980. Over 10,000 
textile and footwear enterprises employed more than four workers 
each, and 34,000 smaller shops manufactured such products in 
1978. Throughout the 1980s, textiles played a critical role in Seoul's 
exports, accounting for US$11.9 billion, or 19.6 percent of total 
export earnings. In 1989 the export of textiles (valued at US$15,340 
million) grew 8.5 percent over the 1988 level. Textile manufac- 
turers, concerned about diminishing export competitiveness because 
of wage increases and won revaluation, expanded their overseas 
investments in 1987 and 1988. Seoul approved sixty-six investment 
projects totaling US$38.4 million from January 1, 1978, through 
the end of September 1988. Most of these investments were locat- 
ed in the Caribbean Basin region and Southeast Asia. Upgrading 
product lines — particularly towards high fashion — and further shift- 
ing to the expanding domestic market were expected to cause slow 
growth in the industry in the early 1990s. 

South Korea's footwear industry also expanded in the late 1980s. 
Footwear exports in 1988 totaled US$3.8 billion, a 34.7 percent 
increase over 1987, 6.3 percent of Seoul's total exports by value. 
Economic forecasters, however, predicted that the industry would 
decline in the 1990s despite the surge of orders in 1989; they at- 
tributed the 1989 surge to political unrest in China, normally a 
major producer of footwear. 

Chemicals 

The chemical industry began full production in the 1970s. 
Although dependent on imports of raw materials and certain high- 
technology commodities, the chemical industry supplied many of 
the intermediate inputs for textile, plastic, synthetic rubber, rub- 
ber shoe, and paint factories, and had made South Korea virtually 
self-sufficient in fertilizers. The chemical fertilizer industry, a 



161 



South Korea: A Country Study 

large part of the chemical industry, met most of South Korea's 
domestic consumption demands. 

In 1987 chemical and pharmaceutical exports increased by 27 
percent over the previous year, but accounted for only 2.8 percent 
of total exports; imports in that category comprised 11.2 percent 
of total imports. The chemical industry was expected to expand 
in the early 1990s, with new capacity coming online and Seoul com- 
mitted to spending money for research and development and con- 
structing new production facilities. Pharmaceuticals, agricultural 
chemicals, dyes, pigments, paint, perfumes, surface active agents 
(surfactants) including synthetic detergents, and catalysts were tar- 
geted as major areas for investment. 

In the late 1980s, petrochemical production facilities included 
twenty-five companies, thirty-six plants, two naphtha crackers, and 
three aromatics extraction plants, with an aggregate total produc- 
tion capacity of 505,000 tons of ethylene per annum. There were 
two large petrochemical complexes, one in Ulsan, the other in Yosu. 
South Korea was an important producer of chemical fertilizers in 
the late 1970s (671,000 nutrient tons exported in 1980), but both 
exports and production declined in the 1980s. 

Energy 

The Korean Peninsula is only modestly endowed with natural 
resources, and North Korea has far more natural resources than 
South Korea. During the Japanese colonial period (1910-45), the 
north served as the center for mining and industry whereas the 
south, with somewhat greater rainfall, a warmer climate, and slight- 
ly greater arable terrain, served as the center for rice production, 
(see Physical Environment, ch. 2). 

South Korea's mineral production is not adequate to supply its 
manufacturing output. Energy needs are also met by importing 
bituminous and anthracite coal and crude petroleum. In 1987 ap- 
proximately 23.4 million tons of anthracite coal, approximately 
4,000 tons of tungsten, 565,000 tons of iron ore, and 47,000 tons 
of zinc ore were mined. Lesser amounts of copper, lead, molybde- 
num, gold, silver, kaolin, and fluorite also were mined (see fig. 9). 

Energy producers were dominated by government enterprises, 
although privately operated coal mines and oil refineries also ex- 
isted. In 1990 South Korea still had no proven oil reserves. Off- 
shore oil possibilities in the Yellow Sea and on the continental shelf 
between Korea and Japan yielded nothing through the 1980s, but 
exploration continued. South Korea's coal supply was both insuffi- 
cient and of low quality. The potential for hydroelectric power was 
very limited because of tremendous seasonal variations in the 



162 



The Economy 



weather and the concentration of most of the rainfall in the sum- 
mer months. Accordingly, Seoul placed an increasingly heavy em- 
phasis on developing nuclear power generation. 

Electric power in South Korea was provided by the Korea Elec- 
tric Power Corporation (KEPCO). When KEPCO's predecessor, 
KECO, was founded in 1961, annual power production was 1,770 
million kilowatt-hours (kwhr); production reached 73,992 million 
kwhr in 1987. The ratio of usage during 1987 was 17.9 percent 
for residential customers, 16.2 percent for public and service busi- 
nesses, and 65.9 percent for the industrial sector. Energy used in 
electric power generation consisted primarily of nuclear, coal, oil, 
and liquified natural gas (LNG). Of the 54,885 million kwhr of 
electricity generated in 1985, 22 percent came from nuclear plants 
then in operation, 74 percent from thermal plants (oil and coal), 
and 4 percent from hydroelectric sites. It was predicted in 1988 
that the generation structure by the year 2000 would be 10.2 per- 
cent hydroelectric, 12.2 percent oil, 22.9 percent coal, 10.2 per- 
cent LNG, and 44.5 percent nuclear. 

South Korea placed a heavy emphasis on nuclear power gener- 
ation. The country's first nuclear power plant, the Kori Number 
One located near Pusan, opened in 1977. Eight plants were oper- 
ational in 1987 when atomic power generation was an estimated 
71,158 million kilowatts, or 53.1 percent of total electric power. 

South Korea's first antinuclear protests occurred in December 
1988 when residents near the Kori complex demonstrated against 
low-level waste that had been secretly buried just outside the plant. 
In 1989 residents near other nuclear reactors protested the environ- 
mental damage they said was caused by the units. Sixteen antinuclear 
groups joined together to form the Movement for the Eradication 
of Nuclear Power Plants. The government, however, asserted that 
the South Korean nuclear program was well run and that none 
of the 193 antinuclear protests reported since 1977 was serious. 

Agriculture 

At the start of the economic boom in 1963, the majority of South 
Koreans were farmers. Sixty-three percent of the population lived 
in rural areas. In the next twenty-five years, South Korea grew 
from a predominandy rural, agricultural nation into an urban, new- 
ly industrialized country and the agricultural workforce shrunk to 
only 21 percent in 1989 (see fig. 10). Government officials expected 
that urbanization and industrialization would further reduce the 
number of agricultural workers to well under 20 percent by 2000. 

South Korea's agriculture had many inherent problems. South 
Korea is a mountainous country with only 22 percent arable land 



163 



South Korea: A Country Study 



Seoul 



Demarcation line 
and demilitarized zone, 

Hwach'dn • 

^ 9 Ch'dngp'ybng-ni 



Fe 



Mukho 
9 ' n UL.SamclTdk 



Inch'dn q q 



'Fe 



Changhang 





Mokp'o 



<?0 a 




Ulsan 



3 AlDC 

Pusan 



Chinhae 



Vdsu 



Cft 'ungmu 



A 
1 
B 



National capital 
Populated place 
Iron and steel 
Shipbuilding and repair 
Textiles 

Food processing 



Q> Chemicals 



Cement 



^ Fertilizer 

Plywood and veneer 
A Smelter 

Automotive assembly 

Electronics 
(Ife Petroleum refining 
j£l Thermal electric power 
ft Hydroelectric power 



Major fishing port 

W Tungsten 

Fe Iron ore 

Cu Copper 

Sn Tin 

G Graphite 

Ka Kaolin 

j Anthracite coalfield 



Source: Based on information from K.P. Wang et al., Mineral Industries of the Far East and 
South Asia, Washington, 1988, 74-75. 

Figure 9. Selected Industrial and Mining Activity, 1988 



164 



The Economy 



and less rainfall than most other neighboring rice-growing coun- 
tries (see Land Area and Borders; Climate, ch. 2). A major land 
reform in the late 1940s and early 1950s spread ownership of land 
to the rural peasantry. Individual holdings, however, were too small 
(averaging one hectare, which made cultivation inefficient and dis- 
couraged mechanization) or too spread out to provide families with 
much chance to produce a significant quantity of food. The enor- 
mous growth of urban areas led to a rapid decrease of available 
farmland, while at the same time population increases and bigger 
incomes meant that the demand for food greatly outstripped sup- 
ply. The result of these developments was that by the late 1980s 
roughly half of South Korea's needs, mainly wheat and animal feed 
corn, was imported. 

Compared with the industrial and service sectors, agriculture 
remained the most sluggish sector of the economy. In 1988 the con- 
tribution of agriculture to overall GDP was only about 10.8 per- 
cent, down from approximately 12.3 percent the previous year. 
Most economists agreed that the country's rural areas had gained 
more than they had contributed in the course of industrialization. 
Still, the growth of agricultural output, which averaged 3.4 per- 
cent per year between 1945 and 1974, 6.8 percent annually dur- 
ing the 1974-79 period, and 5.6 percent between 1980 and 1986, 
was credible. The gains were even more impressive because they 
added to a traditionally high level of productivity. On the other 
hand, the overall growth of the agriculture, forestry, and fishing 
sector was only 0.6 percent in 1987 as compared with the manufac- 
turing sector, which grew 16 percent during 1986 and 1987. Dur- 
ing the first half of 1989, the agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 
sector grew 5.9 percent, as opposed to manufacturing's 2.9 percent. 

Major Crops 

Rice was the most important crop and yields were impressive. 
As noted by Donald S. Macdonald, however, rising wage levels 
and land values have made it expensive to produce. Rice represent- 
ed about 90 percent of total grain production and over 40 percent 
of farm income; the 1988 rice crop was 6.5 million tons. Rice was 
imported in the 1980s, but the amount depended on the success 
of domestic harvests. The government's rice support program 
reached a record US$1 .9 billion in 1986, as compared with US$890 
million in 1985. By raising procurement prices by 14 percent over 
the 1986 level, Seoul achieved a rice price structure that was about 
five times that of the world market in 1987. 

Barley was the second most important crop. Its production 
declined from about 1 .5 million tons in 1970 to about 561 ,500 tons 



165 



South Korea: A Country Study 



1980 WORK FORCE = 13.7 MILLION 




MINING AND 
MANUFACTURING 

23% 



1988 WORK FORCE = 16.9 MILLION 



OTHER 
(INCLUDES 
CONSTRUCTION 
AND SERVICES) 
51% 




Source: Based on information from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Informa- 
tion, Korean Overseas Information Service, A Handbook of Korea, Seoul, 1982, 489; 
Byung-Nak Song, The Rise of the Korean Economy, Hong Kong, 1990, 109; and Europa 
World Yearbook, 1990, 2, London, 1990, 1556. 



Figure 10. Employment by Sector, 1980 and 1988 



166 



The Economy 



in 1988. Other crops included such grains as millet, corn, sorghum, 
buckwheat, soybeans, and potatoes. Fruits and vegetables includ- 
ed pears, grapes, mandarin oranges, apples, peaches, Welsh on- 
ions, Chinese cabbage, red peppers, persimmons, cabbage, peaches, 
and radishes. Other important cash crops included cotton, hemp, 
sesame, tobacco, and ginseng. In 1988, livestock heads included 
native Korean cattle (2 million), hogs (4.9 million), and poultry 
(almost 59 million). 

Forestry and Fishing 

South Korean farmers have always used the nation's forests for 
fuel and household products, but centuries of overutilization and 
poor resource management had practically denuded the country- 
side by the end of the Choson Dynasty (1392-1910). World War 
II interrupted Japanese efforts to replace the ravaged forest stock 
and the Korean War brought to a peak the destruction of Korea's 
forests. After the 1950s, Seoul slowly developed the organizational 
and technical expertise to save the nation's trees. Despite frequent 
setbacks, reforestation had proceeded fairly successfully by the 
1970s; the total volume of timber had grown from a low of 30.8 
million cubic meters in 1954 to over 164.4 million cubic meters 
in 1984. The density of the woodlands expanded from an average 
of 4.8 to 17.8 cubic meters per hectare of forest during the same 
period. 

By 1984 over 20 percent of the nation's 6.5 million hectares of 
forest belonged to the government; most was managed by the Office 
of Forestry, a branch of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Another 
8 percent was owned by local public authorities; 72 percent was 
privately owned. In 1985 about two-thirds of South Korea was 
covered by forests. Until the 1970s, reforestation had taken place 
primarily in national forests; as a result of this situation, the den- 
sity of government-owned forests was about three times greater than 
that of private forests. Most forest owners were smallholders with 
inadequate financial resources to purchase and maintain seedlings. 
However, upon the introduction of the Saemaul Movement, an 
ambitious rural development program launched by Park in 1971, 
the performance of the Village Forestry Associations — similar to 
and often overlapping with the agricultural cooperatives — improved 
significantly. Between 1972 and 1979, forestry agents and village 
associations planted 1 .4 million hectares with 3.4 million seedlings. 

Although the fuel needs of most farmers were met by wood from 
local forests or coal briquettes, the growing industrial demand for 
timber was not adequately supplied by domestic production. In 
1977 South Korea imported 88 percent of its timber, mostly from 



167 



South Korea: A Country Study 



Malaysia and Indonesia. In 1985 South Korea imported US$538 
million worth of wood, lumber, and cork; imports were US$549 
million in 1986. 

South Korea's fishing industry contributed both to the welfare 
of the consumer and to export earnings. Although the value-added 
income from fishing contributed less than 1 percent of GNP and 
the fishing population decreased by over 18 percent during the 1970s 
(to 745,000 persons), fishery products contributed 5 percent of the 
value of commodity exports. Fishery production totaled 470,000 
tons in 1962, 1.3 million tons in 1972, 2.6 million tons in 1982, 
and 3.3 million tons in 1987. In 1988 South Korean fishing house- 
holds earned about US$10,000 on average. 

Most of the expansion of production in the 1970s and 1980s was 
the result of deep-sea fishing operations. The major fishing ports 
were Ulsan and Masan. In the late 1980s, the production of sea- 
weed, oyster, and other products of coastal and offshore breeding 
farms declined, but the catch of tuna and squid in deep-sea fishing 
rose. Fishing trawlers brought in about 250,000 tons of pollock off 
the coast of Alaska in 1985, a catch that both contributed to the 
South Korean diet and was exported to United States food processors. 

In 1985 there were 90,970 fishing vessels harvesting a total catch 
of 858,471 tons. Of these vessels, 71,836 were motorized (836,633 
tons) and 19,134 (21,838 tons) were nonmotorized. These num- 
bers reflected a major change from 1962, when only 6,085 vessels 
out of 45,504 were motorized. 

The Agricultural Crisis of the Late 1980s 

Agricultural labor costs rose as young people left rural areas for 
urban jobs, and farm work mainly was done by women and old 
men. Farmers' relative earnings improved during the 1970s, but 
fell in the 1980s. The gap between incomes of urbanites and peo- 
ple in rural areas widened considerably in the late 1980s. In 1988 
the average income of people in gun (counties) amounted to 79.1 
percent of that of people in cities, as compared with 84.7 percent 
in 1985. South Korean farming households earned about 
US$12,000 in 1988, up 24.4 percent from 1987. In comparison, 
the average income for an urban family in 1989 was about 
US$15,000. Nonfarm income in 1989 comprised 39.5 percent of 
average farm household earnings, as compared with more than 50 
percent in Japan and approximately 70 percent in Taiwan. 

Farm families accumulated debts averaging about US$4,620 per 
household in 1988 and had average assets of about US$66,057. 
The purchase of modern farm machinery as well as of many new 
consumer goods contributed to higher debts. The 35 percent rise 



168 



The Economy 



in assets between 1987 and 1988 mainly was because of a 41 percent 
increase in the price of land. Budgetary pressures from the govern- 
ment on agricultural price supports also reduced farm income. 

There was increased rental of farmland in the 1980s. The per- 
centage of rented farmland among total farmland rose from 2 1 per- 
cent in 1980 to 30.5 percent in 1985. The percentage of farm 
households renting some of their land among total farm households 
expanded rapidly from 37.1 percent in 1980 to 64.7 percent in 1985. 
Nonfarmer ownership of tenant farmland also increased to 63 per- 
cent in 1985. 

The farmers who rented land were mainly the small-landed farm- 
ers adversely affected by Seoul's agricultural open-door policy of 
the 1980s. Under this policy, the government sought cheap cereal 
prices by increasing cheap imports and promoted large-scale farm- 
ing where crops could be produced more cheaply and efficiently. 
In the early 1970s, a farm family could meet almost 100 percent 
of household expenses by farming 0.5 to 1 hectare, but by 1985 
such small plots of land only met 59.8 percent of expenses. Many 
farmers had to rent extra land to augment their incomes. 

Poor prospects on the farm depleted farm villages as the young 
left and the old died. Parents sent their children to the towns and 
cities for a better education. Young farmers who could not find 
wives also left for the cities. 

The government initiated various programs to improve rural con- 
ditions. The most extensive of these was the New Community 
Movement (Saemaul undong, known as the Saemaul Movement). 
Its goal was to mobilize villagers in their own service. At first Sae- 
maul projects were aimed at improving household living conditions. 
Later, projects were directed more to the village as a whole and 
included the construction of roads, bridges, irrigation ditches, and 
common compost plots. Next, the program focused on more eco- 
nomic concerns — group farming, common seed beds, livestock 
production, forestation, and even joint marketing and factories. 
Better health and sanitation as well as beautification of the environ- 
ment also became program goals. The government provided the 
materials and small amounts of money to the villagers, who sup- 
plied the labor. In the early 1980s, President Chun removed con- 
trol over the Saemaul Movement from the Ministry of Home Affairs 
and left most decisionmaking to the Saemaul leaders and bureau- 
crats, headed by the president's younger brother, Chon Kyong- 
hwan. The Saemaul Movement initially was quite successful but 
deteriorated in the early 1980s. Chon Kyong-hwan, arrested on 
a variety of corruption charges in 1988, was accused of large-scale 



169 



South Korea: A Country Study 

extortion and embezzlement while he was chairman of the move- 
ment between 1981 and 1987. 

South Korea, a high-cost agricultural producer, prohibited un- 
restricted beef and rice imports and severely limited many other 
agricultural imports. Foreign trading partners such as the United 
States pressured South Korea to open up the agricultural market, 
but Seoul said that its farmers would be hurt badly by the impor- 
tation of inexpensive beef, rice, tobacco, and other products. In 
April 1989, Seoul released a list of 243 agricultural products sched- 
uled for import liberalization by 1991, but the list did not include 
beef. In the late 1980s, many farmers, already deeply in debt, were 
told by the government that they might have to compete in the 
world market and took to the streets to protest against foreign de- 
mands and to demand further protection from the government. 

In the late 1980s, farmers gained political strength through the 
increased activities of various farm associations and the formation 
of new organizations, such as the National Association of Farmers 
(Chon'guk-nongmin hyophoe) established in 1987. The Korean 
Catholic Farmers Association and Protestant Farmers Association 
became active in 1987. These and other independent farm groups 
applied strong pressure on the government to alleviate their problems. 
Rural residents made up less than one quarter of South Korea's 
voters, but they elected almost half of the National Assembly; thus, 
they exercised virtual veto power over farming legislation. 

Prospects 

The long-term prospects for agriculture were not encouraging. 
Traditionally the peninsula's rice basket, South Korea had not been 
self-sufficient agriculturally for many years. In the late 1980s, almost 
half the nation's foodstuff needs were imports, mostly wheat and 
animal feed corn. Natural disasters compounded the problems of 
farmers in the 1980s. As a result of these factors, the share of the 
GNP provided by the agriculture, forestry, and fishing sector share 
of the GNP shrank 5.2 percent in 1987. 

However, the situation was not totally bleak in the early 1990s. 
Although the purchasing power of the agricultural sector had been 
declining since the early 1960s relative to other sectors of the econ- 
omy, the rate of agricultural productivity increased in the 1980s. 
Livestock raising and rice cultivation had come to dominate the 
agricultural sector over a variety of traditional agricultural pursuits. 

Service Industries 

Service industries included insurance, restaurants, hotels, laun- 
dries, public bath houses, health-related services, and entertainment 



170 



The Economy 



establishments. There were thousands of small shops marketing 
specialized items, large traditional marketplaces, and streamlined 
buildings housing corporate and professional offices. Game rooms 
featuring Ping-Pong tables, or billiards, and tearooms serving a 
variety of beverages were located on almost every downtown city 
corner. 

South Korea's hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympics from Sep- 
tember 18 to October 2, 1988, made 1988 a boom year for tourism. 
More than 2 million tourists spent US$3.3 billion, an increase in 
the number of tourists and the dollars spent, respectively, of 24.9 
percent and 42.2 percent over 1987. Japanese visitors accounted 
for 48 percent of the total; tourists from the United States made 
up 14.9 percent. The Korean National Tourist Corporation predict- 
ed that in 1990 almost 3 million tourists would visit the country. 

An improved transportation and communications infrastructure, 
increasing incomes, enhanced consumer sophistication, and govern- 
ment tax incentives encouraged the development of a modern dis- 
tribution network of chain stores, supermarkets, and department 
stores (see Transportation and Telecommunications, this ch.). 

In the mid-1980s, the largest employer of South Korea's ser- 
vice sector was retail trade. A growing number of workers were 
employed by the mostly department stores (most of which were 
owned by chaebol) that were opening rapidly in the downtown areas 
of major urban centers. The vast majority of retailers were small 
merchants in cities, towns, and villages, each with a modest store- 
front, or stand, limited stock, and poor access to capital, but the 
great majority of South Koreans made their purchases from these 
small retailers. In 1986 there were approximately 26,054 whole- 
sale and 542,548 retail establishments and 233,834 hotels and 
restaurants that employed about 1 . 7 million people (these figures 
probably do not include family members working in small stores) . 

The distribution system was far from perfect, and managers 
recognized the need for better organization and management. Most 
of the nation's wholesalers were located in Seoul and accounted 
for most of the turnover of goods. Most of the sales outlets were 
located in the heart of urban centers. Cargo truck terminals and 
warehouse facilities were spread irregularly through city neigh- 
borhoods. 

Money and Banking 

When Park Chung Hee became president in 1961 , he organized 
a highly centralized government with the power to direct the econ- 
omy. Park quickly nationalized all banks, took control of foreign 
borrowing, and merged the agricultural cooperative movement with 



171 



South Korea: A Country Study 

the agricultural bank. The government also took control of all forms 
of institutional credit, giving Park great control over the business 
community. 

The government began to liberalize the banking system in the 
mid-1980s by denationalizing several banks, but refused to allow 
individual chaebol to acquire controlling shares in these banks. The 
government still maintained strong managerial controls over these 
banks through the Bank of Korea's Office of Bank Supervision and 
Examination, which, under the guidance of the Monetary Board, 
supervised and regularly examined banking institutions. Most of 
the credit provided by these banks went to the chaebol, but the banks 
also were required by law to make at least one-third of their busi- 
ness loans to small and medium-sized firms. 

South Korea's financial sector in the late 1980s included a diver- 
sified commercial banking system, a securities market, and a wide 
range of secondary financial institutions. The banks kept pace with 
the rest of the economy, particularly after the liberalization and 
modernization of financial institutions in the mid-1980s and the 
establishment of the capital market system based on the Fifth Five- 
Year Economic and Social Development Plan. 

The Bank of Korea was established as the central bank on June 
12, 1950. Its major functions included the issuance of all currency; 
the formulation and execution of monetary and credit policies; the 
conduct of the bulk of foreign exchange control business; the 
research, collection, and preparation of statistics on many aspects 
of South Korea's financial system; and the supervision and regu- 
lation of the activities of private banks. The Bank of Korea en- 
gaged in loan and deposit transactions for the government; 
additionally, the bank transacted various government business 
activities. It also made loans to and received deposits from other 
banking institutions; all banks maintained their solvency through 
balances at the Bank of Korea. 

South Korea's five major commercial banks (Chohung, Com- 
mercial, First, Hanil, and Seoul) were privately held. Together with 
two city bank joint ventures — the Kor-Am Bank and the Shin-Han 
(co-owned with the United States and Japan respectively) — there 
were 961 commercial bank branches across South Korea at the end 
of 1987. Local banks were found in every province. 

The Bank of Korea regulated all commercial banking activities 
under the provisions of the General Banking Act passed in 1954. 
Commercial banks got their money through deposits from the 
general public, international loans, and funds borrowed from the 
Bank of Korea. The lending activities of commercial banks focused 
on short-term loans or discounts because long-term lending was 



172 



South Korea: A Country Study 

still the prerogative of such specialized banks as the Korea Exchange 
Bank, Korea Housing Bank, and National Agricultural Coopera- 
tives Federation. In the late 1980s, the banking industry operated 
according to a "prime" bank system whereby each major South 
Korean bank was assigned one domestic commercial bank. Un- 
der specific legislation designed to achieve certain functions or to 
assist special markets, six special banks received funds from the 
government and from the sales of debentures. 

Three other financial development institutions supplied credit 
for business and government projects. The Export-Import Bank 
of Korea extended medium- and long-term credit to both suppli- 
ers and buyers to facilitate exports of capital goods and services, 
major resources development, and overseas investment. The Korea 
Development Bank, which was the government's shareholder in 
state-run enterprises, raised funds from the government as well as 
from international financial institutions and foreign banks to fund 
key industries and infrastructure projects. The Korea Long-Term 
Credit Bank financed equipment investment. 

Small and Medium-Sized Businesses 

Small and medium-sized businesses — generally those with less 
than 400 employees — accounted for US$1 1 billion, or 32 percent, 
of South Korea's exports in 1986. By 1987 these businesses gener- 
ated an estimated US$14 billion, but the export percentage dropped 
to 30 percent as large automobile and electronics groups led ex- 
port growth. Small and medium-sized businesses contributed 38.9 
percent to the GNP in 1986 when calculated on a value-added basis. 

Many of South Korea's smaller firms manufacture specialized 
parts or equipment for the larger chaebol. As is the case with keiretsu 
in Japan, many of the chaebol in South Korea assemble and mar- 
ket goods under their own brandnames, but rely on smaller sup- 
port firms to manufacture most of the individual parts. Wages are 
often lower in the smaller firms than at the chaebol, and working 
conditions often are worse. 

Starting in 1 983 , Seoul selected a number of the more promis- 
ing smaller firms to receive special government assistance. These 
businesses were eligible for a number of tax breaks, help in secur- 
ing financing, and consultations and technical education from the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry. Small businesses were central to 
the government's policy of producing more sophisticated technol- 
ogy locally; additionally, they were critical to the government's 
strategy of encouraging regional development away from the over- 
crowded area around Seoul. In 1989 the government announced 
a plan to spend billions of won to help small and medium-sized 



174 



The Economy 



industries seek structural improvements so that they could move 
away from labor-intensive production in favor of technology- 
intensive production. 

The Labor Force 

Despite significant increases in wages in the 1980s, labor unions 
in the late 1980s continued their wave of strikes demanding better 
working conditions and wages. The ferocity and sheer size of the 
labor movement caught management and the government by sur- 
prise. During his first year or so in office, President Roh Tae Woo 
was confronted with considerable labor unrest; there were more 
than 300 strikes in the first three months of 1989 (see Interest 
Groups, ch. 4). Emboldened by the political reforms of 1987 and 
by reports that the rate of South Korea's economic growth was 
greater than the improvements in their own incomes and life-styles, 
many workers agitated for a greater share of the nation's prosperity 
and sought more freedom and responsibility at the workplace and 
an end to the traditional paternalism of management. Lost produc- 
tion was estimated to have climbed to US$6 billion in 1989 from 
US$4.4 billion in 1988. 

Workers were caught in a revolution of rising expectations, as 
a wave of rising urban land values and housing costs outpaced aver- 
age real wage increases of more than 70 percent during the 1980s. 
Moreover, wages for manual workers, who were responsible for 
much of the production and export that fueled the economy, were 
much lower than the national average. In the late 1980s, working 
families still found themselves struggling to meet minimum stan- 
dards of living. Employees also were expected to work long and 
often erratic hours in exchange for steady employment and were 
frustrated over a lack of benefits and individual say. One labor acti- 
vist noted in 1989 that the labor movement "is not a class struggle. 
We just want better working conditions and better status for work- 
ers. We have been looked down on in Korea for a very long time. ' ' 

Worker complaints were focused on three areas: low wages, long 
working hours, and a high number of industrial accidents. In 1986 
the average wage of a South Korean worker was US$381 a month 
(339,474 won), including overtime and all allowances. The basic 
wage was US$287, or 255,408 won, but, according to the govern- 
ment, the basic wage necessary to sustain a "decent" way of life 
was US$588 (524,1 13 won). Thus, the average worker only earned 
two-thirds of what the government thought necessary to sustain 
a family of four. In 1987 semiskilled workers typically received 
US$1 .50 to US$2.00 per hour and worked fifty-five to sixty hours 



175 



South Korea: A Country Study 



a week; unskilled workers worked twelve-hour days seven days a 
week, earning US$125 a month. 

There were, however, dramatic increases in wages in 1988 and 
1989. Labor stoppages in the manufacturing sector, coupled with 
a scarcity of labor, led to 20-percent salary increases for workers 
in the manufacturing sector in 1988 and 25-percent salary increases 
in that sector in 1989. These raises later spread, increasing wages 
across the entire economy 18.7 percent in 1989. By 1989 some South 
Korean economists were worrying about the effect that skyrocket- 
ing wages would have on the cost of domestic-made goods and the 
consequent impact on export prices. The situation was especially 
worrisome because the wages paid to workers in South Korea's 
major competitors were growing far more slowly. 

South Korea was known for having the world's longest working 
hours. In 1986 the Korean worker averaged about 54.7 hours a 
week. This situation was the natural consequence of the low wage 
system that necessitated extended hours and extra work to earn 
minimum living expenses. 

Wages and Living Conditions 

The economic expansion of the 1980s caused rapid improvements 
in the living conditions of many South Koreans, which does not 
mean, however, that all lived comfortably. Indeed, one had only 
to wander the narrow alleys of Seoul, Inch 'on, or other South 
Korean cities to see poor living conditions. In 1990 families in slum 
areas of Seoul usually had electricity and running water, as well 
as a small range for cooking, a television, and a radio or two. But 
living space was crowded, furniture was shabby, and buildings were 
badly built and gloomy. People in poorer families seemed to be 
fairly healthy and had adequate diets. The level of starvation, as 
well as the cost of some foodstuffs, seemed low. Beggars and the 
homeless who wandered the streets were infrequent. Although there 
were some noticeable exceptions, farming families generally lived 
in small houses, with few of the basic luxuries of middle-class ur- 
ban families. 

Living conditions in South Korea's cities, however, were im- 
proving in the late 1980s. According to the Economic Planning 
Board, in April 1988, the average monthly income in Seoul and 
other major cities was 612,400 won (US$868) a rise of 16.1 per- 
cent over the previous year. 

A composite portrait of average middle-class families in Seoul 
would show the following: a husband in his early forties, a wife 
about six years younger, and two children, aged thirteen and ten. 
The family would live in a fairly small apartment, consisting of 



176 



The Economy 



a hallway, one small bedroom with bunk beds for the children, a 
small room with several bureaus and with mats as floor coverings, 
a television set and a videocassette recorder, and a hi-fi stereo. This 
room would serve as an eating area and family room during the 
day and as the parents' sleeping area at night. There also would 
be a larger room partitioned off into three sections: a living room 
with three elaborate easy chairs, a more formal dining area, and 
a small kitchen with an oven-range, sink, washing machine, shelves, 
and cabinets. The mother would stay at home; the father would 
work from 9:00 A.M. to 10:00 P.M. six days a week. There would 
be a fairly new car, probably a Hyundai, which the father would 
use to drive to work. 

A survey of income distribution in South Korea in 1985 and 1988 
showed that average household income had risen on average 14.8 
percent per year, from 5,857,000 won (US$8,645 based on the 1989 
exchange rate of US$1 = 677.5 won) to 8,863,000 won (US$13,081). 
The Gini coefficient, a commonly used measure of income distri- 
bution, dropped slightiy from 0.3449 in 1985 to 0.3355 in 1988. 
The comparable figure stood at 0.285 in Japan in 1985 and at 0.364 
in the United States in 1978. 

As noted by David I. Steinberg, economic growth translated into 
fairly equitable income distribution when compared with other na- 
tions experiencing similar development and its attendant problems. 
When Park took office, approximately 40 percent of the popula- 
tion lived below the poverty line; by the late 1980s, less than 10 
percent of the population lived under the poverty line, although 
incomes at the top of the scale had increased faster than those at 
the bottom. Salary increases had not been constant under Park's 
regime because Park did not want high labor costs to detract from 
the competitiveness of South Korean goods on the international 
market. By the late 1980s, capital-intensive higher technology was 
more important. Further, although wages had increased substan- 
tially in the late 1980s, this increase was not because of the good 
will of the chaebol or the government, but was the result of a great 
many strikes and a shortage of skilled workers as industry expanded 
and large numbers of workers moved to the Middle East to work 
on construction projects. 

The purchasing power of the average citizen rose rapidly in the 
1980s. Real per capita GNP more than doubled between 1983 and 
1988 (from US$1,914 to US$4,040) and was expected to reach 
US$5,100 by 1991. South Korea was already transforming itself 
into a durable consumer society. By the late 1980s, television sets 
and refrigerators had become a standard part of the average house- 
hold, and ownership of an automobile was not unusual. Families 



177 



South Korea: A Country Study 

tended to consume more meat, fresh vegetables and fruit, canned 
or processed foods, and to eat less rice than in previous decades. 
They also dressed in modern fashions made from quality fabrics. 

Higher incomes led to significant shifts in consumption patterns. 
For example, in 1963 the average family spent 57.4 percent of its 
budget on food. Twenty years later, the share going to food had 
fallen to 40 percent and was expected to continue to fall (but not 
as rapidly as in the past). Despite the decreasing share of food in 
the consumer budget, the absolute value of food consumed grew 
regularly in the 1970s and 1980s and was expected to continue to 
do so in the 1990s. Rising incomes, the increased mobility of the 
average person, and a high literacy rate demonstrated evident so- 
cioeconomic progress. 

Industrial Safety 

Of the almost 5 million workers employed in 70,865 South 
Korean factories in 1986, some 142,000 (nearly 3 percent) were 
so badly injured that they had to be hospitalized for more than four 
days. There were 1,660 workers killed in industrial accidents, mean- 
ing an average of just over four workers died each day. Long work- 
ing hours and bad working conditions contributed to high rates 
of injury and death. 

Transporation and Telecommunications 
Roads 

Domestic transportation improved greatly during the 1980s, and 
growth was evident in all sectors. The rapid improvement and ex- 
tension of public roads and the increasing availability of motor ve- 
hicles contributed enormously to the mobility of the population. 
Approximately 51,000 kilometers of roadways spanned the coun- 
try in 1988, 46.3 percent of which were paved. Express highways 
facilitated travel between major cities and reached a combined 
length of 1,539 kilometers in 1988, as compared to 86.8 kilome- 
ters in 1967 (see fig. 11). The 1980s saw the increased paving of 
roads and the building of ultramodern highways around Seoul (es- 
pecially in the vicinity of the Olympic stadiums) and between Seoul 
and such major cities as Pusan and Taegu. In 1989 the govern- 
ment announced that it would start construction on nine new ex- 
pressways with a combined length of 1,243 kilometers. In 1996, 
when the expressways and two additional projects were expected 
to be completed, South Korea was expected to have twenty-one 
expressways with a combined length of 2,840 kilometers. 

The total number of motor vehicles climbed rapidly in the 1980s. 



178 



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National capital 


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Populated place 





Expressway 





Road 


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Railroad 


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International airport 


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rill IL/ipdl pui I 




1 


25 50 Kilometers 





25 50 Miles 




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Sea 

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Japan 




The Economy 



By 1987 there were approximately 845,000 passenger cars and 
748,000 commercial vehicles, up from a combined total of about 
744,000 in 1980. In 1988 South Korean automakers produced 
504,000 vehicles for domestic sale and 576,134 vehicles for export. 
In the first nine months of 1989, domestic sales reached nearly 
800,000 vehicles. 

The expansion and rapid improvement of South Korea's long- 
distance highway system led to the growth of an excellent intercity 
bus system in the 1980s. In 1988 there were ten express bus com- 
panies operating a fleet of some 900 buses connecting all of the 
major cities of Korea. 

Subways and Railroads 

In 1990 subways were gradually replacing buses as the main 
means of transportation in Seoul. The Seoul subway, the first part 
of which opened in 1974, was operated by the Seoul Metropolitan 
Rapid Transit Company. In 1985 the system carried approximately 
3 million passengers daily. In 1990 the subway had more than 200 
kilometers of track, enabling commuters to reach any station within 
the 45 -kilometer radius of the capital city within an hour. One line 
connected Seoul with Inch 'on. Four subway lines served Seoul, 
in addition to the lines of the Korean National Railroad. 

South Korea has an excellent railroad network. The first rail- 
road, which linked Seoul and Inch 'on, was opened in September 
1899. Other major lines were laid by the Japanese during the coloni- 
al period; these included lines originating in Mokp'o, Masan, and 
Pusan. These lines connected to Seoul and to Sinuiju in North 
Korea, where they were linked with the Trans-Siberian Railway. 
The railroad network was badly damaged during the Korean War, 
but it was later rebuilt and improved. 

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Korean National Railroad, 
a state-run corporation under the Ministry of Transportation, was 
in charge of all rails and continued electrifying heavily used tracks 
and laying additional tracks. As of 1987, the combined length of 
the country's railroad network was approximately 6,340 kilome- 
ters, including approximately 761.8 kilometers of double-track rail- 
roads and 1,023 kilometers of electric railroads. Suburban lines 
were electrified and connected to the Seoul subway system. Roll- 
ing stock included 459 diesel locomotives, 90 electric locomotives, 
133 motor coaches, and 370 electric motor cars. In 1989 Seoul 
announced that it was studying the possibility of constructing high- 
speed railway systems similar to those in Japan and France. 

Railroads in the 1980s were useful primarily in the transporta- 
tion of freight, but they also were important for passenger traffic 



181 



South Korea: A Country Study 

around Seoul and in the heavily-traveled corridor linking the cap- 
ital with the southern port of Pusan. Although the railroad system 
grew little during the 1980s (there were already 5,600 kilometers 
of tracks in 1980), rail improvements — the increased electrifica- 
tion of tracks, replacement of older tracks, and the addition of rolling 
stock — allowed rail traffic to boom. Some of the busiest lines south 
of Seoul linking the capital with Pusan and Mokp'o had three or 
four tracks. The 1980s also saw the introduction of high-speed trains 
connecting Seoul with Pusan, Chonju, Mokp'o, and Kyongju. The 
famous "Blue Train" between Seoul and Pusan (via Taejon and 
Taegu) took only four hours and fifty minutes and offered two class- 
es of service, first class and special. In 1987 approximately 525 mil- 
lion passengers and 59.28 million metric tons were transported by 
the railroad system. 

Civil Aviation 

Although most interurban travel was either by express bus or 
by train, air service between major cities was increasingly availa- 
ble and popular, especially among business travelers. Korean Air, 
founded by the government in 1962 and privately owned since 1969, 
was South Korea's sole airline until 1988. Korean Air served nine 
major domestic routes in 1988 and also offered international ser- 
vice to Japan, the United States, Canada, West Germany, France, 
Hong Kong, Iraq, Libya, Malaysia, the Philippines, Saudi Ara- 
bia, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United 
Arab Emirates. A second carrier, Asiana Airlines, was established 
in 1988 to serve three domestic cities. Seoul's Kimp'o International 
Airport nearly doubled in size by 1989 (largely because of the Seoul 
Olympics) to accommodate the rapidly growing number of air 
travelers. There also were international airports at Pusan and 
Cheju; another was planned for Ch'ongju. 

Telecommunications 

Communications services improved dramatically in the 1980s 
with the assistance of foreign partners and as a result of the de- 
velopment of the electronics industry. The number of telephones 
in use in 1987 reached 9.2 million, a considerable increase from 
1980, when there were 2.8 million subscribers (which, in turn, was 
four times the number of subscribers in 1972). 

Radio, and in more recent years television, reached virtually ev- 
ery resident (see The Media, ch. 4). The Japanese established a 
radio station in Seoul in 1927; by 1945 there were about 60,000 
radio sets in the country. By 1987 there were approximately 42 
million radio receivers in use, and more than 100 radio stations 



182 



The Economy 



were broadcasting. Transistor radios and television sets have made 
their way to the most remote rural areas. Television sets, now mass- 
produced in South Korea, became far less expensive; most city peo- 
ple and a significant number of rural families owned or had access 
to a television. Ownership of television sets grew from 25,000 sets 
when broadcasting was initiated in 1961 to an estimated 8.6 mil- 
lion sets in 1987, and more than 250 television stations were broad- 
casting. 

Foreign Economic Relations 

Exports were the key to South Korea's industrial expansion. Until 
1986 the value of imports was greater than exports. This situation 
was reversed, however, in 1986 when South Korea registered a 
favorable balance of trade of US$4.2 billion. By 1988 the favor- 
able balance had grown to US$1 1 .4 billion. Financing this persis- 
tent, although not unexpected, gap between domestic and imported 
resources was a principal concern for economic planners. In the 
1950s and 1960s, much of the trade deficit was financed by for- 
eign aid funds, but in the last two decades, borrowing from and 
investment in international capital markets have almost completely 
substituted for economic aid. 

Aid, Loans, and Investment 

Foreign economic assistance was essential to the country's recov- 
ery from the Korean War in the 1950s and to economic growth 
in the 1960s because it saved Seoul from having to devote scarce 
foreign exchange to the import of food and other necessary goods, 
such as cement. It also freed South Korea from the burden of heavy 
international debts during the initial phase of growth and enabled 
the government to allocate credit in accordance with planning goals 
(see The Post-War Economy, ch. 1). From 1953 to 1974, when 
grant assistance dwindled to a negligible amount, the nation 
received some US$4 billion of grant aid. About US$3 billion was 
received before 1968, forming an average of 60 percent of all in- 
vestment in South Korea. As Park's policies took effect, however, 
the dependence on foreign grant assistance lessened. During the 
1966-74 period, foreign assistance constituted about 4.5 percent 
of GNP and less than 20 percent of all investment. Before 1965 
the United States was the largest single aid contributor, but there- 
after Japan and other international sponsors played an increasingly 
important role. 

Apart from grant assistance, other forms of aid were offered; 
after 1 963 South Korea received foreign capital mainly in the form 
of loans at concessionary rates of interest. According to government 



183 



South Korea: A Country Study 

sources, between 1964 and 1974 such loans averaged about 6.5 per- 
cent of all foreign borrowing. Other data suggested a much higher 
figure; it seemed that most loans to the government were conces- 
sional, at least through the early 1970s. International Monetary 
Fund (IMF — see Glossary) data showed that imports financed 
through such means as foreign export-import loans with reduced 
rates of interest totaled 11.6 percent of all imports from 1975 to 
1979. The aid component of these loans was only a fraction of their 
total value. 

During the mid-1960s, South Korea's economy grew so rapidly 
that the United States decided to phase out its aid program to Seoul. 
South Korea became increasingly integrated into the international 
capital market; from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s, development 
was financed with a series of foreign loans, two-thirds of which came 
from private banks and suppliers' credits. Total external debt grew 
to a high of US$46.7 billion in 1985. Positive trade balances in 
the late 1980s led to a rapid decline in foreign debt — from US$35.6 
billion in 1987 to an expected US$23 billion by 1991 . Account sur- 
pluses in 1990 were expected to enable Seoul to reduce its foreign 
debt from its 1987 level of about 28 percent of GNP to about 10 
percent by 1991. 

United States assistance ended in the early 1970s, from which 
time South Korea had to meet its need for capital investment on 
the competitive international market and, increasingly, from domes- 
tic accounts. The government and private industry received funds 
through commercial banks, the World Bank (see Glossary), and 
other foreign government agencies. In the mid-1980s, total direct 
foreign equity investment in South Korea was well over US$1 
billion. 

The fact that South Korea was so dependent on foreign trade 
made it very vulnerable to international market fluctuations. The 
rapid growth of South Korea's domestic market in the late 1980s, 
however, began to reduce that dependence. For example, a dra- 
matic rise in domestic demand for automobiles in 1 989 more than 
compensated for a sharp drop in exports. Furthermore, while 
Seoul's huge foreign debt left it vulnerable to changes in the avail- 
ability of foreign funds and in international interest rates, Seoul's 
economic and debt management strategy was very effective. 

South Korea's philosophy concerning direct foreign investment 
had undergone several major changes tied to the changing politi- 
cal environment. Foreign investment was not allowed through the 
1950s. In 1962 the Foreign Capital Inducement Act established 
tax holidays, equal treatment with domestic firms, and guaran- 
tees of profit remittances and withdrawal of principal. Despite the 



184 



The Economy 



provisions of the act, there was little foreign investment activity 
until after the establishment of diplomatic relations between South 
Korea and Japan in 1965. 

Seoul had to mobilize both external and internal sources when 
it launched its First Five- Year Economic Development Plan in 1962. 
The Foreign Capital Inducement Act was amended in 1966 to en- 
courage a greater inflow of foreign capital to make up for insuffi- 
cient domestic savings. A rapid inflow of investment followed until 
1973, when the act was changed to restrict the flow of investments. 
Beginning in the late 1970s, however, the government gradually 
began to remove restrictions as domestic industries began to grow 
and needed to be strengthened to cope with international compe- 
tition. But until the early 1980s, South Korea relied heavily on bor- 
rowing and maintained a somewhat restrictive policy towards 
foreign direct investment. 

Donald S . Macdonald has pointed out that under the liberaliza- 
tion policy, restrictions on foreign direct investment were eased 
in 1984 and 1985. Seoul changed its control policy on foreign invest- 
ment from a * 'positive list" to a "negative list" basis, which meant 
that any activity not specifically restricted or prohibited was open 
to investment. An automatic approval system was introduced un- 
der which all projects meeting certain requirements were to be im- 
mediately and automatically approved by the Ministry of Finance. 

Seoul twice revised the negative list system after its initial 
introduction — first in September 1985 and again in April 1987 — to 
open more industrial sectors to foreign investors. In 1984 there were 
339 items, or 34 percent of the 999 items on the Korean Standard 
Industrial Classification, on the negative list. As of July 1987, there 
were 788 industrial sectors open to foreign investment. In the 
manufacturing sector, 97.5 percent of all industries (509 out of 522) 
were open to foreign investment. 

In December 1987, Seoul announced a policy to liberalize the 
domestic capital market by 1992. The program called for liberalizing 
foreigners' investment funds, offering domestic enterprises rights 
on overseas stock markets, and consolidating fair transaction orders. 
Seoul planned to allow direct foreign investment in its stock mar- 
ket in 1992. 

Of the total direct investment in South Korea from 1962 to 1986, 
which amounted to US$3,631 billion, Japan accounted for 52.2 
percent and the United States for 29.6 percent. In 1987 Japan in- 
vested US$494 million, or 44.9 percent of the total foreign invest- 
ment of US$1.1 billion. Japan invested mainly in hotels and 
tourism, followed by the electric and electronics sector. Direct in- 
vestment from the United States showed a remarkable increase since 



185 



South Korea: A Country Study 



the early 1980s, accounting for 54.4 percent of the 1982-86 total 
investment. The United States invested a total of about US$255 
million, or approximately 24 percent of the 1987 investment. Cumu- 
lative United States investment was about US$1 .4 billion by 1988. 

There was a dramatic rise in foreign investment in the late 1980s. 
Approvals of foreign equity investments reached an all-time high 
of US$1,283 billion in 1988, a 16.6 percent increase over 1987. 
As in previous years, approvals for Japanese investments were the 
dominant factor; they totaled US$696 million (up 41 percent from 
1987), followed by United States investors with US$284 million 
(up 1 1 percent), and West European sources, US$240 million (up 
14 percent). Investment approvals in the service sector doubled in 
1988 to US$561 million, which included two large Japanese hotel 
projects totaling US$344 million. Investment approvals in the 
manufacturing sector, however, declined from US$775 million in 
1987 to US$710 million in 1988. 

South Koreans began investing abroad in the 1980s. Before 1967 
there was virtually no South Korean investment overseas, but there- 
after there was a slow growth because of Seoul's need to develop 
export markets and procure natural resources abroad. In the 1970s, 
South Koreans invested in trading, manufacturing, forestry, and 
construction industries. By the early 1980s, a sharp reduction in 
development projects in the Middle East led to a decline in South 
Korean investment there. Mining and manufacturing investments 
continued to grow throughout the decade. In 1987, out of a total 
South Korean overseas investment of US$1,195 million (745 
projects), US$574 million was invested in developed countries and 
the remaining US$621 million was invested in developing countries. 

One of the most noticeable economic achievements in the 1980s 
was Seoul's reversal of the balance of payments deficit to a sur- 
plus. This improvement was largely attributable to strong over- 
seas demand for South Korean products and to the reduction in 
expenditures for oil imports. In addition, the "invisible" trade ac- 
count (monies from tourism and funds sent home by nationals) 
had improved considerably in the late 1980s because of temporary 
increases in revenue from tourism, receipts from overseas construc- 
tion, and structural decreases in interest payments (see table 5, Ap- 
pendix). 

South Korea's success in achieving a balance of payments sur- 
plus, however, was not without some drawbacks. It led to harsh 
trade disputes with the United States and other developed nations, 
as well as to inflationary pressures. To cope with these problems, 
Seoul had to modify its enthusiastic promotion of exports in favor 
of a policy restraining trade surpluses within reasonable limits. 



186 




Sixty -three-story Daehan Life Insurance Building, a popular 
tourist attraction and one of the tallest buildings in Asia 

Courtesy Oren Hadar 



187 



South Korea: A Country Study 

An important measure restraining the growing foreign trade im- 
balance between South Korea and the United States was Seoul's 
decision to revalue the won against the United States dollar. A 
stronger won made American imports cheaper, increased the cost 
of South Korean exports to the United States, and slowed, but did 
not reverse, the growth in the South Korea-United States trade 
deficit as of 1989. The United States pressed for further apprecia- 
tion of the won in 1989. In April 1989, the United States Depart- 
ment of the Treasury accused South Korea of continued 
' 'manipulation" of the South Korean currency to retain an artifi- 
cial trade advantage. South Korean officials and businesspeople, 
however, complained that the already rapid appreciation of the won 
was slowing economic growth and threatening exports. In May 
1989, South Korea avoided being called an unfair trader by the 
United States and forestalled possible United States trade sanctions, 
but the nation paid a high price by promising to open up its agricul- 
tural market, ease investment by foreigners, and remove many im- 
port restrictions (see table 6, Appendix). 

Foreign Trade Policy 

Seoul stated in 1987 that its foreign trade policy was structured 
for further expansion, liberalization, and diversification. Because 
of the paucity of natural resources and traditionally small domes- 
tic market, South Korea has had to rely heavily on international 
trade as a major source of development. Seoul also sought to diver- 
sify trading partners to ease dependence on a few specific markets 
and to remedy imbalances in the present tendency to bilateral trade. 

Exports and Imports 

The rapid growth of South Korea's economy in the late 1980s 
led to significant increases in exports and imports (see table 7 , Ap- 
pendix). In the wake of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, South Korea's 
trade surplus exceeded US$1 1 billion and foreign exchange revenue 
had increased sharply. Seoul's trade with communist countries 
surged in 1988. Trade with Eastern Europe was US$215 million, 
trade with China almost US$1 .8 billion, and trade with the Soviet 
Union US$204 million. 

In 1989 total exports grew to US$74.29 billion, and imports to- 
taled US$67.21 billion. South Korea's annual trade exceeded 
US$100 billion for the first time in 1988, making it the world's 
tenth largest trading nation. 

During the 1960s and early 1970s, the commodity structure of 
Seoul's principal exports changed from the production of primary 
goods to the production of light industrial goods. After 1974 there 



188 



The Economy 



was a rapid expansion in the production and export of heavy in- 
dustrial and chemical products. By 1986 the share of heavy indus- 
trial and chemical products in total exports had expanded to 55.5 
percent (as compared to 18.9 percent in 1980) whereas the share 
of light industrial products had shrunk to 40.9 percent (as com- 
pared to 71.1 percent in 1980). 

South Korea had depended greatly on the United States and 
Japan as its major trading partners, with 75.6 percent of all ex- 
ports going to these markets in 1970. Success at diversifying ex- 
port markets led to a reduction in the United States-Japan export 
market share to 55.6 percent in 1986. The Middle East accounted 
for 12 percent of South Korea's export trade from 1972 to 1977, 
but its share declined to 5.2 percent in 1986 because of the col- 
lapse of the construction boom in the Middle East and the Iran- 
Iraq war (1980-88). Exports to Western Europe declined from 18.8 
percent in 1979 to 15 percent in 1986. Exports to developing areas, 
such as Latin America (0.8 percent in 1972; 3.6 percent in 1986) 
and Oceania (0.9 percent in 1972; 1.4 percent in 1986), grew. 

Indirect Seoul-Moscow trade was estimated at about US$20 mil- 
lion in 1978, with Moscow importing electronics, textiles, and 
machinery and exporting coal and timber. By the late 1980s, South 
Korea's global fur trader, Jindo, was expected to produce US$20 
million worth of fur garments annually in a joint venture with the 
Soviet Ministry of Light Industry. South Korean businesspeople 
were offered such Soviet products as instruments for nuclear en- 
gineering and technology for processing mineral ores and concen- 
trates. In the first ten months of 1989, bilateral trade between Seoul 
and Moscow reportedly increased 156 percent from 1988 figures 
to US$432 million. 

Since the early 1960s, the structural pattern of imports had shown 
changes, particularly in the relatively decreasing share of import- 
ed consumer goods and the accelerated growth of industrial sup- 
plies and capital equipment imports. The share of consumer goods 
imported in 1962 was 24.1 percent of total imports; this share 
declined to 9.8 percent of total imports in 1986 because of increased 
South Korean production of these goods for the domestic market. 
The declining share of raw materials as a percentage of imports 
during the early 1970s was reversed in 1974 because of the increased 
value of oil imports (caused by the 1973 war in the Middle East). 
By 1979 crude oil was 25 percent of South Korea's total import 
requirements. This figure dropped to 8.4 percent in 1988 because 
of the use of other sources of energy and the decline in the price 
of petroleum in the late 1980s. 



189 



South Korea: A Country Study 

South Korean exports to the United States in 1988 rose to 
US$21.5 billion, a 17-percent increase over 1987; imports rose to 
US$12.8 billion, a 46-percent increase over the 1987 level. The per- 
centage of total South Korean exports destined for the United States 
market decreased to 35.3 percent in 1988 from 38.7 percent in 1987. 
At the same time, the United States' share of total South Korean 
imports rose to 24.6 percent, up from 21.4 percent in 1987. By 1988 
Seoul's favorable balance had grown to more than US$8.7 billion. 

In 1989 imports rose to US$57 billion (up 18 percent from 1988) 
whereas exports reached US$61 billion, a 2-percent increase from 
1988. The trade surplus was reduced from US$11.5 billion to 
US$4.3 billion and was projected to decline even more. Invisible 
receipts rose 10 percent, but payments, mainly reflecting a big in- 
crease in South Korean travel abroad, were up 20 percent. Thus, 
the surplus on invisible trade was reduced from US$1.3 billion to 
US$400 million. 

Korea in the Year 2000 
The Setting 

South Korea's high GNP growth rate during the 1960s and 1970s 
was accompanied by growth in the labor supply and a rising share 
of national product going into capital formation — from 15 percent 
in the early 1960s to more than 30 percent in the late 1970s. In 
1988 South Korean economic planners predicted that in the 1990s 
the share of the GNP devoted to capital formation would not con- 
tinue to rise and, in fact, might fall slightly. Lower birthrates and 
an aging population would result in slow growth of the labor force. 

In the late 1980s, South Korean economic planners expected 
growth to continue at somewhat reduced rates through 2000, a result 
of slower growth in inputs. Large increases in productivity, 
however, could be expected to push GNP growth beyond 1988 lev- 
els. The rapid growth of exports had enabled the country to special- 
ize in the products it made best and to import those it produced 
less efficiendy. No change in this balance was foreseen. However, 
domestic producers would have to rely more on the domestic mar- 
ket for growth than in the past. Protection of domestic producers 
might prompt less productivity; but if competition against foreign 
products were allowed, a favorable impact on productivity might 
be expected. 

The government borrowed heavily in the 1960s and 1970s to 
finance economic development. By the mid-1980s, South Korea 
was one of the world's major debtors. South Korea recorded a 
favorable balance of trade for the first time in 1986; there was an 



190 



The Economy 



even more favorable balance in 1987. Funds generated from this 
trade surplus allowed South Korea to reduce its total foreign debt 
to US$35.6 billion by 1987 and were expected to allow a further 
reduction to US$23 billion by 1991. Since 1986 there had been 
a drastic change in domestic savings, with savings growing to 36 
percent in 1987 as compared to 33 percent in 1986. The twin fac- 
tors of increasing debt and low domestic savings that had threat- 
ened growth in the past had been mitigated to a considerable 
degree. 

The Role of Science and Technology 

The most important sources of productive growth for South 
Korean manufacturers had traditionally been directly or indirect- 
ly related to the ability of South Korean companies to acquire new 
technology from abroad and to adapt it to domestic conditions, 
rather than paying the cost of research and development. However, 
as Seoul's industry and exports continued to evolve toward higher 
levels of technology, domestic research and development efforts 
needed to be increased. Fortunately for South Korea, its high lev- 
el of well-educated workers, who constitute a formidable brain trust 
for future research and development, are its major asset. 

The Seoul government began investing in technology research 
institutes soon after the republic was established. The Korean Atom- 
ic Energy Commission founded in 1959 was responsible for research 
and development, production, dissemination, and management of 
technology for peaceful applications of atomic energy. In the 
mid-1960s, the government established the Ministry of Science and 
Technology to oversee all government research and development 
activities and the Korea Institute of Science and Technology to func- 
tion as an industrial research laboratory. In the 1970s, in order 
to better coordinate research and development, two scientific com- 
munities were established — one in Seoul, the other near Taejon. 
The Seoul complex included the Korea Institute of Science and 
Technology, the Korea Development Institute (affiliated with the 
Economic Planning Board), the Korea Advanced Institute of 
Science, and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute. Plans 
for the Daeduk Science Town near Taejon were far more ambi- 
tious. Modeled after the Tsukuba Science City in Japan, by the 
late 1980s the Daeduk Science Town accommodated laboratories 
specializing in shipbuilding, nuclear fuel processing, metrology, 
chemistry, and energy research. The government founded the 
Korea Advanced Institute of Science to develop and offer gradu- 
ate science programs, and it also encouraged universities to de- 
velop their own undergraduate programs in science. 



191 



South Korea: A Country Study 

The tremendous growth of Samsung since the mid-1980s was 
strong evidence of the high productivity in such modern industries 
as electronics. The group's total sales nearly doubled (8.4 billion 
won to 14.6 billion won) between 1984 and 1986, while the num- 
ber of employees only increased from 122,000 to 147,000. The rea- 
son for this high degree of productivity was South Korea's move 
away from labor-intensive industries to those that were highly au- 
tomated. 

South Korean planners realized that the country needed to ad- 
vance quickly in such areas as high technology if the economy were 
to grow while matching foreign competition. POSCO's decisions 
to build the Pohang Institute of Science and Technology and the 
Research Institute of Industrial Science and Technology were ex- 
amples of this trend. POSCO also used a great deal of money to 
lure back more than 100 top South Korean scientists and researchers 
who had emigrated abroad. 

The Pohang Institute of Science and Technology also maintained 
a major undergraduate and graduate school. By 1988 the institute 
had a faculty of 132 teachers, about 500 undergraduate students, 
and approximately 110 graduate students. Only one of every fifteen 
applicants was accepted and only those students who scored in the 
top 2 percent of the nation's college entrance examinations were 
allowed to apply. 

POSCO's efforts represented a great change from the past. As 
of the late 1980s, many of South Korea's younger scientists, tech- 
nocrats, and economic planners in had received their graduate edu- 
cation in the United States. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the 
government sponsored the scientific and technical education of 
many graduate students at prestigious institutions, such as Har- 
vard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
The success of the Pohang Institute of Science and Technology 
meant that many of South Korea's future scientific and technical 
leaders would be educated at home. 

In 1 990 Seoul announced an ambitious plan to promote science 
and technology so that high-technology activities would dominate 
the economy by the year 2000. The Ministry of Science and Tech- 
nology intended to coordinate technology-related projects between 
government and industry in a variety of fields including semicon- 
ductors, computers, chemistry, and new materials. 

The anticipated slowdown in economic growth could well be 
counteracted by the continued high rate of capital formation, in- 
creased productivity of labor, and expansion of the education sys- 
tem. Until South Korea's per capita income reached that of the most 
advanced industrial nations and as long as South Korea remained 



192 



The Economy 



a 4 'follower" country benefiting from the experiences of others while 
avoiding their mistakes, it was likely that strong growth would 
continue. 

In 1987 the Korea Development Institute issued a report, Korea 
Year 2000, that profiled South Korean economic development in 
2000. The Korea Development Institute noted that the industrial 
structure would be highly developed and would resemble that of 
advanced countries inasmuch as high value-added industries, high- 
technology industries, and soft industries grew relatively rapidly. 
Further, changes in industrial structure were expected rapidly to 
reduce the demand for unskilled workers while simultaneously in- 
creasing the demand for professional and technical manpower, 
resulting in further change of the employment structure. 

The Korea Development Institute also noted that the Ministry 
of Science and Technology had prepared a long-range plan of 
science and technology for the twenty-first century that took into 
account limited available resources. Accordingly, Seoul selected 
its comparative advantage areas, including informatics — 
particularly information storage and retrieval and electronic data 
processing — , fine chemicals, and precision machinery in the short 
term; biotechnology, new materials, and public benefit areas, such 
as the environment, health, and welfare, in the mid- term; and 
oceanography and aeronautics for the mid- and long term. 

The Economic Future 

The Korea Development Institute also forecasted in 1988 that 
South Korea's per capita GNP would exceed US$10,000 early in 
the twenty-first century. The institute predicted that Seoul would 
enjoy a higher sustained growth rate than average through the 
1990s; that the manufacturing industry would play a pivotal role 
in the economy in the twenty-first century; and that the service 
industry would become knowledge-intensive in order to meet the 
needs of a highly diversified industrialized society. The share of 
the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, and fisheries) would sink 
to nearly 5 percent by the turn of the century, whereas the second- 
ary sector (industry) would rise to over 40 percent and the service 
sector would be at about 55 percent. Major areas of industrial 
growth would include automobiles, electronics, and machinery. 

In 1988 Kim Duk-choong of Sogang University listed five main 
points that were expected to make the "Korean economic future 
look bright." He noted that South Korea had drastically reduced 
its foreign debts since 1985, greatiy increased the rate of domestic 
savings, improved on the equitable distribution of income through- 
out the population, increased the role of small and medium- sized 



193 



South Korea: A Country Study 

corporations in the economy, and made the transition from a labor- 
oriented to a technology-oriented economy. He expected that these 
positive economic developments would easily outweigh existing 
problems and lead to real growth in years to come. 

Kim's optimism had merit, but there were other important is- 
sues that could inhibit economic growth, for example, rising pro- 
tectionist sentiments in the United States, Japan, and elsewhere. 
Another problem was the fact that the chaebol tended to restrict sub- 
contracting and to keep as much production as possible inhouse, 
which meant that the smaller industries and businesses, which bore 
the brunt of slowdowns in Japan, would not be able to act as shock 
absorbers. Moreover, as South Korea moved up the technological 
ladder, it would face stiff competition from advanced nations like 
Japan and up-and-coming nations like Thailand. There also was 
the intangible problem of the resolve of South Korea's workers, 
who labored six days a week with little vacation time. What effect 
would a slackening of resolve have on the South Korean worker 
by the 2000? In general, the future of South Korea's economy 
looked very bright, but there were enough intangibles to make ac- 
curate predictions difficult at best. 

* * * 

There are numerous excellent works on the South Korean econ- 
omy that offer a variety of perspectives. Historical studies chart- 
ing the nation's colonial and modernization periods include Andrew 
C. Nahm's Korea under Japanese Colonial Rule and Ramon H. My- 
ers' and Mark R. Peattie's The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945. 
Donald S. Macdonald's The Koreans provides information on the 
Korean economy from colonial times through contemporary soci- 
ety. Among the general works on the postwar economy are David 
I. Steinberg's South Korea's Economy and Chaebol; Han Sung-joo and 
Robert Myers's Korea; Edward S. Mason et al.'s The Economic and 
Social Modernization of Korea; Jene K. Kwon's, Korean Economic De- 
velopment; G. Cameron Hurst Ill's Korea 1988; Alice H. Amsden's 
Asia's Next Giant; David S. Bell, Jr., Bun Woong Kim, and Chong 
Bun Lee' 's Administrative Dynamics and Development; Karl Moskowitz's 
From Patron to Partner; and The Rise of the Korean Economy by Byung- 
Nak Song. 

Opposition groups' views of the South Korean economy are best 
expressed in Minjungsa's Lost Victory. The Far Eastern Economic 
Review publishes frequent articles on the economy, as does Asian 
Survey. For a South Korean perspective on the economy, articles in 



194 



The Economy 

the English-language Korea Newsreview and the various publications 
of the Korean Economic Institute in Washington are valuable. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



195 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 



Hwaso Gate, with parapet, Suwon Castle 



THE CRISIS OF JUNE 1987 brought public dissatisfaction with 
the Chun Doo Hwan government to a head (see The Demise of 
the Chun Regime, ch. 1). The next eight months saw the begin- 
ning of a compromise between the ruling and opposition camps 
that marked a potential watershed in South Korean politics. Poli- 
ticians who had been in exile or under house arrest for many years 
returned to leadership roles. The media, unleashed from both cen- 
sorship and official guidance, began a qualitative and quantitative 
explosion. A newly critical press probed previously hidden aspects 
of the military, the national security agencies, and the government 
more aggressively than ever before. 

For the first time since the fall of the Syngman Rhee regime in 
1960, the Republic of Korea produced a constitution through 
deliberative processes rather than through military intervention or 
emergency measures. Moreover, elections for the presidency in De- 
cember 1987 and for the National Assembly in April 1988 rede- 
fined the political process; a minority president leading a minority 
party began a five-year term with full awareness that, at least in 
the near term, compromise was necessary for political survival. 

The search for the political middle ground was handicapped by 
external pressures upon ruling and opposition parties alike. On 
President Roh Tae Woo's right, conservative bureaucrats, mili- 
tary leaders, and Democratic Justice Party members held over from 
the Chun period watched the president carefully. During the first 
two years of Roh' s rule, the rightists grew increasingly suspicious 
of the process of compromise and upset with the direction taken 
by South Korea's emerging left, both within and outside of the 
political process. The traditional opposition parties — the Reunifi- 
cation Democratic Party and the Party for Peace and Democracy 
led by Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, respectively — felt simi- 
lar pressures from younger and more progressive elements within 
their parties, as well as from the more radical opposition outside 
the political process. By mid- 1989 the Roh government appeared 
to have reached its limit of reform and began to return to earlier 
patterns of political control, including the broad use of the National 
Security Act and national security agencies to limit dissent. 

The National Assembly came into its own in the late 1980s and 
at least temporarily achieved the balance of powers provided for 
in the 1987 Constitution. For the first time in South Korea's his- 
tory, the government party, as a minority in the legislature, was 



199 



South Korea: A Country Study 

forced to seek procedural and substantive compromises with three 
opposition parties. Partisan conflict was temporarily muted for the 
Seoul Olympics in September 1988 but surfaced again at the end 
of the year in a series of legislative committee hearings concerning 
corruption under Chun. Further debate in 1989 led to a political 
compromise late in the year that resolved the question of the "lega- 
cies" of the Fifth Republic (1980-87) that had animated politics 
in the legislature since the beginning of the Roh administration. 

A judicial revolt in mid- 1988 forced the resignation of a chief 
justice appointed by the Chun administration, the subsequent ap- 
pointment of a more politically independent successor, and the 
replacement of several dozen senior judges. An administrative re- 
form commission conducted a surprisingly independent investiga- 
tion of numerous government agencies, including the national 
security bodies that had long interfered in the political process. 

The pattern of politics outside the formal institutions of govern- 
ment continued to change as the 1990s began. New interest groups, 
particularly within the intellectual professions, emerged to challenge 
the government- sponsored professional associations in fields such 
as journalism, teaching, and the arts. These developments in turn 
often provoked heavy-handed responses from the government, long 
accustomed to controlling professional organizations through na- 
tionwide umbrella groups. Cause-oriented groups of various po- 
litical persuasions prepared to launch new parties, stimulated by 
the prospect of local council elections to be held in 1990. 

Many of the political developments of the late 1980s reflected 
important and irreversible social and economic changes that had 
occurred during the previous two decades. As the 1990s began, 
a key question of South Korean politics remained the degree to 
which the development of a better-educated and more affluent 
populace — essential to South Korean modernization, yet corrosive 
of the older style of political leadership — would contribute to greater 
political liberalization. 

The Constitutional Framework 

Despite centuries of authoritarian and autocratic rule, reform 
thinkers in nineteenth-century Korea had debated the subject of 
government and advocated the rule of law and eventual constitu- 
tional government as early as the 1890s. The notion of a govern- 
ment limited by checks and balances under a constitutional order 
was not entirely new to the Korean political setting in 1945. Organi- 
zations such as the Self- Strengthening Society (Chaganghoe) used 
translations to promote the study of numerous European consti- 
tutions and legal codes during the years just before Japan annexed 



200 



Government and Politics 



Korea in 1910. During Japanese rule (1910-45), a self-styled 
Korean government in exile in China drafted several charters and 
constitutions. Within colonial Korea, a small Protestant commu- 
nity conducted self-governing denominational meetings in accor- 
dance with rules of parliamentary procedure. Japanese rule in 
Korea, however, was itself largely exempt even from Japanese con- 
stitutional constraints (see Korea under Japanese Rule, ch. 1). 
Despite Korean interest in the idea of constitutionalism, therefore, 
the colonial experience provided Koreans with little opportunity 
to experience the practice of limited government. 

Since the formation of an independent South Korean republic 
in 1948, the term constitutionalism — as it is popularly understood 
in Western democracies — has become a major focus of political 
strife. Although the concept has been interpreted in various ways, 
there has been at least a nominal consensus that constitutionalism 
would foster, if not guarantee, a general framework for benevo- 
lent and effective government. The constitution would help protect 
certain individual rights and provide safeguards against the con- 
centration of power in the hands of a dictatorial group. 

There have been numerous difficulties in adapting constitution- 
alism to South Korea, not the least of these being the reluctance 
of incumbent leaders to step down peacefully and prepare for a 
transfer of power through the constitutional process. The politics 
of constitutional manipulation has been deadly serious, calculated 
to bolster or prolong the tenure of incumbent presidents or to lend 
an aura of legitimization to a regime brought to power by a coup 
(see table 8, Appendix). South Korea experienced its first peace- 
ful transfer of power since independence only in 1987 (see Politi- 
cal Dynamics, this ch.). In most of the leadership changes prior 
to 1987, the incumbents used forceful tactics — including martial 
law and other surreptitious parliamentary maneuvers — to change 
the constitution. The 1990s began with discussions of possible fur- 
ther changes in the fundamental law. It appeared that South Korea 
had yet to escape a pattern in which both powerholders and their 
political rivals perceived a constitution as a tool for holding power 
rather than as a framework for long-term governance, and in which 
each administration required one or more constitutional revisions. 

The constitutional framework of the Sixth Republic, which started 
in 1987, was based on a constitutional bill that was passed by the 
National Assembly on October 12, 1987, and subsequently approved 
by 93 percent of the voters in a national referendum on October 
28 (see The Legislature, this ch.). The bill was the product of pains- 
taking negotiation and compromise among the major political parties 
in the National Assembly, unlike the preceding two constitutions, 



201 



South Korea: A Country Study 

which were essentially unilaterally drafted by the executive branch 
and then submitted to referendums under emergency measures or 
martial law. The 1987 Constitution became effective on February 
25, 1988, when Roh Tae Woo was inaugurated as president. The 
new Constitution, which consisted of a preamble, 130 articles, and 
supplementary provisions, strengthened the power of the Nation- 
al Assembly and considerably reduced the power of the executive. 
Its adoption marked only the second time that the government and 
opposition parties had produced a constitutional amendment bill 
by consensus in South Korea's modern history and the first time 
that such cooperation had been successful (the first occasion, in 
1980, was cut short by a military coup d'etat). The new fundamental 
law, the first since 1960 not intended to extend the rule of the in- 
cumbent president, provided for direct election of the president, 
an issue the opposition parties had campaigned for since 1985. It 
also eliminated or modified a number of provisions that had come 
under criticism since theyusin (revitalization) constitutional amend- 
ment in 1972. 

The 1987 Constitution declares South Korea a democratic repub- 
lic, its territory consisting of "the Korean Peninsula and its adja- 
cent islands. " Popular sovereignty is the norm of the state; all public 
officials are described as servants of the people; and the tenure and 
political impartiality of these officials are protected by the provi- 
sions of law. In language not found in earlier constitutional amend- 
ments, the Constitution states that the "Republic of Korea shall 
seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peace- 
ful unification based on the principles of freedom and democra- 
cy." In another innovation clearly aimed at the past influence of 
the military on politics and political succession, the Constitution 
stipulates that "political neutrality shall be maintained" by the 
armed forces. 

The section on fundamental rights reflects continued evolution 
toward the affirmation of civil rights and due process of law (see 
Human Rights, this ch.). Individuals may not be punished, placed 
under preventive restrictions, or subjected to involuntary labor "ex- 
cept as provided by law and through lawful procedures. ' ' The pro- 
tection of habeas corpus, restored in the 1980 constitution but rarely 
honored in practice in political cases under the Chun government, 
is further reinforced. People detained or arrested must be informed 
of the reason and of their right to be assisted by counsel. Family 
members of those arrested or detained must be informed of the 
fact "without delay." Prosecutors' failure to indict a criminal sus- 
pect or accused person placed under detention might entitle the 
person to claim compensation for wrongful arrest. Warrants must 



202 



Late nineteenth-century 
and early twentieth- century 
buildings, Seoul 
Courtesy Carpenter Collection, 
Library of Congress 




be issued by a judge "through due procedures" rather than at the 
mere request of prosecutors, as had often occurred, especially in 
political cases, in the past. Other new provisions include the right 
of citizens to receive aid from the state if they suffer injury or death 
because of the criminal acts of others; the autonomy of institutions 
of higher learning; and recognition of extended labor rights. 

The articles on rights, like other portions of the Constitution, 
originated during a process of political compromise that deferred 
a number of complex or controversial issues until a later date. A 
number of new social welfare provisions were left to subsequent 
legislation. These measures included aspirations to protect work- 
ing women from unjust discrimination, state protection for citizens 
incapacitated by disease and old age, environmental protection 
measures, housing development policies, and "protection for 
mothers" (see Public Health and Welfare, ch. 2). 

As in earlier constitutions, the formal provision of a right was 
often qualified by other constitutional provisions or by related laws. 
The most significant of these pre-existing laws was the National 
Security Act, which severely truncated rights of due process speci- 
fied in the Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure (1954) 
for persons accused of a variety of political offenses. 

The Constitution affirms both the right and the duty to work 
and requires legislation for minimum wages and standards of work- 
ing conditions to "guarantee human dignity." Special protection 



203 



South Korea: A Country Study 

is provided to working women and working children. Except for 
workers in important defense industries, workers have the right 
to independent association, collective bargaining, and collective 
action — a marked change from the 1980 constitution, which stat- 
ed that collective action could be regulated by law. By 1990, 
however, not all of the numerous laws that restricted the exercise 
of labor rights had been thoroughly subjected to the scrutiny of 
the Constitution Court (see The Judiciary, this ch.). 

Chapter Nine of the Constitution, which is concerned with the 
economy, continues the theme of the previous constitution in com- 
mitting the state to fostering economic growth and foreign trade. 
As was the case under the 1980 constitution, tenant farming is tech- 
nically prohibited, but leasing or proxy management of farmland 
is recognized in the interest of increasing agricultural productivity 
and rational land utilization. The new Constitution permits regu- 
lations designed to "ensure the proper distribution of income" and 
prevent "abuse of economic power." In an implicit recognition 
of severe disparities in regional development in the past, the state 
is also charged with ensuring balanced development of all regions 
of the country. The government is responsible for establishing na- 
tional standards and for developing technical, scientific, and hu- 
man resources. 

Separation of powers came from the political process as well as 
from the formal structure of government embodied in the Consti- 
tution. The Sixth Republic's Constitution provides greater formal 
balance than earlier constitutions among the three branches of 
government. In important substantive areas, it strengthens the legis- 
lature and the judiciary. In other areas, it sets broad policy guide- 
lines but leaves legislation to the legislators. The resulting formal 
checks and balances were reinforced by the outcome of the April 
1988 general elections, in which the president's party — the Demo- 
cratic Justice Party — lost a working majority in the legislature for 
the first time since the establishment of the Republic of Korea. 

The process for amending the Constitution received public atten- 
tion in early 1990 when the Democratic Justice Party and two of 
the three major opposition parties announced plans to merge and 
to amend the Constitution to provide for a cabinet-responsibility 
system. Proposed amendments to the Constitution could be intro- 
duced by the president or by a simple majority of members of the 
National Assembly. A favorable vote of two- thirds of the National 
Assembly members is required before amendments can be placed 
before a national referendum. To be successful, amendments re- 
quire a majority vote by at least one-half of the electorate eligible 



204 



Government and Politics 



to vote in general elections. An incumbent president may not benefit 
from an amendment extending the term of the presidency. 

The Government 
The Legislature 

The unicameral National Assembly consists, according to the 
Constitution, of at least 200 members. In 1990 the National Assem- 
bly had 299 seats, 224 of which were directly elected from single- 
member districts in the general elections of April 1988. Under 
applicable laws, the remaining seventy-five representatives were 
appointed by the political parties in accordance with a proportional 
formula based on the number of seats won in the election. By law, 
candidates for election to the National Assembly must be at least 
thirty years of age. As part of a political compromise in 1987, an 
earlier requirement that candidates have at least five years' con- 
tinuous residency in the country was dropped to allow Kim Dae 
Jung, who had spent several years in exile in Japan and the Unit- 
ed States during the 1980s, to return to political life. The Nation- 
al Assembly's term is four years. In a change from the more 
authoritarian Fourth Republic and Fifth Republic (1972-80 and 
1980-87, respectively), under the Sixth Republic, the National As- 
sembly cannot be dissolved by the president. 

Legislators are immune from arrest or detention, except in cases 
of flagrante delicto, while the National Assembly is in session. If 
an arrest occurs before the National Assembly session begins, the 
legislator concerned must be released for the duration of the ses- 
sion. National Assembly members also enjoy legal immunity for 
statements made in that forum. Greater freedom of the media and 
independence of the courts, combined with the power of the oppo- 
sition parties in the legislature, gave greater substance to this im- 
munity during the first two years of the Sixth Republic than under 
the preceding government, when prosecutors and the courts did 
not honor such immunity. 

The position of the National Assembly in the Constitution is 
much stronger than it had been under the Fifth Republic (see ta- 
ble 9, Appendix). The annual session of the National Assembly 
was extended to 100 days. Extraordinary sessions of thirty days 
each might be called by as little as one-quarter of the membership 
(versus one-third in the 1980 constitution), and there was no limit 
on the number of such sessions that could be called each year. The 
power to investigate state affairs also was strengthened. The Na- 
tional Assembly now held the power to remove the prime minister 
or a cabinet minister at any time, rather than having to wait a year 



205 



South Korea: A Country Study 



following appointment, as had been the case before. The consent 
of the National Assembly was required for the appointment of all 
Supreme Court justices, not just the chief justice. The National 
Assembly performed a tie-breaking function in presidential elec- 
tions and was required to approve or to disapprove presidential 
emergency measures before they took effect, time permitting. 
Failure to obtain National Assembly approval would void the emer- 
gency measures. 

The Executive 

The president, according to the Constitution, is head of state, 
chief executive of the government, and commander in chief of the 
armed forces. The Constitution and the amended Presidential Elec- 
tion Law of 1987 provide for election of the president by direct, 
secret ballot, ending sixteen years of indirect presidential elections 
under the preceding two governments. Presidential succession is 
for a single five-year term by direct election, which must be held 
at least thirty days before the incumbent president retires. If a pres- 
idential vacancy should occur, a successor must be elected within 
sixty days, during which time presidential duties are to be performed 
by the prime minister or other senior cabinet members in the order 
of priority as determined by law. While in office, the chief execu- 
tive is exempt from criminal liability except for insurrection or 
treason. 

The president may, at his own discretion, refer important poli- 
cy matters to a national referendum, declare war, conclude peace 
and other treaties, appoint senior public officials, and grant am- 
nesty (with the concurrence of the National Assembly). In times 
of serious internal or external turmoil or threat, or economic or 
financial crises, the president may assume emergency powers "for 
the maintenance of national security or public peace and order." 
Emergency measures may be taken only when the National As- 
sembly is not in session and when there is no time for it to con- 
vene. The measures are limited to the "minimum necessary." 

The 1987 Constitution deleted the 1980 constitution's explicit 
powers to temporarily suspend the freedoms and rights of the peo- 
ple. However, the president is permitted to take other measures 
that could amend or abolish existing laws for the duration of a cri- 
sis. It is unclear whether such emergency measures could temporar- 
ily suspend portions of the Constitution itself. Emergency measures 
must be referred to the National Assembly for concurrence. If not 
endorsed by the assembly, the emergency measures can be revoked; 
laws overridden by presidential orders regain their original effect. 
In this respect, the power of the legislature is more vigorously 



206 



Government and Politics 



asserted than in cases of ratification of treaties or declarations of 
war, in which the Constitution simply states that the National Assem- 
bly "has the right to consent" to the president's actions. In a change 
from the 1980 constitution, the 1987 Constitution stated that the 
president is not permitted to dissolve the National Assembly. 

The president works out of an official residence called the Blue 
House, so named because of the building's blue roof tiles. He is 
assisted by the staff of the Presidential Secretariat, headed by a 
cabinet-rank secretary general. Apart from the State Council, or 
cabinet, the chief executive relies on several constitutional organs 
(see fig. 12). 

These constitutional organs include the National Security Coun- 
cil, which provides advice concerning the foreign, military, and 
domestic policies bearing on national security. Chaired by the presi- 
dent, the council in 1990 had as its statutory members the prime 
minister, the deputy prime minister, the ministers for foreign af- 
fairs, home affairs, finance, and national defense, the director of 
the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP, known as the 
Korean Central Intelligence Agency — KCIA — until December 
1980), and others designated by the president. Another body was 
the Advisory Council for Peaceful Unification Policy, inaugurat- 
ed in June 1981 under the chairmanship of the president. From 
its inception, this body had no policy role, but rather appeared to 
serve as a government sounding board and as a means to disburse 
political rewards by providing large numbers of dignitaries and 
others with titles and opportunities to meet periodically with the 
president and other senior officials. 

The president also was assisted in 1990 by the Audit and Inspec- 
tion Board. In addition to auditing the accounts of all public insti- 
tutions, the board scrutinized the administrative performance of 
government agencies and public officials. Its findings were reported 
to the president and the National Assembly, which itself had broad 
powers to inspect the work of the bureaucracy under the provi- 
sions of the Constitution. Board members were appointed by the 
president. 

One controversial constitutional organ was the Advisory Coun- 
cil of Elder Statesmen, which replaced a smaller body in February 
1988, just before Roh Tae Woo was sworn in as president. This 
body was supposed to be chaired by the immediate former presi- 
dent; its expansion to eighty members, broadened functions, and 
elevation to cabinet rank made it appear to have been designed, 
as one Seoul newspaper said, to "preserve the status and position 
of a- certain individual. " The government announced plans to 
reduce the size and functions of this body immediately after Roh's 



207 



South Korea: A Country Study 



PRESIDENT 



PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARIAT 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
AGENCY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 

PLANNING 
AUDIT AND INSPECTION BOARD 
PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY FORCE 



ADVISORY COUNCIL ON STATE 

AFFAIRS 
ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR 

PEACEFUL UNIFICATION POLICY 
CONSTITUTION COMMITTEE 
CENTRAL ELECTION MANAGEMENT 

COMMITTEE 
NATIONAL ECONOMIC ADVISORY 
COUNCIL 




|SUBBLOCKS| 
I TEAMS | 



1SUBBL0CKS| 
I TEAMS 



| TOWNS | 


| TOWNSHIPS | 






j BLOCKS | 


j VILLAGES | 



[sUBBLOCKsj 



TEAMS 



Figure 12. Structure of the Government, 1989 



inauguration. Public suspicions that the council might provide for- 
mer President Chun with a power base within the Sixth Republic 
were rendered moot when Chun withdrew to an isolated Buddhist 
temple in self-imposed exile in November 1988. 

The State Council 

The top executive body assisting the president in 1990 was the 



208 



Government and Politics 



State Council, or cabinet, the members of which in 1990 included 
the president, the prime minister, and from fifteen to thirty heads 
of various ministries and their equivalents. More often a technocrat 
than a politician, the prime minister is appointed by the president 
with the consent of the National Assembly. Other cabinet mem- 
bers, also presidential appointees, are supposed to be recommended 
by the prime minister but actually are chosen by the president. 
As was also true under the 1980 constitution, no member of the 
military may hold a cabinet post unless he is retired from active 
service. 

The State Council is responsible for the formulation and im- 
plementation of basic plans and policies concerning a wide range 
of government functions. The results of deliberation by the coun- 
cil are conveyed to the Presidential Secretariat and the Office of 
the Prime Minister, the two principal units responsible for coordi- 
nation and supervision relating to various government agencies. 
Given the importance of economic performance to the stability and 
security of the nation, the Economic Planning Board plays a sig- 
nificant role in the administrative and economic process. The 
minister of the board by law doubles as deputy prime minister; 
his senior assistants, many of them holding advanced degrees from 
foreign universities, have been among the ablest public servants 
in the country. 

As South Korean observers have noted, the president's power 
to appoint persons to senior and deputy ministerial positions not 
only has administrative significance but also is an important polit- 
ical tool for balancing factional interests within the president's party 
and for rewarding loyalty. The South Korean media closely scruti- 
nize high-level appointments for clues to politics within the ruling 
party. The announcement in early 1990 of plans to merge the rul- 
ing party and two of the three major opposition parties and to insti- 
tute a cabinet-responsibility form of government produced even 
more intensive interest in cabinet appointments. 

In 1989 a presidentially appointed Administration Reform Com- 
mission concluded a fourteen-month study concerning the struc- 
ture of the government. In reporting its findings to the president, 
the panel proposed a number of changes, including the merger or 
abolition of several State Council ministries and other government 
agencies. Faced with strenuous lobbying by officials of the agen- 
cies concerned, the ruling party and government administration 
tabled most of the recommendations. Several proposals were im- 
plemented. The new Ministry of Culture, established in late 1989 
from the former Ministry of Culture and Information, was placed 



209 



South Korea: A Country Study 



under the initial direction of Yi O-yong, a prominent essayist and 
literary critic. The new ministry continued the cultural and artis- 
tic functions of its predecessor and also took over responsibilities 
concerning national and public libraries and national language policy 
from the Ministry of Education. The establishment of the Minis- 
try of Environment, upgraded from the former Office of Environ- 
ment within the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, acknowledged 
that national development over the preceding three decades had 
often neglected environmental concerns. Its establishment redeemed 
a pledge made in both the 1980 and 1987 constitutions that the 
people of South Korea ''shall have the right to a healthy and 
pleasant environment," and that the government would take mea- 
sures for environmental protection. 

The Presidential Secretariat 

The Presidential Secretariat, often referred to in the Western 
media as the Blue House staff, in 1 990 included a secretary general 
of cabinet rank and six or seven senior secretaries with responsi- 
bility for political, economic, and other specialized areas. As in 
other political systems, these top aides enjoyed special presiden- 
tial confidence. They were widely believed to control access to the 
chief executive and to influence personnel appointments and policy 
decisions. 

The Judiciary 

The administration of justice was the function of the courts as 
established under the Constitution and the much-amended Court 
Organization Law of 1949. A number of provisions of the 1987 
Constitution were intended to improve judicial independence, which 
was long held, even within the judiciary itself, to be inadequate 
(see Events in 1988, this ch.; table 10, Appendix). 

At the top of the court system in 1990 was the Supreme Court, 
whose justices served six-year terms, giving them a measure of inde- 
pendence from the president, whose single term was only five years 
(lower-level judges served ten-year terms.) All other judges were 
appointed by the Conference of Supreme Court Justices and the 
chief justice. This process reverses the more centralized appoint- 
ment process that had been in place since theyustn system of 1972, 
in which the chief justice (under the direction of the president, in 
practice) appointed lower court judges. All but the chief justice may 
be reappointed. The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal 
in all cases, including courts-martial; except for death sentences, 
however, military trials under extraordinary martial law may not 
be appealed. 



210 



Government and Politics 



High Courts in Seoul, Kwangju, and Taegu hear appeals against 
decisions of lower courts in civil and criminal cases. They also may 
assume jurisdiction over litigation brought against government 
agencies or civil officials. Courts of first instance for most civil and 
criminal matters are the district courts in Seoul and major provincial 
cities. The Family Court in Seoul handles matrimonial, juvenile, 
and other family law matters; in other cities such issues are adju- 
dicated in the district courts. 

The Constitution divides responsibility for constitutional review 
of laws and administrative regulations between the Supreme Court 
and the Constitution Court. The Supreme Court reviews only regu- 
lations, decrees, and other enactments issued by the various minis- 
tries of other government agencies. The constitutionality or legality 
of the regulation to be reviewed must be at issue in an ongoing 
trial. The Constitution Court has much broader powers. It decides 
on the constitutionality of laws enacted by the National Assembly 
when requested by a court to aid in the resolution of a trial, or 
in response to a constitutional petition, which may be brought by 
any person who has exhausted available legal remedies. The Con- 
stitution Court also has exclusive power to rule on the dissolution 
of political parties and impeachment of the president, cabinet mem- 
bers, and other high officials. All nine members of the Constitu- 
tion Court must be qualified to be judges. The president, National 
Assembly, and chief justice each select three members of the court's 
nine-member panel. 

The Constitution Court began operation in late 1988. Unlike 
its predecessors, which since the early 1960s had made only three 
rulings, the new body gave rulings in 400 of the more than 500 
cases considered during its first year. Most of the cases heard were 
constitutional petitions. In a series of major decisions, the court 
declared unconstitutional a law prohibiting creditors from suing 
the government, directed the National Assembly to revise a por- 
tion of the National Assembly Law requiring independent candi- 
dates to pay twice the deposit of party- affiliated candidates, declared 
the Act Concerning Protection of Society unconstitutional, and up- 
held the constitutionality of a law prohibiting third-party involve- 
ment in labor disputes. 

The Civil Service 

For centuries the most honored profession in Korea was govern- 
ment service, which had been more or less preempted by the scholar- 
official class (see Traditional Social Structure, ch. 2). In modern 
South Korea, however, the civil service has lost some of its earlier 
prestige, partly because financially rewarding jobs have been more 



211 



South Korea: A Country Study 

plentiful in private industry and commerce. Nonetheless, the up- 
per levels of the civil service, particularly in the economic minis- 
tries, generally draw upon some of the best-trained and most 
technically competent members of the population. 

Civil servants have generally enjoyed reputations as competent 
and dedicated, but the proverbial corruption in the bureaucracy 
has also unfairly brought disrepute to the profession as a whole. 
Efforts to eliminate malfeasance have been continuous, although 
they have been perhaps most pronounced (in the fashion of tradi- 
tional Chinese and Korean dynastic succession) after the assump- 
tion of power by a new regime. The record of reform often has 
been mixed. In 1980 Chun Doo Hwan announced a far-reaching 
program intended to "purify" the bureaucracy. Many South 
Koreans welcomed investigations of former cabinet ministers and 
the confiscation of large, unexplained fortunes from other leaders, 
such as Kim Chong-p'il, accused of enriching themselves under 
the preceding Park Chung Hee regime. Chun also dismissed more 
than 200 high officials and 1,000 lower-level functionaries. Politi- 
cal motives were clearly evident in the ouster on vague charges of 
all opposition politicians of any prominence and in the removal 
of public officials and staff members of state-run corporations likely 
to remain overly loyal to the late president's political machine. 

The anticorruption reforms of Roh Tae Woo, marked by great- 
er attention to due process and broad political participation than 
those of his predecessor, won considerable public support. In his 
presidential campaign, Roh had joined other presidential candi- 
dates in promising exposure of financial irregularities under the 
Fifth Republic and had pledged broader disclosure of public offi- 
cials' assets through the amendment of existing laws. The first 
promise was largely honored. The question of Fifth Republic cor- 
ruption was dealt with through vigorous prosecution of former high- 
level officials and relatives of former President Chun Doo Hwan 
charged with abuse of power or other irregularities. The opposi- 
tion parties played a major role in the process by participating in 
an unprecedented series of National Assembly hearings conduct- 
ed in late 1988. These riveting sessions, often televised, attracted 
millions of viewers, emptying the streets of Seoul while the hear- 
ings were taking place and drawing greater members even than 
the broadcast earlier in the year of the Seoul Olympics. By late 
1989, the courts had tried and sentenced numerous Chun relatives 
and former high officials, including a former ANSP chief, on var- 
ious corruption or influence-peddling charges. 

Despite these successes, the disclosure of senior officials' assets 
remained an elusive goal as the 1980s came to a close, hampered 



212 



Government and Politics 



by the lack of legal measures to penalize nondisclosure. The Na- 
tional Assembly had finally passed a law concerning public owner- 
ship of property that would require land owners to register property 
in their true names, but still had not ratified a more controversial 
bill that would impose stiff penalties for the failure of assembly- 
men, ministers, and vice-ministerial level officials to report their 
financial dealings. 

The civil service is managed by the Ministry of Government Ad- 
ministration. Recruitment for the most part occurs through com- 
petitive examinations held annually in two categories, "ordinary" 
and "higher" examinations. Those passing the higher tests gener- 
ally are recognized as bright and able and are loosely known as 
members of the so-called higher civil service examinations clique. 
They are given preference in appointment and over the years have 
become the nucleus of bureaucratic elites scattered in three major 
government functions — general administration, foreign affairs, and 
the administration of justice. The foreign service and judiciary are 
recruited through separate examination systems that are extremely 
selective. Faculty members at state universities, although selected 
according to traditional academic criteria rather than solely by ex- 
amination, also are part of the civil service system, as are those 
who have passed examinations to become public school teachers. 

The Constitution provides that "all public officials shall be ser- 
vants of the entire people and shall be responsible to the people" 
and guarantees the political impartiality of public officials. From 
the perspective of the citizen needing to do some business in a street- 
level government office, however, the ethos of service sometimes 
gives way to the traditional self-regard of the official, a situation 
encapsulated in the traditional phrase kwanjon minbi (respect for 
the official, contempt for the people). Political neutrality also has 
been undercut by the persistence of political and bureaucratic pres- 
sures on civil servants, especially during national elections. These 
pressures can be especially intense upon low-ranking officials at 
the bottom of the bureaucratic chain of command and on those 
officials in the upper five of the nine civil service grades who serve 
as presidential appointees. 

In early 1989, the number of government officials totaled 
700,026, most of whom worked for the executive branch of govern- 
ment. About 7,200 civil servants worked for the judiciary. The new 
importance of the National Assembly under the Sixth Republic was 
reflected in an increase in staff hired by the legislative branch to 
some 2,700 employees — 500 more than during the final year of the 
preceding administration. In the 1980s, about one-third of civil 
service employees worked in local government. The civil service 



213 



South Korea: A Country Study 

still represents a cross section of society. However, graduates of 
the so-called big three universities — Seoul National University, 
Yonse University, and Koryo University (more commonly called 
Korea University in English) — continue to enjoy an advantage. 
Graduates of these schools, all of which are located in Seoul, con- 
tinue to have an edge in gaining employment in the government 
as well as in the private sector and are disproportionately represented 
in the higher civil service grades. 

Local Administration 

South Korea in 1990 was divided into six provincial-level cities — 
the special city (t'ukpyolsi) of Seoul (Soul-t'ukpyolsi to Koreans) 
and the five cities directly governed (chikhalsi) by the central 
government — Pusan, Taegu, Inch'on, Taejon, and Kwangju — 
and nine provinces, or to (see Glossary), including Cheju Island 
(see fig. 1). Major cities were divided into wards (ku) and precincts 
(tong). A province was composed of counties (gun) and cities (si) 
with a population of more than 50,000. A county consisted of towns 
(up) with a population of 20,000 and more each, townships (myon), 
and villages (rc). Both cities and towns had further subdivisions 
designed to facilitate communication between government and peo- 
ple on local community matters. 

The need for local self-government was first recognized in 1948; 
a local autonomy law was enacted in 1949. It was not until De- 
cember 1960, however, that local elections for the mayors of Seoul 
and Pusan, provincial governors, and local councils — the first in 
Korean history — were held. Under the system in operation from 
the military coup d'etat of May 1961 until late 1969, Seoul, Pusan, 
and the provincial governments were under the direct control of 
the central government. In view of its special importance, Seoul 
was controlled by the central government and made subordinate 
to the Office of the Prime Minister. Provincial administrations and 
the special cities reported to the Department of Local Affairs of 
the Ministry of Home Affairs. Likewise, administrative departments 
of provincial and city governments maintained close contacts with 
the regional and central offices of the respective cabinet ministries. 
The police apparatus in each locale also was administratively respon- 
sible to the National Police Headquarters in Seoul. The mayor of 
Seoul was appointed by the president and usually was regarded 
as his close confidant. Heads of other administrative divisions were 
recommended by the minister of home affairs for presidential approv- 
al. Mayors of ordinary cities and county chiefs — members of the 
civil service — were recommended by the provincial governor for 
appointment by the president. Heads of towns and townships were 



214 



Government and Politics 



named by county chiefs, heads of wards and precincts by mayors, 
and village chiefs by heads of townships. 

Under the system of proportionality in use in the National As- 
sembly in 1985, the majority of the at-large seats — two-thirds — 
was given to the party that came in first. This arrangement dis- 
proportionately favored the government party, with its traditional 
advantages of incumbency. Thus, in the 1985 general elections, 
the government party ended up with a little over 35 percent of the 
popular vote — the largest share — but held more than 53 percent 
of the seats in the legislature. Conversely, the second-placed party, 
with roughly 29 percent of the votes, occupied just over 24 per- 
cent of the seats after the at-large seats were distributed. The two- 
member district system used in 1985 also helped the government 
party, which had litde chance of finishing first in many pro- 
opposition urban districts, but could hope to win a second-place 
seat (see table 11, Appendix). 

In late 1989, the National Assembly passed legislation designed 
to increase local autonomy over the following two years. Under 
the newly amended Act Concerning Local Autonomy, local auto- 
nomy was to be introduced in several phases. Local councils would 
be elected by June 1990. The central government was to continue 
appointing local administrative heads — including mayors of the six 
special cities and nine provinces — until elections for those posts, 
scheduled for 1991, could be held. The government would retain 
full control over deputy heads of special cities and provinces for 
the first four years, after which the central government would merely 
ratify the choices of the mayors and provincial governors. In a last- 
minute compromise, the National Assembly acceded to the oppo- 
sition parties' position, permitting political parties to nominate can- 
didates for local elections either individually or in coalition with 
other parties. Related laws scheduled for National Assembly consid- 
eration in 1990 were expected to address other details of local 
government, including the question of financial autonomy. 

Political Dynamics 

Compromise and Reform: July-December 1987 

The period from late June through December 1987 saw rapid 
implementation of political reforms in an unusual mood of com- 
promise between the ruling and opposition parties. In July the 
government paroled 357 political offenders, amnestied more than 
2,000 other prisoners, and restored full political rights to promi- 
nent opposition figure Kim Dae Jung. In August the National 



215 



South Korea: A Country Study 

Assembly established a committee to study constitutional revision. 
Representatives of four parties took one month to negotiate and 
propose a draft constitution that incorporated most of the provi- 
sions long sought by the opposition parties: greater press freedom 
and protection for civil rights, a stronger National Assembly, and 
direct presidential elections. After the bill passed the National As- 
sembly, more than 93 percent of the voters approved the new draft 
in a plebiscite on October 28, 1987. 

Anticipating the presidential election of December 1987, the four 
major presidential candidates (Roh Tae Woo, Kim Dae Jung, Kim 
Young Sam, and Kim Chong-p'il, collectively referred to in the me- 
dia as "one Roh and three Kims") began their informal campaign- 
ing with a series of public appearances and speeches in October. 

In April 1987, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung had led their 
respective factions, who together included seventy-two National 
Assembly members, out of the New Korea Democratic Party 
(NKDP) to form the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP). 
Summer-long efforts to produce a single RDP presidential candi- 
date failed. By late September, Kim Young Sam was finally left 
in control of the party when Kim Dae Jung and his followers depart- 
ed to form a new party of their own — the Party for Peace and 
Democracy (PPD). Kim Young Sam announced his candidacy on 
October 10, and the RDP convention proclaimed Kim the party's 
candidate on November 9. Kim Chong-p'il was affiliated with the 
New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP). 

Hoping to benefit from the inability of Kim Dae Jung and Kim 
Young Sam to agree on a unified candidacy, Roh Tae Woo's 
Democratic Justice Party (DJP) expected to win the election with 
a plurality of 1 million votes and sweep about 45 percent of the 
total vote. The party's strategy was based on the substantive ap- 
peal of Roh Tae Woo's June 29 declaration in favor of a new 
democratic constitution and other reforms, along with a massive 
public relations campaign. The public relations campaign — roundly 
scored by Roh's political rivals — portrayed the former four-star 
general and division commander (he had helped Chun depose the 
army chief of staff in December 1979) as a simple, "ordinary man" 
who would bring about a society in which other ordinary people 
could live comfortably and more affluently. The Roh campaign 
also avoided the traditionally strident slogans of South Korean 
politics, preferring promising phrases such as "Commitment to 
a Bright Future." 

DJP strategists seeking the youth vote, which accounted for nearly 
60 percent of the electorate, acknowledged the party's likely problem 



216 



Government and Politics 



with the more opposition-minded liberal arts college graduates; 
instead, they focused on segments of the young population believed 
to be more easily won, such as high- school graduates and techni- 
cal college graduates. As the campaign continued, Roh increas- 
ingly attempted to distance himself from his patron, Chun Doo 
Hwan, admitting that the government had committed torture and 
"other mistakes' ' and affirming that not even the head of state could 
be exempted in eradicating corruption. 

The other conservative candidate, viewed by some of the press 
as a "spoiler' ' who would take votes from Roh Tae Woo, was Kim 
Chong-p'il. Kim's campaign used the "man of experience" theme 
and was structured around small meetings (especially outside his 
native South Ch'ungch'ong Province), some larger rallies, and care- 
fully chosen television spots financed from the coffers of the Frater- 
nal Association of National Revitalization and by other affluent 
and conservative South Koreans. In his speeches, Kim criticized 
Roh's long association with the evils of the Fifth Republic and out- 
lined a tentative program of financial relief for farmers, coal miners, 
and others. 

Like the other major candidates, Kim Young Sam took advan- 
tage of the liberalized political climate to begin his presidential cam- 
paign with a series of public rallies even before the October 28 
national referendum on the new constitution. The failure to agree 
with Kim Dae Jung on a unified opposition candidacy required 
a two-pronged offensive, designed both to divert blame for poten- 
tially splitting the opposition vote in the election and to attack Roh 
Tae Woo. The RDP's slogans, "End Military Government with 
Kim Young Sam" and "A Man for Peace, Harmony, and 
Honesty," reflected the dual objectives of the campaign. On Octo- 
ber 17, 1987, Kim told a home- town audience of 1 million in Pu- 
san that, unlike Roh, he would lead a corruption-free government 
that would end a "long tradition of military-backed governments" 
and would make appropriate monetary and symbolic compensa- 
tion to those killed and wounded in the 1980 "civilian uprising" 
in Kwangju. In a large rally in Taejon on October 24, Kim sug- 
gested that a Kim Dae Jung candidacy would "bring about sharp 
confrontation among Cholla and Kyongsang people. " In keeping 
with the name of his party, Kim also publicized his plan for "Five 
Steps to Peaceful Unification" on October 12. 

Kim Dae Jung's populist campaign themes were national recon- 
ciliation, a just economy, political neutrality of the military, and 
pursuit of reunification. The platform struck a balance between 
appeals to Kim Dae Jung's hoped-for constituency among work- 
ers, farmers, and lower middle-class voters and reassurances to 



217 



South Korea: A Country Study 

voters who feared that a Kim Dae Jung candidacy could inflame 
regional loyalties or result in vindictive purges against those who 
held power during the Fifth Republic. One of Kim's sons directed 
specialized party organs such as the United Democratic Youth As- 
sociation to attract younger voters. Like Roh and Kim Young Sam, 
Kim Dae Jung was able to assemble 1 million participants in ral- 
lies in Seoul and in home-province appearances, while drawing 
somewhat smaller crowds in other provinces. 

In addition to the four principal candidates, several minor par- 
ties also offered candidates. These included relative unknowns, such 
as Kim Son-jok of the Ilche Party (Unified Party), Sin Chong-il 
of the Hanism Unification Party, and Hong Suk-cha of the Social 
Democratic Party. Another candidate, Paek Ki-wan, was promi- 
nent in dissident circles. Most of these candidates faded as the cam- 
paign progressed, eventually withdrawing their candidacy in 
support of one or another major candidate. 

The election results closely followed projections based on the 
regional origins of the four major candidates, despite protestations 
by all that regionalism should not divide the country. Of the major 
candidates, Roh took 36.9 percent of the votes, Kim Young Sam 
28 percent, Kim Dae Jung 26.9 percent, and Kim Chong-p'il only 
8 percent. 

Losers in the election had been charging the government party 
with illegal electioneering activities ever since it became clear in 
late September that Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam would 
not be able to agree on a unified candidacy. The traditional ad- 
vantages of incumbency were evident early; by October the busi- 
ness pages of Seoul's daily press were already discussing the 
"election inflation" caused by election-related spending, which in- 
cluded government disbursements for development projects. Such 
spending, common in many countries prior to elections, included 
a substantial decrease in the price of heating oil, an increase in 
the official purchase price of rice, and a salary increase for civil 
servants. Also common, although by no means limited to the rul- 
ing party, were customary "transportation costs" given to people 
to attend rallies and the wide distribution of small gifts, such as 
the cigarette lighters bearing Roh Tae Woo's name, dispensed by 
the ruling party. Political cartoonists could easily make light of the 
latter practice, probably because it had been many years since the 
votes of South Koreans, even in rural areas, had been swayed by 
simple gifts such as a bowl of rice wine or a pair of rubber shoes. 
One candidate seemed to sum up the prevailing attitude in remarks 
at a mid-November rally: "If they give you money, take it. If they 



218 



Government and Politics 



take you to Mount Sorak for sightseeing, then have a nice jour- 
ney. But on 16 December, be sure to give your vote to me." 

More serious irregularities reported prior to and during the elec- 
tions included acts of violence or intimidation against election ob- 
servers, biased television coverage, mobilization of local officials 
and neighborhood organization officers to encourage people to vote 
for Roh, and fraudulent handling of ballot boxes. In one working 
class district in Seoul, for example, election observers seized two 
ballot boxes being surreptitiously brought in to a polling station 
on the morning of the election. The government, which removed 
the observers by force two days later, claimed that the boxes con- 
tained absentee ballots, but had no explanation for why they were 
delivered in commercial trucks carrying fruit, bread, and other con- 
sumer goods. 

Conversely, few election observers commented on the intimidat- 
ing effect — no less on potential voters than on candidates — of acts 
of violence that repeatedly occurred against all major candidates. 
Candidates were forced to hire phalanxes of bodyguards with plastic 
shields for protection against flying objects and often were made 
to cut short public speeches during appearances in regional strong- 
holds of other candidates. In spite of local abuses, it was difficult 
to estimate what fraction of Roh Tae Woo's plurality of almost 
2 million votes, out of 23 million cast, may have been improperly 
influenced. Extravagant claims of wholesale manipulation in the 
computerized vote tabulation were made difficult to assess by the 
failure of those who had made such charges to present convincing 
evidence. Claims of election rigging also were undercut at the time 
by the continued insistence of both the Kim Dae Jung and Kim 
Young Sam camps that their candidate was the one to whom the 
election rightfully should have gone. 

Within a week after the election, public anger at the outcome 
was divided. Protests continued against election irregularities but 
were accompanied by increasing criticism of the two major oppo- 
sition leaders for their failure to produce a unified candidacy that 
could have defeated the government party candidate. The RDP 
and PPD, embarrassed by the fact that Kim Dae Jung and Kim 
Young Sam together received 54 percent of the vote to Roh's 36 
percent, both apologized to the public, while vowing to continue 
disputing the results of the election. Both major opposition par- 
ties, together with Kim Chong-p'il's party, gradually turned their 
attention to the question of upcoming National Assembly elections. 

Events in 1988 

President-elect Roh Tae Woo outlined his 1988 political goals — both 



219 



South Korea: A Country Study 



old and new — in a New Year's interview. Some of Ron's comments 
echoed the authoritarian language of President Chun's 1987 New 
Year's speech, which had typically called for ' 'grand national har- 
mony" in which transcendent political leadership would see the 
country through, if only the people would "rid themselves of all 
vestiges of the old habit of confrontation and strife." Roh made 
ample reference to traditional themes, speaking of * ' suprapartisan 
operation of national affairs," "rooting out corruption," and a 
mixture of persuasion and "stern measures," if necessary, to bring 
leftist elements back into the fold. Roh also seemed to promise 
genuine innovations: to eliminate authoritarian practices, to in- 
vestigate and punish people guilty of past financial scandals, to pro- 
tect the press from harassment by law enforcement authorities, to 
reorganize intelligence agencies, to demilitarize politics, and to 
resolve the 1980 Kwangju incident by restoring honor to the vic- 
tims and providing remuneration to the bereaved. 

Other leaders and other political forces also had their own agendas 
for the new year. Under the heading of "Liquidating the Legacy of 
the Fifth Republic," the opposition parties of Kim Dae Jung and 
Kim Young Sam sought to investigate corruption in the Fifth Repub- 
lic, to reexamine the Kwangju incident, and, as well, demanded 
the release of all political detainees and the reform of numerous 
laws that had been used to control nonviolent political activity and 
free expression. Like Roh, Kim Dae Jung's ability to compromise 
was limited to a degree by his own desire not to lose influence with 
an offstage constituency, in this case the dissident community and 
other elements to his left. Kim Chong-p'il's presidential campaign 
had also made use of these themes in its attacks on the govern- 
ment party's candidate, Roh Tae Woo. Of even greater importance, 
however, was restoration of the reputations and professional careers 
of numerous individuals from the Park Chung Hee era who, like 
Kim himself, had been purged in 1980 during Chun Doo Hwan's 
takeover. These individuals included more than 8,800 civil servants 
and officers of state corporations as well as several dozen senior 
military officers (from the army chief of staff down), who had lost 
both ranks and pensions. Successful resolution of these issues greatiy 
increased Kim's ability to work with the government party. 

Other groups in society had their own expectations. Members 
of labor unions at many of South Korea's large corporations, fresh 
from a major campaign of strikes in late 1987, hoped for the right 
to elect their own leaders and organize outside the framework of 
the government- sponsored Federation of Korean Trade Unions 
(see Interest Groups, this ch.). Some dissident organizations hoped 
that the forthcoming 1988 Seoul Olympics could be held jointly 



220 



National Assembly in plenary session, Seoul 
Courtesy Korean Overseas Information Service 

in P'yongyang and Seoul (see Foreign Policy, this ch.). Leftist stu- 
dents also sought opportunities to meet with North Korean stu- 
dents. Some activist students hoped to establish firmer contacts with 
farmers and the growing labor movement, while at the violence- 
prone fringe of the radical student movement others planned to 
continue to dramatize their grievances through arson attacks against 
United States and South Korean government facilities (see Politi- 
cal Extremism and Political Violence, this ch.). Still other dissidents 
planned to continue demonstrating against the Roh government out 
of conviction that it was a simple continuation of the previous mili- 
tarized regimes. 

After his inauguration in February 1988, Roh took steps to honor 
some of his campaign promises, appointing a woman to his cabi- 
net and approving the rehabilitation of thirty-one generals dismissed 
in Chun's coups of 1979 and 1980. Another commitment, to ap- 
point members of the opposition parties to cabinet posts, was not 
met when the two major parties failed to propose names for con- 
sideration. Four of the new cabinet appointees, however, were from 
the C holla provinces. 

Negotiations among the major political parties promptly began 
over amending the National Assembly Election Law, one of the 
major political issues left unresolved in the 1987 Constitution. At 



221 



South Korea: A Country Study 



stake were two variables: the size of the electoral districts and the 
degree of proportionality. Each party took a position that it be- 
lieved would be to its advantage. Initially, the government party 
and Kim Chong-p'il's NDRP favored different mixtures of large 
and small districts. Kim Young Sam's party was divided between 
its rural members, who also favored multiple-member districts, and 
the leadership, which argued for single-member districts. Kim Dae 
Jung's party, which in the presidential election had swept all but 
two districts in Seoul, hoped to use its heavily concentrated con- 
stituency in the Cholla provinces to become the largest opposition 
party with a single-member district system. 

The ruling party eventually shifted to a single-member district 
formula close to that proposed by the PPD, but finally withdrew 
from the negotiations, claiming that the other parties could not come 
to agreement in time. In a manner reminiscent of the tactics of 
the Park Chung Hee era, the ruling party took advantage of its 
legislative majority to pass unilaterally its own draft amendment 
in a one-minute session held at 2:00 A.M. on March 8, 1988. The 
newly amended law reinstated single-member electoral districts, 
last used in the general election of 1970. It also diluted the ele- 
ment of proportionality somewhat by reducing the number of at- 
large seats to 75, or about one-fourth of the total of 299, and by 
more evenly distributing them among the participating parties. The 
opposition parties strongly protested (Kim Dae Jung's party less 
vigorously than the others) and then started to prepare their cam- 
paigns. 

According to most observers, the results of the general election 
of April 26, 1988, set the stage for a new political drama. For the 
first time in South Korean history, the government party lost its 
working majority in the legislature. The government party had 
hoped to emerge victorious, as the two largest opposition parties 
again split the antigovernment vote. With 34 percent of the popu- 
lar vote, however, the DJP held only 125 seats (87 district seats 
and the remainder at-large), well under the 150 needed for a majori- 
ty. Kim Chong-p'il's party, the NDRP, ended up with a total of 
thirty-five seats, enabling it to form its own bargaining group in 
the National Assembly. Kim Young Sam's RDP gained a small 
number of seats, but lost in overall ranking in the larger body. Kim 
Dae Jung's PPD took the senior opposition party position with more 
than 19 percent of the vote and 23 percent of the total number of 
seats (see table 12, Appendix). 

There were several reasons for the upset. The government party 
might have made a stronger showing had not Roh, intent upon con- 
solidating his control of a party that still contained many holdovers 



222 



Government and Politics 



from the Chun period, replaced one-third of incumbent legisla- 
tors with political newcomers. Because the new candidates were 
not able to build up quickly the personal networks necessary for 
success at the district level, the ruling party in effect gave up one 
of its strongest campaign assets on the eve of the election. Other 
factors included the ruling party's lack of a following among younger 
and better-educated voters and its failure to distance itself suffi- 
ciently from the Chun government (the former president's brother 
was arrested on corruption charges one month before the election). 
Increasing regionalism also played a role, especially in the Cholla 
provinces, where the government party candidates failed to win 
a single district seat. 

The impact of the new balance of political forces in the National 
Assembly, characterized by the press asydsoyadae (small ruling pow- 
er, large opposition power), quickly became evident. Even before 
the thirteenth National Assembly convened in late May 1988, the 
floor leaders of the government and opposition parties met to agree 
upon procedures and to discuss the release of political prisoners. 
These four- way talks became common during the next two years, 
especially for routine business matters. Four- way talks also were 
used to negotiate in advance such political issues as the distribu- 
tion of committee chairmanships (nine for opposition parties, seven 
for the government party) and the National Assembly's investiga- 
tion of dozens of cases of corruption or other irregularities com- 
mitted under the preceding Fifth Republic. 

The judiciary also moved toward greater political independence 
in 1988. In June one-third of the nation's judges demanded that 
the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Kim Yong-ch'ol, resign 
as a measure to restore public trust in the politicized court system. 
Two weeks after the chief justice resigned in disgrace, the two major 
opposition parties abstained from the National Assembly vote to 
confirm Roh's first choice for the vacancy, thereby causing the 
nomination to fail. This action resulted in the nomination of Yi 
Il-kyu, a more independent-minded figure known for not bending 
to political pressure. A Supreme Court justice during the Chun 
presidency — until his appointment was not renewed in 1986 — Yi 
had won wide public respect for overturning lower court rulings 
in political cases. Yi's appointment as chief justice led to National 
Assembly approval of thirteen new Supreme Court justices and 
a major reshuffle of the judiciary in July that affected some thirty- 
five senior District Court and High Court judges. At a meeting 
of chiefs of all court levels in December 1988 when the Supreme 
Court was drafting a revision to the Court Organization Law that 
would give the judiciary full control over its own budgets, Chief 



223 



South Korea: A Country Study 

Justice Yi Il-kyu called on the judiciary to "take a hard look at 
ourselves for the situation in which the public felt distrust for the 
judiciary" and pledged that he would "never tolerate any outside 
influence in court proceedings." 

Under Yi's leadership, the South Korean judiciary became more 
independent. This trend continued into 1989, as courts overturned 
the parliamentary election victories of two government party can- 
didates on charges of illegal campaigning and sentenced numer- 
ous former officials and relatives of former President Chun Doo 
Hwan to prison terms on corruption and power- abuse charges. In 
another unprecedented action in late 1989, a judge acting on his 
own initiative granted bail to a student activist charged with violat- 
ing the National Security Act. 

The Seoul Olympics, scheduled to begin in September 1988, con- 
tributed to a tacit political truce where the more contentious and 
difficult political questions, such as the revisions of "bad laws" 
sought by the two larger opposition parties, were concerned. The 
primary focus of partisan politics during 1988 was the settling of 
old accounts concerning the Fifth Republic. These issues, in turn, 
were divided into two categories: questions related to Chun's sei- 
zure of power in late 1979 and early 1980, including the Kwangju 
incident, and questions concerning corruption and other irregular- 
ities during the period of Chun's rule through 1987. In July 1988, 
following the president's veto of two bills that would have expand- 
ed the legislature's inspection powers — for example, enabling the 
National Assembly to order judicial warrants forcing subpoenaed 
witnesses, such as former President Chun, to testify — the govern- 
ment party agreed with the three major opposition parties to hold 
hearings into numerous irregularities of the Fifth Republic. Other 
special committees established in July were charged with studying 
reunification policy, democratization issues, problems of region- 
alism in politics, the conduct of the Seoul Olympics, and irregular- 
ities in the recent presidential and general elections. 

In twenty meetings held between late September and mid- 
December 1988, the committee investigating corruption under the 
Chun government interviewed dozens of witnesses, many of them 
high-level civilian and military officers. The televised hearings daz- 
zled the public with revelations concerning the suppression of me- 
dia independence in 1980, the extortion of political funds from large 
corporations, and improprieties connected with the Ilhae Institute, 
a charitable foundation established by Chun Doo Hwan (see The 
Media, this ch). 

The hearings had several effects. Pressures against the former 
president grew as the hearings continued; in late November 1988, 



224 



Government and Politics 



Chun appeared on television to apologize to the nation, taking 
responsibility for what he termed the "tragic consequences" in 
Kwangju in 1980. He also stated that he would surrender US$24 
million in cash and property and announced that he would seek 
seclusion in a Buddhist monastery in repentance. The hearings led 
to subsequent criminal prosecutions of numerous members of 
Chun's family, as well as former high officials, including the former 
director of the Agency for National Security Planning, Chang Se- 
dong. The hearings also gave many South Koreans their first op- 
portunity to see their legislators in action and set a precedent for 
future broadcasts of National Assembly business. 

The drama of the hearings drew attention away from the more 
prosaic business of the National Assembly, which during the year 
passed dozens of laws and decided on a 1989 budget. Despite often 
strong disagreements among parties, these results underscored the 
role of four-way talks in the process of political compromise, previ- 
ously a rare commodity in South Korean politics. The resulting 
de facto coalition foreshadowed the merger of three of the four par- 
ties in early 1990. 

People dissatisfied with Roh's first year as president overlooked 
significant political factors, including the restraining impact of world 
attention prior to the 1988 Seoul Olympics on Roh's conduct. Roh 
did make effective moves to consolidate his political position dur- 
ing the year, including a series of appointments and reshuffles 
within the Democratic Justice Party, the cabinet, and the senior 
ranks of the military. Changed political circumstances in 1989 made 
it possible for Roh to move more decisively to deal with opponents 
inside and outside the National Assembly. 

Returning to the Politics of National Security, 1989 

In his 1989 New Year's address, President Roh promised greater 
efforts in reaching out to communist bloc countries and in improving 
relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North 
Korea). He also emphasized continued democratization, coupled 
with stability. The emphasis on stability was shared by the NDRP, 
which in its New Year's statement noted the need to correct the 
unbalanced distribution of wealth and to eliminate conflicts based 
on regionalism but also rejected "any action to undermine political 
and social stability." Both the RDP and the PPD viewed 1989 as 
the year for the final resolution of Fifth Republic issues and called 
for the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate impar- 
tially criminal charges stemming from the National Assembly in- 
vestigations. 



225 



South Korea: A Country Study 

The president's willingness to move toward tighter social con- 
trols was given further impetus by developments in the first few 
months of the year. In February farmers angry over the govern- 
ment's liberalization of agricultural trade staged large-scale, some- 
times violent, demonstrations in Seoul. During the same month, 
the nationwide leftist student organization, the National Associa- 
tion of University Student Councils (Chondaehyop) challenged the 
government's desire to retain the initiative between the two Koreas 
by announcing plans to send members to Pyongyang's World 
Youth and Student Festival scheduled for July. In March a sub- 
way workers' strike paralyzed commuter transportation in Seoul 
for seven days. Nationwide labor unrest continued through April 
with a violent strike by Hyundai shipyard workers. Student demon- 
strators continued to match police tear gas with Molotov cocktails 
through the early months of the year. In May the nation was 
shocked when students who had taken police officers hostage in 
a building at Tongui University in Pusan set a fire that took the 
lives of seven police officers who had stormed the facility. 

These events were accompanied by signs of uneasiness among 
advisers of President Roh. In March a cabinet minister, known 
as a spokesman for those in the military seeking a crackdown on 
labor union and student radicalism, resigned. A week later, at 
graduation ceremonies of the Korea Military Academy, the acade- 
my superintendent twice failed to salute the president and in his 
speech complained that "people have such confused perceptions 
about which are hostile and which are friendly countries that they 
do not know who our enemy is." Pressures on the president to 
curb what these and other conservatives in the military and the 
government party believed was a trend toward deterioration in- 
creased further in late March, when it became known that two 
prominent South Korean dissidents had traveled to P'yongyang, 
where they met with North Korean leader Kim II Sung and at- 
tended a church service. These developments and others, such as 
the announcement in June that a former opposition legislator had 
made an unauthorized trip to North Korea in 1988, gave the presi- 
dent the rationale to reverse another trend — the declining involve- 
ment of the national security agencies in domestic political life. 

During the political openness of 1988, a report of the govern- 
ment's Administration Reform Commission had denigrated the 
Agency for National Security Planning, on grounds that the agency 
had in the past "violated human rights on many occasions and 
interfered in politics, thus incurring the condemnation of the pub- 
lic." As ruling and opposition parties studied ways to limit the agen- 
cy's role in domestic political surveillance, the ANSP also appeared 



226 



Government and Politics 



to take a new approach, announcing that it was scaling back domes- 
tic operations, sharing classified documents on external security 
issues at press conferences, and sending new agency directors to 
pay respects to the presidents of the opposition parties. By early 
1989, political agreement had been reached on a revised ANSP 
law that would require the agency to observe the right of habeas 
corpus, remain politically neutral, and end other forms of inter- 
ference in domestic political life. 

The president's response to the growing political crisis of early 
1989 was to grant a renewed mandate to the police and security 
agencies. In view of increasing attacks on police boxes, a long- 
standing program to provide police with M- 1 6 rifles was stepped 
up and new rules of engagement issued, permitting police to fire 
in self-defense on Molotov cocktail- throwing demonstrators. In the 
aftermath of the Tongui University incident, the National Assem- 
bly quickly passed a law providing special penalties for the use of 
Molotov cocktails. In early April, the president established a Joint 
Security Investigations Headquarters to coordinate the work of 
police, intelligence, and national security agencies. This organ, 
which was in existence from early April through late June 1989, 
investigated student union groups, dissident organizations, and an 
antigovernment newspaper, eventually arresting more than 500 per- 
sons (including the pair who had traveled to North Korea in March) 
on suspicion of "aiding an antistate organization" — North 
Korea — under the broad terms of the National Security Act. 

The Joint Security Investigations Headquarters was disbanded 
in June under pressure from the National Assembly. Public prose- 
cutors and the Agency for National Security Planning, however, 
continued making arrests and pursuing investigations into a vari- 
ety of political activities on national security grounds. There also 
was a resumption of the quasi-legal or illegal practices common 
in national security cases before 1988: breaking into the campaign 
headquarters of an opposition candidate in a by-election in July; 
publishing lists of banned "antistate" books even after a civil court 
ruling that such a ban was illegal; arresting people for reading or 
possessing books considered to be pro-North Korean; arresting an 
antigovernment journalist for planning unauthorized coverage of 
North Korea; and ignoring court orders to allow arrested political 
detainees to meet with their attorneys. By the end of 1989, all people 
who had traveled to North Korea without authorization had been 
convicted and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. 

The role of the ANSP was further strengthened during the rest 
of the year. As part of a cabinet shuffle in July, Roh appointed 
a former high- school classmate, with a reputation for a hardline 



227 



South Korea: A Country Study 



approach as a prosecutor under the Fifth Republic, as head of the 
ANSP. In the National Assembly, discussion of amendments that 
would ease sections of the National Security Act and restrict the 
powers of the ANSP were indefinitely postponed. In September 
the government introduced an amendment that would enable the 
ANSP to bypass the constitutional guarantees of access to a law- 
yer in national security cases. In late 1989, the government claimed 
that 342 people had been charged under the National Security Act 
during the year. 

Parties and Leaders 

Unlike the two former military leaders who had preceded him, 
Roh Tae Woo followed an indirect course to the chairmanship of 
the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) and the presidency. A Korea 
Military Academy classmate of Chun Doo Hwan and Chong Ho- 
yong and a 1959 graduate of the United States Army Special 
Warfare School, Roh had passed through a succession of career- 
building military commands, including a brigade of the Special 
Warfare Command, before moving a regiment of his frontline Ninth 
Division into Seoul to support Chun's forcible removal of the army 
chief of staff and other senior military leaders on December 12, 
1979. As Chun consolidated his political position through the spring 
and summer of 1980, he placed Roh in the most politically sensi- 
tive military posts, naming him to be commander of the Capital 
Garrison Command and, later, the Defense Security Command. 
After Chun became president in 1980, however, he retired Roh 
from the military and used him to fill a series of government posts, 
beginning with a position as second minister of political affairs, 
a position that was apparently created especially for Roh. After 
a short period as minister of sports in the spring of 1982, Roh served 
for fifteen months as the minister of home affairs. 

In retrospect it seems clear that Roh's ability simultaneously to 
benefit by, yet distance himself politically from, his association with 
Chun began in mid- 1983 when he was moved from the post of 
minister of home affairs to take the chairmanship of South Korea's 
Olympic Committee, which he held through 1986. With the Olym- 
pic Committee portfolio, Roh was able to avoid entanglement in 
increasingly tough police handling of the student movement while 
remaining in the public eye as the person who had successfully 
managed the campaign to have Seoul selected as the site of the 1988 
Games of the XXIV Olympiad. After his election to the National 
Assembly in April 1985, Roh emerged as a significant figure in 
the DJP when Chun appointed him to the party presidency. 



228 



Government and Politics 



At the end of the first two years of the Roh presidency, the DJP 
was a different party from that bequeathed by Chun in 1981 . Roh 
had surprised political observers when he dismissed one-third of 
the party's local chapter chairmen and denied the party's nomi- 
nation in the April 1988 National Assembly election to 126 incum- 
bent party members in favor of relatively unknown and new party 
members. These decisions undoubtedly cost the party heavily in 
the number of seats won, but they also enabled Roh to begin to 
reshape the party in his own image. By December 1988, Roh was 
ready to consolidate his control of the DJP. Within four days, Roh 
replaced twenty of twenty- three cabinet ministers, eliminating vir- 
tually all those carried over from the Chun administration. He also 
reshuffled the senior DJP leadership, removing Park Chun-kyu, 
a former adviser to Park Chung Hee's Democratic Republican 
Party, from the chairmanship. 

The numerically dominant membership, or mainstream, of the 
DJP was made up of figures from the city of Taegu and North 
Kyongsang Province, a group sometimes characterized by the press 
as the TK Mafia, or TK Division (TK for Taegu and Kyongsang). 
This trend had become evident during the Fifth Republic under 
Chun and within the Democratic Republican Party under Park 
Chung Hee before him. Roh also attempted, however, to replace 
Chun loyalists within the party with individuals who were more 
likely to owe him their primary loyalty. Roh supporters included 
some members of an influential subset of the TK group made up 
of individuals who had graduated from Kyongbuk High School, 
Roh's alma mater. In December 1988, for example, all of the presi- 
dent's senior staff were Roh's fellow high- school alumni. Taegu - 
Kyongsang ties also extended to numerous civil and military posts, 
most notably all army chiefs of staff after 1980, one-quarter of 
director-level officers in the Korean National Police, and 120 of 
662 prosecutors in 1989. 

A second group that supported the president comprised a num- 
ber of older politicians whom the Seoul press termed the New Elders 
Group. Members of this group fled from North Korea in the 1940s 
or during the Korean War, held senior positions in various walks 
of life, especially journalism, and played an important role in rally- 
ing the votes of other former North Koreans in Kyonggi and Kang- 
won provinces in the 1987 presidential election. For this service, 
they were allowed to return to political life, in many cases for the 
first time since persons of North Korean origin lost political in- 
fluence following the fall of Syngman Rhee in 1960 and the 1961 



229 



South Korea: A Country Study 

coup d'etat of Park Chung Hee. As a group, they were strongly 
anticommunist and favored the restoration of * 'law and order" in 
the face of rising dissent in South Korean society. 

Political alignments within the ruling party tended to form around 
personalities rather than ideas because of the importance of per- 
sonal networks in South Korean society and the fact that under 
the Constitution Roh could not succeed himself. In August 1989, 
President Roh removed Yi Chong-ch'an from a senior party post. 
Yi, the leader of a group of DJP members hailing from the Seoul 
area, was known to favor greater democracy within the party and 
to oppose revision of the Constitution to create a cabinet-responsible 
system. After the announcement in early 1990 that the parties of 
Kim Young Sam and Kim Chong-p'il would merge with that of 
Roh Tae Woo, observers expected the roles both of ideas and of 
personal alignments or factions to be even more significant in the 
new, enlarged Democratic Liberal Party. 

New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) leader Kim Chong- 
p'il had been nominated as the presidential candidate of the 
Democratic Republican Party following Park's assassination in late 
1979, but Kim was arrested by Chun on corruption charges dur- 
ing the latter' s takeover in 1980. Kim was accused of corruption 
and stripped of most of his personal assets in South Korea. He spent 
six years in the United States. In March 1986, he returned to South 
Korea to attempt to reconstruct Park's old party and restore his 
own political fortunes. In a series of speeches in 1986 and 1987, 
Kim spoke of the need to continue the "revitalizing" tasks of the 
yusin phase of Park Chung Hee (see South Korea under Park Chung 
Hee, 1961-79, ch. 1). His appeal initially was to former officials, 
cashiered military leaders, and others who had lost their positions 
in 1980. As Kim's message changed to emphasize his association 
with the beginnings of South Korea's modern economic develop- 
ment in the 1960s, he began to attract some younger, conserva- 
tive South Koreans, and many from his native Ch'ungch'ong 
Province. By October 30, 1987, when Kim's NDRP was formally 
established, people under the age of forty made up more than half 
of the party's 3,000 charter members. Others included the twenty- 
one National Assembly members of the now defunct Korea 
Nationalist Party, which during the 1980s had provided a home 
for political survivors of Park Chung Hee's party. 

Kim Young Sam was a veteran politician with a strong consti- 
tuency in Pusan and in South Kyongsang Province. As a Nation- 
al Assembly member for the opposition New Democratic Party 
(NDP) in the 1960s, he fought a series of losing battles against Park 
Chung Hee on such issues as normalization of relations with Japan 



230 



Government and Politics 



in 1965. By 1970 he had risen to the top policy-making committee 
of the NDP. He lost the party's nomination to political rival Kim 
Dae Jung in the presidential election of 1971 but continued to hold 
top party posts through 1979, when the government-dominated 
National Assembly expelled him after he called for the resignation 
of Park and the abandonment of the yusin system. This incident 
contributed to large-scale unrest in Pusan and nearby Masan and 
may have indirectly contributed to Park's assassination. 

Kim Young Sam, like other well-known political figures, such 
as Kim Chong-p'il and Kim Dae Jung, was banned from politics 
in 1980 by Chun Doo Hwan; he spent the early 1980s under house 
arrest. A Presbyterian elder, Kim used the enforced leisure in well- 
publicized self-improvement along traditional cultural lines common 
to exiled South Korean politicians. He was occasionally photo- 
graphed while practicing calligraphy in his book-lined study, or 
while on permitted outings with his Democratic Alpine Club. 
Government censorship prevented detailed press coverage of his 
twenty- three-day hunger strike against the Chun government in 
May and June 1983. Although Kim's house arrest was lifted after 
the hunger strike, his political rights were not restored until after 
the February 1985 National Assembly elections. Kim subsequent- 
ly joined his faction members in the newly formed New Korea 
Democratic Party as an official party adviser; his long-time rival, 
Kim Dae Jung, directed his own faction in the party from outside 
it as a member of the Council for Promotion of Democracy. 

In the late 1980s, South Korean political observers, increasing- 
ly interested in the question of leadership succession within the op- 
position parties, focused their attention more on generational 
groupings than on factions. Seen this way, the RDP was broadly 
divided into old-line Kim Young Sam loyalists and some additional 
experienced opposition politicians in their fifties and an emergent 
group of younger politicians, mostly in their forties. Many of the 
latter group began their first terms in the National Assembly in 
1988. They typically brought to their political careers progressive 
political credentials earned in human rights law, labor relations, 
or other fields. Several members of this group received nationwide 
attention for their cogent interrogation techniques during the Na- 
tional Assembly hearings in late 1988. 

At the time of the presidential elections in December 1987, sixty- 
two-year-old opposition leader Kim Dae Jung from the Cholla 
region was in many ways the South Korean political candidate best 
known outside of South Korea. A one-time newspaper publisher, 
a Roman Catholic of eclectic views, and a charismatic popular 
speaker elected to the National Assembly four times in the 1960s, 



231 



South Korea: A Country Study 

Kim had an international reputation that stemmed largely from 
the continuous efforts of the South Korean government to keep 
him out of the country, in prison, or under house arrest following 
his near- victory over Park in the 1971 presidential election. He 
had built active support organizations among South Koreans in 
Japan and the United States by the time the Korean Central In- 
telligence Agency kidnapped him at a Tokyo hotel in 1973. Fol- 
lowing United States intervention to save his life during the 
abduction, he was brought back to South Korea to stand trial for 
alleged violation of the election law and Park's Emergency Meas- 
ure Number Nine. He served several years of imprisonment and 
house arrest, then was released and had his civil rights restored 
in 1980 on the heels of the October 1979 assassination of Park. 

Again arrested under martial law in May 1980, Kim Dae Jung 
was accused of fomenting the Kwangju incident and sentenced to 
death by a military court on sedition charges that the United States 
Department of State described at the time as "far-fetched" (see 
The Kwangju Uprising, ch. 1). Under pressure from the United 
States government, his death sentence was subsequendy reduced 
to life and then to twenty years' imprisonment. This term was sus- 
pended in late 1982 when Kim went to the United States to seek 
medical treatment. In the United States, Kim divided his time 
among a research appointment at Harvard University, the Korean 
Institute for Human Rights in Alexandria, Virginia (informally 
known as the Kim Dae Jung Embassy), and wide-ranging travels 
to speak before Korean- American groups and United States civic, 
academic, and human rights organizations. Kim returned to South 
Korea in February 1985 on the eve of the National Assembly elec- 
tions. In March 1985, he was released from the 1980 general ban 
on political activity, although the suspended criminal charges still 
in effect meant that he could neither belong to a party nor run for 
office. He immediately joined with Kim Young Sam, who had also 
had his ban lifted, to establish the Council for Promotion of 
Democracy. Although Kim Dae Jung spent most of the next two 
years under house arrest, he telephonically provided informal 
guidance to his faction within the New Korea Democratic Party 
and, after April 1985, within the Reunification Democratic Party 
(RDP). As part of the political understanding reached in late June 
1987, the government dropped all outstanding charges against him 
and he reemerged to participate fully in politics. After negotiations 
with the Kim Young Sam faction of the RDP failed to reach agree- 
ment concerning a unified candidacy, the Kim Dae Jung faction 
and its supporters left in October 1987 to form the Party for Peace 



232 



Government and Politics 



and Democracy (PPD). The December 16 election was fast ap- 
proaching when Kim received his party's presidential nomination 
on November 12. 

As the 1990s began, the PPD was made up of at least three dis- 
cernible groups. The first group comprised old-line Kim Dae Jung 
followers who occupied the senior positions in the party hierarchy 
and gave unquestioning loyalty to the party leader. A second group, 
making up more than one-half of the party's seventy-one Nation- 
al Assembly seats after the April 1988 election, consisted of first- 
termers obliged by custom to play a low-key role in party affairs 
until they acquired more political experience. Within this group, 
however, was a subgroup of activists with long experience in cause- 
oriented groups and human rights law. Many of these activists had 
worked for the party in the National Assembly elections in 1985; 
a few had run as independents in 1988 before formally joining the 
party. Many of this group, organized as the Study Group for Peace- 
ful and Democratic Reunification (P'yongminyon) within the party, 
participated conspicuously in National Assembly hearings in 1988. 
Collectively, they constituted the party's left wing and its link with 
the broader dissident movement outside of the National Assem- 
bly. Political speculation in late 1989 centered on whether this group 
would continue to exert a leftward pull, seeking to bring the posi- 
tion of the PPD closer to that of South Korea's emergent left. Ob- 
servers noted that several PPD members of this group also were 
members of the Coalition for a National Democratic Movement 
(Chomminyon) formed in January 1989 and were likely to be in- 
volved with that organization's plans to form a progressive politi- 
cal party to participate in the first local council elections scheduled 
to take place in 1990. 

Chomminyon was one of a variety of groups that considered plans 
to form cause-oriented political parties in anticipation of local council 
elections. These bodies included a group of some fifty former cabinet 
members and retired generals who believed that the government 
party was not conservative enough and at least two groups of en- 
vironmentalists who planned to establish parties dedicated to that 
issue. A proposed Green Party, like its European counterparts, 
planned to emphasize antiwar and antinuclear issues as well as the 
cause of the environment, but also supported a concept of "Oriental 
humanity" that would promote respect for the elderly and other 
traditional virtues. 

Interest Groups 

Despite its Constitution and formal structure, the South Korean 
government has never fully conformed to the liberal democratic 



233 



South Korea: A Country Study 



model that sees the state as a simple summation of diverse and com- 
peting interests within society. In politics, as in economic life, South 
Korea has more closely fit the "strong state" model, in which the 
government has tended to outweigh particular social or group in- 
terests. Nonetheless, the balance between the government and var- 
ious interest groups showed some dramatic changes in the late 
1980s; as the 1990s began, observers found it likely that such 
changes would continue, despite efforts by the government to re- 
tain its traditionally strong position. 

During most of the postwar period, the South Korean gov- 
ernment had encouraged organizations for the communication of 
economic interests, but had not encouraged professional or occupa- 
tional interest groups to voice political demands. Independent or 
unsanctioned interest groups had come into existence from time 
to time to challenge fundamental policies of the government. In 
the late 1980s, such challenges accounted for a sizable proportion 
of extragovernmental political activity. 

The relationship between government and business associations 
in South Korea had its roots in the period of Japanese colonial rule, 
when the governor general established the Seoul Chamber of Com- 
merce and Industry and other industrial associations as a means 
of communicating economic policies to the business community. 
Since 1952 all businesses have been required by South Korean law 
to belong to the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the 
bylaws and initial membership of which closely paralled those of 
the Seoul Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the colonial peri- 
od. Since 1961 , when the Park government began its economic de- 
velopment plans, the Federation of Korean Industry has represented 
the major conglomerates. A larger organization, the Federation 
of Small and Medium Industries, has had much less influence. The 
Korea Traders' Association and the Korean Federation of Textile 
Industries round out the four major industrial associations. In 1989 
there were some 200 additional business associations licensed by 
the state (see The Government and Public and Private Corpora- 
tions, ch. 3). 

In most cases, the government recognizes only a single associa- 
tion as the representative of that industry. Major business leaders 
may have individual access to administrators through personal ties 
and might be able to influence the government in minor ways, such 
as obtaining exemptions from specific taxes. For the most part, 
however, business associations through the 1980s were dominated 
by the government. As noted by one specialist, "It is through in- 
dustry associations that the Korean government implements its poli- 
cies, enforces routine compliance, gathers information, and 



234 



National Museum of Korea, Seoul 
Courtesy Oren Hadar 

monitors performance." In the 1980s, this process was sometimes 
facilitated by the placement of retiring senior military or national 
security officials in industry association positions. 

Institutional changes and pressures toward open markets began 
to change the traditional government-business relationship in the 
mid-and late 1980s. Larger corporations became interested in hav- 
ing a role in policy formulation more commensurate with their con- 
tribution to more than two decades of economic growth. This 
interest took several forms, including substantial corporate con- 
tributions to all major political parties during elections. As eco- 
nomic ministries grew in influence within a more decentralized 
economic planning structure in the 1980s, the related industry as- 
sociations gained a greater voice, just as was true in Japan and 
the United States. Growing liberalization of the domestic market 
under foreign pressure also led to greater friction between the in- 
terests of specific economic sectors and the need of the government 
to satisfy its foreign critics or risk a loss of access to vital foreign 
markets. As the 1990s began, these frictions seemed likely to con- 
tinue and to lead eventually to further readjustments. 

In general, the higher-paid professions establish and administer 
their own associations and cooperate closely with the appropriate 
government ministries but receive no government support. These 



235 



South Korea: A Country Study 

associations are chiefly concerned with maintaining standards and 
the economic status of the professions concerned and have been 
traditionally regarded by the government as politically safe. The 
major exception has been the Korean Bar Association, which be- 
came increasingly outspoken on human rights and related legal is- 
sues in the 1970s and 1980s. 

The government has attempted to keep tight controls on the in- 
tellectual professions, sponsoring the formation of the Korean Fed- 
eration of Education Associations and the Federation of Artistic 
and Cultural Organizations of Korea. Membership in the Korean 
Federation of Education Associations was compulsory for all 
teachers through high-school level. Members of these umbrella 
groups received significant medical benefits, and they tended to 
avoid political controversy. The Korean Newspaper Association 
and Korean Newspaper Editors' Association were politically cau- 
tious during the early 1980s, but became much less constrained 
during the early years of Roh's rule. 

Dissident associations have frequently grown from the intellec- 
tual sector of society. The Minjung Culture Movement Associa- 
tion (mtnjung means populist) was formed in 1985 by dissident artists 
and writers who did not want to belong to the state-controlled Fed- 
eration of Artistic and Cultural Organizations of Korea. Similar 
organizations of dissident journalists, such as the Association of 
Journalists Dismissed in 1980, or the Democratic Press Movement 
Association, often were dealt with harshly under the Fifth Repub- 
lic. The Association of Korean Journalists, although more broad- 
ly based and less ideological, was quick to resist censorship and, 
after a change in the law in 1988, supported the formation of jour- 
nalists' unions. 

The government has been especially sensitive about unautho- 
rized professional associations among teachers. Many teachers, and 
some opposition political leaders, have been determined to reduce 
the state's control over the political views of teachers and the con- 
tent of education. In early 1989, President Roh vetoed an 
opposition- sponsored amendment to the Education Law that would 
have allowed teachers to form independent unions. In spite of the 
president's veto, activist leftist teachers — numbering about 10 per- 
cent of the nation's primary through high-school faculties — 
announced their intention to form such a union. The National 
Teachers Union (Chon'gyojo), inaugurated in late May 1989, criti- 
cized the Korean Federation of Education Associations as 
progovernment and weak in protecting teachers' rights (see Primary 
and Secondary Schools, ch. 2). The Ministry of Education respond- 
ed by dismissing more than 1,000 members of the new union in 



236 



Government and Politics 



the spring and summer of 1989, resulting in the eventual with- 
drawal of more than 10,000 additional teachers. The Agency for 
National Security Planning conducted a well-publicized investiga- 
tion into the union's ideology, with the implication that members 
could be charged with aiding an antistate organization under the 
National Security Act. Police broke up pro-National Teachers 
Union rallies; members participating in a signature- gathering cam- 
paign to support the union were charged with traffic violations. 
Eventually, several teachers' union leaders received prison terms 
on various charges. The Ministry of Education produced new guide- 
lines that permitted teachers' colleges to deny admission to stu- 
dents with activist records and that allowed district education boards 
to screen out "security risks" when testing candidates for employ- 
ment. These measures effectively halted the activities of the National 
Teachers Union. 

The modern Korean labor movement, including unions of skilled 
and unskilled workers, dates to the first decade of Japanese colonial 
rule. South Korean law and constitutions since 1948 have recog- 
nized the "three rights" of labor: the right to organize, the right 
to bargain collectively, and the right to take collective action. In 
practice, however, the government has consistently attempted to 
control labor and mitigate the effects of unionism through the use 
of a variety of legal and customary devices, including company- 
supported unions, prohibitions against political activities by unions, 
binding arbitration of disputes in public interest industries, which 
include 70 percent of all organized labor, and the requirement that 
all unions be affiliated with one of the seventeen government- 
sponsored industrial unions and with a general coordinating body, 
the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU). In the 1980s, 
large companies, often supported by the police and intelligence 
agencies of the government, also exerted pressure on unions to pre- 
vent strikes, to undermine the development of white-collar unions, 
to retain control of union leaders, and to prevent persons with some 
college education from attempting to organize workers by taking 
positions as industrial laborers. 

Despite such measures, the government has never exercised 
total control of the labor movement. Even the FKTU occasionally 
has been able to file administrative suits against government rul- 
ings or to lobby — sometimes successfully — against laws that would 
have a negative impact on working conditions or rights of unions. 
Through most of its existence, however, the federation has been 
able to do little beyond submit proposals for legal reform to the 
government. Throughout the postwar period, dissenting labor or- 
ganizations either have attempted to function apart from the 



237 



South Korea: A Country Study 

government- sanctioned structure under the FKTU, or have formed 
rival umbrella organizations, such as the National Council of Trade 
Unions, established in 1958. 

South Korea experienced an explosion of labor disputes from 
1987 through 1989 under the more open political conditions fol- 
lowing the crisis of late June 1987 and the pressures created by 
long-deferred improvements in wages and working conditions (see 
table 13, Appendix; Social Classes in Contemporary South Korea, 
ch. 2). More than 3,500 labor disputes occurred from August 
through November 1987. Most were quickly resolved by negotiated 
wage increases and by the prospect that another common 
demand — freer scope for union activities — would be met in forth- 
coming legislation. In 1988 labor-related laws were amended to 
make it easier to establish labor unions and to reduce government 
intervention in labor disputes. Unions were still prohibited, 
however, from articulating any demands that the government in- 
terpreted as political in nature. 

In 1988 the number of unions increased from 4,000 to more than 
5,700. This figure included numerous new white-collar unions 
formed at research institutes, in the media, and within the larger 
corporations. 

There was a general privatization of labor-management conflict 
during 1988 and 1989 as the government adopted a more neutral, 
hands-off stance. Companies experimented widely with tactics such 
as lockouts (5 in 1987; 224 in 1988), and labor unions achieved 
new levels of joint action by workers in different regions and in- 
dustries. The government's ability to manage organized labor 
through the traditional means of controlling the FKTU declined. 
The FKTU, under criticism for the many years it had represent- 
ed the government more than labor, also began to take a more in- 
dependent posture as the 1980s came to a close. In 1989 the 
once-docile umbrella organization prepared to sponsor union can- 
didates in anticipated local elections (an illegal activity under ex- 
isting law) and held education seminars and rallies to press for 
"economic democracy" through revision of labor laws and other 
reforms. Notwithstanding the increasing ability of labor to organize 
and to present economic demands, however, the government con- 
tinued to suppress leftist labor groups that appeared to have broad 
political goals or that questioned the legitimacy of the government, 
such as the National Council of Labor Unions (Chonnohyop), which 
was formally established in early 1990. 

In early 1990, the government announced new measures to sup- 
port its return to more restrictive policies governing strikes. The 
number of intelligence agents at key industries was more than 



238 



Government and Politics 



doubled (from 163 to 337) and a special riot police task force — 
sixty-three companies in strength — was deployed against "illegal" 
strikes. 

During the postwar period, articulation of workers' interests had 
been weakest for South Korea's farming population. In 1946 the 
government used the Korea Federation of Peasants to mobilize the 
rural population against leftist peasant unions. The Federation of 
Agricultural Cooperatives, established in 1957, was also largely 
funded and administered by the state. Its purpose was not to 
represent farmers' interests but to facilitate government control over 
the purchase and sale of grain and farmers' purchases of fertilizer. 

Although most South Korean farmers continued to belong to 
cooperatives, two pressures converged in the late 1980s to change 
the way in which farmers' interests were represented. First, as rural- 
urban income disparities grew in the late 1970s and 1980s, farmer 
dissatisfaction with the government cooperatives' role in setting 
crop prices and the costs of agricultural supplies also increased (see 
Agriculture, ch. 3). Some farmers turned to independent organi- 
zations, such as the Korean Catholic Farmers Association or the 
Christian Farmers Association. These groups, which were viewed 
as dissident organizations by the government, performed a varie- 
ty of services for farmers and also took public positions on govern- 
ment agricultural and price policies, sometimes using mass rallies. 
The second change, which affected larger numbers of farmers, was 
the result of South Korea's growing trade surpluses in the late 1980s 
(see Foreign Trade Policy, ch. 3). As the government responded 
to pressure from major trading partners, such as the United States, 
to open South Korea's domestic markets, farmers became increas- 
ingly active in large-scale protest rallies against both the government 
and the major political parties. As the 1990s began, it was clear 
that the traditional harmony of political interests between a conser- 
vative rural population and conservative governments had ended. 

Political Extremism and Political Violence 

The deliberate use of violence, including occasional assassina- 
tion, to express or advance political goals was common among both 
the right and the left in South Korea after liberation in 1945 and 
up to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. Subsequent 
political violence up to the 1980s, apart from exchanges between 
police and participants in political demonstrations or rallies, was 
largely limited to the illegal government use of violence or the threat 
of violence to suppress dissent and intimidate political opponents. 
During the presidency of Syngman Rhee (1948-60), for example, 
the government mobilized the Anticommunist Youth League and 



239 



South Korea: A Country Study 



members of street gangs to smash facilities of critical newspapers 
and intimidate opposition candidates for election (see The Syngman 
Rhee Era, 1948-60, ch. 1). The Park government continued ille- 
gal police practices, including torture of some dissidents, intellec- 
tuals, and even members of the National Assembly, and was often 
indirectly involved in violence. The Korean Central Intelligence 
Agency (KCIA) also used various means, including physical threats, 
to intimidate South Korean journalists in the United States. Such 
methods continued under Chun, occasionally resulting in the deaths 
of political defendants under police torture. Police were passively 
present while hired thugs broke up dissident religious services or 
union meetings. Under Roh Tae Woo, police handling of politi- 
cal suspects retained some of the illegal violence of earlier times, 
although improved media freedom also meant greater scrutiny of 
police misconduct. In contrast with earlier regimes, however, the 
Roh government permitted prosecution and conviction of police 
officers and even of military personnel in several cases involving 
violence during its first year in office. 

Under a special "afforestation program" administered by the 
Defense Security Command, more than 400 student activists were 
punitively induced into the army during the Chun years. Accord- 
ing to a Ministry of National Defense report, at least five commit- 
ted suicide or were killed, and many were forced to become 
informants (see The Defense Security Command, ch. 5). At least 
50 people died (of some 10,000 incarcerated) in the government's 
"triple purity" (samch'ong) reeducation camps in the early 1980s. 
Ten years after the May 1980 Kwangju incident, many South 
Koreans continued to believe that the initial violence committed by 
armed Special Forces troops against civilian demonstrators on that 
occasion was deliberate. The former martial law commander for the 
region told a National Assembly committee in 1988 that civilian pro- 
tests were not violent enough at the beginning to justify the use 
of elite forces and that army brutality aggravated the situation. 

Public violence against government institutions was rare from 
the 1950s through the early 1980s. When students overthrew the 
Syngman Rhee government in April 1960, mobs destroyed the 
headquarters of Rhee' s Anticommunist Youth League. More spon- 
taneous forms of violence often occurred during student protest 
rallies in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, when small numbers of rock- 
throwing students at the edges of large rallies clashed with club- 
wielding riot police, or security forces dispatched martial arts 
experts and plainclothes officers to beat or arrest demonstrators. 
Students also occasionally beat up police informants or plainclothes 



240 



Government and Politics 



officers. This pattern changed following the killings of students and 
other demonstrators in Kwangju in May 1980. 

The Kwangju incident permanently stained the legitimacy of the 
Chun government for subsequent generations of student activists, 
many of whom also blamed the United States for what they be- 
lieved to be its supportive role. The use of Molotov cocktails by 
some elements among student demonstrators, both as a counter 
to increasingly effective police use of tear gas and as a reflection 
of increased militancy, became a feature of student demonstrations 
during the 1980s. 

Another threshold was crossed in March 1982, when several stu- 
dents deliberately set a fire in the American Cultural Center in 
Pusan, causing severe damage and, inadvertently, the death of 
another South Korean student studying in the building at the time. 
In a related statement, the students said they were beginning an 
anti-United States struggle to eliminate United States power from 
South Korea. The students blamed the United States for causing 
"the permanent national division of Korea" and for "supporting 
the military regime that refuses democratization, social revolution, 
and development." 

In April 1985, radical students, together with veteran activists 
released from prison the year before, formed the Struggle Com- 
mittee for the Liberation of the Masses, the Attainment of Democra- 
cy, and the Unification of the Nation, or Sammint'u. The ideology 
of this organization borrowed from dependency theory in blam- 
ing a "dependent industrialization process" dominated by the Unit- 
ed States for South Korea's social and political problems. 
Sammint'u supported various forms of direct action, including in- 
filtration of labor unions and forcible occupations of United States 
and South Korean government facilities. Sammint'u activists con- 
ducted a number of such actions, including a three-day seizure of 
the United States Information Service (USIS) building in Seoul 
in May 1985 and the occupation of two regional offices of the Minis- 
try of Labor in November of the same year. Although Sammint'u 
was suppressed in 1986 under the National Security Act as an "anti- 
state" organization, its emphasis on well-organized occupations 
and other actions (rather than the more spontaneous forms of tradi- 
tional student protest) and its ability to mobilize students across 
campus lines marked a permanent change in student protest tac- 
tics (see College Student Activism, ch. 2). 

By the late 1980s, violence-prone student radicals, although a 
small minority even among politically active students, demonstrated 
increasing effectiveness in organizing occupations and arson as- 
saults against facilities. In 1988, under the general guidance of the 



241 



South Korea: A Country Study 

National Association of University Student Councils (Chondae- 
hyop) and the Seoul Area Federation of Student Councils 
(Soch'ongnyon), small groups of students armed with Molotov cock- 
tails, metal pipes, and occasionally tear gas grenades or improvised 
incendiary or explosive devices and staged more than two dozen 
raids on United States diplomatic and military facilities. Students 
also conducted a similar number of attacks against offices of the 
government and ruling party and the suburban Seoul residence 
of former President Chun (see table 13, Appendix). 

Anti-United States attacks in 1989 began in February with a sei- 
zure of the USIS library in Seoul and attempted arson at the Ameri- 
can Cultural Center in Kwangju. Additional incidents continued 
through the year at about the same level as in 1988, culminating 
in the violent occupation of the United States ambassador's resi- 
dence by six students in December. In the spring of 1989, there 
were numerous incidents of arson and vandalism against Hyun- 
dai automobile showrooms in many cities, as Chondaehyop mobi- 
lized member organizations nationwide to support a strike by 
Hyundai shipyard workers. Other attacks occurred throughout the 
year against Democratic Justice Party (DJP) offices and South 
Korean government facilities. 

As the 1980s ended, however, violence-prone radical groups also 
suffered setbacks and found themselves under increased pressure 
from the courts, police, and public and student opinion. The deaths 
of seven police officers in a fire set by student demonstrators in 
Pusan in May 1989, the arrest of Chondaehyop leaders on Na- 
tional Security Act charges stemming from the unauthorized trav- 
el of a member of the organization to P'yongyang over the summer, 
and the beating to death of a student informer by activists at one 
university in Seoul in October contributed to this pressure. In stu- 
dent council elections throughout the country in late 1989, students 
at many campuses defeated student council officers associated with 
the Chondaehyop's "national liberation" strategy, often replac- 
ing them with other leaders who favored a "people's democracy" 
approach, emphasizing organizational work among farmers and 
the labor movement over violent assaults on symbolic targets, at 
least for the near term. 

Many South Korean commentators interpreted the outcome of 
the 1989 campus elections as a renunciation of violent methods or 
as a turn away from radical student activism. Other observers noted, 
however, the ideological and organizational complexity of "peo- 
ple's democracy" elements, some of which had in the past equaled 
or exceeded Chondaehyop's commitment to violent activism. As 
the 1990s began, it seemed likely that at least some radical elements, 



242 



Government and Politics 



although perhaps increasingly driven underground like their coun- 
terparts in Japan, would remain committed to the use of violence 
as a political tool. 

Human Rights 

Traditional Korean political thought, rooted in neo-Confucianism, 
placed some emphasis on benevolent rule and on the government's 
paternalistic responsibility to redress grievances of the population. 
These ideas were carried further in the nineteenth century by the 
Tonghak Movement (tonghak means Eastern Learning), which es- 
poused equality of the sexes and of social classes. Interest among 
Koreans in modern human rights, however, and especially in civil 
and political rights protected by law began late in the Choson Dy- 
nasty (1392-1910) with the natural rights ideas of enlightenment 
movement (kaehwa) reformers, such as Kim Ok-kyun, So Chae- 
p'il, and Pak Yong-hyo (see The Choson Dynasty, ch. 1). 

The Japanese colonial period (1910-45) saw further diffusion 
of such ideas. In 1919 Koreans who had fled Japanese colonial rule 
established a government-in-exile in Shanghai that affirmed wide- 
ranging civil and political rights — freedoms of the ballot, religion, 
press, movement, property, and social and sexual equality. Within 
Korea in the 1920s, labor and tenant farmers unions spread the 
idea of rights and provided experience in organizational and pro- 
test techniques. As colonial rule continued, many Korean nation- 
alists came to assume the desirability of a modern legal order and 
due process of law, especially while experiencing dual legal stan- 
dards and abuses such as torture and fabrication of evidence in 
political cases. Meanwhile, Koreans serving in the colonial police 
and receiving training in the Japanese Imperial Army often ab- 
sorbed the increasingly stringent and authoritarian perspective of 
Japanese militarism. 

Human rights performance did not immediately improve fol- 
lowing the liberation of Korea from Japanese rule in 1945. Many 
factors — national division, ideological conflict, and violent confron- 
tation even before the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 — 
contributed to this problem. Japanese-style practices held over from 
the colonial days also were to blame. The United States Army Mili- 
tary Government in Korea (1945-48), confronted with serious 
problems of public order, found itself retaining the old colonial 
police apparatus and its Korean personnel (see South Korea un- 
der United States Occupation, 1945-48, ch. 1). United States- 
sponsored legal reforms, such as an effort to institute habeas corpus 
in 1946, often failed; attempts by United States advisers to prevent 
South Korean police from using torture, especially in political cases, 



243 



South Korea: A Country Study 

also were unsuccessful. Under Syngman Rhee, South Korea con- 
tinued the prewar pattern of using law and the police for political 
purposes — intimidating the judiciary, arresting journalists, and ap- 
plying extralegal pressures against the teaching profession and mem- 
bers of the new National Assembly. 

Under the presidencies of Park and Chun such problems wors- 
ened, and there were increasing signs of tension between the govern- 
ment and its supporters, who sought to ignore or minimize such 
rights, and many South Koreans, including some even within 
the government, who believed that civil, legal, and political rights 
should be honored. This tension was evident in the affirmations 
of rights found in most of South Korea's postwar constitutions and 
especially in the government's need for increasingly stringent mea- 
sures to control a restive judiciary under theyusin constitution. The 
forced resignations of judges and the resort to military tribunals 
in some political trials were rationalized on national security 
grounds, but only served to show that by the mid-1970s the gov- 
ernment was, on such matters, no longer able to command the 
respect and cooperation of a significant part of the country's legal 
profession. 

The Chun government modified some of the worst features of 
the yusin constitution by removing the admissibility of confessions 
as evidence, for example, but continued most of the abusive police 
and judicial practices of the Park period with little change. Penal 
sentences for people found guilty of offenses under certain politi- 
cally relevant laws — the National Security Act and the Act Con- 
cerning Assembly and Demonstration, for example — actually were 
harsher under Chun than under the preceding yusin system. 

In addition to the growing disaffection of the legal profession 
in the 1970s and 1980s, South Korea's modernization had gener- 
ated two social trends — rapid urbanization and dramatic increases 
in literacy and education levels — that were essential to industriali- 
zation, irreversible, and highly corrosive of traditional authoritar- 
ian practices. Public outrage against the police torture and killing 
of a student during an interrogation in early 1987 helped to fuel 
the growing political crisis that culminated in the tulmultuous events 
in June. 

The agreement in late 1989 between opposition and government 
parties concerning the legacy of the Fifth Republic left unresolved 
the question of what the press and many politicians referred to as 
revision of akpop (evil laws). These were laws long used in South 
Korea to restrict and punish nonviolent political activity. The abo- 
lition in 1988 of one such law, the Basic Press Act of December 
1980, had important and immediate effects on freedom of the press. 



244 



Government and Politics 



Other laws remained on the statute books and were increasingly 
used in 1989 as the Roh administration reached the apparent limits 
of its willingness to tolerate dissent. Despite Roh's initial reputa- 
tion for moderation, police records reported in the press show that 
by late 1989 the Roh government had more than doubled the Chun 
administration's rate of arrests for political offenses. 

As measured in numbers of persons under investigation, stand- 
ing trial, or serving sentences, the Act Concerning Assembly and 
Demonstration continued under Roh, as under the Fifth Repub- 
lic, to be the law most frequently used to restrict and control non- 
violent political expression. The law gave police chiefs, of whom 
there were twenty-four in Seoul alone, the authority to deny per- 
mission, without appeal, for any proposed demonstration. Police 
also had wide discretion over treatment of participants in illegal 
demonstrations, determining whether a given participant was to 
be charged with sponsoring an illegal demonstration, which car- 
ried the threat of a seven-year prison term, or with varying degrees 
of participation, which could be punished as a misdemeanor or even 
with a simple warning. Police had on occasion taken actions un- 
der the law to prevent persons from attending meetings that the 
police believed were "likely to breed social unrest." 

The National Security Act, as amended in 1980, restricted "anti- 
state activities" that endangered "the state or the lives and free- 
dom of the citizenry. ' ' However, Seoul used the law not only against 
espionage or sabotage, but also to control and punish domestic dis- 
sent, such as the publication of unorthodox political commentary, 
art, or literature, on the grounds that such expressions benefited 
an "antistate organization." In divided Korea, almost any act of 
opposition to the South Korean government could be and has been 
characterized as benefiting North Korea. Arrests under the law have 
been made for a wide variety of actions, including the sale of cas- 
sette tapes containing antigovernment songs; the sale, possession, 
or reading of books and other publications on the government's 
banned list; or chanting anti- American slogans at a student rally. 
Ordinary procedural protections of the Code of Criminal Proce- 
dure were not provided for defendants for offenses under this law. 
Any liaison with antistate organizations was also punishable un- 
der the law, although in the late 1980s there was considerable de- 
bate concerning the government's selectivity in allowing some 
politicians and businessmen to travel to North Korea or meet with 
North Korean officials while severely punishing critics of the govern- 
ment who did the same thing. There was a surge in prosecutions 
for various offenses under the National Security Act in 1989, despite 
continuing talk of amending the law to facilitate broader contacts 



245 



South Korea: A Country Study 

with the north. In early 1990, as the third year of Roh's adminis- 
tration began and as the government mulled over plans to sign 
several international agreements concerning human rights, it was 
still unclear whether or when the promise of Roh's 1988 inaugural 
speech, that "the day when freedoms and human rights could be 
slighted in the name of economic growth and national security has 
ended," would be redeemed. 

The Media 

Modern Korean journalism began after the opening of Korea 
in 1876. The Korean press had a strong reformist and nationalis- 
tic flavor from the beginning but faced efforts at political control 
or outright censorship during most of the twentieth century. Many 
Korean journalists established a tradition of remaining indepen- 
dent. They were often critical of the government, zealously pro- 
testing any attempts at press censorship. At annexation in 1910, 
the Japanese governor general assumed direct control of the press 
along with other public institutions. Following the March First 
Movement in 1919, Japanese authorities loosened their overt con- 
trol over cultural activities and permitted several Korean 
newspapers to function while maintaining some behind-the-scenes 
direction over politically sensitive topics. During the 1920s, Korean 
vernacular newspapers, such as Tonga ilbo (East Asia Daily), and 
intellectual journals, such as Kaebyok (Creation), conducted run- 
ning skirmishes with Japanese censors. Japanese authorities pro- 
hibited sales of individual issues on hundreds of occasions between 
1926 and 1932. Japan's war mobilization in the ensuing years ended 
any semblance of autonomy for the Korean press; all Korean- 
language publications were outiawed in 1941. 

Following the period of the United States Army Military Govern- 
ment in Korea (1945-48), which saw a burgeoning of newspapers 
and periodicals of every description as well as occasional censor- 
ship of the media, almost all subsequent South Korean govern- 
ments have at times attempted to control the media. Syngman 
Rhee's government continued the military government's Ordinance 
Number Eighty-Eight, which outlawed leftist newspapers. Rhee 
also closed moderate newspapers and arrested reporters and pub- 
lishers on numerous occasions between 1948 and 1960. On taking 
power in 1961, Park Chung Hee's Supreme Council for National 
Reconstruction closed all but fifteen of Seoul's sixty-four daily 
newspapers and refused to register a comparable percentage of the 
country's news services, weeklies, and monthly publications while 
using its own radio and news agencies to promote its official line. 
The Park government also used the Press Ethics Commission Law 



246 



Government and Politics 



of 1964 and, after 1972, emergency decrees that penalized criti- 
cism of the government to keep the media in line. In 1974 the 
government ordered a number of journalists fired and used the 
KCIA to force Tonga ilbo to stop its reporting on popular opposi- 
tion to the Park government by intimidating the paper's advertisers. 

During the Park and Chun years, the government exercised 
considerable control and surveillance over the media through the 
comprehensive National Security Act. In late 1980, the Chun gov- 
ernment established more thorough control of the news media than 
had existed in South Korea since the Korean War. Independent 
news agencies were absorbed into a single state-run agency, numer- 
ous provincial newspapers were closed, central newspapers were 
forbidden to station correspondents in provincial cities, the Chris- 
tian Broadcasting System network was forbidden to provide news 
coverage, and two independent broadcasting companies were ab- 
sorbed into the state-run Korean Broadcasting System (KBS). In 
addition, the Defense Security Command, then commanded by 
Roh Tae Woo, and the Ministry of Culture and Information or- 
dered hundreds of South Korean journalists fired and banned from 
newspaper writing or editing. 

The Basic Press Act of December 1980 was the legal capstone 
of Chun's system of media control and provided for censorship and 
control of newspapers, periodicals, and broadcast media. It also 
set the professional qualifications for journalists. Media censorship 
was coordinated with intelligence officials, representatives of vari- 
ous government agencies, and the presidential staff by the Office 
of Public Information Policy within the Ministry of Culture and 
Information using daily "reporting guidelines" (podo chich'im) sent 
to newspaper editors. The guidelines dealt exhaustively with ques- 
tions of emphasis, topics to be covered or avoided, the use of govern- 
ment press releases, and even the size of headlines. Enforcement 
methods ranged from telephone calls to editors to more serious forms 
of intimidation, including interrogations and beatings by police. 
One former Ministry of Culture and Information official told a 
National Assembly hearing in 1988 that compliance during his ten- 
ure from 1980 to 1982 reached about 70 percent. 

By the mid-1980s, censorship of print and broadcast media had 
become one of the most widely and publicly criticized practices of 
the Chun government. Even the government-controlled Yonhap 
News Agency noted in 1989 that "TV companies, scarcely worse 
than other media, were the main target of bitter public criticism 
for their distorted reporting for the government in the early 1980s. " 
Editorials called for abolition of the Basic Press Act and related 
practices, a bill was unsuccessfully introduced in the National 



247 



South Korea: A Country Study 

Assembly to the same end, and a public campaign to withhold com- 
pulsory viewers' fees in protest against censorship by the KBS net- 
work received widespread press attention. By the summer of 1986, 
even the ruling party was responding to public opinion. 

The political liberalization of the late 1980s brought a loosening 
of press restraints and a new generation of journalists more will- 
ing to investigate sensitive subjects, such as the May 1980 Kwangju 
incident. Roh's eight-point declaration of June 29, 1987, provid- 
ed for "a free press, including allowing newspapers to base cor- 
respondents in provincial cities and withdrawing security officials 
from newspaper offices." The South Korean media began a rapid 
expansion. Seoul papers expanded their coverage and resumed the 
practice of stationing correspondents in provincial cities. Although 
temporarily still under the management of a former Blue House 
press spokesman, the MBC television network, a commercial net- 
work that had been under control of the state-managed KBS since 
1980, resumed independent broadcasting. The number of radio 
broadcast stations grew from 74 in 1985 to 1 1 1 (including both AM 
and FM stations) by late 1988 and to 125 by late 1989. The num- 
ber of periodicals rose as the government removed restrictions on 
the publishing industry (see Transportation and Telecommunica- 
tions, ch. 3; table 15, Appendix). 

There also were qualitative changes in the South Korean me- 
dia. The Christian Broadcasting System, a radio network, again 
began to broadcast news as well as religious programming in 1987. 
In the same year, the government partially lifted a long-standing 
ban on the works of North Korean artists and musicians, many 
of whom were of South Korean origin. A newspaper run by dissi- 
dent journalists began publication in 1988. A number of other new 
dailies also appeared in 1988. Many of the new weekly and monthly 
periodicals bypassed the higher profits of the traditional general 
circulation magazines to provide careful analyses of political, eco- 
nomic, and national security affairs to smaller, specialized au- 
diences. Observers noted a dramatic increase in press coverage of 
previously taboo subjects such as political-military relations, fac- 
tions within the military, the role of security agencies in politics, 
and the activities of dissident organizations. Opinion polls dealing 
with these and other sensitive issues also began to appear with in- 
creasing regularity. Journalists at several of the Seoul dailies organ- 
ized trade unions in late 1987 and early 1988 and began to press 
for editorial autonomy and a greater role in newspaper manage- 
ment. 

In 1989 South Korea's four largest dailies, Hanguk ilbo, Chun- 
gang ilbo, Choson ilbo, and Tonga ilbo, had a combined circulation of 



248 



Government and Politics 



more than 6.5 million readers. The antiestablishment Hangydre sim- 
mun (One Nation News) had 450,000 readers — less than the major 
dailies or smaller papers like Kyonghyang simmun or Soul simmun but 
larger than four more specialized economic dailies. All the major 
dailies were privately owned, except for the government-controlled 
Hanguk ilbo. Several other daily publications had specialized reader- 
ships among sport fans and youth. Two English-language news- 
papers, the government- subsidized Korea Herald and the Korea Times, 
which was affiliated with the independent Soul simmun, were widely 
read by foreign embassies and businesses. A Chinese-language daily 
served South Korea's small Chinese population (see Population, 
ch. 2). 

The Yonhap News Agency provided domestic and foreign news 
to government agencies, newspapers, and broadcasters. Yonhap 
also provided news on South Korean developments in English by 
computerized transmission via the Asia-Pacific News Network. Ad- 
ditional links with world media were facilitated by four satellite 
link stations. The International Broadcast Center established in 
June 1988 served some 10,000 broadcasters for the 1988 Seoul 
Olympics. The government's KBS radio network broadcast over- 
seas in twelve languages. Two private radio networks, the Asia 
Broadcasting Company and Far East Broadcasting Company, 
served a wide regional audience that included the Soviet Far East, 
China, and Japan. 

The South Korean government also supported Naewoe Press, 
which dealt solely with North Korean affairs. Originally a propagan- 
da vehicle that followed the government line on unification policy 
issues, Naewoe Press became increasingly objective and moderate 
in tone in the mid-1980s in interpreting political, social, and eco- 
nomic developments in North Korea. Vantage Point, an English- 
language publication of Naewoe Press, provided in-depth studies 
of North Korean social, economic, and political developments. 

Except for two newspapers (one in Korean and one in English) 
that the government owned or controlled and the state television 
network, ownership of the media was for the most part distinct from 
political or economic power. One exception was the conservative 
daily, Chungang ilbo. Under the close oversight of its owner, the 
late Samsung Group founder and multimillionaire Yi Pyong-ch'ol, 
the paper and its affiliated TBC television network generally sup- 
ported the Park government during the 1970s. Its relations with 
the government became strained after 1980, however, when Chun 
Doo Hwan forced TBC to merge with KBS. A journalists' strike 
at Chungang ilbo in 1989, in one of many similar incidents at the 



249 



South Korea: A Country Study 

major South Korean newspapers, won even greater management 
and editorial independence. 

Most of South Korea's major newspapers derived their financial 
support from advertising and from their affiliation with major pub- 
lishing houses. The Tonga Press, for example, published not only 
the prestigious daily Tonga ilbo, but also a variety of other periodi- 
cals, including a newspaper for children, the general circulation 
monthly Sin tonga (New East Asia), a women's magazine, and spe- 
cialized reference books and magazines for students. Throughout the 
postwar period, Tonga ilbo has been noted for its opposition sympathies. 

South Korea's principal antiestablishment newspaper, Hangyore 
simmun, began publication in May 1988. It was founded by dissident 
journalists who were purged by the government in the early 1970s 
or in 1980; many of the paper's reporters and editorial staff left posi- 
tions on mainstream newspapers to join the new venture. The struc- 
ture and approach of the paper reflected the founders' view that in 
the past the South Korean news media had been too easily co-opted 
by the government. The paper had a human rights department as 
well as a mass media department to keep an eye on the government's 
press policy and to critique the ideological and political biases of 
other newspapers. The paper's nationalism and interest in national 
reunification were symbolically represented in the logo, which depict- 
ed Lake Ch'onji at the peak of Mount Paektu in North Korea; in 
the exclusive use of the Korean alphabet; and by the type font in 
which the paper's name was printed — the font dated from a famous 
Korean publication of the eighteenth century. The paper was printed 
horizontally, rather than vertically like other Seoul dailies. In other 
innovations, the Hangyore simmun relied on sales revenues, private 
contributions, and the sale of stock, rather than on advertising from 
major corporations, in line with its claim to be "the first newspaper 
in the world truly independent of political power and large capi- 
tal. " The newspaper came under increasing government pressure 
in 1989 (see Political Dynamics, this ch.). 

South Korea also had extensive and well-developed visual me- 
dia. The first Korean film was produced in 1919, and cinemas sub- 
sequently were built in the larger cities. The result of the spread 
of television sets and radios was the dissemination of a homogenized 
popular culture and the impingement of urban values on rural com- 
munities. 

Foreign Policy 
Organization and Operation 

The Constitution of the Sixth Republic vests the conduct of foreign 



250 



Government and Politics 



affairs in the presidency and the State Council, subject to the ap- 
proval of the National Assembly. The president and the State Coun- 
cil, through the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs, 
make periodic reports on foreign relations to the legislature. The 
president receives or dispatches envoys without legislative confir- 
mation; treaties, however, must receive legislative consent. Decla- 
rations of war, the dispatch of troops overseas, and the stationing 
of foreign troops within the national borders also are subject to legis- 
lative approval (Article 60 of the Constitution). The National As- 
sembly has a standing Foreign Affairs Committee that reports its 
deliberations to plenary sessions of the assembly. The assembly may 
also establish ad hoc committees to consider questions of special 
importance to the state. 

Constitutionally, major foreign policy objectives are established 
by the president. The chief foreign policy advisers in the State Coun- 
cil are the prime minister, who heads the cabinet, and the minister 
of foreign affairs. From time to time, these officials may be ques- 
tioned by the National Assembly; the Assembly may pass a recom- 
mendation for the removal from office of the prime minister or a 
State Council member (Article 63). The president is assisted by 
the National Security Council in the formulation and execution 
of foreign, military, and domestic policies related to national security 
prior to their deliberation by the State Council (Article 91). The 
Agency for National Security Planning, its mission akin to that 
of a combined United States Central Intelligence Agency and Fed- 
eral Bureau of Investigation, has direct access to the president and 
operates at his personal direction in the overall conduct of foreign 
policy (see The Agency for National Security Planning, ch. 5). 

Diplomatic missions abroad conduct foreign policy. The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs was established with functional and area divi- 
sions. The foreign ministry staff consists of civil service members 
and a highly professionalized career foreign service corps, select- 
ed on the basis of at least a college education and performance in 
a highly competitive examination supervised by the Ministry of 
Government Administration. Regarded as prestigious social posi- 
tions, diplomatic posts attract ambitious and bright individuals who 
undergo an intensive training program conducted by the Foreign 
Affairs Research Institute. The institute in the late 1980s had a 
very rigorous curriculum in international diplomacy, specialized 
area training, and intensive language training. 

Basic Goals and Accomplishments 

The external posture of South Korea in general, and toward 
North Korea in particular, began a new chapter in the 1980s. While 



251 



South Korea: A Country Study 

retaining its previous goal — enhancing political legitimacy, mili- 
tary security, and economic development by maintaining close ties 
with the West — South Korea greatly expanded its diplomatic 
horizons by launching its ambitious pukpang chongch 'aek (see Glos- 
sary), northern policy, or Nordpolitik. Nordpolitik was Seoul's ver- 
sion of the Federal Republic of Germany's (West Germany) 
Ostpolitik of the early 1970s. Although the policy's origins can be 
traced back to 1973 under Park, it was greatly invigorated by Roh. 

Seoul's Nordpolitik was designed for a number of rather ambi- 
tious but initially ill-defined objectives. Seoul's basic dilemma in 
its Nordpolitik appeared to be how to reconcile its traditional ties 
with the West with its new opportunities in the East. First, 
policymakers felt that their economic and military reliance on the 
West was excessive, mendicant, and too lengthy. Seoul sought to 
correct this situation by establishing its own self-reliant global 
posture. This desire to be less dependent became particularly acute 
as Seoul's Western allies greatly improved relations with Eastern 
Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. 

Second, Nordpolitik was designed to expand and diversify trade 
relations on a global scale to cope with increasing trade protec- 
tionism from the United States. Intentionally or not, the policy 
aroused anti- Americanism. Ironically enough, the rising anti- 
United States feeling was accompanied by increasing demands for 
economic and political democracy, culminating in the Kwangju 
incident in May 1980. 

Finally, Nordpolitik involved the pursuit of wide-ranging rela- 
tions with socialist countries and contacts and dialogue with North 
Korea. It had often been observed that political leaders in Pyong- 
yang and Seoul utilized their confrontational postures to sustain 
their political legitimacy. Claiming that Pyongyang's response had 
been far from satisfactory, Seoul's policymakers solicited assistance 
and cooperation from Pyongyang's socialist allies to induce and 
persuade P'yongyang to become more accommodating. Yet Seoul's 
success in improving relations with P'yongyang' s socialist allies had 
not resulted in substantially improved relations with P'yongyang 
by 1990. In fact, for the short term, Seoul even might have less- 
ened its chances for improved relations with P'yongyang by hav- 
ing improved its relations with North Korea's socialist allies and 
by raising the question of whether Nordpolitik was primarily 
designed to confront and compete with P'yongyang. Thus far, 
Nordpolitik clearly demonstrated the limited power of P'yongyang' s 
socialist allies, particularly Moscow and Beijing, vis-a-vis the ex- 
tremely self-reliant North Korea. In reality, Seoul may have grossly 
underestimated Pyongyang's firmly established independence. 



252 



Twenty -two-story combined government and ministerial building, Seoul 
Courtesy Korean Overseas Information Service 



253 



South Korea: A Country Study 

On the whole, however, Nordpolitik was successful, and Seoul's 
accomplishments could be readily observed in sports, trade, and 
diplomacy. The 1988 Seoul Olympics was a major catalyst for Nord- 
politik. It was the first Olympic Games in twelve years not marred 
by a bloc-level boycott and had the highest participation ever — 1 59 
nations and more than 9,000 athletes. Seoul gained new global 
recognition and visibility as more than 3 billion people around the 
world watched the games being televised live. 

Had it not been for the North Korean bombing of KAL 858 over 
the Andaman Sea in November 1987, Seoul might have been more 
willing to reach out to P'yongyang. While the much-feared and 
predicted North Korean misbehavior over South Korea's staging 
of the Olympics did not materialize, Seoul probably was relieVed 
by Pyongyang's absence from the games. 

Seoul's international trade record has been impressive (see For- 
eign Economic Relations, ch. 3). While encountering, along with 
other newly industrialized nations, mounting trade friction with 
the United States and other major markets, Seoul emerged in the 
late 1980s as the world's tenth-largest trading nation. Economic 
reforms and the open-door policies of socialist countries, coupled 
with their recognition of Seoul's economic growth, pushed economic 
trade and cooperation between South Korea and socialist coun- 
tries into full swing. 

Perhaps Seoul's most impressive success was in diplomacy. Liter- 
ally implementing the 1988 Olympics slogan, "From Seoul to the 
World, and from the World to Seoul," by the beginning of 1990 
South Korea had established diplomatic relations with 133 coun- 
tries and had 138 diplomatic missions, including representative 
offices and a consulate department in Moscow. Conversely, North 
Korea had diplomatic relations with 102 countries and 85 overseas 
missions. An impressive number of young South Korean diplo- 
mats were trained in the West and actively implemented Nord- 
politik. These diplomats were also supported by the aggressive 
worldwide market diversification programs of South Korea's big 
business establishments, the chaebol, and by an increasingly large 
number of overseas South Koreans, many of whom become 
salespersons of South Korean products (see The Origins and De- 
velopment of Chaebol, ch. 3). 

After Roh's inauguration in February 1988, Nordpolitik was par- 
ticularly invigorated. In a July 7, 1988, statement primarily aimed 
at insuring the success of the Olympics, Roh unveiled a six-point 
plan to ease forty years of bitter confrontation between Seoul and 
P'yongyang and to clear the way for peaceful unification of the 
divided peninsula. In the afterglow of the Olympics, Roh made 



254 



Government and Politics 



his diplomatic debut as the first South Korean president to address 
the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, on October 18, 1988. 
Roh's speech called for a six-nation consultative conference to dis- 
cuss a broad range of issues concerning peace, stability, progress, 
and prosperity in Northeast Asia. Pledging unilaterally never to 
use force first against North Korea, Roh proposed to replace the 
existing 1953 armistice agreement with a peace treaty. 

Relations with the United States 

South Korea's relations with the United States have been most 
extensive and intense since 1948. This relation was perhaps inevita- 
ble because South Korea was primarily established by the United 
States and was saved from a total collapse in the course of the 
Korean War (1950-53) by the United States-initiated, United 
Nations- sponsored rescue operation. During the subsequent four 
decades, however, Seoul came of age economically, politically, and 
even militarily and was no longer as economically or militarily de- 
pendent on the United States. Instead, by the 1990s it was seeking 
to establish a partnership for progress. The Seoul- Washington rela- 
tionship in this transition was increasingly subject to severe strains. 

Trade had become a serious source of friction between the two 
countries. In 1989 the United States was South Korea's largest and 
most important trading partner, and South Korea was the seventh- 
largest market for United States goods and the second-largest market 
for its agricultural products. Friction, however, had been caused 
in the late 1980s by South Korea's trade surplus. Correcting and 
eliminating this trade imbalance became the center of economic 
controversy between Seoul and Washington. Although Seoul gave 
in to Washington's demands to avoid being designated as a "pri- 
ority foreign country" (PFC) under the United States "Super 301 " 
provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 
economic policymakers in Seoul greatiy resented this unilateral eco- 
nomic threat. They also feared that the PFC designation would 
fuel anti- Americanism throughout South Korea. 

Security was another source of strain. Some policymakers in 
Seoul and Washington maintained that United States forces should 
remain in South Korea as long as Seoul wanted and needed them. 
Not only did 94 percent of South Koreans support the presence 
of United States forces, but even the vocal opposition parties fa- 
vored a continued United States military presence in South Korea. 
Stability in the peninsula, they argued, had been maintained be- 
cause strong Seoul-Washington military cooperation had deterred 
further aggression. 



255 



South Korea: A Country Study 



Other policymakers, however, felt that United States troops 
should gradually be leaving South Korea. They argued that South 
Korea in the late 1980s was more economically, militarily, and po- 
litically capable of coping with North Korea. Moreover, they doubt- 
ed that P'yongyang could contemplate another military action, 
given its acrimonious relationships with Moscow and Beijing. In 
Washington, meanwhile, an increasing number of United States 
policymakers advocated gradual troop withdrawal for budgetary 
reasons. The consultations on restructuring the Washington- Seoul 
security relationship held during Secretary of Defense Richard B . 
Cheney's February 1990 visit to South Korea marked the begin- 
ning of the change in status of United States forces — from a lead- 
ing to a supporting role in South Korea's defense. In addition, Seoul 
was asked to increase substantially its contribution to defense costs. 
Although the precise amount of savings would be difficult to mea- 
sure, the United States would likely save at least US$2 billion to 
US$3 billion annually if defense costs were restructured as the United 
States wished. Furthermore, disengagement would avoid the potential 
for American entanglement in complicated internal South Korean 
politics. In short, it was suggested that it was time for Seoul to be 
treated as an independent entity responsible for its own security. 

Politics also strained relations between Seoul and Washington. 
An increasingly sensitive South Korean nationalism was faced with 
what Seoul viewed as a hardened Washington. The United States 
role in the May 1980 Kwangju uprising was the single most press- 
ing South Korean political issue of the 1980s. Even after a decade, 
Kwangju citizens and other Koreans still blamed the United States 
for its perceived involvement in the bloody uprising. 

Washington's policymakers applauded Nordpolitik as a neces- 
sary adjustment of the relationship between Seoul and Moscow. 
However, the South Korean press contributed to a distorted zero- 
sum notion of the situation, suggesting that improving ties with 
the Soviet Union would cause strains in the relationship with the 
United States. In his February 1989 speech to the South Korean 
National Assembly, President George Bush defined continuity and 
change as the guideposts in Seoul- Washington relations. 

Relations with the Soviet Union 

Seoul-Moscow relations entered a new era in the 1980s. In many 
ways, Roh's Nordpolitik and Mikhail Gorbachev's "New Think- 
ing" had something in common — they were attempts to reverse 
their nations' recent histories. Their efforts, while supported by 
popular longings, still confronted serious resistance from conser- 
vative and powerful bureaucracies. In a fundamental sense, the 



256 



Government and Politics 



Soviet economic crisis appeared responsible for Moscow's improved 
relations with Seoul. Politically, Gorbachev had signaled Soviet 
interest in improving relations with all countries in the Asia-Pacific 
region irrespective of sociopolitical system, including South Korea, 
as was clearly spelled out in his July 1986 Vladivostok and August 
1988 Krasnoyarsk speeches. 

Improved Seoul-Moscow relations appear to have been careful- 
ly and systematically planned in three related stages: sports, trade, 
and political relations. The Seoul Olympics was a major catalyst. 
The Soviets were eager to participate in the games, if only for the 
sake of the athletic competition. Seoul's most honored guests were 
from the Soviet Union. Moscow sent more than 6,000 Soviets to 
South Korea. Soviet tourist ships came to Pusan and Inch 'on, and 
Aeroflot planes landed in Seoul. And when the Soviet team head- 
ed for home, it also took along thirty- six South Korean television 
sets, seven minibuses, four large buses, four cars, and one copy 
machine — all gifts from Daewoo. 

Economically, Seoul and Moscow were natural partners. South 
Korea had been seeking to trade with the Soviet Union even be- 
fore Gorbachev came to power. Gorbachev desired foreign capital 
and high technology, as well as Seoul's help in alleviating the Soviet 
economic crisis through direct investment, joint ventures, and trade. 
Moreover, with the advantage of geographic proximity, South 
Korea was an ideal source of badly needed consumer goods and 
managerial skills. As early as May 1979, during a visit to Helsinki, 
then South Korean minister of foreign affairs Pak Tong-jin signed 
an agreement obtaining Finnish assistance in exporting South 
Korean products to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Seoul 
has welcomed trade opportunities with Moscow and considers the 
Soviet Union a significant part of the global market. Moreover, 
the natural resources Seoul increasingly needs — oil, metals, tim- 
ber, and fish — are abundant in the Soviet Far East. Trade with 
the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China would also allevi- 
ate South Korea's apprehension over the United States' increas- 
ing trade protectionism. Moreover, South Korea's expanding trade 
with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union initially was encouraged 
by the United States, although Washington later became increas- 
ingly concerned over possible high-technology transfers. 

Because of the lack of diplomatic relations, most South Korean- 
Soviet trade initially was indirect; Eastern Europe, Hong Kong, 
Japan, and Singapore served as intermediaries. With an increas- 
ing volume of trade, Seoul and Moscow began trading direcdy, using 
facilities near Vladivostok and Pusan. Several major South Korean 



257 



South Korea: A Country Study 

businesses, including Daewoo, Sunkyong, and Lucky-Goldstar, 
traded directly with the Soviet Union in 1990. 

Based on mutual economic interests, the Korean Trade Promo- 
tion Corporation (KOTRA) and the Soviet Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry exchanged a trade memorandum in 1988 pledging 
mutual assistance in establishing trade offices in 1989. During a 
six-day visit to Seoul in October 1988, Vladimir Golanov, deputy 
chairman of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry, was 
received by officials of South Korea's major multinationals. 
KOTRA president Yi Sun-gi signed the trade memorandum in 
Moscow in December 1988. Seoul's trade office in Moscow opened 
in July 1989; Moscow's trade office in Seoul opened in April 1989. 
In December 1989, Seoul invited Soviet officials to attend a trade 
exhibition where members of the Soviet state-run Tekhsnabeksport 
displayed impressive high-technology items. 

Political relations were developing gradually. South Korea's new- 
found wealth and technological prowess had been attracting the 
interest of a growing number of socialist nations. In initiating Nord- 
politik, its chief architect Pak Ch'6r-6n — Roh's confidential for- 
eign policy adviser — was rumored to have visited Moscow to consult 
with Soviet policymakers. Kim Young Sam visited Moscow from 
June 2 to June 10, 1989, with the apparent approval of the Roh 
administration. Selected from among several other South Korean 
politicians (including Kim Dae Jung, who had reportedly been in- 
vited to Moscow) to make certain that the newly emerging Seoul- 
Moscow relationship would proceed steadily, Kim Young Sam was 
received as a guest of the Soviet Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations (IMEMO). He participated in talks with 
various Soviet officials, including the newly elected chairman of 
the Supreme Soviet, academician Yevgeni Primakov. In a joint state- 
ment, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) and IMEMO 
pledged to promote closer trade and cultural ties between the two 
nations. While Kim Young Sam was in Moscow, the Kremlin 
announced that it would allow some 300,000 Soviet-Koreans who 
had been on the Soviet island of Sahkalin since the end of World 
War II to return permanently to South Korea — clearly a reflec- 
tion of the continuing improvement in Seoul-Moscow relations. 

Moscow even arranged a Seoul-P'yongyang meeting. During 
the meeting, which was planned by IMEMO, Kim Young Sam, 
with Roh's prior approval, met with the North Korean ambassador 
to the Soviet Union, Kwon Hui-gyong, who reportedly proposed 
a regular exchange between the RDP and the Korean Workers' 
Party (KWP), as well as a North-South summit meeting. Kim 
also met with Ho Tarn, chairman of the Committee for Peaceful 



258 



Government and Politics 



Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF), who came to Moscow 
from P'yongyang. 

The progress in Seoul-Moscow relations was extraordinary. 
Given the complementary and parallel interests between Seoul and 
Moscow, their relations were likely to proceed even if there were 
temporary setbacks. A highly experienced South Korean diplomat, 
Kong No-myong, was assigned to the Moscow consulate; an equally 
experienced Soviet diplomat was posted to Seoul. In June 1990, 
Roh held his first summit with President Mikhail S. Gorbachev 
in San Francisco. Moscow's "Seoul Rush" may be regarded as 
an effort to reconcile (and possibly to terminate) its past political- 
military obligations to P'yongyang with the new economic and stra- 
tegic opportunities in Seoul. Seoul's "Moscow Rush" had been 
conceived primarily as a way to utilize its growing economic power 
for political purposes, particularly in its relations with P'yong- 
yang. On the other hand, if indeed the final destination of Nord- 
politik was P'yongyang, Seoul had thus far proved to be less 
successful than Moscow. 

Relations with Japan 

Korea is geographically close, yet emotionally distant from Japan. 
Given the historical relationship between the two countries, the 
paradoxical nature of their relation is readily understandable. Since 
normalizing relations in 1965 at the urging of the United States, 
Seoul and Tokyo have held annual foreign ministerial conferences. 
The usual issues discussed have been trade, the status of the Korean 
minority population in Japan, the content of textbooks dealing with 
the relationship, Tokyo's equidistant policy between P'yongyang 
and Seoul, and the occasional problems (see Foreign Policy, ch. 1). 

At the first of three ministerial conferences held in 1987 (in Seoul, 
New York, and Geneva, respectively), the two countries' foreign 
ministers discussed pending issues, including Seoul's trade deficit 
with Tokyo. The Japanese minister of foreign affairs pledged to as- 
sist Seoul in its role as host of the Olympics. Seoul and Tokyo signed 
a bilateral agreement on sea rescue and emergency cooperation. 

The 1988 foreign ministerial conference was held in Tokyo. There 
the two countries agreed to expand exchanges of youths, students, 
and teachers and to establish the twenty-first century committee 
between the two nations, as well as a joint security consultative 
committee for the Seoul Olympics. 

Roh's Nordpolitik somewhat relaxed Seoul's vehement opposi- 
tion to Tokyo's approach to P'yongyang. The Japan Socialist Party, 
in particular, has become active in improving relations not only 
between P'yongyang and Tokyo, but also between itself and Seoul. 



259 



South Korea: A Country Study 

As the Japan Socialist Party has abandoned its posture favoring 
P'yongyang, Seoul has welcomed the new equidistant policy, in- 
viting a former secretary general of the Japan Socialist Party, 
Ishibashi Masashi, to Seoul in October 1988. Ishibashi's visit was 
unusually productive, not only in improving his party's image in 
Seoul, but also in his reported willingness to mediate between Seoul 
and P'yongyang. Although Tokyo appeared willing to assist Seoul 
in improving relations not only with P'yongyang but also with Bei- 
jing, it did not seem to welcome the much-improved Seoul-Moscow 
relationship. Further, Seoul-Tokyo relations became somewhat 
strained when in 1989 Tokyo began steps to improve relations with 
P'yongyang. 

Relations with China 

Nordpolitik has been viewed as less attractive in Beijing than 
in Moscow. Beijing's needs for Seoul in the 1980s were hardly 
matched with those of Moscow, particularly in economic terms. 
Still, because of complementary economic needs and geographic 
proximity, South Korea and China began to trade actively. The 
absence of any official relations, however, made it difficult to ex- 
pand trade between Seoul and Beijing because South Korea could 
not legally protect its citizens and business interests in China. 

Beijing, in comparison with Moscow, has been politically closer 
to P'yongyang, a situation that has slowed political improvements 
between Beijing and Seoul despite the increasing volume of trade 
between the two countries. Furthermore, China has attempted to 
mediate between North Korea and the United States and North 
Korea and Japan and also has initiated and promoted tripartite 
talks among P'yongyang, Seoul, and Washington. 

Active South Korean-Chinese people-to-people contacts have 
been encouraged. Academics, journalists, and particularly fami- 
lies divided between South Korea and China were able to exchange 
visits freely in the late 1980s. Nearly 2 million ethnic Koreans, es- 
pecially in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in China's 
Jilin Province, have interacted with South Koreans. 

It has been difficult to determine what effect the political tur- 
moil in China will have on Sino-Korean relations. After the mili- 
tary crackdown on demonstrators in Beijing in June 1989, 
P'yongyang predictably came out in support of Beijing's repres- 
sive actions. Seoul, on the other hand, produced a more muted 
response that did not condone the actions in Tiananmen Square 
but did not condemn them either. Trade between the two coun- 
tries continued to increase. 



260 



Government and Politics 



Relations with North Korea 

Nordpolitik's final destination — P'yongyang — has proved difficult 
to reach. After nearly two decades, inter-Korean relations had not 
improved measurably. In fact, it may be argued that political leaders 
in Seoul and P'yongyang have skillfully used the perceived mutual 
threat to maintain and justify their political legitimacy. Their pos- 
tures may seem reasonable, given that until the precarious 1953 
armistice agreement is replaced by a permanent peace treaty, the 
Korean War cannot be considered completely over. Nevertheless, 
Seoul and P'yongyang have been increasing their contacts across 
and around the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in a gradual and un- 
even fashion. These expanding contacts appear quite natural be- 
cause there are an estimated 10 million separated family members. 
Moreover, South Korean business leaders have been keenly aware 
of potential economic benefits in improved relations with North 
Korea. Inasmuch as inter-Korean contacts are gradually becom- 
ing a "growth industry," their prospects appear promising. 

Inter-Korean relations may be divided into four periods. The 
first stage covered the period between 1972 and 1973; the second 
stage was initiated by Pyongyang's delivery of relief goods to South 
Korea after a typhoon caused devastating floods in 1984; and the 
third stage began with the exchange of home visits and perform- 
ing artists in 1985. The fourth stage, activated by Nordpolitik un- 
der Roh, was represented by expanding public and private contacts 
between the two Koreas. These working-level contacts have included 
Red Cross talks aimed at exchanging home visits by divided fami- 
lies and performing artists; sports talks aimed at establishing a uni- 
fied team for the 1990 Beijing Asian Games; economic trade at 
the level of premiers; preliminary talks for joint parliamentary meet- 
ings; and expanded academic and religious exchanges. 

The Nordpolitik blueprint — Roh's declaration of July 7, 1988 — 
opened a new chapter in inter-Korean dialogue. Calling for the 
building of a single "national commonwealth," Roh solicited the 
assistance of Washington and Tokyo to improve Seoul's relations 
with Moscow and Beijing. At the same time, he encouraged Wash- 
ington and Tokyo to improve relations with P'yongyang and to ex- 
pand inter-Korean exchanges. Roh urged a positive response from 
P'yongyang; North Korea's reaction, however, was not positive. 

P'yongyang issued an immediate and detailed statement on July 
11, 1988. The CPRF dismissed Roh's proposal as old wine in a 
new bottle, claiming that only the 1972 three basic principles for 
Korean reunification — reunification by peaceful means, by tran- 
scending ideological differences (nationalism), and without external 



261 



South Korea: A Country Study 

interference (self-determination) — could be the basis to improve 
inter-Korean dialogue. Seen from Pyongyang's perspective, Roh's 
July 7 proposal was nothing more than a political ploy to cope with 
increasing radical student agitation that opposed Seoul's hosting 
of the Olympics without Pyongyang's participation. Consequendy, 
Roh's statement angered rather than mollified Pyongyang's 
posture, which was based on Kim II Sung's proposal to establish 
a Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea. 

Meanwhile, Seoul began to speak more openly about the rising 
level of direct and indirect inter-Korean trade, much to the dis- 
pleasure of P'yongyang. P'yongyang claimed that Seoul had fabri- 
cated these trade stories. By 1988, however, Seoul began to reduce 
tariffs and other duties to liberalize trade with P'yongyang. Trade 
statistics provided by Seoul and P'yongyang on north- south trade 
were largely unreliable inasmuch as each government had its own 
reasons for reporting high or low figures. Much of the trade was 
conducted through third parties. 

Pyongyang's response to Seoul consisted of three points: ask- 
ing for the repeal of the National Security Act, which designated 
P'yongyang an enemy; making a declaration of nonaggression; and 
establishing a "Peaceful Reunification Committee." Over the next 
few months, Roh's government attempted to make progress toward 
satisfying each of these requirements. In his October 18, 1988, Unit- 
ed Nations speech, Roh advocated convening a six-nation consul- 
tative conference to achieve a permanent peace setdement in Korea 
and called for establishing a partnership with P'yongyang. In his 
1989 New Year's address, Kim II Sung extended an invitation to 
the presidents of the major South Korean political parties and re- 
ligious leaders, including Cardinal Kim Soo Hwan, Reverend Mun 
Ik-hwan, and Reverend Paek Ki-wan, for a leadership-level inter- 
Korean reunification meeting to be held in P'yongyang. However, 
any meaningful inter-Korean dialogue bogged down at Pyong- 
yang's objections to the annual United States-South Korean Team 
Spirit military exercises. 

Economic relations have demonstrated more promise. An autho- 
rized public visit to North Korea by Chong Chu-yong, honorary 
chairman of the Hyundai Group, in early 1989 (in technical viola- 
tion of South Korea's National Security Act) was a remarkable 
breakthrough. After years of behind-the-scene efforts, Chong, 
through a South Korean intermediary in Japan, was invited by 
P'yongyang and fulfilled his long- cherished dream of seeing his 
relatives at his native village, near scenic Kumgang-san. Chong 
was received in P'yongyang by Ho Tarn, Chairman of the Com- 
mittee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, and by 



262 



President Roh Tae Woo 
Courtesy Embassy of the 
Republic of Korea, Washington 




business leaders eager to discuss large-scale economic cooperation, 
such as joint ventures and development of the tourist industry. 
Chong's visit caused euphoric expectations and also engendered other 
visits. 

Many of Chong's expected business dealings, however, suffered 
temporary setbacks after his return to South Korea. These setbacks 
were primarily caused by the unauthorized visits to North Korea 
of Reverend Mun Ik-hwan (March- April 1989), South Korean law- 
maker So Kyong-won (who had secretly visited P'yongyang in Au- 
gust 1988, had been accused of the visit in June 28, 1989, and had 
been sentenced in December 1989 to fifteen years in prison), and 
dissident South Korean student representative, Im Su-kyong (who 
had attended the thirteenth World Youth and Student Festival, July 
1-8, 1989, in P'yongyang and later had been sentenced to a prison 
term). The government's harsh handling of these visits clearly 
showed that it intended to keep the initiative in dealings with North 
Korea, but the action also appeared to some Koreans to contradict 
Roh' s July 7 statement encouraging free inter-Korean contacts at 
various levels. That Roh's statement itself seemed to disregard the 
National Security Act added momentum to dissident calls for the 
law's abrogation or revision. 

Relations with International Organizations and the Third World 

South Korea has been very active in the United Nations (UN) 



263 



South Korea: A Country Study 

even though, as of 1990, it was not a member. Seoul has taken 
a vigorous part in the activities of various subsidiary and special- 
ized UN agencies, as well as other international organizations, and 
has had active permanent missions to the UN, the UN Economic 
and Social Council and its Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific, and the European Community. An increas- 
ing number of UN Security Council members, including the Soviet 
Union, tended to consider seriously Seoul's bid for separate entry 
into the UN. This move was vehemently opposed by North Korea, 
which claimed that such a recognition would make the division of 
Korea permanent. 

Seoul's activities in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Confer- 
ence (PECC) were particularly noteworthy. As a founding mem- 
ber of the PECC, South Korea played a key role in liberalizing trade 
networks throughout the entire Pacific region. The South Korean 
national committee of the PECC represented academic, business, 
and government interests. The national committee was extremely 
useful not only in formulating Seoul's trade policies, but also in com- 
municating these policies to other members' national committees and 
in successfully negotiating mutually advantageous trade agreements. 

Equally impressive has been Seoul's diplomacy toward the de- 
veloping world. Being a developing nation itself, South Korea has 
identified with other developing nations. For this reason, and in ap- 
parent competition with P'yongyang, Seoul has been actively seek- 
ing to improve relations, particularly with nonaligned nations, based 
on the principles of good neighborliness, reciprocity, and equality. 
As of January 1990, Seoul had full diplomatic relations with seventy- 
eight members of the Nonaligned Movement, including Yugosla- 
via and Algeria. To promote economic assistance and expand trade, 
Seoul established the Economic Development Cooperation Fund in 
1987. South Korea signed three loan agreements: US$13 million 
for a road construction project in Indonesia, US$10 million for 
modernization of fishing vessels in Peru, and US$10 million for rail- 
way projects in Nigeria. To promote better relations with develop- 
ing countries on the basis of south-south cooperation, Roh made 
state visits to Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei in November 1988. 

Future Prospects 

Seoul became more globally conscious in the 1980s. South Korean 
contacts with foreigners have been largely a post-Korean War 
phenomenon. Indeed, Seoul's expanding foreign business contacts 
have been greatiy stimulated by the fierce rivalry with North Korea. 
Seoul's basic goals are still to enhance political legitimacy, military 
security, and economic development vis-a-vis P'yongyang. After the 



264 



Government and Politics 



1988 Seoul Olympics, however, South Korea's diplomatic horizon 
was greatly expanded because of Roh's Nordpolitik, which had suc- 
cessfully transformed South Korea's sports industry, economic re- 
lations, and diplomacy (although its success with P'yongyang was 
limited) . 

Lacking a reconciliation with North Korea — the final destina- 
tion of Nordpolitik — Roh's remarkable accomplishments will re- 
main incomplete. In his 1990 New Year policy statement, Roh 
observed that "the East European wave of reform toward freedom 
and prosperity is bound to teach North Korea before long. ' ' He 
added that he hoped that "similar change will take place in the 
North in an orderly and peaceful fashion." Roh pledged "[a]ll- 
out efforts ... to convince North Korea . . . that it should join 
the trend of world history and open up." 

* * * 

A number of introductory books on South Korean domestic pol- 
itics and foreign relations are available in English. Ki-baik Lee's 
A New History of Korea is a Korean scholar's perspective on Korean 
political history, valuable chiefly for its examination of the period 
before 1945. Ramon H. Myers and Mark Peattie's The Japanese 
Colonial Empire, 1895-1945 sheds light on the colonial roots of sub- 
sequent South Korean political cultural and behavior. Young Whan 
Kihl's Politics and Policies in Divided Korea compares political leader- 
ship and styles in the two Koreas, while Ralph N. Clough's Em- 
battled Korea is a thorough and cogent treatment of diplomacy and 
extradiplomatic foreign policies as seen through the prism of rivalry 
between the two Koreas. Dae-Kyu Yoon's Law and Political Authority 
in Korea is an excellent and detailed study of the interaction be- 
tween law and politics in the Republic of Korea. 

A number of useful articles on South Korean foreign relations 
and the United States-Korean relationship are contained in Robert 
A. Scalapino's and Hongkoo Lee's Korea-U.S. Relations. Donald 
Stone Macdonald's The Koreans, although not limited to politics, 
is a useful survey. David I. Steinberg's The Republic of Korea con- 
tains many insightful observations on South Korean politics. Kim 
Dae Jung is the only major political figure to have his views pub- 
lished extensively in English. Mass Participatory Economy gives his 
views on South Korean political economy as of the mid-1980s; Prison 
Writings presents his thoughts on South Korean political culture 
and other subjects. Human Rights in Korea, edited by William Shaw, 
contains several chapters on postwar South Korean political and 
human rights issues. The United States Department of State's June 



265 



South Korea: A Country Study 

1989 "United States Government Statement on the Events in 
Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May 1980" also is a valuable 
document. 

Following the abolition of the Basic Press Act in 1988, the South 
Korean media became a rich source of both factual and interpre- 
tive material on politics and government. Korea Newsreview, based 
on coverage of the government-owned Korea Herald newspaper, 
presents weekly articles concerning politics and foreign affairs, 
generally from a progovernment point of view; beginning in 1987, 
the publication has also printed the writings of dissenting guest 
columnists. The full spectrum of Seoul's Korean-language news 
media coverage on political topics is sampled and translated in the 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily Report: East Asia. 
The United States Embassy in Seoul publishes its Press Transla- 
tions: Korea six days each week. 

Outside political analysis may be found in monthly periodicals, 
including Asian Survey and The Journal of Northeast Asian Studies. The 
monthly Korea Update contains news and commentary on politics 
and human rights issues. Perceptive accounts of the political scene 
are found in Far Eastern Economic Review and Asian Wall Street Jour- 
nal, as well in major United States dailies such as the Washington 
Post, New York Times, and Christian Science Monitor. 

Among annual publications are Korea Annual, published by the 
state- sponsored Yonhap News Agency, and the Asia Yearbook, pub- 
lished by the Far Eastern Economic Review. Amnesty International's 
Report on Human Rights contains a chapter on South Korea in each 
annual edition, as does the Department of State's Country Reports 
on Human Rights Practices. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



266 



Chapter 5. National Security 




Signal Fire Tower, Suwon Castle, sited with a view of the royal villa. The 
tower offered an important means of communication. 



DURING SOUTH KOREA'S Fifth Republic (1981-87), the 
modernization of the armed forces was one of the highest priori- 
ties of Chun Doo Hwan's administration. As a result, when Chun's 
term in office ended, he left behind one of the best-equipped mili- 
tary forces in Asia. Army units had been reorganized and equipped 
with indigenously produced weapons. The improvement of defense 
fortifications and supply systems along the southern side of the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) ensured that ground forces were bet- 
ter prepared to defend South Korea than at any time since the end 
of the Korean War (1950-53). An automated air defense system, 
jointly managed by the army and air force, reduced the possibility 
that South Korea would be caught unprepared in the event of a 
surprise attack. As a by-product of rapid industrialization and 
coproduction agreements with United States and West European 
firms, South Korean aircraft producers and shipbuilders were able 
to supply most of the country's needs for modern fighter aircraft, 
helicopters, coastal patrol vessels, and other equipment required 
by the air force and navy. 

A tenuous peace held throughout the 1980s on the Korean 
Peninsula — tenuous because the government of the Democratic Peo- 
ple 's Republic of Korea (North Korea) in P'yongyang continued 
to expand its armed forces and to deploy two-thirds of all military 
units — army, navy, and air force — in a combat-ready status close 
to the DMZ. Moreover, North Korean-directed terrorist activity 
against South Korea threatened to provoke a renewal of hostili- 
ties. In 1980 P'yongyang and Seoul each had about 600,000 mili- 
tary personnel on active duty. From 1980 to 1985, the North Korean 
armed forces increased by 150,000 people, whereas the South 
Korean armed forces expanded modestly by about 5,000 people. 
In 1990 North Korea's armed forces had 1.4 million military per- 
sonnel on active duty. South Korea's armed forces had 650,000 
persons on active duty and another 1,240,000 persons in the 
reserves. 

Under Chun's leadership, Seoul cautiously promoted a peace- 
ful dialogue with North Korea and encouraged the expansion of 
north-south contacts in the early 1980s; P'yongyang remained unin- 
terested in these overtures and on at least two occasions perpetrat- 
ed terrorist attacks that increased tension on the Korean Peninsula. 
The primary purpose of South Korean peace proposals in 1981 
and 1982 was to realize a summit meeting between Chun and North 



269 



South Korea: A Country Study 

Korean president Kim II Sung. South Korean leaders hoped that 
the establishment of a government- to- government dialogue would 
lead to agreements reducing the size of the armed forces of both 
countries and establishing the framework for a peace plan to replace 
the 1953 armistice. 

In October 1983, a P'yongyang-directed terrorist attack result- 
ed in the cessation of the peace process. A bomb that exploded in 
Rangoon, Burma, killed twenty-one people, including seventeen 
high-ranking officials of the South Korean government then visit- 
ing Burma. The bombing was planned and executed by personnel 
drawn from North Korean army units. Chun's decision not to retali- 
ate with force set a precedent that won him praise from abroad 
and sympathy for his unpopular regime at home. Seoul's reliance 
on diplomatic and economic measures to counter terrorism rather 
than a small-scale attack on a North Korean target, which could 
be used as an excuse for beginning an all-out war, effectively mobi- 
lized international public opinion to limit trade and other contacts 
with North Korea. 

Another terrorist attack occurred in September 1987 when two 
North Korean saboteurs placed a bomb on a Seoul-bound Korean 
Air Boeing 707 aircraft carrying ninety- five passengers and twenty 
crew members. The plane exploded over the Andaman Sea (south 
of Burma), killing all aboard. Chun, following the precedent set 
in 1983 after the Rangoon bombing, ruled out military retaliation 
and asked the international community to condemn North Korea 
for its continued belligerence. 

South Korea also experienced an increase in politically motivated 
domestic violence during the 1980s. For the first time, a small, vocal 
segment of the population persistently challenged former and cur- 
rent military leaders, including Chun, to stay out of politics. The 
1980 Kwangju rebellion was used by disenfranchised politicians 
and disillusioned radical students as a rallying cry. Moderates were 
encouraged to pressure Chun to change the constitution and pub- 
lic security laws to guarantee that soldiers, police, and the intelli- 
gence services would never again be turned against the people. 
Seoul's claims that the radical student organizations were fronts 
for North Korea gradually lost credibility, particularly in 1985, 
when student participation in the political process contributed to 
the high proportion of votes cast for the New Korea Democratic 
Party in that year's parliamentary elections. Public indignation con- 
cerning increasingly brutal attacks on dissidents by police became 
a major political issue in January 1987 when Pak Chong-ch'ol, a 
Seoul National University student, was tortured and subsequent- 
ly died while in police custody. From March through June 1987, 



270 



National Security 



combat police units of the Korean National Police responsible for 
crowd control were constantly on the move as antigovernment 
demonstrations, sometimes including tens of thousands of ordinary 
citizens, became everyday occurrences in Seoul, Pusan, Kwangju, 
and other cities. 

After the inauguration of Roh Tae Woo as president in Febru- 
ary 1988, attention once again reverted to North Korea as the fore- 
most threat to security. Roh made good his promise to ensure the 
safety of athletes and spectators from around the world who came 
to Seoul for the 1988 Seoul Olympics. Japan and the United States 
provided direct security assistance during this period, the former 
by closely monitoring the thousands of airline flights and visitors 
passing through Tokyo and other Japanese cities en route to the 
event, the latter by deploying additional air, naval, and security 
units in and around South Korea before and during the Olym- 
pics. Following the Olympics, Roh relaxed restrictions on South 
Korean contacts with North Koreans, gave in to increasing demands 
for social spending, and acknowledged growing skepticism about 
the threat from P'yongyang, all of which resulted in reducing the 
percentage of the budget spent on defense. These policies were 
designed to encourage reciprocal moves by North Korea and to 
reduce tension between the two Koreas. 

In 1989 Roh publicized plans to restructure the South Korean 
armed forces to enhance their defensive capabilities. Seoul also 
planned to acquire new types of technologically sophisticated 
weapons to prepare the armed forces for warfare and defense in 
the twenty-first century. 

Development of the Armed Forces 
KoguryO, Si I la, and KoryO Kingdoms 

Historical records suggest that the Koguryo Kingdom was the first 
Korean state to emphasize the military arts. From the first through 
the fourth centuries A.D., the Koguryo tribes frequently fought 
with Chinese and other groups for control of the region from the 
Liao River south to the Yalu River, the latter forming today's in- 
ternational boundary between North Korea and China. Modern 
South Korean textbooks emphasize an unbroken history of foreign 
incursions. Like the early warrior kings of Paekche and Silla, 
however, King Kwanggaet'o, who ruled Koguryo from 391 to 412, 
significantly added to his state's territory by military conquest, absorb- 
ing neighboring tribes and fortified towns throughout present-day 
northeastern China and down into the Korean Peninsula (see Silla; 



271 



South Korea: A Country Study 

Koryo, ch. 1). The Koguryo established military units in each of 
their five tribes. Each tribal army had about 10,000 men. An elected 
leader in charge of all military forces in the kingdom headed the 
chain of command. It was considered an honor for a man to be 
selected to be a soldier by the council of elders. 

In the seventh century, the Silla Kingdom united Korea south 
of the Taedong River and successfully resisted repeated campaigns 
by the rulers of Sui (581-617) and Tang (618-907) China to con- 
quer all of Korea. Under Silla rule, the king placed military com- 
manders in charge of civil and military affairs in all of the country's 
local districts. A military academy was established in the capital 
city of Kyongju and was open to young men of aristocratic birth. 
Upon completion of their training, these young men were given 
the title hwarang, meaning Flower Knight. Most of the great mili- 
tary leaders of Silla trained at this academy and dedicated their 
lives to military service. 

During the Koryo Dynasty (918-1392), Korea remained in- 
dependent until the kingdom was invaded by the Mongols in 1231 . 
King Taejo (918-39) was a merchant and military leader who re- 
unified the peninsula after the political fragmentation that followed 
the decline of the Silla Dynasty in the late ninth century. During 
the reign of King Munjong (1046-83), Korea's northern bound- 
aries once again reached the Yalu and Tumen rivers. King Mun- 
jong established two military districts along the northern border 
and based army units there to defend the kingdom. Following a 
military coup led by socially and economically disgruntled gener- 
als in 1170, Koryo kings (most notably those of the Ch'oe family) 
became virtual puppets of military leaders from 1196 to 1258. In 
1259, at the end of several years of warfare with the Mongols, Koryo 
capitulated, becoming a vassal of the Mongol Yuan Dynasty 
(1279-1364) based in Dadu, which is modern Beijing (see The Evo- 
lution of Korean Society, ch. 1). King Kongmin (1351-74), 
however, increasingly resisted Yuan-imposed institutions and sided 
with the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) against the Mongols. Yi Song- 
gye, one of Kongmin's commanders, rebelled against the effort of 
Kongmin' s son to reverse Korea's pro-Ming orientation and in 
1392 established the Choson Dynasty. 

The Choson Dynasty and the Japanese Colonial Period 

In 1592 Japan dispatched a force of approximately 170,000 men 
in 700 ships to conquer Korea. The Japanese army landed at Pu- 
san in March and controlled most of the Korean Peninsula by July. 
The small Korean navy under Admiral Yi Sun-sin used ironclad 
battleships known — because of their appearance — as turtle boats 



272 



National Security 



to make frequent attacks on the Japanese fleet attempting to resup- 
ply Japanese forces in Korea. King Sonjo requested military assis- 
tance from Beijing and, as the Chinese and Korean armies gradually 
pushed the Japanese south, the Korean navy frustrated Japanese 
efforts to initiate new attacks on the Korean Peninsula. Although 
Japan's first attempts to subjugate Korea were unsuccessful, many 
of the central organizations of the Korean imperial military sys- 
tem were weakened by the impact of the invasion. 

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Korean rulers gener- 
ally devoted little attention to the military, although King Injo 
(1623-49) did reorganize the army and establish five permanent 
military bases in the country. Military service became unpopular 
after the Japanese invasion. The yangban (see Glossary) class no 
longer provided a large source of strong military leaders, and the 
lower classes generally preferred to pay a tax that exempted them 
from conscription. Because Korean rulers had little contact with 
the outside world, the Korean military establishment remained 
uninformed about developments of new weapons and modern bat- 
tlefield tactics until the middle of the nineteenth century. 

In the late 1860s, the advisers of King Kojong (1864-1907), 
alarmed by the interest of the United States, France, Russia, and 
other Western countries in opening Korea to foreign trade, con- 
vinced him to modernize the Korean army. During the next two 
decades, Korean military missions travelled to China and Japan 
to study modern warfare. King Kojong had neither the money nor 
the will to establish a large army, and he continued to rely primarily 
on the Chinese for military protection. In the 1880s, Chinese ad- 
visers trained 2,000 Korean troops and organized them into four 
elite units that were intended to be King Kojong' s palace guard. 
The Tonghak Rebellion in Cholla Province in 1894 provided Japan 
with an excuse to dispatch troops to Korea, and Japanese forces 
were sent in July with the dual mission of eliminating Chinese in- 
fluence on the Korean Peninsula and laying the foundation for the 
eventual colonization of the country. 

Japanese victories in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and 
the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) — both partially fought in 
Korea — left Korea without any foreign powers willing to oppose 
the Japanese annexation of Korea. Soon after the Treaty of Ports- 
mouth was signed in July 1905, formally ending the Russo-Japanese 
War, Japan stationed large contingents of police and army units 
in Korea and disbanded the Korean army. Korea became a 
Japanese colony in August 1910. 

In the 1920s and 1930s, the main staging areas for Korean mili- 
tary groups whose aim was to end Japanese rule in Korea were 



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South Korea: A Country Study 

in Nanjing, China; along the Korean border in Jilin and Liao- 
ning provinces; and in Irkutsk in the Soviet Union. The Nanjing- 
based groups received military training from and supported Chiang 
Kai-shek's Guomindang (Kuomintang or KMT — the National Peo- 
ple's Party, or Nationalist Party). Until 1939 there were several 
small Nationalist and communist military groups that used guer- 
rilla tactics to harass the Japanese in Korea and Manchuria (as 
northeast China was then known). By the end of 1940, the Japanese 
Imperial Army had destroyed most organized resistance along the 
Korean border with China; many Korean communists who had 
belonged to these groups joined the Northeast People's Revolu- 
tionary Army of the Chinese Communist Party (see Korea under 
Japanese Rule, ch. 1). A small number of Soviet-controlled Korean 
military units were organized in Irkutsk as early as 1921. 

The South Korean Army after World War II 

In November 1945, the United States Army Military Govern- 
ment in Korea (1945-48) began the task of organizing Korean mili- 
tary and police forces. In December a school for training military 
officers was established; the South Korean National Constabulary 
was organized in January 1946. The United States originally had 
planned to assist South Korea in developing only those police and 
military organizations necessary to maintain law and order dur- 
ing the period Korea was to be under the five-year Soviet- American 
trusteeship. By 1948, however, it was apparent that South Korea 
would need to expand the National Constabulary into a larger and 
more conventionally organized army to adequately defend itself 
from a possible invasion by North Korea. For this reason, the Unit- 
ed States provided funds and training to expand the eight provin- 
cial units and one capital city unit of the National Constabulary 
from regiments to brigades (see South Korea under United States 
Occupation, 1945-48, ch. 1). 

In November 1948, the Republic of Korea National Assembly 
passed the Armed Forces Organization Act. Under the provisions 
of this act, the National Constabulary was reorganized into an army 
comprising seven divisions. In June 1949, when the last United 
States Army units deployed in Korea as part of the post- World War 
II occupation forces withdrew, leaving behind a 500-person mili- 
tary advisory group, the leaders of the South Korean army con- 
trolled an organization that had been internally weakened by 
subversion and political factionalism and that lacked enough trained 
personnel and modern weapons to prepare adequately for war. 

North Korea's effort to win control of the south using guerrilla 
warfare forced South Korea's military leaders to concentrate on 



274 



Courtesy 




counterinsurgency operations. In the fall of 1949, North Korean 
guerrilla units attempted to gain control of remote areas and small 
towns in the mountainous areas of eastern and southern South 
Korea. It was estimated that as many as 5,000 guerrillas trained 
in North Korea were infiltrated into these areas by the winter of 

1949. Two South Korean army divisions and one army brigade 
were quickly deployed to conduct sweep and destroy missions to 
eliminate the guerrillas. Counterinsurgency operations were initiat- 
ed in South Cholla Province in October 1949. In some areas, South 
Korean villages were evacuated both to protect civilians and to as- 
sist counterinsurgency units in locating guerrilla bases. By April 

1950, less than 500 North Korean guerrillas remained in South 
Korea. Although the counterinsurgency program succeeded in end- 
ing the threat posed by the guerrillas, it had a deleterious effect 
on the army, necessitating reorganization and retraining for con- 
ventional war preparedness. 

War on the Korean Peninsula 

When North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950, the poor 
quality of the South Korean armed forces immediately became ap- 
parent. Although South Korea had 94,000 troops when North 
Korea began its all-out surprise attack, one week later only 20,000 
troops could be accounted for. By early September 1950, the 



275 



South Korea: A Country Study 

invading forces held all of South Korea except for the Pusan-Taegu 
corridor in the southeast. 

The United Nations (UN) Security Council, upon the request 
of the United States, condemned North Korea's invasion of South 
Korea and asked members of the UN to assist South Korea. Fifteen 
nations besides the United States and South Korea eventually 
provided troops; all forces fought under the UN flag and under 
the unified command of General Douglas A. MacArthur, com- 
mander in chief of UN forces. These combined forces successfully 
broke North Korea's extended supply lines by landing at Inch 'on 
in September 1950. The invading forces were pushed back to near 
the Chinese border. Only the massive intervention of the Chinese 
People's Volunteers (CPV) in October averted the defeat of the 
North Korean forces. United Nations and communist forces fought 
to a standstill. 

In July 1953, an armistice was signed that in 1990 remained the 
only agreement preventing the renewal of hostilities on the penin- 
sula. The armistice fixed the boundaries of the 241 -kilometer DMZ 
as the border between North Korea and South Korea. It also 
established a Military Armistice Commission, comprising China, 
North Korea, the United States, and South Korea, to resolve ar- 
mistice violations and prevent the resumption of hostilities. As of 
1990, the Chinese representative still was posted to the Military 
Armistice Commission, attended its plenary sessions, participat- 
ed in secretarial meetings, officers of the day meetings, language 
officers meetings, and observed Neutral Nations Supervisory Com- 
mission meetings, but deferred to North Korea's representative. 

South Korea's Response to the North Korean Military Buildup 

In the 1960s, P'yongyang began a sustained expansion of its 
armed forces that continued without interruption through the 1980s 
(see fig. 13). Under presidents Syngman Rhee and Park Chung 
Hee, the South Korean military remained largely dependent on 
the United States to deter a second North Korean invasion and 
to provide much of the training and equipment needed by the armed 
forces. When the First Republic (1948-60) fell, South Korea's mili- 
tary institutions were stronger relatively than most of its other 
government agencies. Each service had a well-established school 
system and adequate supplies of weapons, ships, and aircraft from 
World War II and the Korean War. 

Because of internal politics and Syngman Rhee's policy of con- 
trolling the promotion and assignment of all general rank officers, 
the military leadership was already at the edge of involvement in the 
nation's politics. Park Chung Hee and the other military leaders 



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National Security 



who participated in the May 1961 coup d'etat that brought down 
the Second Republic (1960-61) were motivated largely by dissatis- 
faction with their corrupt and ineffective military and civilian su- 
periors (see The Democratic Interlude, ch. 1). They believed that 
South Korea's survival as a nation depended on the reestablish- 
ment of social and economic stability. They viewed the strength 
of the armed forces and the reinstitution of the National Security 
Act of 1960 and other laws intended to reduce civil disturbances 
as necessary means to restore order and promote sound economic 
development. By 1963 when Park won election to the presidency 
of the Third Republic (1963-72) as a civilian, he already had placed 
other former military leaders, mostly members of the eighth class 
of the Officer Candidate School who had graduated in 1949, in 
key government positions. 

Two of Park's major objectives during the Third Republic were 
to improve defense cooperation with the United States and to 
modernize the armed forces (see South Korea under Park Chung 
Hee, 1961-79, ch. 1). In pursuit of these goals, Park devoted one- 
third of all government spending to defense in 1965. As a sign of 
support for United States policies in Southeast Asia and in exchange 
for the substantial financial and material contributions for modern- 
izing the army, Park deployed units of the South Korean army 
and marine corps to the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). 

In the early 1970s, the Park administration, with United States 
assistance through its Foreign Military Sales program, promoted 
the establishment of an indigenous defense industry. Park's mili- 
tary advisers were concerned that Kim II Sung already had built 
a North Korean arms industry. The Nixon administration was call- 
ing for Washington's allies to assume more responsibility for their 
own defense. Nixon's national security advisors also feared that 
Seoul might be too weak to deter a North Korean invasion unless 
it began to manufacture some of its own weapons. 

A Defense Industry Bureau was established in the Ministry of 
National Defense, and planning for a defense industry was incor- 
porated into South Korea's first Force Improvement Plan 
(1971-76). Some of the weapons were assembled in government- 
owned plants. Licensed production of the United States-designed 
Colt M-16 rifle was initiated in 1971, with select South Korean 
companies supplying the government assembly plant with most of 
the parts for the weapon. In other cases, coproduction responsibility 
was entirely delegated to civilian-managed companies, many of 
which already had produced nonmilitary items with technical assis- 
tance from various United States firms. The Tacoma Boatbuilding 
Company, for example, assisted a South Korean shipbuilding 



277 



South Korea: A Country Study 



1200 



lu 1000 



O 

CO 
DC 
LU 
CL 



CO 
Q 
Z 
< 
CO 
Z) 

O 
i 



800 



600 



400 



200 



■ SOUTH KOREA 
NORTH KOREA 





1980 



1990 



Figure 13. Comparative Growth of the Armed Forces of South Korea and 
North Korea, 1950-90 

company based in Chinhae in constructing several classes of patrol 
boats, including the Paegu-class derived from the Asheville-class, 
which was equipped with Harpoon antiship missiles. 

Park's assassination in 1979 did not obscure his regime's con- 
tributions to improving the armed forces during the eighteen years 
he was in power. He reorganized the Ministry of National Defense 
and each of the armed services to enhance the government's capa- 
bility to manage any military contingency, including an all-out 
attack by North Korea across the DMZ, small-scale infiltrations 
along South Korea's extensive 8,640-kilometer coastiine, and var- 
ious types of low-intensity conflict, such as commando raids that 
targeted industrial, power, and communications facilities, or at- 
tempts by terrorists to assassinate key government officials. 

President Chun Doo Hwan perpetuated the military's dominance 
over politics from December 1979 until Roh's inauguration in 



278 



National Security 



February 1988 and protected Park's legacy of simultaneously im- 
proving the country's economic and military capabilities. Chun 
continued Park's policy of devoting one-third of all government 
spending to the military, outstripping estimated North Korean mili- 
tary expenditures during most of the 1980s. Chun also continued 
Park's policy of promoting defense-related research and develop- 
ment and commercial agreements with the United States, Japan, 
and Western Europe — a policy that provided Seoul with access to 
more advanced defense technologies. Particular emphasis was 
placed on expanding the air force and establishing a modern air 
defense network. 

Korean Air, then South Korea's only civil airline, began 
coproduction of Northrop F5-E/F fighter aircraft in 1982. At the 
end of Chun's term in office, Seoul was considering coproducing 
either the General Dynamics F-16 or the McDonnell Douglas 
FA- 18. During Chun's administration, South Korean shipbuilders 
increased production of various types of frigates, missile-equipped 
fast attack craft, and other, smaller naval vessels. Civilian indus- 
tries also became more involved in coproduction of defense ord- 
nance, including armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, 
tanks, and communications equipment. 

The Military's Role in Society 

As the 1990s began, the armed forces remained the largest and 
most influential government organization in South Korea. Over 
75 percent of South Korean males over the age of twenty had served 
in the regular army, the reserves, or the Homeland Reserve Force, 
or had been assigned duties supporting the armed forces under the 
Conscription Law of 1949. The National Technicians Law gave 
the Ministry of National Defense the authority to order civilian 
industrial plants to produce military items and to draft technicians 
with special skills into military service during wartime. The Act 
Concerning Protection of Military Secrets limited the freedom of 
the press to report on military affairs. The Military Installation 
Protection Law restricted civilian access to areas around military 
installations. 

The Defense White Paper, 1988, a report on the armed forces and 
military preparedness and the first comprehensive document ever 
prepared by the Ministry of National Defense for the public, not- 
ed several initiatives the Roh administration had undertaken to 
address these concerns. During both the Park and Chun administra- 
tions, students who demonstrated against the government had been 
expelled frequently from school and drafted into the army, where 
they were treated harshly unless they demonstrated a willingness 



279 



South Korea: A Country Study 



to accept government doctrine on opposing communism, promot- 
ing the common good of society, and showing respect for military 
and political power figures. In the Defense White Paper, 1988, the 
Roh administration announced that new conscription policies had 
been formulated that would standardize selection procedures and 
end past abuses. Officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) 
were under orders to follow a new military protocol that respected 
the rights of soldiers as citizens. Another measure announced in 
1988 was the abolition of the Student Defense Corps, a military 
training organization established at South Korean colleges in 1969 
to provide mandatory lectures on the government's national secu- 
rity policies and mobilization plans and instruction in handling 
weapons and military tactics. 

Changes in the living and working environment on military bases 
were to include the gradual elimination of barracks and office build- 
ings constructed in the 1950s, expansion of education programs 
to prepare soldiers for selected jobs in the civilian sector before their 
discharge, and small increases in pay. Additionally, in order to al- 
leviate civil-military discord, the Roh administration planned to 
relocate many of the bases in urban areas to suburban or rural areas 
as soon as possible. Urban growth around military installations in 
large cities, including Seoul, Pusan, Taejon, Inch'on, Ch'unch'on, 
Masan, YVonju, Uijongbu, and Chinhae, had compromised the 
security of these bases and day-to-day military activities; in turn, 
the bases had disturbed the normal commercial and social activi- 
ties of civilians. 

In the 1980s, in addition to their regular military duties, mili- 
tary units continued the traditional practice of aiding farmers in 
planting and harvesting rice, assisting civil authorities in prevent- 
ing loss of life and property during and following natural disasters, 
delivering medical services in rural areas, and providing other so- 
cial services. In 1987 a total of 561,000 military personnel helped 
local farmers plant their rice, and 392,000 military personnel were 
made available for harvesting the crop. The army and the 
Homeland Reserve Force — more than 1 million troops — were mobi- 
lized in July 1987 to perform rescue operations and repair wind 
and flood damage caused by a typhoon. Stranded civilians were 
evacuated to safety, temporary dikes were constructed to prevent 
flood damage, debris was cleared from roads, and temporary 
shelters were constructed for the homeless. 

Government policies on emergency preparedness were designed 
to quickly mobilize civilian personnel and resources to support the 
military during wartime. The Military Manpower Law delegated 
responsibility to the Office of Military Manpower Administration 



280 



National Security 



of the Ministry of National Defense for maintaining computerized 
records on all civilians who were eligible to serve in the Homeland 
Reserve Force. Men and women between the ages of twenty and 
sixty who had not been assigned duties in the military reserves but 
had technical skills needed by the military could also be assigned 
to support the military during wartime or a national emergency 
declared by the president and approved by the National Assembly 
under Article 77 of the 1987 Constitution. As the 1990s began, 
an estimated 5 million men and women were available for war- 
time duties in the Homeland Reserve Force and designated civilian 
industries that would produce, repair, and deliver defense goods 
to the military in wartime. Another important element of emer- 
gency preparedness was a plan to mobilize civilian ships, aircraft, 
heavy construction equipment, and other types of vehicles and 
equipment useful to the military in wartime. 

Under provisions of the Emergency Prepared Resources Manage- 
ment Law, provincial and local government authorities were respon- 
sible for registering civilian assets that were to be included in the 
plan. Periodic exercises of the plan were conducted to test mobili- 
zation procedures. Local governments were required to provide 
the Ministry of National Defense and other appropriate ministries, 
including the Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Trans- 
portation, with their mobilization plans. 

Organization and Equipment of the Armed Forces 

The National Security Council and the Ministry of National 
Defense were the primary executive bodies responsible for mili- 
tary affairs. The former, comprising the prime minister, the director 
of the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP), and the 
ministers of national defense, foreign affairs, home affairs, and 
finance, was responsible for advising the president on security is- 
sues and was convened at the pleasure of the president. The Minis- 
try of National Defense was organized into bureaus responsible 
for force development, budget, personnel, reserve forces, logistics, 
military installations, medical affairs, the defense industry, and the 
military education system. 

Army 

The ground forces were organized into three armies and sever- 
al independent operational and functional commands (see fig. 14). 
The First Army and the Third Army occupied well-fortified posi- 
tions stretching southward from the DMZ about fifty kilometers. 
The First Army's mission was to defend the eastern section of the 
DMZ. The Third Army, South Korea's largest and most diversified 



281 



South Korea: A Country Study 




Figure 14. Deployment of South Korean and United States Forces in South 
Korea, 1990 



combat organization, was responsible for guarding the most likely 
potential attack routes from North Korea to Seoul^— the Munsan, 
Ch'orwon, and Tongduch'on corridors. The Second Army had 
operational command over all army reserve units, the Homeland 
Reserve Force, logistics, and training bases located in the six 
southernmost provinces. Select army troops were assigned to the 
Capital Defense Command (formerly the Capital Garrison Com- 
mand), whose active duty component, really more a countercoup 



282 



National Security 



force than a defensive force, was a little less than a division in 1990, 
organized into three separate security groups or regiments. They 
were assigned to defend the Blue House (the presidential residence), 
major government and Ministry of National Defense buildings, 
and Kimp'o International Airport. The wartime strength of the 
Capital Defense Command comes from multiple division reserves, 
which would be mobilized during a conflict. The Capital Defense 
Command also was responsible for peacetime training of all Seoul 
area reserves. Functional commands included the Counterespionage 
Operations Command, subordinate to the chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and responsible for interdicting North Korean 
saboteurs and espionage agents; the Defense Security Command, 
the army's internal security organization; and the Logistics Base 
Command, which was established to manage the movement of sup- 
plies to the frontlines. 

Active-duty infantry units were organized as combined armed 
forces with armor and artillery forces subordinate to the division 
or brigade commander. The Third Army and First Army controlled 
nineteen infantry divisions and two mechanized infantry divisions. 
In 1987 each infantry division had about 14,716 soldiers but in 
terms of transportation and communications and other equipment 
was considered "light" by United States standards. Each infantry 
division had four battalions per regiment, three infantry regiments 
and one artillery regiment, a reconnaissance/ranger battalion and 
an armor battalion (some only had armor companies), and a 
reasonable facsimile of combat support and combat service sup- 
port units in comparison to United States counterparts. The two 
mechanized infantry divisions each had three mechanized/ 
maneuver brigade headquarters, a cavalry battalion, and a mix 
of nine armor and mechanized infantry battalions. 

The army was responsible for the ground component of South 
Korea's air defense network and had two surface-to-surface mis- 
sile battalions and several antiaircraft gun battalions. The surface- 
to-surface missile battalions were equipped with United States- 
produced HAWK and Nike Hercules missiles, the former having 
a range of 42 kilometers, the latter a range of 140 kilometers. The 
field armies had small quantities of three types of man-portable, 
shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles. These included the 
British-produced Javelin and the United States-produced Redeye 
missile. Additionally, there were three types of antiaircraft guns 
in use: the Swedish-produced Bofors L/70 40mm; the Swiss- 
produced Oerlikon GDF-002 35mm; and the domestically produced 
Vulcan 20mm. 



283 



South Korea: A Country Study 

The Special Warfare Command had seven brigades trained for 
wartime missions behind enemy lines. Although information on 
the organization of these units was unavailable in 1990, they prob- 
ably were among the best-trained and most combat-ready forces 
in the army. 

A single aviation brigade operated several types of attack and 
transport helicopters that could be strategically deployed to sup- 
port combat operations of the infantry divisions and special forces. 
Some 200 McDonnell Douglas 500-MD helicopters were produced 
under license by Korean Air between 1976 and 1984. At least fifty 
of these helicopters were equipped with TOW antitank weapons. 
The remainder were used as transports and for other support mis- 
sions. In 1990 South Korea also had about 50 McDonnell Doug- 
las AH- IS attack helicopters and 144 McDonnell Douglas 
UH-1B/H transport helicopters. 

The role of women in the army has changed in the late twen- 
tieth century. A small, all-volunteer Women's Army Corps (WAC) 
was made a separate unit of the army in 1971. Women were re- 
quired to be high-school graduates, they were enlisted for a two- 
year tour of duty, and their military occupational specialties were 
limited to nursing and a few other noncombat positions. 

In September 1989, the National Assembly revised the military 
personnel law which governed the WAC , and the WAC was offi- 
cially deactivated on December 30, 1989. Female soldiers were for- 
mally reassigned to seven branches within the army: infantry, 
administration, intelligence, finance, education and information, 
logistics, and medical service. A separate WAC school and per- 
sonnel center remained. 

Between 1980 and 1990, the army increased in size by only a 
small margin. During this same period, however, new units were 
formed; the procurement of new tanks, armored personnel carri- 
ers, field artillery, antitank guns, air defense missiles, helicopters, 
and other types of military equipment significantly improved the 
defensive capabilities of the ground forces (see table 16, Appen- 
dix). In 1980 the army had approximately 1,200 United States- 
produced M-47 and M-48 tanks and 500 mostly United States- 
produced M-l 13 armored personnel carriers (also some Fiat 6614 
wheeled armored personnel carriers). By 1990 South Korea had 
manufactured 200 of the domestically produced T-88 tank and had 
upgraded most of its M-48s to M-48A3s or M-48A5s. During the 
period from 1980 to 1990, the number of field artillery pieces more 
than doubled, going from 2,000 to 4,200 pieces, and South Korea 
began to introduce larger guns to extend the effective range of fire. 
In 1980 the army was equipped with 57mm, 75mm, 90mm, and 



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National Security 



106mm recoilless rifles for antitank use and TOWs. In 1990 the 
TOW and LAW still were the primary antitank weapons. The 
106mm/90mm recoilless rifles increased in numbers and were the 
basic antitank system for the infantry, although lower caliber 
weapons still existed. The TOWs were relatively scarce and were 
organized into independent units separate from the infantry divi- 
sions' main organization and equipment. The national air defense 
network comprised only 100 Vulcan antiaircraft guns and a small 
number of Nike-Hercules and HAWK surface-to-air missiles in 
1980; by 1990 there were 600 antiaircraft guns, and the Nike- 
Hercules and HAWKs had both increased in number and under- 
gone significant upgrades. 

Air Force 

The air force was organized into three commands operating ap- 
proximately 700 aircraft from eight major airbases: the Combat 
Air Command controlled the bulk of the roughly 500 jet combat 
aircraft; a small Air Transportation Command had 37 transport 
aircraft; and the Air Training Command used 7 types of trainers 
(see table 17, Appendix). In 1990 the air force had 40,000 person- 
nel on active duty. Most of these personnel were stationed at large, 
well-defended air bases located at Suwon, Osan, Ch'ongju, Kang- 
nung, Taegu, Kunsan, Kwangju, and Sunch'on. The air force also 
operated an unknown number of smaller airbases. Civilian airfields, 
including three international airfields at Seoul, Pusan, and Cheju, 
would be utilized in wartime, as would specially designed sections 
of major highways. 

The Combat Air Command, headquartered at Osan, controlled 
aircraft that included twenty-two squadrons of ground attack fight- 
ers/interceptors, twenty-three counterinsurgency aircraft in one 
squadron, twenty reconnaissance aircraft in one squadron, and 
fifteen search-and-rescue helicopters in one squadron. All of these 
aircraft were produced in the United States, with the exception of 
sixty-eight Northrop F-5E/Fs that were coproduced with Korean 
Air. The 294 Northrop F-5s and 36 General Dynamics F-16C/Ds 
were the primary ground attack aircraft. Approximately 130 
McDonnell Douglas F-4s were deployed for air defense but were 
equally useful in ground attack. All three types of aircraft were capa- 
ble of being used in either role, depending on their armament. The 
air force supported army counterinsurgency programs with twenty- 
three Cessna A-37 aircraft, used as forward air controllers, but 
which could also be used in ground attack. Eight Northrop F-5s 
and twelve McDonnell Douglas F-4s were equipped solely for 



285 



South Korea: A Country Study 



reconnaissance. A total of fifteen Bell UH-1B and UH-1H helicop- 
ters were available for search-and-rescue operations. 

During the 1980s, the air force modernization program focused 
primarily on the formation and deployment of twelve new fighter 
aircraft squadrons and the establishment of an automated air defense 
network. The F-16 provided South Korea with an aircraft believed 
to be technologically superior to similarly designed communist air- 
craft, including the Soviet-produced MiG-29, the most sophisti- 
cated aircraft employed by the North Korean air force. South 
Korea-United States coproduction of F-5 aircraft demonstrated the 
resolve of South Korean military planners to promote a defense 
industry that simultaneously utilized advanced United States tech- 
nology while enhancing indigenous efforts both at establishing an 
aviation industry and increasing access to Western technology. 

The Tactical Air Control Center at Osan became operational 
in 1983. Reconnaissance aircraft and air defense radar sites in- 
formed the center about potentially hostile aircraft before they en- 
tered South Korean airspace. In wartime this capability was 
expected to allow South Korean air controllers more time to as- 
sess threat and the ability quickly to communicate orders to inter- 
ceptor aircraft and surface-to-air missile sites. 

Navy and Marine Corps 

In 1990 the navy and marine corps remained small forces primar- 
ily dedicated to protecting the nation's territorial waters and islands. 
There was one large naval base at Chinhae, and seven small naval 
stations located at Cheju, Inch'on, Mokp'o, Mukho, Pukp'yong-ni, 
P'ohang, and Pusan. Both the navy and marine corps were subor- 
dinate to the chief of naval operations, who was a member of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The navy, with 35,000 personnel, was organi- 
zed into three fleet commands and separate commands for aviation, 
amphibious operations, mine warfare, training, and logistics — all 
subordinate to the first vice chief of naval operations. The marine 
corps, with 25,000 personnel, was organized into two divisions and 
one brigade under the Marine Corps Command. Although part 
of the navy, marine units often operated under army control. 

During the 1980s, the navy's modernization program focused 
on antisubmarine warfare and the deployment of new types of in- 
digenously produced submarines, frigates, missile-equipped fast 
attack craft, and patrol boats. Naval vessels deployed with the 
Eastern, Western, and Southern fleets were equipped with modern 
sonar equipment, depth charges, and torpedoes to counter more 
effectively North Korea's growing submarine force (see table 18, 
Appendix). Two types of United States-produced and one type of 



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National Security 



French-produced shipborne surface-to-surface and surface-to-air 
missiles were used by the navy on its destroyers, frigates, and fast 
attack craft. United States-produced Harpoon surface-to-surface 
missiles, with a ninety-kilometer range, were deployed on Gearing- 
class destroyers, Ulsan-class frigates, and Paegu-class fast attack 
craft derived from the Ashville-class. French-produced Exocet 
surface-to-surface missiles, with a seventy-kilometer range, were 
employed on Donghae frigates and Kirogi-class fast attack craft. 
Paegu fast attack craft were equipped with United States-produced 
Standard surface-to-air missiles. 

The Naval Aviation Command and the Naval Amphibious Com- 
mand operated small fleets of aircraft and landing craft, respec- 
tively, to support naval fleet and marine corps operations. 
Twenty-five Grumman S-2 aircraft, twenty-five Hughes 500-MD 
helicopters, and ten Bell SA-316 helicopters were shore based. They 
were deployed for surveillance of surface ships and for antisubma- 
rine warfare. 

The marine corps was assigned the defense of the Han River 
estuary and five northwestern islands located close to North Korea. 
The Naval Amphibious Command operated fifty-two amphibious 
craft in support of the marine corps. 

Reserve and Civil Defense Forces 

The reserve forces included mobilization reserve forces for each 
of the armed services and the Homeland Reserve Force, a paramili- 
tary organization responsible for community and regional defense. 
Between 1968 and 1988, males between the ages of eighteen and 
forty were eligible for defense call-up duty; there was no clear policy 
on the age at which a recruit was eligible for retirement. In Janu- 
ary 1988, a new policy was instituted that reduced the age-group 
of the male population subject to service in the reserves: only males 
who had been drafted for service between the ages of nineteen and 
thirty-four were required to serve in the reserves. The period of 
service was limited to between six and eight years, depending on 
the individual's age at conscription. 

The mission of the mobilization reserves was to provide each 
of the services with well-trained personnel prepared to enter com- 
bat as soon as possible in wartime. In 1990 there were 1,240,000 
men in the reserves: 1,100,000 in the army; 60,000 in the marines; 
55,000 in the air force; and 25,000 in the navy. Most recruits had 
served on active duty in their respective services and were assigned 
to a reserve unit upon completion of their term of enlistment. Units 



287 



South Korea: A Country Study 

in the reserves probably closely resembled active-duty organiza- 
tions. Mobilization reserve personnel attended regularly scheduled 
training about one day a month and also participated in an annu- 
al field exercise that lasted about one week. Active-duty officers 
and NCOs were assigned to command and staff positions in the 
reserves at battalion and higher levels. 

The Homeland Reserve Force was established in April 1968 as 
part of a nationwide program to increase defense preparedness in 
the wake of North Korean provocations. In January 1968, a North 
Korean commando unit infiltrated Seoul and attacked the Blue 
House in an attempt to assassinate President Park Chung Hee. 
That same month, two additional North Korean commando units 
launched attacks on towns on the east coast in attempts to encourage 
the South Korean populace to overthrow the government. 
Homeland Reserve Force personnel were given basic training in 
physical fitness, weapons familiarization, and defense tactics against 
various types of attacks by enemy forces. In wartime these units 
would remain close to or in their own cities, villages, or towns, 
where they would guard roads, power plants, factories, and other 
potential military targets. 

In 1975 the National Assembly passed the Civil Defense Law, 
which was promulgated to establish organizations in every com- 
munity to protect lives and property during wartime and natural 
disasters. Males between the ages of nineteen and fifty who were 
not drafted for service in the military were recruited for service 
in civil defense units. In 1980 there were over 90,000 civil defense 
personnel in the country. By 1990 their numbers were more than 
3.5 million. Their missions included air raid defense, search and 
rescue, and building and road repair. 

Recruitment, Training, and Conditions of Service 

All males, except for a small percentage of individuals considered 
physically or socially undesirable for military service, could be draft- 
ed into the army. In 1990 there were 407,000 males nineteen years 
of age who were required to register for military service. Approxi- 
mately 9.2 percent of these young men were rejected for conscrip- 
tion for one of the following reasons: having a physical or mental 
disability; possessing a criminal record; being an orphan; and be- 
ing born out of wedlock or having one parent who was not a South 
Korean citizen. Conscripts were required to have at least an elemen- 
tary school education; 77 percent of those drafted had at least a 
high school education. 

The Military Manpower Agency was responsible for assigning 
recruits to the army, navy, marines, the Korean Augmentation 



288 



Army troops participate in offshore training exercise. 

Courtesy Republic of Korea Army 

of the United States Army (KATUSA), and the combat police units 
of the Korean National Police. Recruits could request assignment 
to a particular service and were assigned based on their education, 
technical skills, and physical condition. About 85 percent of eligi- 
ble recruits were drafted for periods of between thirty and thirty- 
six months. Candidates for the KATUSA program were required 
to be high school graduates with some English-language training. 
In 1990 approximately 5,000 men in KATUSA served with the 
United States Army units in South Korea. In 1990 the air force 
was an all-volunteer force. 

The conscription system was flexible and allowed most young 
men to plan their service in a way that would promote their in- 
dividual career goals. High school graduates who had been accepted 
into a college or technical school or who were attending such schools 
were granted deferments. Conscripts with good education records 
and aptitudes suited to particular military specialties were select- 
ed to be trained as specialists in combat support branches such as 
signals, ordnance, and engineers. Even conscripts assigned to com- 
bat, however, were encouraged to take classes during their terms 
of duty to prepare for employment when they left the service. 

The army, navy, and air force each had a full range of recruit 
training centers, schools for technical military occupational specialties, 



289 



South Korea: A Country Study 



and officer training courses. Army recruits were transported from 
provincial induction centers to one of the Second Army's recruit 
training centers for basic training. Each branch of the army had 
one or more schools that offered curricula for enlisted personnel, 
NCOs, and officers. The large number of schools and the diversi- 
fied training programs available to servicemen supported the ar- 
my's need for skilled personnel to use, maintain, repair, and 
resupply combat forces during wartime. The air force had schools 
for pilots, air technicians, communication and electronics specialists, 
aircraft maintenance specialists, and air traffic controllers. The navy 
had its own schools oriented to the needs of the three fleets and 
the marine corps. 

All officers and enlisted personnel were closely supervised and 
had to obey strict security regulations that limited their contacts 
with civilians, including their own families. All military personnel 
were provided with food, clothing, housing, and medical services. 
A variety of entertainment and recreational programs were or- 
ganized on military installations to reduce boredom and promote 
the physical health and morale of service personnel. 

Officers and Noncommissioned Officers 

Officers were graduates of army, navy, or air force service acade- 
mies, reserve officer training cadet programs offered at civilian col- 
leges, or were recruited from enlisted personnel for selected 
short-term service in noncombat occupational billets. More than 
90 percent of the field- grade officers chosen to command combat 
units at battalion and higher levels were graduates of the Korea 
Military Academy (in the case of the army), the Air Force Acade- 
my, or the Naval Academy. Applicants were chosen on the basis 
of their academic records, performance in competitive examina- 
tions, physical condition, and dedication to the mission of the armed 
forces. Each academy offered a four-year curriculum to provide 
the cadet with a bachelor's degree and practical military skills. 
Graduates of the military academies were required to serve ten years 
in the military and made up 5 percent of the newly commissioned 
officers each year. Approximately 40 percent of the new second 
lieutenants were commissioned from the Reserve Officer Train- 
ing Corps (ROTC) after two years' training and a two-year, three- 
month obligation. Another 40 percent of the new second lieutenants 
were from the Third Military Academy, which had a twenty- to 
thirty-six week training course. The remaining 15 percent were 
direcdy commissioned specialists, including personnel in the medical 



290 



National Security 



corps, judge advocates, and chaplains. Most of the recruits of the 
Third Military Academy were newly graduated from junior col- 
leges or regular colleges. At one time the Third Military Academy 
was itself a two-year college. Historically, most of the ROTC officers 
left after completing their obligation, but the graduates of the Third 
Military Academy often stayed on to field-grade rank and were 
the dominant source of commission at that rank. 

Advanced individual training for officers was provided at the 
Army's Command and General Staff College, the National Defense 
College, and military training institutes in other countries. The 
Command and General Staff College prepared selected field- grade 
officers for command and staff duties at division, corps, and army 
levels. The National Defense College trained a limited number of 
selected senior officers of the three services and some civilian govern- 
ment officials for the highest command and staff positions. 

Each army branch, as well as the air force, navy, and marine 
corps, was responsible for selecting NCOs for training in their oc- 
cupational specialty. Those selected were required to reenlist for 
two to seven years, depending on the availability of replacements 
in their branch. Army staff sergeants were selected from civilian 
applicants and eligible enlisted personnel who had completed the 
required courses of studies in branch schools. The navy recruited 
petty officers through examination at the time of conscription. Af- 
ter finishing basic training, candidates were trained for their duties 
in a branch school. The air force followed a procedure similar to 
the navy's. Combat marines were sent to army schools for NCO 
training, whereas marines in service branches usually attended navy 
schools. 

Enlisted Personnel 

Recruit training in each of the services lasted about sixteen weeks 
and focused on physical conditioning, basic military skills, and the 
functions of combat and combat support units. Conscripts select- 
ed to serve in the army and marine corps were sent to Second Army 
recruit training centers for basic training. The navy and air force 
operated their own recruit training centers. 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 

The rank and grade structure of the three services correspond- 
ed, with minor exceptions, to that of the United States forces, as 
did the correlation between rank and responsibility (see fig. 15). 
In peacetime, the army and air force were each commanded by 
a four-star general; a lieutenant general commanded the marines, 
and an admiral commanded the navy. 



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South Korea: A Country Study 




292 



National Security 



Service uniforms also resembled those of the United States forces 
in color and style. Service personnel wore a summer uniform of 
denim and a winter uniform of wool. Troops in forward areas wore 
a more expensive padded winter uniform. Noncommissioned 
officers of the army and air force wore a tunic buttoned to the top; 
navy noncommissioned officers wore the United States-type sea- 
man's blouse. Officers' uniforms were similar to those worn by 
officers of the United States. 

Defense Spending and Military Production 

From the end of the Korean War to 1990, South Korea had 
evolved from a country dependent on other nations for its nation- 
al security to a strong and growing nation, increasingly capable 
of meeting its own defense needs. Civilian industries maintained 
military assembly lines as a separate, and generally small, part of 
their corporate activities. 

Defense Spending 

Seoul's defense budget increased in proportion to the growth of 
the national economy throughout the 1970s and 1980s, demonstrat- 
ing how strongly national leaders felt about improving the armed 
forces (see fig. 16). Between 1971 and 1975, defense spending in- 
creased from US$411 million to US$719 million. Defense expen- 
ditures averaged about 4.5 percent of the country's gross national 
product (GNP — see Glossary). In 1976, the first year that the 
government included proceeds from the defense tax in published 
figures for military expenditures, the budget for the armed forces 
and defense industries increased 100 percent over the 1975 figure 
to US$1 .5 billion. The costs involved in initiating weapons produc- 
tion and the loss of military grant aid from the United States were 
the major reasons for the gradual increase of defense spending from 
5.2 percent of GNP in 1979 to 6.2 percent of GNP in 1982. By 
1990 defense spending had increased to almost US$10 billion a year, 
but because of the dramatic growth in the country's economy, this 
figure was below 30 percent of the government's budget and less 
than 5 percent of GNP for the first time since 1975. 

Annual defense budgets were proposed by the Ministry of Na- 
tional Defense and approved by the president following consulta- 
tions with the National Assembly. Beginning in fiscal year (FY — see 
Glossary) 1979, the Ministry of National Defense adopted a budget 
management system based on the United States Department of 
Defense project planning budget system. The South Korean system 



293 



South Korea: A Country Study 



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NORTH KOREA** □ SOUTH KOREA 



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1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 

YEAR 

In constant 1988 United States dollars. ** Estimate. 



Source: Based on information from United States, Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1989, Washington, 1989, 
53. 



Figure 16. Comparison of Defense Expenditures, South Korea and North 
Korea, 1978-88 

focused on force modernization and the maintenance of military 
organizations in peacetime at 70 percent of their wartime strength. 
The government's mobilization and resource management plans 
for support of the military were designed to bring the armed forces 
up to full strength quickly and to maintain the country's capabili- 
ty to supply the military during wartime. Under the 1987 Consti- 
tution, the National Assembly was accorded more responsibility 
to review the defense budget and to recommend appropriate lev- 
els of spending. In 1990, however, the president continued to have 
the final say on budget matters. 

Approximately 40 percent of the defense budget was devoted 
to weapons and equipment modernization in 1990. Defense plan- 
ners established a number of long-range goals: to establish an 



294 



National Security 



independent reconnaissance system with intelligence satellites and 
early warning aircraft; to improve the quality of firepower and the 
accuracy of domestically produced weapons; to deploy indigenously 
produced surface-to-air and tactical surface-to-surface missiles; and 
to replace outdated fighter aircraft and naval vessels with techno- 
logically advanced models that would neutralize the threat of North 
Korea's modern weapon systems. 

The operational costs of the three armed services constituted ap- 
proximately 35 percent of the defense budget. Improvements in 
training, logistical support to combat units, and pay and benefits 
provided to military personnel were a part of the increased cost 
of supporting the armed forces. The acquisition of sophisticated 
new types of weapons, although contributing to national security, 
also increased operational costs. 

The remaining 25 percent of the defense budget was mostly al- 
located among the armed forces reserves; South Korea's share of 
the United States-Republic of Korea combined defense improve- 
ment program; research into new defense technologies; and con- 
struction and maintenance of military installations. 

Military Production 

The Defense Industry Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense 
was the government agency responsible for managing the quanti- 
ty and quality of domestically produced weapons and equipment. 
In 1990 South Korean industries provided about 70 percent of the 
weapons, ammunition, communications and other types of equip- 
ment, vehicles, clothing, and other supplies needed by the military. 

Weapons production for the army began in 1971 when the Minis- 
try of National Defense constructed a plant to assemble United States- 
designed Colt M-16 rifles. The memorandum of agreement between 
the United States and the Republic of Korea authorized produc- 
tion of enough rifles to supply South Korean army units. However, 
the agreement prohibited the production of additional M-16s 
without the permission of Colt Industries and the United States 
government. In the mid-1970s, South Korea signed agreements 
to begin licensed production of many types of United States- 
designed weapons, including grenades, mortars, mines, and recoil- 
less rifles, with the same stipulations as those for the M-16 rifle. 
South Korea also began to manufacture ammunition for the 
weapons it produced for the army. 

By 1990 South Korean companies had army contracts to produce 
tanks, self-propelled and towed field guns, two types of armored 
vehicles, and two types of helicopters. A division of Hyundai 



295 



South Korea: A Country Study 

produced the 88 Tank (formerly called the K-l tank) at Ch'ang- 
won. The K-l was the result of a joint United States-South Korean 
design. The 88 Tank's 105mm gun was an improved version of 
the same caliber gun that was standard on South Korea's M-48A5 
tanks. Although a few components of the tanks' fire control and 
transmission systems were imported, Hyundai and South Korean 
subcontractors manufactured most of the systems. One of the Sam- 
sung Group's businesses produced 155mm M-109 self-propelled 
howitzers. Kia Machine Tool was the manufacturer for the KH-178 
105mm and the KH-179 155mm towed field guns. The KH-178 
and KH-179 guns were derived from United States-designed ar- 
tillery but were considered indigenously designed. Daewoo Indus- 
tries and Asia Motors had a coproduction agreement for an 
Italian-designed wheeled, armored personnel vehicle. Bell Helicop- 
ters Textron of the United States and Samsung coproduced UH-1 
helicopters. Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, also of the United States, 
had a contract with Daewoo to coproduce H-76 helicopters. 

In December 1989, the Ministry of National Defense selected 
the McDonnell Douglas FA- 18 to be the second United States- 
designed fighter aircraft to be coproduced in South Korea. Sam- 
sung's aerospace division was awarded a contract to manufacture 
the airframe and engine; Lucky-Goldstar became the subcontrac- 
tor for the aircraft's avionics. McDonnell Douglas agreed to deliver 
twelve FA- 18s to the South Korean air force in 1993 and to assist 
Samsung with the later assembly of 108 aircraft in South Korea. 
As of 1990, the entire FA- 18 program was under review because 
of increased costs. Korean Air used its depot maintenance facili- 
ties at Kimhae to overhaul most types of aircraft in service with 
the South Korean air force. Additionally, the United States Air 
Force contracted with Korean Air for the maintenance of its F-4, 
F-15, A-10, and C-130 aircraft stationed in South Korea, Japan, 
and the Philippines. 

In 1990 South Korean shipbuilders were building two indigenous- 
ly designed naval vessels, and they had coproduction agreements 
with United States, Italian, and German companies for several other 
types of ships. Four shipbuilders — Hyundai, Daewoo, Korea Ta- 
coma, and Korean Shipbuilding and Engineering — constructed 
South Korean-designed Ulsan-class frigates and Tonghae-class cor- 
vettes for the navy. During the 1980s, Korea Tacoma, a South 
Korean-owned subsidiary of the United States Tacoma Boatbuild- 
ing Company, produced one class of patrol gunboat and one class 
of landing ship for the navy. The Kirogi-class patrol boat was a 
larger model of the Tacoma-designed Schoolboy-class patrol boat 
manufactured in South Korea during the 1970s. The Kirogi-class 



296 



National Security 



patrol boat, a 170-ton vessel, required a thirty-one-person crew 
and was equipped with five guns: one 40mm single-barreled Bofors 
on the bow, two 30mm twin-barreled Emerson Electrics in the stern, 
and two 20mm Oerlikon twin-barreled guns behind the bridge. The 
Kirogi-class patrol boat, with a range of 700 kilometers and a max- 
imum speed of 38 knots, was well suited for its inshore patrol 
mission. 

The Mulgae-class landing ship, another naval vessel designed 
and produced in the United States by Tacoma Boatbuilding Com- 
pany, was ordered by the navy to augment a small amphibious 
fleet that comprised several models of obsolescent transport craft 
produced in the United States during World War II and trans- 
ferred to the South Korean navy in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
Mulgae-class landing ship was designed to carry an infantry com- 
pany with its weapons, mechanized and wheeled vehicles, and other 
supplies. It had a range of 560 kilometers and a maximum speed 
of 13 knots. In 1986 South Korea's Kangnam Shipbuilding Cor- 
poration began construction of the Swallow/Chebi class minehunter, 
which was based on the Italian-designed Lerici-class. At that time, 
the South Korean navy had only eight United States-produced 
Kunsan-class minesweepers in service with the three fleets. The 
Swallow-class minehunter had new types of sonar and mine coun- 
termeasure equipment that was expected to improve the navy's 
capability to locate and to eliminate minefields in international ship- 
ping lanes during wartime. 

In the late 1980s, production of submarines designed by the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany (West Germany) was initiated. Three 
150-ton submarines designed by the Howaldswerke Shipbuilding 
Corporation were in service with the navy in 1990. Howaldswerke 
also had plans to provide technical assistance for the construction 
of three Type 209 submarines, about 1 ,400 tons each. South Korean 
military planners were interested in using submarines to protect 
critical shipping lanes from North Korean submarines in wartime. 

Strategic Planning for War 

Under the terms of the 1954 Republic of Korea-United States 
of America Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States and South 
Korea agreed to cooperate in defending the security and strategic 
interests of both countries. South Korea's deployment of army and 
marine units to South Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s demon- 
strated its commitment to meeting its obligations under the treaty. 
By 1990 the United States had stationed 44,500 military person- 
nel in South Korea — a signal to North Korea and other countries 



297 



South Korea: A Country Study 

in the region that Washington would meet its security commitments 
to Seoul under the Mutual Defense Treaty. 

United States Forces in Korea 

In the confusion of the early days of the Korean War, Seoul 
placed its armed forces under the command of General Douglas 
A. MacArthur as United Nations (UN) commander. This arrange- 
ment continued after the armistice. For some twenty-five years, 
the United Nations Command headquarters, which had no South 
Korean officers in it, was responsible for the defense of South Korea, 
with operational control over a majority of the units in the South 
Korean military. The command was the primary peacetime plan- 
ning organization for allied response to a North Korean invasion 
of South Korea and the principal wartime command organization 
for all South Korean and United States forces involved in defend- 
ing South Korea. In 1978 a binational headquarters, the South 
Korea-United States Combined Forces Command (CFC), was 
created, and the South Korean military units with front-line mis- 
sions were transferred from the United Nations Command to the 
CFC's operational control. The commander in chief of the CFC, 
a United States military officer, answered ultimately to the national 
command authorities of the United States and the Republic of 
Korea (see fig. 17). 

Historically, operational control of South Korea's tactical armed 
forces has made the United States commander vulnerable to the 
politics of association. United States commanders have rigidly 
avoided commentary on South Korean party politics, confining 
public statements to purely military matters on such issues as arms 
buildups and threats from North Korea. However, in the complex 
politics of the Korean Peninsula, the United States commander's 
military opinions often have been publicly manipulated as support 
for Seoul's authoritarianism. 

In May 1961 and December 1979, the command structure was 
breached by South Korean troops participating in military coups. 
A more complex set of circumstances occurred in May 1980, when 
troops were withdrawn from the CFC under existing procedures 
and dispatched to Kwangju to respond to the student uprising. Con- 
fusion in the South Korean public over the particular circumstances 
of the incident, the United States position, and the limits of the 
CFC's control led many South Koreans to believe that the United 
States fully supported the violent suppression of the uprising. The 
lack of an accurate historical record for nearly ten years gener- 
ated widespread misunderstanding, and it has been credited with 



298 



National Security 



the rise of anti- Americanism in South Korea, a movement which 
continues. 

Only after President Chun stepped down at the end of 1987, 
and the opposition in the National Assembly grew stronger, did 
the United States begin answering the questions concerning Unit- 
ed States involvement in Kwangju. On June 19, 1989, Washing- 
ton issued the "United States Government Statement on Events 
in Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May 1980," in response to 
formal requests from the National Assembly. The statement ad- 
dressed a series of questions related to the rise to power of then 
Lieutenant General Chun Doo Hwan. The statement noted no prior 
knowledge of the assassination of President Park Chung Hee, nor 
warning of the December 12, 1979, incident, in which a group of 
South Korean army officers led by Major General Chun seized 
control of the military. It was revealed that Washington repeated- 
ly protested to the government and the military leadership about 
the misuse of forces under the Combined Forces Command. The 
report also stated that South Korean authorities gave the United 
States two hours advanced warning of the extension of martial law 
on May 18, 1980, and no prior warning of the military's intention 
to arrest political leaders or to close both the National Assembly 
and the universities. 

The statement clearly noted that none of the South Korean forces 
deployed at Kwangju were, during that time, under either the oper- 
ational control of the CFC or the control of any United States 
authorities. Additionally, the United States had neither prior 
knowledge of the deployment of special forces to Kwangju nor 
responsibility for their actions there. The report addressed the use 
of the Twentieth Division, CFC, and clarified that the CFC agree- 
ment allowed both the United States and South Korea to assert 
control over its forces at any time without the consent of the other. 
According to the statement, the United States was informed in ad- 
vance of intentions to use elements of the Twentieth Division to 
reenter Kwangju, that United States officials, after cautioning 
against the use of military force to solve a political crisis, accepted 
that it would be preferable to use the Twentieth Division rather 
than Special Forces units (but the latter were also involved) . The 
report further documented that the United States repeatedly pro- 
tested public distortions of Washington's actions and policy by Seoul 
and the South Korean press, namely allegations that the United 
States knew either of the December 12 incident in advance or of 
the extension of martial law, or that Washington approved of the 
Special Forces actions in Kwangju. 



299 



South Korea: A Country Study 



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National Security 



While the report rebutted most of the myths of American cul- 
pability for events in 1979 and 1980, the ten-year delay in issuing 
the report did little to resolve the misgivings held by many South 
Koreans, who still persisted in believing that the United States was 
in some way a party to the military takeover in May 1980, and 
the harsh suppression of the Kwangju demonstrations that followed. 

In 1990 a few hundred United States military personnel were 
assigned to the United Nations Command headquarters in P'an- 
munjom, in the DMZ, and were responsible for representing the 
United States at meetings of the Military Armistice Commission. 
Because the Seoul and P'yongyang governments had never negotiat- 
ed a peace agreement after the Korean War, the sometimes shaky 
1953 armistice concluded between the United Nations Command, 
North Korea, and China remained the only formal channel for han- 
dling complaints about violations of the truce. 

There were 32,000 United States Army personnel in South Korea 
in 1990; most were assigned to the Eighth Army, which included 
the Second Infantry Division, the Seventeenth Aviation Brigade, 
and other detachments deployed north of Seoul as part of the joint 
South Korean-United States forward defense strategy. If a con- 
flict were to occur, the Second Infantry Division would be expect- 
ed to serve as a reserve force for the South Korean army on one 
of the main invasion routes between the DMZ and Seoul. United 
States Army personnel with command or planning responsibilities 
for combat units also were assigned to the headquarters of the CFC 
and to the headquarters of the Republic of Korea-United States 
Combined Field Army, of which the Second Infantry Division was 
the main American component. The remaining United States Army 
personnel were assigned to support the missions of selected Unit- 
ed States and South Korean combat units, serving primarily in com- 
munications, logistics, and training positions. 

There were 12,000 United States Air Force personnel in South 
Korea in 1990. They were assigned to units responsible for early 
warning, air interception, close air support of United States and 
South Korean ground forces, combat support, aircraft maintenance, 
and the transportation of personnel and supplies from the United 
States, Japan, and other United States military installations in the 
Pacific. The Seventh Air Force, headquartered at Osan Air Base, 
was the command element for all United States Air Force organi- 
zations in South Korea. United States Lockheed U-2 high-altitude 
reconnaissance and South Korean Grumman E-2C early warn- 
ing aircraft patrolled the North Korean border and monitored the 
Soviet Union's air and naval activities in the Sea of Japan area. 



301 



South Korea: A Country Study 

Advanced F-16 fighter aircraft were used by tactical fighter squad- 
rons based at Osan and Kunsan. These squadrons operated 
alongside South Korean air force tactical squadrons in both air in- 
terception and close air support roles. South Korea and the United 
States jointly managed the South Korean tactical air control sys- 
tem, which had wartime responsibility for Korean airspace and the 
entire South Korean coastline. The United States Military Airlift 
Command was responsible for transporting United States military 
personnel, weapons, and supplies from the United States and lo- 
cations in the Pacific to South Korea. 

United States Navy and United States Marine Corps personnel 
in South Korea consisted of about 500 officers and enlisted per- 
sonnel who occupied critical staff and liaison positions in the CFC. 
The United States Pacific Command in Hawaii frequently deployed 
units of the United States Pacific Fleet, based in Japan, and units 
of the marine corps, based in Okinawa and other locations in the 
Pacific, to South Korea for joint training exercises, particularly 
Team Spirit, held every spring to promote South Korean-United 
States military cooperation and readiness. During the 1988 Seoul 
Olympics, the United States Seventh Fleet operated in the Sea of 
Japan and was assigned specific missions to assist units of the CFC 
in discouraging P'yongyang from attempting to disrupt the Olympic 
Games. 

South Korean and United States Cooperation 

In 1968 the United States and South Korea held their first an- 
nual Security Consultative Meeting. This meeting provided high- 
level defense experts from the two countries with an official forum 
for reassessing the nature of the North Korean threat to South 
Korea, for agreeing on an overall defense strategy for South Korea, 
and for outlining the roles of both countries in deterring a North 
Korean invasion. 

During the 1989 Security Consultative Meeting in Washington 
(the meetings were held in alternate years in Seoul and Washing- 
ton), the two nations agreed that the Moscow-assisted moderniza- 
tion of Pyongyang's air force and army indicated that the military 
situation in Northeast Asia remained tense and unpredictable. 
Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev's Korean policy, focused on 
promoting unofficial contacts with Seoul though Moscow, continued 
to bolster Pyongyang's military establishment. 

South Korean and United States leaders who attended the 1 989 
Security Consultative Meeting considered it unlikely that the Soviet 
Union would initiate a military conflict targeting South Korea. They 
believed, however, that increasing Soviet military support for North 



302 



National Security 



Korea made it highly probable that the Soviet Union would con- 
tinue to assist North Korea if war broke out. For this reason, United 
States secretary of defense Richard B. Cheney and South Korean 
minister of national defense Yi Sang-hun agreed to strengthen stra- 
tegic planning through existing organizations, such as the CFC. 

Internal Security 

From the founding of the Republic of Korea, its leaders, while 
professing liberal democratic ideals, consistentiy held that the secu- 
rity threat posed by an aggressive, communist North Korea re- 
quired some modification of Western democracy to fit Korean 
realities. Confronted with a heavily armed enemy determined to 
reunify the peninsula on its own terms — by force, if necessary — 
successive South Korean governments gave top priority to exter- 
nal and internal security, guaranteed by large and well- organized 
security services. The need for social order and discipline in the 
face of this threat remained central to the government's approach. 
Faced with a divided country, even "loyal" opposition often was 
suppressed as dangerously disruptive. On more than one occasion, 
political opposition was confused with communist subversion. The 
communist threat at times provided political justification for 
authoritarian regimes to maintain power and to suppress public 
criticism or demands for democracy. In both 1961 and 1980, the 
military cited these concerns to justify its interventions in South 
Korean politics. 

The Threat from the North 

After the division of the peninsula, North Korea used subver- 
sion and sabotage against South Korea as part of its effort to achieve 
reunification. North Korea was unsuccessful at developing a covert 
political infrastructure in South Korea or forging links with dissi- 
dents resident in South Korea, and after the early 1960s Pyong- 
yang's efforts were unproductive. Based on available evidence, in 
1990 it appeared that P'yongyang placed or recruited only a limit- 
ed number of political agents and sympathizers in the southern part 
of the peninsula. Pyongyang's agents acted individually for the 
most part, did not maintain regular contact with one another, and 
received only intermittent support and guidance. 

Peacetime infiltration by North Korean agents was a fact of life 
in South Korea after the armistice in 1953. There were, however, 
clear shifts both in the number and method of infiltrations over 
the years and in their goals. Through the mid-1960s, P'yongyang 
sent agents primarily to gather intelligence and to try to build a 
covert political apparatus. This tactic was followed by a dramatic 



303 



South Korea: A Country Study 

shift to violent attempts to destabilize South Korea, including com- 
mando raids along the DMZ that occasionally escalated into fire- 
fights involving artillery. These raids peaked in 1968, when more 
than 600 infiltrations were reported, including an unsuccessful at- 
tempt at a commando attack on the Blue House in Seoul and the 
infiltration of over 120 commandos on the east coast. In 1969 more 
than 150 infiltrations were attempted, involving almost 400 agents. 
In 1970 and 1974, agents attempted unsuccessfully to assassinate 
President Park. In the 1974 attempt, during an August 15 ceremony 
marking National Liberation Day at the National Theater in Seoul, 
the assassin's shots missed President Park but killed Mrs. Park. 
Subsequently, Pyongyang's infiltration efforts abated somewhat, 
and the emphasis shifted back to intelligence gathering and covert 
networks. 

From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, most North Korean in- 
filtration was done by heavily armed reconnaissance teams, which 
increasingly were intercepted and neutralized by South Korean 
security forces. After shifting to infiltration by sea for a brief peri- 
od in the 1980s, P'yongyang apparently discarded military recon- 
naissance in favor of inserting agents from third countries. North 
Korea did not abandon violence, however, as was shown by the 
abortive 1982 attempt to recruit Canadian criminals to assassinate 
President Chun Doo Hwan, the 1983 Rangoon assassination at- 
tempt that killed seventeen South Korean government officials and 
four Burmese dignitaries, and the 1987 destruction of a Korean 
Air airliner with 115 people on board. In the airliner bombing, 
North Korea broke from its pattern of targeting South Korean 
government officials, in particular the president, and targeted or- 
dinary citizens. 

North Korean propaganda concentrated on weakening the so- 
cial fabric and sowing discord between the South Korean govern- 
ment and the population. Indirectly, North Korea sought to turn 
dissident elements within South Korean society into propagandists 
and agitators who would undermine the government. P'yongyang 
achieved some limited indirect success in this effort, as indicated 
by the repetition of some of its themes by student dissidents. North 
Korean coverage of dissident activity in the south was on occasion 
so timely and accurate as to lead some members of the South Korean 
government to believe that dissent in the south was directed from 
the north. However, despite similarities between North Korean 
propaganda and dissident statements, South Korean security agen- 
cies never convincingly established a direct connection between 
the dissidents and the north, although in the late 1980s some ele- 
ments among dissident groups increasingly used Marxist-Leninist 



304 



Armed Forces Day parade 
Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Korea, Washington 

language and North Korean political themes (see Political Extre- 
mism and Political Violence, ch. 4). 

Seoul's Response 

The pre-Korean War period was marked by political turmoil 
and widespread demands for sweeping political, economic, and so- 
cial change. As the communists entrenched themselves in the north 
and right-of-center politicians emerged in control in the south, the 
possibility for peaceful unification of the peninsula disappeared. 
In the autumn of 1946, a series of unorchestrated leftist-led labor 
strikes and rural peasant rebellions were suppressed by the fledg- 
ling Korean National Police after some 1,000 deaths and 30,000 
arrests. The communist South Korean Workers' Party led a part- 
ly indigenous guerrilla movement in the south after a major rebel- 
lion on Cheju Island in April 1948 that claimed tens of thousands 
of lives. South Korea's military and paramilitary forces were be- 
set by mutinies and defections but eventually gained the upper hand. 
In reaction to the communist-based Yosu-Sunch'on rebellion of Oc- 
tober 1948, a harsh national security law was passed in December 
1949 that made communism a crime. However, the law was so com- 
prehensive and vague that it could be used against any opposition 
group. Under the law, members of the South Korean Workers' 



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South Korea: A Country Study 

Party were arrested and some 150,000 persons were barred from 
political activity. Guerrilla warfare continued until the end of 1949, 
coupled with skirmishing along the thirty-eighth parallel. North 
Korea's conventional attack followed when it became clear that the 
insurgents would not triumph easily. 

Recollection of this chaotic period and the invasion from North 
Korea colored subsequent South Korean government attitudes 
toward internal security. Domestic opposition, especially from the 
left, was suspect. President Syngman Rhee's call for national uni- 
ty provided political justification for limiting the activities of the 
opposition during the 1950s. Although the regime did not suppress 
all opposition or independent sources of information, it suppressed 
some organized opposition and criticism (see The Media, ch. 4). 

In the late 1950s, as Rhee became more authoritarian, the gov- 
ernment increasingly resorted to using the police force and, to a 
lesser extent, the military security forces, for political purposes. 
The Ministry of Home Affairs, whose charter ranged from intelli- 
gence and investigative operations to supervision of local and 
provincial affairs, emerged as a powerful political force. The police, 
with a strong core of veterans from the Japanese colonial police 
(approximately 70 percent of the highest ranking officers, 40 per- 
cent of the inspectors, and 15 percent of the lieutenants), was both 
effective and feared. The police used strong-arm tactics to coerce 
support for the ruling party during elections and harassed the po- 
litical opposition. The prerogative of the police to call in anyone 
for questioning was a powerful tool of intimidation. These circum- 
stances inevitably led to police corruption, politicized law enforce- 
ment, and exploitation of the populace in the name of internal 
security. Rhee's political survival became more and more depen- 
dent on the police. When police control wavered at the time of the 
April 19 student revolution in April 1960, his regime fell. 

The short-lived Chang Myon government (July 1960 to May 
1961) did not survive long enough to articulate an internal security 
policy but was committed to a more open political system. However, 
because of internal conflict within the ruling party and the obstruc- 
tions of the conservative opposition, society was in a state of polit- 
ical and social turmoil. 

Following the May 16, 1961, military coup, the Korean Cen- 
tral Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was formed on June 19. Directly 
under the control of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruc- 
tion, the KCIA, with nearly unlimited power, emerged as the or- 
ganization most feared during the Park Chung Hee era. Under 
Kim Chong-p'il's direction, the organization weeded out anti-Park 
elements and became the prime tool keeping the regime in power. 



306 



National Security 



Under Park, the lack of advancement in civil liberties continued 
to be justified by referring to the threat from North Korea. The 
political influence of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the police 
declined in the face of the KCIA's power. The relationship between 
the police and general public, however, was not significantly al- 
tered. As Se-Jin Kim wrote in 1971: "The former still act with 
arbitrary arrogance; the latter respond with fear but not respect. ' ' 

The government often used martial law or garrison decree in 
response to political unrest. From 1961 to 1979, martial law or a 
variant was evoked eight times. The October 15, 1971, garrison 
decree, for example, was triggered by student protests and result- 
ed in the arrest of almost 2,000 students. A year later, on October 
17, 1972, Park proclaimed martial law, disbanded the National 
Assembly, and placed many opposition leaders under arrest (see 
Constitution; Human Rights, ch. 4). In November the yusin con- 
stitution (yusin means revitalization), which greatly increased 
presidential power, was ratified by referendum under martial law. 

The government grew even more authoritarian, governing by 
presidential emergency decrees in the immediate aftermath of the 
establishment of the yusin constitution; nine emergency decrees were 
declared between January 1974 and May 1975. The Park regime 
strengthened the originally draconian National Security Act of 1960 
and added an even more prohibitive Anticommunism Law. Un- 
der those two laws and Emergency Measure Number Nine, any 
kind of antigovernment activity, including critical speeches and writ- 
ings, was open to interpretation as a criminal act of "sympathiz- 
ing with communism or communists" or "aiding antigovernment 
organizations." Political intimidation, arbitrary arrests, preven- 
tive detention, and brutal treatment of prisoners were not un- 
common. 

Opposition to the government and its harsh measures increased 
as the economy worsened in 1979. Scattered labor unrest and the 
government's repressive reactions sparked widespread public dis- 
sent: mass resignation of the opposition membership in the Na- 
tional Assembly and student and labor riots in Pusan, Masan, and 
Ch'angwon. The government declared martial law in the cities. 
In this charged atmosphere, under circumstances that appeared 
related to dissatisfaction with Park's handling of the unrest, on Oc- 
tober 26, 1979, KCIA chief Kim Chae-gyu killed Park and the 
chief of the Presidential Security Force, Ch'a Chi-ch'ol, and then 
was himself arrested. Emergency martial law was immediately 
declared to deal with the crisis, placing the head of the Defense 
Security Command, Major General Chun Doo Hwan, in a posi- 
tion of considerable military and political power. 



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South Korea: A Country Study 



Popular demand for the restoration of civil liberties after Park's 
death was immediate and widespread. Acting President Ch'oe Kyu- 
ha revoked Emergency Measure Number Nine, which had forbid- 
den criticism of the government and the yusin constitution. Civil 
rights were restored to almost 700 people convicted under the emer- 
gency decrees. The illegitimacy of the yusin constitution was ac- 
knowledged, and the process of constitutional revision begun. 

The slow pace of reform led to growing popular unrest. In early 
May 1980, student demonstrators protested a variety of political 
and social issues, including the government's failure to lift emer- 
gency martial law imposed following Park's assassination. The stu- 
dent protests spilled into the streets, reaching their peak during 
May 13 to 16, at which time the student leaders obtained a promise 
that the government would attempt to speed up reform. The mili- 
tary's response, however, was political intervention led by Lieu- 
tenant General Chun Doo Hwan, then KCIA chief and army chief 
of staff. Chun, who had forced the resignation of Ch'oe' s cabinet, 
banned political activities, assemblies, and rallies, and arrested 
many ruling and opposition politicians. 

In Kwangju, demonstrations to protest the extension of martial 
law and the arrest of Kim Dae Jung turned into rebellion as demon- 
strators reacted to the brutal tactics of the Special Forces sent to 
the city. The government did not regain control of the city for nine 
days, after some 200 deaths. 

General Chun Doo Hwan, as chairman of the standing com- 
mittee of the Special Committee for National Security Measures 
(SCNSM), assumed de facto leadership of the country. The 
pronouncement of martial law announced as a result of Park's as- 
sassination remained in effect until January 24, 1981. Under the 
Special Committee for National Security Measures and the Legis- 
lative Council for National Security that replaced it, sweeping po- 
litical controls were instituted. Established political parties were 
disbanded and over 800 people banned from politics; the media 
were restructured, many journals were abolished, and hundreds 
of journalists were purged; some 8,000 employees were purged from 
government or government-controlled companies and some 37,000 
people were arrested and "re-educated" in military training camps 
under the Social Purification Campaign; and military court juris- 
diction was extended to such civilian offenses as corruption and 
participation in antigovernment demonstrations. The new National 
Assembly Law and the amended National Security Act (which was 
rewritten to incorporate elements of the 1961 Anticommunist Law) 
also were passed. On January 10, 1981, the Martial Law Command 



308 




Checkpoint at the Demilitarized Zone 
Tank trap north of Seoul 
Courtesy Robert L. Worden 



309 



South Korea: A Country Study 



allowed people to resume limited political activities in preparation 
for the presidential election. 

The Fifth Republic's constitution marked significant progress 
from the yusin constitution. As implemented by the newly elected 
Chun government, however, it fell far short of popular expecta- 
tions of democraticization that had been raised after Park's death. 
The constitution was attacked by students and dissidents as Park's 
yusin system under new trappings. The government attempted to 
defuse discontent by "decompression" as well as repression, gradu- 
ally returning civil rights to those banned in 1980. Addition- 
ally, the government opened up the political system slightly in 1983 
and to a greater degree in 1985, although the dissident movement 
continued. 

Discontent was kept under control until 1987 by the regime's 
extensive security services — particularly the Agency for National 
Security Planning (ANSP, the renamed KCIA), the Defense Secu- 
rity Command (DSC), and the Combat Police of the Korean Na- 
tional Police (KNP). Both the civilian ANSP and the military DSC 
not only collected domestic intelligence but also continued "intel- 
ligence politics." 

The Act Concerning Assembly and Demonstration was used to 
limit the expression of political opposition by prohibiting assem- 
blies likely to "undermine" public order. Advanced police notifi- 
cation of all demonstrations was required. Violation carried a 
maximum sentence of seven years' imprisonment or a fine. Most 
peaceful nonpolitical assemblies took place without government in- 
terference. However, the act was the most frequently used tool to 
control political activity in the Fifth Republic, and the Chun re- 
gime was responsible for over 84 percent of the 6,701 investiga- 
tions pursued under the act. 

The security presence in city centers, near university campuses, 
government and party offices, and media centers was heavy. 
Citizens, particularly students and young people, were subject to 
being stopped, questioned, and searched without due process. The 
typical response to demonstrations was disruption by large num- 
bers of Combat Police, short-term mass detention of demonstra- 
tors, and selective prosecution of the organizers. Arrest warrants — 
required by law — were not always produced at the time of arrest 
in political cases. 

The National Security Act increasingly was used after 1985 to 
suppress domestic dissent. Intended to restrict "antistate activi- 
ties endangering the safety of the state and the lives and freedom 
of the citizenry," the act also was used to control and punish non- 
violent domestic dissent. Its broad definition of offenses allowed 



310 



National Security 



enforcement over the widest range, wider than that of any other 
politically relevant law in South Korea. Along with other politically 
relevant laws such as the Social Safety Act and the Act Concern- 
ing Crimes Against the State, it weakened or removed procedural 
protection available to defendants in nonpolitical cases. 

Questioning by the security services often involved not only psy- 
chological or physical abuse, but also outright torture. The 1987 
torture and death of Pak Chong-ch'ol, a student at Seoul Nation- 
al University being questioned as to the whereabouts of a class- 
mate, played a decisive role in galvanizing public opposition to the 
government's repressive tactics. 

The security services not only detained those accused of violat- 
ing laws governing political dissent, but also put under various lesser 
forms of detention — including house arrest — those people, including 
opposition politicians, who they thought intended to violate the laws. 
Many political, religious, and other dissidents were subjected to 
surveillance by government agents. Opposition assembly members 
later charged in the National Assembly that telephone tapping and 
the interception of correspondence were prevalent. Ruling party 
assembly members, government officials, and senior military offi- 
cials probably also were subjected to this interference although they 
did not openly complain. 

Listening to North Korean radio stations remained illegal in 1990 
if it were judged to be for the purpose of "benefiting the antistate 
organization" (North Korea). Similarly, books or other literature 
considered subversive, procommunist, or pro-North Korean were 
illegal; authors, publishers, printers, and distributors of such materi- 
al were subject to arrest. 

Use of tear gas by the police (over 260,000 tear gas shells were 
used in 1987 to quell demonstrations) increasingly was criticized; 
the criticism eventually resulted in legal restrictions on tear gas use 
in 1989. The government continued, however, to block many "ille- 
gal" gatherings organized by dissidents that were judged to incite 
"social unrest." In 1988 government statistics noted 6,552 rallies 
involving 1.7 million people. There were 2.2 million people who 
had participated in 6,791 demonstrations in 1989. 

Intelligence Agencies 

The Agency for National Security Planning 

The Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP) was origi- 
nally established on June 19, 1961 as the Korean Central Intelli- 
gence Agency (KCIA) directly under the Supreme Council for 



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South Korea: A Country Study 

National Reconstruction in the immediate aftermath of the May 
16, 1961, military coup. Its duties were to "supervise and coor- 
dinate both international and domestic intelligence activities and 
criminal investigation by all government intelligence agencies, in- 
cluding that of the military. ' ' Its mission was akin to that of a com- 
bined United States Central Intelligence Agency and Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. 

The first head of the KCIA was Kim Chong-p'il. Kim, utiliz- 
ing the existing Army Counterintelligence Corps, built a 3,000- 
member organization — the most powerful intelligence and inves- 
tigatory agency in the republic. The KCIA maintained a com- 
plex set of interlocking institutional links with almost all of the 
government's key decision-making bodies. The KCIA had a near- 
monopoly over crucial information concerning national security 
under the charter of the Act Concerning Protection of Military 
Secrets and, more importantly, possessed considerable veto pow- 
er over other agencies through its supervisory and coordination 
functions. 

The KCIA's practically unlimited power to investigate and to 
detain any person accused of antistate behavior severely restricted 
the right to dissent or to criticize the regime. The frequent ques- 
tioning, detention, or even prosecution of dissidents, opposition 
figures, and reporters seriously jeopardized basic freedoms and 
created an atmosphere of political repression. 

After the 1979 assassination of President Park Chung Hee by 
the KCIA director, the KCIA was purged and temporarily lost 
much of its power. Chun Doo Hwan used his tenure as acting direc- 
tor of the KCIA from April to July 1980 to expand his power base 
beyond the military. The organization was renamed the Agency 
for National Security Planning, and its powers were redefined in 
presidential orders and legislation. The ANSP, like its predeces- 
sor, was a cabinet-level agency directly accountable to the presi- 
dent. The director of the ANSP continued to have direct presidential 
access. In March 1981, the ANSP was redesignated as the prin- 
cipal agency for collecting and processing all intelligence. The re- 
quirement for all other agencies with intelligence- gathering and 
analysis functions in their charters to coordinate their activities with 
the ANSP was reaffirmed. 

Legislation passed at the end of 1981 further redefined the 
ANSP's legally mandated functions to include the collection, com- 
pilation, and distribution of foreign and domestic information 
regarding public safety against communists and plots to overthrow 
the government. The maintenance of public safety with regard to 
documents, materials, facilities, and districts designated as secrets 



312 



National Security 



of the state was the purview of the ANSP, as was the investigation 
of crimes of insurrection and foreign aggression, crimes of rebel- 
lion, aiding and abetting the enemy, disclosure of military secrets, 
and crimes provided for in the Act Concerning Protection of Mili- 
tary Secrets and the National Security Act. The investigation of 
crimes related to duties of intelligence personnel, the supervision 
of information collection, and the compilation and distribution of 
information on other agencies' activities designed to maintain public 
safety also were undertaken by the ANSP. By 1983 the ANSP had 
rebounded and again was the preeminent foreign and domestic in- 
telligence organization. 

As of 1990, the organizational structure of the ANSP was con- 
sidered classified by Seoul, although earlier organizational infor- 
mation was public knowledge. Despite the social and political 
changes that came with the Sixth Republic (1987- ), the ANSP 
apparendy still considered the support and maintenance of the presi- 
dent in power to be one of its most important roles. In April 1990, 
for example, ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) coleader Kim 
Young Sam complained that he and members of his faction wi- 
thin the DLP had been subjected to "intelligence maneuvering in 
politics" that included wiretapping, surveillance, and financial in- 
vestigations. 

Nevertheless, the ANSP's domestic powers were indeed curtailed 
under the Sixth Republic. Prior to the change, the ANSP had had 
free access to all government offices and files. The ANSP, Defense 
Security Command, Office of the Prosecutor General, Korean Na- 
tional Police, and the Ministry of Justice had stationed their agents 
in the National Assembly to collect information on the activities 
of politicians. In May 1988, however, overt ANSP agents, along 
with agents of other intelligence agencies, were withdrawn from 
the National Assembly building. The ANSP's budget was not made 
public, nor apparently was it made available in any useful man- 
ner to the National Assembly in closed sessions. In July 1989, pres- 
sured by opposition parties and public opinion, the ANSP was 
subjected to inspection and audit by the National Assembly for the 
first time in eighteen years. The ANSP removed its agents from 
the chambers of the Seoul Criminal Court and the Supreme Court 
in 1988. 

As of 1990, however, the ANSP remained deeply involved in 
domestic politics and was not prepared to relinquish the power to 
prevent radical South Korean ideas — much less North Korean 
ideas — from circulating in South Korean society. Despite an agree- 
ment in September 1989 by the chief policymakers of the ruling 
and opposition parties to strip the ANSP of its power to investigate 



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South Korea: A Country Study 

pro-North Korean activity (a crime under the National Security 
Act), the ANSP continued enforcing this aspect of the law rather 
than limiting itself to countering internal and external attempts to 
overthrow the government. The ANSP continued to pick up radi- 
cal student and dissident leaders for questioning without expla- 
nation. 

In another move to limit the potential for the ANSP to engage 
in "intelligence politics," the ANSP Information Coordination 
Committee was disbanded because of its history of unduly influenc- 
ing other investigating authorities, such as the Office of the Prose- 
cutor General. Additionally, the ANSP, responding to widespread 
criticism of its alleged human rights violations, set up a "watch- 
dog' ' office to supervise its domestic investigations and to prevent 
agents from abusing their powers while interrogating suspects. 

Aside from its controversial internal security mission, the ANSP 
also was known for its foreign intelligence gathering and analysis 
and for its investigation of offenses involving external subversion 
and military secrets. The National Unification Board and the ANSP 
(and the KCIA before it) were the primary sources of government 
analysis and policy direction for South Korea's reunification strategy 
and contacts with North Korea. The intelligence service's reputa- 
tion in pursuing counterespionage cases also was excellent. 

The ANSP monitored visitors, particularly from communist and 
East European countries, to prevent industrial and military espi- 
onage. Following the diplomatic successes of the late 1980s — the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and 
the countries of Eastern Europe, and the increased informal con- 
tacts with China, Mongolia, and Vietnam — this mission grew in 
importance. The security watch list contained 162 out of 3,808 
visitors from communist nations in 1988 and 226 out of 6,444 
visitors in 1989. 

The Defense Security Command 

It was Syngman Rhee, not the military, who initiated the polit- 
ical involvement of the military in intelligence activities. The turning 
point came in 1952 when Rhee proclaimed martial law — and the 
presence of military police in the chamber of the National Assem- 
bly guaranteed passage of the constitutional amendment he sought 
over the objections of a recalcitrant legislative branch and still- 
independent judicial branch. Throughout Rhee's administration, 
two military units — the Joint Military Provost Marshal and the 
army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) — engaged in extralegal and 
violent political tactics, apparently not excluding the outright mur- 
der of politically undesirable people. Although the details never 



314 



Infantry mobile training exercise 
Courtesy Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea 

were disclosed fully, more than a few minor political figures' dis- 
appearances were connected to the two units. 

Under Park, the provost marshal's political role declined, while 
the CIC and its successor, the Army Security Command (ASC), 
concentrated on internal military security. The CIC/ASC, which 
was under Park's direct control, maintained strict surveillance over 
all high-ranking officers. It acted as a deterrent to would-be coup 
leaders. It tried, less successfully, to prevent the rise of disruptive 
factions within the military. 

The Defense Security Command was formally activated in Oc- 
tober 1977. This merger of the Army Security Command, the Navy 
Security Unit, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations 
produced a single, integrated unit under the direct command and 
operational control of the minister of national defense. Although 
technically subordinate to the minister, the DSC commander oper- 
ated semiautonomously and typically had personal, direct access 
to the president. Given the disparity in service size, the old ASC 
predominated within the DSC. The strength of the DSC varied 
over time within a probable range of 5,000 to 7,000 people during 
the 1980s. 

The DSC (and its predecessors) was created to deal with the real 
question of loyalty within a military on a divided peninsula. It was 



315 



South Korea: A Country Study 

inspired by the Guomindang model, in which political officers moni- 
tored the military services for subversion or disloyalty. The DSC 
was responsible for monitoring the military for loyalty; for 
safeguarding military information; for monitoring domestic polit- 
ical, economic, and social activities that might jeopardize military 
capabilities and national unity; for maintaining defense industrial 
security — both physically and in terms of counterespionage; for 
countering North Korean infiltration; for detecting espionage and 
anticommunist law violations; and for conducting special investi- 
gations at the direction of the president. 

The DSC assigned small elements to all major military units to 
monitor security and loyalty. These elements operated outside the 
unit's chain of command and performed a highly effective indepen- 
dent audit function. The DSC representatives never rivaled unit 
commanders as political officers occasionally had in communist mili- 
tary units. Their input into officer evaluations, however, often 
played a decisive role in career progression, giving DSC members 
influence far beyond their rank and producing friction between them 
and the "regular" military. Corruption within the DSC was difficult 
to verify, but political manipulations, misappropriation of operat- 
ing funds, and undue influencing of promotions certainly occurred 
and were particularly rampant in the mid- to late 1970s. 

For most of the Park regime, the ASC/DSC remained concerned 
primarily with internal military matters and was involved in the 
Yun P'il-yong incident in 1972 and removing the army chief of 
staff, General Yi Se-ho, in 1979 for corruption. Yun P'il-yong, 
head of the Capital Garrison Command, was court martialed, along 
with several close followers, on charges of bribery and corruption. 
His "real" offense, however, was creating a faction among the class- 
es of the four-year graduates of the Korea Military Academy. Yun's 
faction did not disappear when he was purged. The group of young 
officers, who called themselves the "Hanahoe" (One Mind Soci- 
ety), had its origins in an alumni group, the Taegu Seven Stars, 
of seven young officers, including Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae 
Woo, from the first graduating class of the Academy (Class 11). 
The Hanahoe evolved into a group of some 200 members through 
ten graduating classes. In 1979 and 1980, Chun drew on the Hana- 
hoe in his ascent to power. The irony of Park's death at the hands 
of his KCIA chief in 1979, however, was compounded by the rise 
to power of the commander of the DSC, then Major General Chun 
Doo Hwan, who used the military's anticoup apparatus to ensure 
the success of his own coup (see The Chun Regime, ch. 1). 

During and following Chun's rise to power, the DSC greatly 
expanded its charter into domestic politics and during the early 



316 



National Security 



1980s was, perhaps, the dominant domestic intelligence service. 
The DSC was "credited" with masterminding the media reorgani- 
zation of 1980 and with being the midwife for the first political par- 
ties of the Fifth Republic. Many former DSC members played 
prominent roles in Chun's administration and in the ruling 
Democratic Justice Party. 

The end of the Fifth Republic brought the DSC under even more 
pressure than had been brought against the ANSP to cut back on 
its domestic political activities. Both the DSC and the ANSP with- 
drew from the National Assembly at the same time in 1988. In 
October 1988, Minister of National Defense O Cha-bok reported 
to the National Assembly that the DSC would concentrate on coun- 
terespionage activities, preventing the spread of communism, con- 
ducting "relevant research," major restructuring, and would 
discontinue the investigation of civilians. Subsequently, the DSC 
eliminated the Office of Information that had been charged with 
collecting information on civilians, whose members had been ac- 
tive in local government offices. As a result of this move, 116 small 
detachments were disbanded, and the DSC announced plans to 
cut 860 personnel, or 14 percent of its 1990 strength. Additional- 
ly, the DSC curtailed its involvement in security screening of non- 
military government personnel. An official of the DSC claimed that 
surveillance of politicians was turned over to "another agency." 
Given the historically broad interpretation of national security 
threats espoused by DSC personnel, however, many analysts doubt- 
ed that the DSC had totally disengaged from domestic political sur- 
veillance. Despite the democratic trends of the late 1980s, 
intelligence and security agencies still were populated by individuals 
who were both institutionally and personally loyal to the president 
and ready to use any means at their disposal to support him. 

Korean National Police 

Organized by the United States Army Military Government in 
1945, the Korean National Police (KNP) force was formally acti- 
vated in 1948 by the new Korean government and placed under 
the Ministry of Home Affairs. Even after the establishment of a 
separate military service in 1948, the police force retained a 
paramilitary role and was employed in military operations during 
the Korean War. 

Attacked in its early years as a remnant of Japanese colonial rule 
(1910-45), beset by low professionalism, factionalism, endemic cor- 
ruption, and political manipulation, the Korean National Police 
nonetheless still evolved into a relatively modern and effective force. 
Although the police force was used by the Rhee regime in such 



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South Korea: A Country Study 

a flagrantly political way that it was held in low esteem by the 
citizenry, reforms made after the 1961 military coup began the 
police force's slow evolution into a professional force. Reorgani- 
zation, recruitment by examination, merit promotion, and modern 
concepts of management and training were instituted. Further im- 
provements came during the 1970s when modern communication, 
data processing, and crime detection practices were introduced. 

In 1975 the director general of the KNP was elevated to vice- 
ministerial rank directly under the minister of home affairs. The 
KNP reported through its own channels to its headquarters in Seoul. 
Provincial governors and local officials had no authority over the 
police. 

In addition to the regular police functions of law enforcement, 
criminal investigation, and public safety, the KNP was responsi- 
ble for riot control, countering student demonstrations, and other 
public disorders. Coastal security, including patrolling coastal 
waters, antismuggling operations, and coordinating counterespi- 
onage operations with the navy and the air force, were also its pur- 
view. "Combat operations" against small-scale North Korean 
infiltration attempts; the monitoring of foreign residents in South 
Korea; anticommunist operations, including counterintelligence 
activities and monitoring of "security risks" (historically expand- 
ed to including monitoring political, labor, economic, academic, 
religious, and cultural figures); and counterterrorist operations were 
all part of the mission of the KNP. There sometimes was competi- 
tive overlap between the KNP, ANSP, and the DSC. 

In 1989 the KNP was a 130,000-person organization that con- 
sisted of a headquarters, thirteen metropolitan/provincial police 
bureaus, the Combat Police, the National Maritime Police, an an- 
titerrorist unit, the Central Police Academy, and other support ser- 
vices, such as a forensics laboratory, a hospital, and other police 
schools. As of January 1989, there were 201 police stations and 
3,220 police substations and detachments throughout the country. 

The National Police Headquarters exercised authority over all 
police components. Metropolitan and provincial police bureaus were 
responsible for maintaining public order by directing and super- 
vising their own police stations (see fig. 18). 

The police station was responsible for maintaining public peace 
within its own precinct. The police station had seven functioning 
sections: an administration and public safety section, responsible 
for operation and supervision of police substations and boxes, liti- 
gation of minor offenses, traffic control, and crime prevention; a 
security section, responsible for maintaining public order; an in- 
vestigation section, responsible for investigating criminal incidents, 



318 



National Security 



lawsuits, booking criminals, custody of suspects, detention-cell 
management, and transference of cases and suspects involved in 
criminal cases to prosecution authorities; a criminal section, respon- 
sible for crime prevention; a counterespionage section; and an in- 
telligence section, responsible for collection of intelligence and 
information. The police substation or police box took preliminary 
actions in all criminal incidents, civic services, and accidents. 

Police boxes were the South Korean equivalent of the cop on 
the beat. They provided direct contact between the people and the 
police. Police box personnel were supposed to know their areas and 
the people who lived and worked in them. Police boxes were com- 
manded by lieutenants or sergeants and had reaction vehicles avail- 
able on a twenty-four-hour basis. 

Weighed down by a wide range of administrative duties, KNP 
personnel spent only 1 5 percent of their time on routine enforce- 
ment duties in 1989. Among other things, the KNP collected fines, 
approved death certificates, and processed security checks for pass- 
port applicants. The personnel shortage was acute; official statis- 
tics showed that there was only one police officer (excluding the 
Combat Police, who accounted for nearly half the strength of the 
KNP) for every 680 South Koreans, as compared with one police 
officer for every 390 people in the United States, one for every 318 
people in West Germany, and one for every 551 people in Japan 
(the lowest ratio for any major industrialized noncommunist coun- 
try). This shortage was compounded by a tight budget and the con- 
tinued preoccupation with riot control, which left the force ill 
equipped to deal with the demands of an increasingly affluent and 
sophisticated society. 

Recruitment and training were done through the Central Police 
Academy, the National Police College, and the Police Consolidat- 
ed Training School. The Central Police Academy was established 
in 1987. It had a maximum capacity of 35,000 recruits and was 
capable of simultaneously offering a six-week training course for 
police recruits, a two-week training course for draftees of the Com- 
bat Police, and a variety of basic specialized training courses for 
junior police. Officials planned to recruit about 10,000 new police 
officers a year from 1989 to 1991 to alleviate the personnel short- 
age, although their ability to maintain the quality of the force, given 
the low starting pay, was questioned. Only 12 percent of police 
applicants were university graduates in 1989. Screening unsuita- 
ble recruits was problematic because neither psychiatric nor poly- 
graph assessments were administered. (In 1982, for example, an 
unstable police officer killed fifty-four people in one night follow- 
ing a domestic dispute.) 



319 



South Korea: A Country Study 



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320 



National Security 



By 1989 the National Police College had graduated some 500 
officers since its first class graduated in 1985. Each college class 
had about 120 police cadets, divided between law and public ad- 
ministration specializations. The National Police College began ad- 
mitting women in 1989; five women were admitted each year. The 
cadets shared a collective life for four years at the college. The goal 
was to establish a career officers corps similar to those created by 
the military academies. 

The Police Consolidated Training School provided advanced 
studies, basic training for junior police staff, and special practical 
training courses for security and investigative officers from the coun- 
terespionage echelons of police agencies. It also trained Maritime 
Police instructors, key command personnel for the Combat Police 
force, and foreign-language staff members. 

Revolvers and carbines were the customary weapons; billy clubs 
were carried by patrol officers. The gradual replacement of car- 
bines by rifles began in 1981. In 1989 the KNP reemphasized the 
planned replacement of carbines with M-16 rifles. Approximate- 
ly 4,300 M-16s were to be supplied to police boxes and stations 
in 1989; by 1999 a total of 110,000 M-16s was scheduled to be 
distributed. Transportation was by motorcycle, bicycle, jeep, truck, 
and squad car. 

The KNP's special weapons and tactics squad was known as 
Force 868. Organized in 1982, its members were trained in martial 
arts and counterterrorist tactics. It received significant support and 
advice from United States and West European counterterrorist task 
forces preceding the 1988 Seoul Olympics and was well supplied 
with the more specialized equipment needed for combating ter- 
rorism. 

The Combat Police force was technically subordinate to the 
Ministry of National Defense, but the Ministry of Home Affairs 
and the Korean National Police were responsible for its operational 
management and budget. During hostilities, the Combat Police 
reverted to the Ministry of National Defense. The members of the 
Combat Police were conscripted at age twenty or older and served 
for approximately two-and-a-half years. Divided into companies, 
the Combat Police force was assigned to the metropolitan police 
bureaus. Except for supervisory personnel who were regular KNP 
officers, members of the Combat Police were paramilitary; their 
primary responsibilities were riot control and counterinfiltration. 
Under normal conditions, they did not have law enforcement pow- 
ers as did regular KNP officers. In 1967 the Combat Police force 
was organized to handle counterinfiltration and antiriot duties. 



321 



South Korea: A Country Study 

Approximately half of the total strength of the KNP was formed 
into 350 Combat Police/riot control companies. The percentage 
of Combat Police in the total force increased during the 1980s. In 
1982 there were 39,706 Combat Police, about 40 percent of the 
police total. By 1987 Combat Police represented 45.8 percent of 
the total force with 54,100 members. Since service in the Combat 
Police was regarded as fulfilling a military obligation, young men 
who did not wish to serve the compulsory minimum thirty-month 
service in the military could choose instead a thirty-five-month stint 
with the Korean National Police as combat police. Draftees into 
military service also could be assigned to the Combat Police force 
after completion of basic training. 

Although the police were relatively well trained and disciplined, 
illegal police behavior in the conduct of investigations or handling 
of suspects was occasionally a serious problem. In 1985, for exam- 
ple, as a result of some form of official misconduct, one-fourth of 
Seoul's detectives were transferred, demoted, or otherwise dis- 
ciplined. Rough treatment of suspects before a warrant was ob- 
tained was a continuing problem. Redress in cases of official 
misconduct normally was handled internally and rarely resulted 
in criminal charges against police officials. 

Historically, the use of excessive force by the police was perva- 
sive. In violent confrontations with student demonstrators, police 
units generally remained well disciplined, but rioters were beaten 
on apprehension, often by plainclothes police. Charges of police 
beatings in nonpolitical cases were made fairly frequently and some- 
times were reported in the press. Antigovernment youth activists 
were subjected to repeated and severe physical torture, which at 
times resulted in death during interrogations. Various degrees of 
physical maltreatment, including sleep and food deprivation, electric 
shocks, beating, and forced water intake were common during police 
interrogations under the Rhee, Park, and Chun regimes. With the 
founding of the Sixth Republic, such reports declined. However, 
according to the United States Department of State's reports on 
human rights, some credible allegations of torture were made during 
the last half of 1989 by persons arrested under the National Secu- 
rity Act. Credible allegations of cruel treatment also continued in 
1990. Although political cases received the most publicity, mistreat- 
ment of people detained or arrested for nonpolitical crimes is al- 
leged to be widespread. 

Criminal Justice 

Throughout Korea's history, the assimilation of foreign laws has 
taken place in waves. Korea assimilated the codes of the Chinese 



322 



Police box 

Courtesy Korean National Police 



Qin, Wei, and Tang dynasties in the early Three Kingdoms peri- 
od, the codes of the Tang, Song, and Yuan dynasties in the Koryo 
period (918-1392), the Ming Code in the Choson Dynasty 
(1392-1910) period, Western civil law at the close of the Choson 
Dynasty and during the Japanese occupation, and both Continental 
Law and Anglo-American law after liberation in 1945. The Cho- 
son Dynasty also produced numerous codifications of Korean law 
and created new laws as necessary to deal with economic, social, 
and other public policy issues. Confucian values exerted strong in- 
fluence on Korea's traditional law. 

With the end of the Choson Dynasty in 1910, decisive changes 
occurred in Korean law. Traditional Korean institutions were sud- 
denly replaced. Reform measures, characterized by the introduc- 
tion of Western institutions, began with the Kabo Reforms 
(1894-95) forced on Korea by Japan and modeled on the Japanese 
reforms of the Meiji Restoration (1868). These hasty reforms 
produced many laws translated from Japanese codes, which in turn 
had their origins in Roman and Germanic laws. The imposition 
of institutions by the Japanese and their post- 19 10 use for repres- 
sive colonial control constituted a sharp break with the Korean past. 

The Westernized legal system's key features included its origin 
in the European civil law tradition; prominent roles for legal scholars, 



323 



South Korea: A Country Study 

university professors, and legislators, rather than judges; codified 
law rather than precedent as the major source of law; and an in- 
quisitorial rather than adversarial court procedure. In other respects, 
however, Japanese colonial rule continued several features of the 
traditional Korean legal order. Under Japanese colonial rule, for 
example, there was no constitutional law, no guarantee of rights, 
and no judicial review of the exercise of political power. The legal 
system of Korea under Japanese rule was composed essentially of 
rules, duties, and obligations. Further, there was little institution- 
al or procedural separation of powers. The Japanese governor 
general had even greater executive and legislative power than tradi- 
tional Korean kings and ruled through a large, efficient, and modern 
bureaucracy. 

After independence, revulsion over the Japanese occupation moti- 
vated Korean officials to devise a new codification designed to 
replace all Japanese laws, decrees, and orders, as well as the regu- 
lations and decrees of the United States Army Military Govern- 
ment in Korea (1945-48) with Korean codes. The process took ten 
years. Eventually, the Criminal Code (1953), the Code of Crimi- 
nal Procedure (1954), the Civil Code (1958), the Civil Procedure 
Law (1960), and the Commercial Code (1962), as well as other 
codes — deliberately distinguished from previous Japanese codes — 
were adopted. In most substantive areas, however, South Korean 
law retained the most fundamental principles and procedures of 
continental jurisprudence as originally received through Japan. 

The Code of Criminal Procedure (1954) governed most aspects 
of the enforcement of criminal justice. The code retained the basic 
characteristics of the European continental legal system and had 
some features of Anglo-American law. Among the features adapt- 
ed from the United States legal system were a requirement for 
judicial warrants; modification of preliminary examination; 
strengthening of the system of state-appointed counsel; rejection 
of hearsay evidence as a matter of rule; and a requirement for cor- 
roborating evidence obtained in confessions. 

The first exclusionary ruling on a confession in a South Korean 
court based on the constitutional guarantee of the right to legal 
counsel occurred in late 1989. Law enforcement and security agency 
officials, however, did not consider themselves compelled to ad- 
here to legal precedents or court rulings when subsequently inves- 
tigating other cases. Police and prosecutors, especially in political 
or espionage cases, still limited the frequency and length of defen- 
dants' meetings with counsel, except when taking written state- 
ments. Legislative action was needed for the South Korean system 



324 



National Security 



to proceed beyond court redress of specific violations in specific 
cases to the establishment of general guidelines. 

Crime 

During the late 1980s, South Korea experienced a jump in its 
traditionally low rates of violent crime. A growing number of vio- 
lent crimes were directed against women, a fact that drew special 
public concern. 

The Korean National Police authorities denied that there was 
any "organized crime" in South Korea, although police boxes in 
Seoul in 1990 posted signs encouraging citizens to report any in- 
formation concerning p'ongnyokpae, violent bands of men armed with 
knives and improvised weapons who contributed to the rise in vio- 
lent assaults throughout the city. Although there were some ties 
between Japan's underworld — the yakuza (Japanese gangsters) — 
and South Korean criminal groups through ethnic Koreans resid- 
ing in Japan, yakuza "bosses" did not direct the extension of yakuza 
activities into South Korea. Nevertheless, the disturbing increase 
in violent crime and apparent disputes between criminal groups 
suggested that if organized crime did not yet exist in South Korea 
in 1989, its precursors were evident. 

Historically, narcotics abuse in South Korea had been very low; 
it was confined primarily to marginal urban low-income groups 
and did not include either heroin or cocaine abuse (see Health Con- 
ditions, ch. 2). In the late 1980s, narcotics abuse remained low 
but had steadily increased, becoming a social and political issue. 
In reaction to this increase, enforcement responsibility was trans- 
ferred from the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs to the Nar- 
cotics Division of the Supreme Prosecution Administration under 
the Ministry of Justice. This action gave narcotics enforcement a 
higher priority, more staffing, and more funding. (Drug-related 
arrests had increased from 810 in 1985 to 1,227 in 1987 and to 
1,606 in 1988.) Most drug-related criminal activity involved the 
manufacture or abuse of methamphetamine and South Korea's 
emergence as a major Asian producer of hirropon, an illicit metham- 
phetamine. A related problem was transshipment of Asian heroin 
destined for the United States and other world markets. 

Criminal Procedure 

In the absence of martial law or emergency decrees, both of which 
historically had been exercised by the government and provisions 
for which remained in the 1987 Constitution, criminal procedure 
in other than political cases followed a set format. Both public prose- 
cutors and the police were authorized to conduct investigations of 



325 



South Korea: A Country Study 

criminal acts. Public prosecutors were under the direction and su- 
pervision of the Office of the Supreme Prosecutor General; the 
supreme prosecutor general was appointed by the president. In 1990 
there were four branches of the Office of the High Prosecutor Gener- 
al and fourteen district offices. Theoretically, police authority to 
investigate criminal acts was subordinate to the direction and review 
of the prosecutors. Also, the arrest of a suspect required a judicial 
warrant except in cases of flagrante delicto or when it was believed 
that the suspect would flee or commit the act again. The request 
for a warrant could be made only by the prosecutor. 

After an arrest, the suspect had to be transferred to the public 
prosecutor within ten days and indicted within ten days of the prose- 
cutor' s gaining custody. The judge was permitted to extend de- 
tention another ten days; the suspect could request court review 
of the legality of detention. 

The public prosecutor initiated legal action. The name of the 
accused, the alleged crime, the alleged facts of the case, and the 
applicable laws were stated in the indictment. The prosecutor had 
significant discretionary power to decide whether or not to bring 
the case to court based on his interpretation of the law and evi- 
dence, or in consideration of a suspect's age, character, motive, 
or other circumstances, even though a crime had been committed. 

Prosecutors normally indicted only when they accumulated what 
they considered overwhelming evidence of a suspect's guilt. The 
courts, historically, were predisposed to accept the allegations of 
fact in an indictment. This predisposition was reflected in both the 
low acquittal rate — less than 0.5 percent — in criminal cases and 
in the frequent verbatim repetition of the indictment as the judg- 
ment. The principle of " innocent until proven guilty" applied in 
practice much more to the pre-indictment investigation than to the 
actual trial. 

During the 1980s, there was a dispute within the legal system 
over the judiciary's power to check prosecution. The prosecution 
and judiciary differed over whether or not the law gave the judiciary 
grounds to arraign suspects before issuing warrants. The judiciary 
tried repeatedly in the 1980s to institutionalize this right and in 
1989 asserted it in a proceeding. The judiciary was riot able to com- 
pel the prosecution to accept this view, however. 

At the prosecutor's discretion, a case could be brought before the 
court by summary indictment if the offense were punishable by 
fines. In such a case, the judge gave a summary judgment without 
holding a public hearing. The accused could request an ordinary trial. 

Once indicted, the accused had the right to be released on bail. 
Exceptions could be made if the offense were punishable by death, 



326 



Emergency training, Korean National Police 
Courtesy Korean National Police 

life imprisonment, or imprisonment over ten years; if the defen- 
dant were a recidivist; if there were suspicion that the defendant 
would destroy evidence; or if there were reasonable grounds to sus- 
pect that the defendant would flee; or if the residence of the defen- 
dant were unknown. In 1989 bail was granted in a National Security 
Act case for the first time. 

The constitutional right to representation by an attorney was 
not interpreted as applying to the investigation and interrogation 
phases. In National Security Act cases, access to counsel was regu- 
larly denied during the investigation phase. In 1989 lawyers sought 
court orders granting access, but neither the ANSP nor the Prose- 
cutor General's Office felt compelled to comply when the Nation- 
al Security Act was involved. 

There was no jury system. Cases that involved offenses punish- 
able by the death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for 
not less than one year were tried by three judges of a district or 
branch court. The remaining cases were heard by a single judge. 
Political and criminal cases were tried by the same courts; mili- 
tary courts did not try civilians except under martial law. 

At least five days before trial, the defendant was served a copy 
of the indictment. The defendant had to be represented by coun- 
sel if the offenses were punishable by death or imprisonment for 



327 



South Korea: A Country Study 

more than three years. The court appointed defense counsel if the 
defendant was unable to do so because of age, mental capacity, 
poverty, or other handicaps that might impair choice or commu- 
nication. 

Hearings generally were open to the public. If danger to national 
security or prejudice to public peace or good morals were involved, 
the judge could close the proceedings. Charges against defendants 
in the courts were declared publicly. Trial documents, however, 
were not part of the public record. In lengthy and complex indict- 
ments, the relationship between specific alleged actions and viola- 
tions of specific sections of the penal code could become unclear. 
In cases involving a mixture of political and criminal charges, this 
situation at times led to charges of unfair proceedings. A defen- 
dant had the right to remain silent and free from physical restraint 
in the courtroom. Judges generally allowed considerable scope for 
the examination of witnesses. 

Either the defendant or the prosecutor could appeal a judgment 
on the basis of law or fact. Appeals could result in reduced or in- 
creased sentences. A Constitution Court was established in 1988 
to relieve the burden on the Supreme Court (see The Judiciary, 
ch. 4). When the constitutionality of a law was at issue in a trial, 
the Supreme Court requested a decision of the Constitution Court. 
The president, chief justice, and the National Assembly each named 
three members of the nine-member Constitution Court. 

The Supreme Court retained the power to make final review 
of the constitutionality or legality of administrative decrees, regu- 
lations, or actions when at issue in a trial. Grounds for an appeal 
to the Supreme Court were limited by the Code of Criminal Proce- 
dure to violation of the Constitution, law, or regulation material 
to the judgment; abolition, alteration, or pardon of penalty; a grave 
mistake in factfinding; or extreme impropriety in sentencing. An 
interpretation of law in an appeal had binding effect on the inferi- 
or court only when the case was remanded. In other cases, however, 
a decision of the Supreme Court only had persuasive effect. 

Judges were trained professionally and were among the best 
products of one of the toughest education systems in the world. 
The qualifications for a judge were the completion of two years 
of courses at the Judicial Research and Training Institute after pass- 
ing the national judicial examination, or the possession of qualifi- 
cations as a prosecutor or an attorney. Judges were members of 
a tiny elite; the institute had only 3,692 graduates from 1949 to 
1988. In 1988 there were only 940 judges, 668 prosecutors, and 
1,593 practicing attorneys. There were additional requirements for 
higher positions: fifteen years of legal experience for the chief justice 



328 



National Security 



and justices of the Supreme Court; ten years of experience for the 
chief judge of an appellate court, the chief judge of a district court, 
the chief judge of a family court, and the senior judge of an appel- 
late court; and five years of experience for the judge of an appel- 
late court, the senior judge of a district court, and the senior judge 
of a family court. South Korea's president, with the consent of the 
National Assembly, appointed both the chief justice and, upon the 
recommendation of the chief justice, the other justices of the 
Supreme Court. Under the 1987 Constitution and the Court Or- 
ganization Law, lower justices were appointed by the chief justice 
with the consent of the Conference of Supreme Court Justices. 

Historically, the executive branch exercised great influence on 
judicial decisions. However, there were some indications of in- 
creased judicial independence in 1989. In a number of cases, the 
Constitution Court found that the government had violated the 
constitutional rights of individuals. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
invalidated the results of the elections for two National Assembly 
seats, citing election law violations by victorious ruling party can- 
didates. 

Penal administration was controlled and supervised by the Minis- 
try of Justice. There were four detention facilities (for unconvict- 
ed detainees), twenty-seven correctional institutions, ten juvenile 
training institutes, and four juvenile classification homes. Condi- 
tions in correctional institutions were austere and particularly harsh 
in winter. Discipline was strict. Prisoners who broke rules or pro- 
tested conditions sometimes were physically abused. Under nor- 
mal circumstances, however, convicts were not physically punished. 
Most accusations of mistreatment involved persons detained or 
awaiting trial in detention facilities, rather than those who were 
already convicted and serving their sentences in prison. Visitation 
was strictly limited to legal counsel and immediate families. Mail 
was subject to monitoring and occasional censorship. There was 
no significant difference in the treatment of prisoners on the basis 
of wealth, social class, race, or sex. The treatment of political 
prisoners could be better or worse than that of regular prisoners. 
On some occasions, special provisions were allowed for political 
prisoners, and as late as 1989 it also was alleged by human rights 
activists that political prisoners sometimes were subjected to sleep 
deprivation and psychological pressure. 

There were a number of probationary devices that permitted 
police to supervise suspected or convicted criminals, including defer- 
ral of prosecution and suspension of sentence. These measures in- 
creased judicial flexibility and were often used to show clemency. 
Probationary devices also had frequently been used to ensure that 



329 



South Korea: A Country Study 

released political offenders behaved in a manner acceptable to the 
government. Criminals who showed repentance regularly were freed 
in amnesties, often linked to holidays. Amnesty often was declared 
to showcase the beneficence of the state in forgiving criminals. 

* * * 

Three excellent sources on the South Korean armed forces are 
Edward A. Olsen's "The Societal Role of the Republic of Korea 
Armed Forces" in The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies; 
Eugene Kim's "The South Korean Military and Its Political Role" 
in Political Changes in South Korea; and Young Woo Lee's insightful 
article "Birth of the Korean Army, 1945-50" in Korea and World 
Affairs. The Asian Defence Journal often has comparative analyses 
of the military capabilities of the North Korean and South Korean 
armed forces. Larry A. Niksch's "The Military Balance on the 
Korean Peninsula" in Korea and World Affairs and Richard L. Snei- 
der's The Political and Social Capabilities of North and South Korea for 
the Long- Term Military Competition provide useful information on the 
Korean arms race. Dae-Kyu Yoon's Law and Political Authority in 
Korea is an excellent and detailed study of the interaction of law 
and politics in South Korea. Two books by South Korean army 
officers, Colonel Lee Suk Bok's The Impact of United States Forces 
in Korea and Brigadier General Taek-Hyung Rhee's U.S.-ROK 
Combined Operations provide the South Korean perspective on United 
States-South Korean military relations. English-language sources 
on national security issues are published regularly by the Seoul 
government, South Korean universities, and two daily newspapers, 
Korea Herald and Korea Times. The Ministry of National Defense 
publishes an annual White Paper that provides a comprehensive ex- 
amination of military organization, defense spending, and train- 
ing in the South Korean armed forces. The National Police 
Headquarters annually publishes Korean National Police, a pictorial 
and textual description of that organization. Manwoo Lee, Ronald 
D. McLaurin, and Chung-in Moon's (eds.), Alliance under Tension: 
The Evolution of South Korean- U.S. Relations is another useful source. 

The subversive activities of North Korea in South Korea and 
abroad and the causes for increased domestic violence in South 
Korea in the 1980s are discussed in official reports published by 
the United States Department of State and the Committee on For- 
eign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives. The 
Bombing of Korean Airlines Flight KAL-858, by the United States 
House Committee on Foreign Relations, provides a comprehen- 
sive examination of North Korea's past use of and capabilities for 



330 



National Security 



future acts of terrorism targeting South Koreans. Donald N. Clark's 
The Kwangju Uprising examines aspects of the Kwangju incident 
following Chun Doo Hwan's December 1979 coup. Selig S. Har- 
rison's The South Korean Political Crisis and American Policy Options 
discusses the goals of radical organizations in South Korea in the 
mid-1980s. For information concerning the history of the Korean 
legal system, Chun Bong Duck, William Shaw, and Choi Kai- 
Kwon's Traditional Korean Legal Attitudes should be consulted. Arti- 
cles in the Far Eastern Economic Review and Asian Survey should also 
be consulted. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



331 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Major Economic Indicators, 1986-89 

3 Central Government Expenditures, 1984, 1986, and 1987 

4 Central Government Revenues, 1984, 1986, and 1988 

5 Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1965-88 

6 Trade with the United States, 1982-89 

7 Principal Trading Partners, 1986 and 1988 

8 Constitutional Amendments, 1948-90 

9 Status of the National Assembly under the 1987 Constitution 

10 Executive Domination of the Judiciary, 1972-86 

11 National Assembly Election Returns, February 1985 

12 National Assembly Election Returns, April 1988 

13 Strikes and Labor Disputes, 1987-90 

14 Principal Radical Organizations, 1985-89 

15 Media Statistics, 1986, 1988, and 1989 

16 Orders of Battle and Major Equipment for Ground Forces 

of South Korea and North Korea, 1990 

1 7 Orders of Battle and Major Equipment for Air Forces of South 

Korea and North Korea, 1990 

18 Orders of Battle and Major Equipment for Naval Forces of 

South Korea and North Korea, 1990 



333 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) divide by 5 

and add 32 



Table 2. Major Economic Indicators, 1986-89 



Indicator 1986 1987 1988 1989 



Gross National Product 1 102.7 128.4 169.2 204.0 

Economic growth 2 12.9 12.8 12.2 6.5 

Per capita income 3 2,503.0 3,098.0 4,040.0 4,830.0 

Consumer prices 4 1.4 6.1 7.2 5.2 

Gross savings 5 33.1 36.3 37.7 35.8 

Trade account 6 4.2 7.7 11.4 4.6 

Current account 6 4.6 9.9 14.2 5.0 

Total foreign debt 1 44.5 35.6 31.2 30.3 

Gross investment share 4 29.3 29.4 29.9 33.4 



1 In billions of United States dollars. 

2 In percentage change. 

3 In United States dollars. 

4 Annual percentage change. 

5 As percentage of gross national product. 

6 In billions of United States dollars, balance of payments basis. 

Source: Based on information from Korea Economic Institute of America, Korea's Econ- 
omy, Washington, 1990. 



335 



South Korea: A Country Study 



Table 3. Central Government Expenditures, 1984, 1986, and 1987 
(in billions of won) * 



1984 1986 1987 

Expenditure Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount Percentage 



National defense 3,539.9 28.2 4,335.5 28.3 4,793.5 26.1 

General 6,822.1 54.4 8,577.0 56.0 10,009.0 54.5 

Fixed capital 

formation 949.6 7.6 1,284.4 8.4 1,391.5 7.6 

Net lending -2.4 — 9.5 — 0.5 — 

Other 1,225.1 9.8 1,113.7 7.3 2,170.7 11.8 

TOTAL 12,534.3 100.0 15,320.1 100.0 18,365.2 100.0 



— means negligible. 

* For value of the w6n — see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from Bank of Korea, Annual Report, 1987, Seoul, 1987, 68; 
and The Europa World Year Book, 1989, 2, London, 1989, 1574. 



Table 4. Central Government Revenues, 1984, 1986, and 1988 
(in billions of won) * 



Source 


1984 


1986 


1988 




. . . 6,697.4 


8,464.0 


12,545.1 




1,593.7 


1,942.5 


2,573.3 




, 1,511.3 


1,878.9 


2,978.4 




284.8 


372.4 


512.3 




866.0 


984.0 


874.0 


Government enterprise receipts (net) . . . 


232.3 


238.3 


340.8 


Other 


... 2,012.0 


2,398.5 


4,185.4 


TOTAL 


. . . 13,197.5 


16,278.6 


24,009.3 



* For value of the w6n — see Glossary. 



Source: Based on information from Bank of Korea, Annual Report 1987, Seoul, 1987, 68; 
and The Europa World Year Book, 1989, 2, London, 1989, 1574. 



Table 5. Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1965-88 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Year 


Current Account 
Balance 


Trade Account 
Balance 


Year 


Current Account 
Balance 


Trade Account 
Balance 


1965 . . 


9 


-240 


1985 . . 


-887 


-19 


1970 . . 


-623 


-922 


1986 . . 


4,617 


4,206 


1975 . . 


1,887 


-1,671 


1987 . . 


9,854 


7,659 


1980 . . 


-5,321 


-4,384 


1988 . . 


14,266 


11,561 



336 



Appendix 



Table 6. Trade with the United States, 1982-89 
(in billions of United States dollars) 





1982 


1983 


1984 


1985 


1986 


1987 


1988 


1989 




6.28 


8.26 


10.52 


10.78 


13.92 


18.38 


21.47 


20.64 




5.95 


6.27 


6.87 


6.55 


6.54 


8.76 


12.75 


15.91 




0.32 


1.98 


3.65 


4.23 


7.37 


9.62 


8.71 


4.73 



* Figures may not add because of rounding. 



Source: Based on information from United States Department of Commerce, International 
Trade Administration, Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United 
States: Korea, Washington, June 1989; United States, Department of Commerce, 
International Trade Administration, Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications 
for the United States: Korea, Washington, April 1990; and Korea Economic Institute 
of America, Korea Economic Update, 1, No. 2, Summer 1990, 4. 



Table 7. Principal Trading Partners, 1986 and 1988 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



1986 Exports 



Country by Rank Volume 



United States 13,880 

Japan 5,426 

Hong Kong 1,691 

Canada 1,248 

West Germany 1,242 

Britain 1,034 

Saudi Arabia 855 

France 543 

Australia 535 

Singapore 532 



1986 Imports 



Country by Rank Volume 



Japan 10,869 

United States 6,545 

West Germany 1,216 

Australia 1,080 

Malaysia 902 

Canada 709 

France 706 

Saudi Arabia 635 

Britain 454 

Oman 440 



1988 Exports 



Country by Rank 



Volume 



1988 Imports 



Country by Rank 



Volume 



United States 21,404,087 

Japan 12,004,068 

Hong Kong 3,560,944 

West Germany 2,367,803 

Britain 1,950,899 

Canada 1,692,327 

Singapore 1,355,260 

Saudi Arabia 1,130,309 

France 1,064,886 

Australia 864,821 



Japan 15,975,786 

United States 12,756,657 

West Germany 2,073,987 

Australia 1,797,390 

Malaysia 1,331,354 

Canada 1,196,816 

France 1,134,851 

Taiwan 1,071,264 

Britain 914,503 

Indonesia 905,297 



Source: Based on information from Korea Trade Promotion Corporation, How to Trade 
with Korea: 1987 — A Practical Guide to Trade and Investment, Seoul, 1987, 20-26; and 
The Europa World Year Book, 1989, 2, London, 1989, 1574. 



337 



South Korea: A Country Study 

Table 8. Constitutional Amendments, 1948-90 



Date Description 



July 4, 1954 To amend 1948 constitution to allow direct popular elec- 

(First Republic) tion of president rather than election by National As- 

sembly, in which President Syngman Rhee's Liberal 
Party lacked a stable majority. Passed in late-night Na- 
tional Assembly session under martial law with some 
opposition members under arrest and others forcibly 
assembled to form quorum. 

November 27, 1954 To eliminate limits on presidential terms in office to per- 
mit incumbent president (Rhee) indefinite tenure. Bill 
carried (after two earlier failures) by fraudulent round- 
ing of fractional number required for two-thirds 
majority. 

June 15, 1960 To replace presidential system with parliamentary form 

(Second Republic) of government following overthrow of President Rhee. 

Provided extensive civil rights and established Cen- 
tral Election Management Committee. 

November 23, 1960 To allow ex post facto legislation for punishment of rig- 
ging of March 1960 presidential elections and other 
actions by officials under former Rhee government. 

December 17, 1962 To reestablish presidential form of government in civilian 

(Third Republic) form for military leaders under Park Chung Hee, who 

staged coup d'etat in May 1961. 

October 17, 1969 To remove two-term restriction to permit President Park 

indefinite tenure. 

November 21, 1972 To increase executive power by permitting broad use of 

(Fourth Republic— yusin presidential emergency measures, to undercut power 

constitution) of National Assembly, and to restrict many civil rights. 

Ratified by referendum under martial law. 

October 22, 1980 To end^ui-m political order and provide new constitu- 

(Fifth Republic) tional framework for military leaders under Chun Doo 

Hwan, who staged coup d'etat in May 1980. Restored 
some civil rights, which were qualified by accompany- 
ing legislation. Ratified by referendum under martial 
law; coupled with measures barring all major civilian 
politicians from political participation. 

October 28, 1987 To void Fifth Republic constitution and provide for direct 

(Sixth Republic) popular election of president; coupled with measures 

restoring rights of political participation to all politi- 
cians barred in 1980. Drafted by joint committee of 
ruling and opposition party representatives following 
public pledges by ruling party presidential candidate 
Roh Tae Woo in June 1987. Restored stronger civil 
rights provisions of 1960 and 1962 constitutions. 

Source: Based on information from Korea Annual, 1988, Seoul, 1989, 91-94; John Kie-Chiang 
Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial, Ithaca, 1968, 43, 48; and Constitution of the Republic 
of Korea, Seoul, 1987. 



338 



Appendix 



Table 9. Status of the National Assembly under 
the 1987 Constitution 

Area of Power Provision 

Symbolic Text concerning National Assembly precedes text con- 
cerning executive. 

National Assembly National Assembly member apprehended or detained 

and State Council prior to opening of session must be released during 

session on request of National Assembly (except in 
cases of flagrante delicto). 

Requires one-quarter of membership to convene extra- 
ordinary session (versus one-third in 1980 consti- 
tution). 

Deletes provision limiting business in presidentially called 
extraordinary session to bills introduced by president. 

Deletes 150-day limit on assembly sessions. 

Deletes reference to dissolution of assembly. 

Extends power of inspection or investigation of specific 
matters of state affairs to include matters under crimi- 
nal investigation or trial. 

Deletes provision disallowing motion for removal of 
prime minister or State Council member(s) within first 
year after appointment. 

Deletes provision for removal of entire State Council if 
prime minister is removed. 

Judicial appointments Requires consent of National Assembly for all appoint- 
ments to Supreme Court (not just chief justice). 

Presidency Vote by majority of National Assembly breaks tie in 

presidential elections. 

Requires convocation of National Assembly if there is 
time, prior to emergency measures or presidential 
orders having legal effect. Failure to obtain National 
Assembly approval voids emergency measures and re- 
stores effect of previous laws. 

Source: Based on information from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Informa- 
tion, Korean Overseas Information Service, Constitution of the Republic of Korea, Seoul, 
1980; and Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Information, Korean Over- 
seas Information Service, Constitution of the Republic of Korea, Seoul, 1987. 



339 



South Korea: A Country Study 

Table 10. Executive Domination of the Judiciary, 1972-86 



Year Developments 



1972 President Park Chung Hee dismisses nine Supreme Court 

justices who had overturned a law denying relatives of war 
veterans right to claim compensation from state. Park's 1972 
yusin constitution rescinds Supreme Court's power to review 
constitutionality of laws. 

1980 . Six Supreme Court justices are interrogated by security agency 

and subsequendy forced to step down for their minority views 
that Kim Chae-gyu, President Park's assassin, had not con- 
spired to overthrow government. 

Early 1980s A number of law students are blacklisted from enrolling in Ju- 
dicial Training and Research Institute after demonstrating 
against 1980 Chun Doo Hwan coup d'etat. 

1985 Two Seoul District Court judges are punitively reassigned to 

provincial posts after acquitting accused student demonstra- 
tors. A third judge is transferred after protesting the reas- 
signment. 



Supreme Court reverses its earlier decision in appeal case of 
Kang Chong-gon, a National Security Act offender under con- 
tinued detention after his original sentence had expired. 

1986 Justice Yi Il-kyu is denied reappointment to Supreme Court. 

Among his independent decisions are a 1963 determination 
that voided coerced confession made by suspect on spying 
charges and questioning jurisdiction of 1980 military court 
in 1985 appeal by lawyer linked with opposition figure Kim 
Dae Jung. 



Table 11. National Assembly Election Returns, February 1985 



Number of Seats Percentage Percentage 

Party Direct Proportional of Vote of Seats 



Democratic 

Justice Party 87 61 35.3 53.6 

New Korea 

Democratic Party 50 17 29.2 24.3 

Democratic 

Korea Party 26 9 19.5 12.7 

Korea 

Nationalist Party 15 5 9.2 7.2 

Other and 

independents * 6 6.8 2.2 

Total 184 92 100.0 100.0 



* Most independents subsequendy joined one of the four major parties. 

Source: Based on information from Byung Chul Koh, "The 1985 Parliamentary Election 
in South Korea," Asian Survey, 25, No. 9, September 1985, 883-97. 



340 



Appendix 



Table 12. National Assembly Election Returns, April 1988 



Number of Seats Percentage Percentage 

Party Direct Proportional of Vote of Seats 



Democratic 

Justice Party 87 38 34.0 41.8 

Party for Peace 

and Democracy 54 16 19.3 23.4 

Reunification 

Democratic Party 46 13 23.8 19.7 

New Democratic 

Republican Party 27 8 15.6 11.7 

Other and 

independents 1 10 7.2 3.3 

Total 2 224 75 100.0 100.0 



1 Most independents subsequently joined one of the four major parties. 

2 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Chan Wook Park, "The 1988 National Assembly Elec- 
tion in South Korea: The Ruling Party's Loss of Legislative Majority," Journal 
of Northeast Asian Studies, 7, No. 3, Fall 1988, 65. 



Table 13. Strikes and Labor Disputes, 1987-90 

Number of 



Year Events Comments 



1987 3,749 70.1 percent over pay. 

1988 1 ,873 Average duration 10 days; 51.6 percent over pay, 

16.9 percent over the right to bargain 
collectively, 7.1 percent over working 
conditions, 5.9 percent over dismissal, 
3 percent over employers' unfair acts. 

1989 * 1,678 Average duration 17.8 days, 47.6 percent over 

pay, 25.5 percent over collective bar- 
gaining; 69 percent of events ruled ille- 
gal under Labor Dispute Adjustment 
Law. 



* January through October. 



341 



South Korea: A Country Study 

Table 14. Principal Radical Organizations, 1985-89 



Date Established Organization 



April 17, 1985 National Federation of Student Associations (Chonhangnyon). 

Action wing is Struggle Committee for the Liberation of the 
Masses, the Attainment of Democracy, and the Unification 
of the Nation (Sammint'u). Both outlawed as "anti-state or- 
ganizations" under National Security Act and suppressed in 
1986. 

March 21, 1986 Struggle Committee Against Imperialism, the Military, and Fas- 



cism, and for the Nation and Democracy (Mimmint'u) in- 
augurated at thirty-eight universities. Mimmint'u ideology 
emphasizes political linkages and cooperation among students, 
workers, and farmers. 



April 11, 1986 Committee for the Anti-U.S. Struggle for Independence and the 

Anti-Fascist Struggle for Democracy (Chamint'u) formed at 
Seoul National University and Korea University. Chamint'u 
ideology emphasizes struggle and direct action against the 
government and the United States presence in South Korea. 

May 1987 Seoul Area Council of University Student Representatives 

(Sodaehyop). Combines Chamint'u and Mimmint'u 
elements. 

August 19, 1987 National Association of University Student Councils (Chondae- 

hyop) established in Taejon. Replaced and enlarged Sodaehyop. 

May 1988 Seoul Area Federation of Student Councils (Soch'ongnyon). 



Source: Based on information from Wonmo Dong, "University Students in South Korean 
Politics: Patterns of Radicalization in the 1980s," Journal of International Affairs [Seoul], 
40, No. 2, Winter-Spring 1987, 233-55; and "Monthly Views Two Dissident 
Groups' Interactions," Sin tonga [Seoul], March 1, 1989, 268-85, in Foreign Broad- 
cast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia, April 7, 1989, 26-38. 



Table 15. Media Statistics, 1986, 1988, and 1989 



Media 


1986 


1988 


1989 




8 


9 


18 


Local newspapers 1 


10 


10 


24 


News agencies 


2 


2 


2 


National radio stations 2 


3 


3 


3 


Affiliated local 










47 


49 


48 




2 


2 


2 


Foreign press 










40 


50 


50 




2,500 


n.a. 


3,500 



n.a. — not available. 

1 Newspapers are Korean-language dailies, excluding sports newspapers. 

2 Excluding Far Eastern Broadcasting Company. 

3 Estimated. 



342 



Appendix 



Table 16. Orders of Battle and Major Equipment for Ground 
Forces of South Korea and North Korea, 1990 



Category 



South Korea 



North Korea 



Active-duty personnel 
Military units 



Equipment 





575,000 1 




930,000 


3 


army headquarters 


16 


corps headquarters 


10 




31 


infantry divisions 2 




headquarters 2 






2 


mechanized 


15 


armored 




infantry divisions 2 




brigades 2 


21 


infantry divisions 2 


24 


infantry brigades 2 


7 


special forces 


25 


special forces 




brigades 




brigades 


8 


independent 








infantry brigades/ 








armor/infantry/ 








marine 






1 


aviation brigade 






2 


^i i rfa rp- tn- «n i rf*a rp 




surface-to-surface 




missile battalions 




missile battalions 3 


1,560 


tanks 


3,500 


tanks 


1,550 


armored personnel 


1,960 


armored personnel 




carriers 




carriers 


4,200 


field artillery 


7,800 


field artillery 




pieces 




pieces 


140 


multiple rocket 


2,500 


multiple rocker 




launchers 




launchers 


5,300 


mortars 


11,000 


mortars 


12 


surface-to-surface 


70 


surface-to-surface 




missiles 




missiles 



— means negligible. 

1 Includes 25,000 marines. 

2 Includes subordinate armor and artillery units. 

3 Number of units unknown. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1989-1990, London, 1989, 165-66; 
and Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1989, 
Seoul, 138-40. 



343 



South Korea: A Country Study 



Table 17. Order of Battle and Major Equipment for Air Forces 
of South Korea and North Korea, 1990 



Category South Korea North Korea 



Personnel 




40,000 1 




70,000 


Military units 1 


22 


ground attack/ 


3 


bomber regiments 






interceptor 










squadrons 








1 


reconnaissance 


18 


ground attack 






squadron 




regiments 




l 


search-and-rescue 




surface-to-surface 






squadron 




missile battalions 2 




4 


transport 


6 


+ transport 






squadrons 




regiments 








2 


defense artillery 










divisons 




5 


surface-to-surface 


7 


air defense 






missile battalions 




regiments 




2 


air defense 










artillery brigades 








1 


counterinsurgency 










squadron 






Equipment 










Fighter aircraft . . . 


90 


F-5A/B 


40 


J-7 


36 


F-16C/D 


160 


J-6 




204 


F-5E/F 


100 


J" 5 




130 


F-4 


40 


Q-5 




20 


RF-4/5 


10 


Su-25 




23 


A-37 


24 


MiG-29 








46 


MiG-23 








120 


MiG-21 








300 


MiG-17 








20 


Su-7 


Bombers 







80 


H-5 


Transport 


37 




280 




Helicopters 


400 3 




142 





1 Data on transportation, helicopter, and training units not available. 

2 Number of units unknown. 

3 In army and naval aviation units. The army, navy, and air force have an additional 263 support aircraft, 
including helicopters, trainers, and transports. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1989-1990, London, 1989, 165-66; 
and Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1989, 
Seoul, 1990, 138, 141. 



344 



Appendix 

Table 18. Orders of Battle and Major Equipment for Naval Forces 
of South Korea and North Korea, 1990 



Category South Korea North Korea 







oO,UUU 










fleet commands 




East Coast Fleet 


1 

I 


aviation command 




\AIf±Qt Cnact Tn*»*»t 




1 
1 


amphibious 










command 








1 


logistics command 








1 


mine-warfare 










command 








1 


training command 








3 


minisubmarines 


24 


submarines 




11 


destroyers 


2 


frigates 




17 


frigates 


4 


corvettes 




11 


missile-attack craft 


29 


missile-attack craft 




68 


patrol boats 


330 


patrol boats 




9 


minesweepers 


40 


minesweepers 




52 


amphibious craft 


125 


amphibious craft 




10 


Grumman S-2 










aircraft 








35 


Hughes 500-MD 










helicopters 







Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1989-1990, 1989, London, 165-66; 
and Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1989, 
Seoul, 1990, 141. 



345 



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Congress. 101st, 1st Session. House of Representatives. 

Committee on Foreign Affairs. Developments in United States- 
Republic of Korea Relations. Washington: GPO, 1990. 

Congress. 101st, 2d Session. House of Representatives. 

Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. Study Mis- 
sion to Korea, Hong Kong, Thailand, Laos, and Hawaii (January 3-14, 
1990). Washington: GPO, 1990. 



374 



Bibliography 



Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- 
tices for 1989. Washington: GPO, 1990. 

Department of State. "Korea: New Beginnings," Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin, 87, No. 9, September 1987, 32-34. 

Department of State. "United States Government State- 
ment on the Events in Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May 
1980," Washington: June 19, 1989. 

Whitaker, Mark. "South Korea's Miracle Week," Newsweek, 110, 
July 13, 1987, 26-28. 

Williams, Nick B. "1980 Uprising: Memories of Kwangju Haunt 
Korea," Los Angeles Times, November 3, 1987, 14. 

Wilson, Robert W. "Wellsprings of Discontent: Sources of Dis- 
sent in South Korean Student Values," Asian Survey, 28, No. 
10, October 1988, 1066-81. 

Wysocki, Bernard. "Growing Disillusionment Fuels Expansion of 
Korean Opposition," Wall Street Journal, June 22, 1987, 23. 

"South Korean Election Isn't Only Politics," Wall Street 

Journal, July 31, 1987, 12. 

Yang, Sung Chul. "The North and South Korean Arms Race and 
a New Alternative," Korean Journal of International Studies [Seoul], 
20, No. 3, Fall 1989, 431-81. 

Yi, Sang-u. Security and Unification in Korea. Seoul: Sogang University 
Press, 1983. 

Yoon, Dae-Kyu. Law and Political Authority in Korea. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press and Seoul: Kyungnam University 
Press, 1990. 

Yoon, Woo Kon. Korean Public Bureaucracy. Seoul: Sung Kyun Kwan 

University Press, 1982. 
Youm, Kyu Ho. "Press Freedom under Constraints: The Case 

of South Korea," Asian Survey, 26, No. 8, August 1986, 868-82. 
Youm, Kyu Ho, and Michael B. Sal wen. "A Free Press in South 

Korea: Temporary Phenomenon or Permanent Fixture," Asian 

Survey, 30, No. 3, March 1990, 312-25. 

(Various issues of the following publications also were used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Asian Defence Journal [Kuala Lum- 
pur], 1985-89; Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], 1987-88; 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia, 
1989-90; Korea Herald [Seoul] , 1985-90; and Korea Times [Seoul], 
1985-90.) 



375 



Glossary 



chaebol — Korean translation of the Japanese word zaibatsu, or busi- 
ness conglomerate. A group of specialized companies with 
interrelated management servicing each other. 

chip (jip) — The household, i.e., family members under one roof; 
the term k'unjip (big house) refers to the main family of the 
eldest son, while the term chagunjip (little house) refers to the 
branch family households of the younger sons. 

Ch'ondogyo — Teachings of the Heavenly Way, an indigenous 
monotheistic religion stressing the equality of man and the unity 
of man and the universe. Formerly Tonghak (q. v. ), Ch'ondogyo 
had approximately 27,000 followers and 66 churches in South 
Korea in 1988. 

chuch 'e (juche) — The political ideology promulgated by Kim II Sung. 
The application of Marxism- Leninism to the North Korean 
experience based on autonomy and self-reliance. 

chungin — The "middle people," a small group of technicians and 
administrators in traditional Korea, subordinate to the yang- 
ban (q.v.), that included astronomers, physicians, interpreters, 
legal specialists, and artists. 

Demarcation Line — Established under the Korean armistice agree- 
ment of 1953; marks the actual cease-fire line between South 
Korea and North Korea. 

DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) — The 4-kilometer-wide buffer zone 
along the approximately 241 -kilometer-long Demarcation Line 
(q.v.). 

fiscal year — calendar year. 

Five Relationships — The Confucian concept of ideal social rela- 
tionships, formulated by classical Chinese philosophers such 
as Mencius (372-289 B.C.), which states that there should be 
affection between father and son, righteousness between ruler 
and minister, attention to their separate functions between hus- 
band and wife, proper order between old and young, and faith- 
fulness between friends. 

GDP — gross domestic product. The total value of all final (con- 
sumption and investment) goods and services produced by an 
economy in a given period, usually a year. 

GNP — gross national product. GDP (q. v.) plus income from over- 
seas investments minus the earnings of foreign investors in the 
home economy. 



377 



South Korea: A Country Study 

han'gul — The Korean phonetic writing system, developed by schol- 
ars in the court of King Sejong in the fifteenth century, which 
is used either by itself or in conjunction with Chinese characters. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabiliz- 
ing international exchange rates and payments. The main busi- 
ness of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members 
(including industrialized and developing countries) when they 
experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans 
frequently carry conditions that require substantial internal 
economic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are 
developing countries. 

p'a — The lineage, a kinship unit consisting of all descendants of 
a common male ancestor who, in many cases, was the found- 
er of a village. Some p'a contain thousands of households — 
chip (q.v.) — and members conduct ceremonies at the common 
ancestral gravesite. In some villages or hamlets in traditional 
Korea, many or most of the people were members of the same 

p' a - 

pukpang chdngch'aek — Also seen as Nordpolitik, or northern policy. 
Reconciling traditional ties with the West with new opportu- 
nities in the East; establishing self-reliant global posture; ex- 
panding and diversifying trade relations on global scale to cope 
with trade protectionism from the United States; improving 
relations with P'yongyang. 

to (do) — Province, used in combined form, as Kangwon-do for 
Kangwon Province, or Chungch'ong-pukto for North Ch'ung- 
ch'ong Province. There are eight mainland provinces and one 
island province in the Republic of Korea. Do, or to, also means 
island, as in Cheju-do. 

Tonghak — Literally, Eastern learning, an indigenous religious 
movement founded by Ch'oe Che-u in the early 1860s, which 
spearheaded a popular, anti-foreign rebellion in 1894-95. Later 
renamed Ch'ondogyo (q.v.). 

won — The monetary unit. In January 1989, the exchange rate was 
W682.4 per US$1. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the 
primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for 
productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but 



378 



Glossary 



administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to 
furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much eas- 
ier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, 
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD 
through loans and assistance specifically designed to encourage 
the growth of productive private enterprises in the less devel- 
oped countries. The president and certain senior officers of the 
IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC . The three institu- 
tions are owned by the governments of the countries that sub- 
scribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, 
member states must first belong to the International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF) — q.v.). 
yangban — The scholar-official ruling class of traditional Korea, dis- 
tinguished for its knowledge of neo-Confucianism and its mo- 
nopoly of high government positions; more broadly, families 
with lineages descended from scholar-officials and scholars who 
had passed the civil service examinations even though they had 
not secured an official post. 



379 



Index 



abortion, 79 

account surpluses, 153, 184 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS), 129-30 

Act Concerning Assembly and Demon- 
stration, 244, 245, 310 

Act Concerning Crimes Against the State, 
311 

Act Concerning Local Autonomy, 215 
Act Concerning Protection of Military 

Secrets, 279, 312, 313 
Act Concerning Protection of Society, 211 
Administration Reform Commission, 

209, 226 

Advisory Council of Elder Statesmen, 
207-8 

Advisory Council for Peaceful Unification 
Policy, 207 

Agency for National Security Planning 
(ANSP) (see also Korean Central Intel- 
ligence Agency), 207, 225, 281, 310, 
311-14; activities of, 227, 237, 314; 
conduct of foreign policy by, 251 ; func- 
tions of, 312-13; Information Coordi- 
nation Committee of, 314; limitations 
on powers of, 226-27, 228, 313, 314; 
organizational structure of , 3 1 3 ; origin 
of, 312; reluctance of, to limit power, 
313-14, 327; role of, strengthened, 
227-28 

Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggres- 

sion, Exchange and Cooperation, xxxvi 
agricultural: bank, 171-72; development, 

44; subsidies, 47; technology, 47; trade, 

226; workforce, 45, 163 
agricultural cooperative movement, 141, 

167; merged with agricultural bank, 

171-72 

agricultural economy: government's em- 
phasis on, 142; under Park, 46; pre- 
twentieth century, 139 

agricultural productivity, 165, 167, 170; 
growth of, 165; under Saemaul Move- 
ment, 47 

agricultural products, 165, 167, 255; 
barley, 165, 167; imports of, xxix, 170; 
livestock, 167; price supports for, 169; 
rice, 165 



agricultural sector (see also farmers): con- 
tribution of, to gross domestic product, 
165; decline in, xxix, 46; problems in, 
163-65; prospects for, 170; share of, in 
gross national product, 193 

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Min- 
istry of, xxix 

AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome 

air defense system, 269; army's respon- 
sibility for, 283, 285 

air force, 285-86, 289; aircraft, 285-86; 
base locations, 285; commands in, 285; 
materiel, xxxix; modernization pro- 
gram, 286; organization of, 285; per- 
sonnel, 285; role of, xxxix 

Air Force Academy, 290 

Air Force Office of Special Investigations, 
315 

airports, 182 

Air Training Command, 285 

Air Transportation Command, 285 

akpop (evil laws), 244 

Algeria, 264 

Allen, Richard V., 60 

American Cultural Center, 241, 242 

ancestor worship, 11; function of, 100; in 

kinship system, 100; in urban families, 

104 

ANSP. See Agency for National Security 
Planning 

anti-American sentiment, 55, 62, 221, 
241, 255; aroused by Nordpolitik, 252; 
aroused by Kwangju uprising, 241, 
299; fueled by Reagan's support of 
Chun, 60; violence in, 241, 242 
Anticommunism Law, 307 
Anticommunist Youth League, 239, 240 
April 19 Student Revolution, 34, 306 
armed forces. See military; see also under in- 
dividual branches 
Armed Forces Organization Act, xxxix- 
xl, 274 

army, 281-85; aircraft of, 284; air defense 
network, 283, 285; Capital Defense 
Command, xxxix, 282-83; Counter- 
espionage Operations Command, 283; 
Defense Security Command, 283, 307, 



381 



South Korea: A Country Study 



310, 313, 314-17; disbanded by Japa- 
nese, 273; dissident students drafted 
into, 279-80; First Army, xxxviii- 
xxxix, 281, 283; infantry units in, 283, 
285; Logistics Base Command, 283; 
materiel, 284-85; organization of, 281; 
responsibilities of, 283; Second Army, 
xxxix, 282; Special Warfare Command, 
284; Third Army, xxxviii-xxxix, 281- 
82, 283; weapons, 283, 284-85; women 
in, 284 

Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC), 
312, 314 

Army Security Command, 315 

art: Buddhist influence on, 15; calligra- 
phy, 16; Chinese influence on, 16; gold 
objects, 15; Indian influence on, 15; 
under Japanese rule, 22; painting, 16; 
pottery, 15-16; sculpture, 15; tomb 
paintings, 15, 123 

artists, 16 

Asia Motors, 296 

Asiana Airlines, 182 

Asia-Pacific News Network, 249 

Association for Korean Residents in 
Japan. See Mindan 

Association of Journalists Dismissed in 
1980, 236 

Association of Korean Journalists, 236 
associations, xxxii-xxxiii, 170, 200, 234- 

236, 243 
Audit and Inspection Board, 207 
automobiles, 156; domestic demand for, 

138, 158; parts for, 160 
automotive industry, xxviii, 156, 158, 

160; government emphasis on, 142, 

158, 160 

balance of payments: effects of, 186; in 
1970s, 138; in 1986, 138; surplus, 186 
balance of trade, 183, 190-91 
Bank of Korea, 142, 172; Office of Bank 
Supervision and Examination of, 172 
Bank of Seoul and Trust Company, 154 
banks, 149, 172, 174; decline in, 154-55; 
money-deposit, 154; nationalized, 141, 
171; under Chun, 58; under Park, 141; 
trust services of, 154 
Basic Press Act (1980), 244, 247; public 

criticism of, 247-48 
Bell Helicopters Textron, 296 
birth control. See family planning 



birth rate, 29, 79; projected, 190; urban, 
84 

Blue House, 207, 283, 288, 304 
borders, 3, 7, 70 
Bright Society Rallies, 58 
Britain, 157; treaty with, 12 
Brunei, 264 

Buddhism, xxvii, 123, 128; decline of, 
124; dominance of, 7; effect of land re- 
form on, 9-10; influence of, 10, 15, 70; 
number of adherents to, 127; opposi- 
tion to, 10; Won (Wonbulgyo), 126 

Bush, George, 256 

business associations, 234; history of, 234; 
relationship of, with government, 234, 
235 

business conglomerates. See chaebol 
businesses: contribution of, to gross na- 
tional product, 174; financing of, 155; 
government assistance to, 174-75; gov- 
ernment discrimination among, 97; 
under Park, 43; relationship of, with 
government, 235; small and medium- 
sized, 174-75; wages in, 174; working 
conditions in, 174 
bus system, 181 

cabinet. See State Council 

Cairo Conference, 24 

Capital Defense Command, xxxix, 282- 

83; responsibilities of, 283 
capital equipment, 189 
Capital Garrison Command, 228, 282, 

316 

capital market, 172 

Carter, Jimmy, 51 

Central People's Committee, 27, 28 

Central Police Academy, 318, 319 

CFC. See United States-Republic of Korea 

Combined Forces Command 
Ch'aChi-ch'61, 41, 42; assassinated, 42, 

307 

chaebol (business conglomerates), xxxiii, 
148, 194; access of, to foreign tech- 
nology, 149; characteristics of, 148; co- 
operation of, with government, 148; 
department stores owned by, 171; de- 
velopment and origins of, 43, 146-49; 
diversification programs of, 254; ex- 
ports by, 148-49; government favorit- 
ism toward, 97, 141; growth of, 148- 
49; largest, 147; precursors of, 95, 140; 



382 



Index 



revenues of, 147; under Rhee, 147; role 
of, in economic development, 141, 147; 
working conditions in, 147 
Ch'ae Man-sik, 22 

chaeya seryok (opposing political forces), 53 
chagunjip. See household 
Ch'a Kyu-h6n, 56 

Changanghoe. See Self-Strengthening So- 
ciety 

Chang My5n John M. Chang), 34, 37- 
38, 140, 306 

Chang Se-dong, 225 

Chang To-yong, 38 

Cheju Island, 71, 75, 305; administration 
of, 214; airport, 182; dialect of, 113; 
land area of, 71; shamanism on, 106; 
women on, 77, 106 

chemical industry, 139, 141, 161-62; areas 
for investment, 162; expansion of, 44, 
189; exports by, 144, 162, 189; fertiliz- 
ers in, 161-62; government emphasis 
on, 142, 144; growth in, 144; imports 
by, 162; role of chaebol in, 149 

Cheney, Richard B., 256, 303 

Chiang Kai-shek, 27, 274 

China: borders with, 3; contacts of, with 
South Korean people, 260; cooperation 
with, xxxiv; diplomatic relations with, 
xxxiv; ethnic Koreans in, 260; influence 
of, xxiv, 4, 5, 12, 16, 18, 33, 89, 123; 
invasion of Kory6 by, 8; as mediator, 
260; military trained in, 273; Nordpoli- 
tik viewed by, 260; relations with, 8; 
role of, in Korean War, 32; ties with, 
xxxiii, 61, 252, 260; trade with, xxxii, 
xxxiii, xxxiv, 7, 188, 257; in trustee- 
ship, 27; war with, 271, 272; Western 
influence in, 11 

Chinese Communist Party, 274 

Chinese Eastern Railway, 14 

Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV), 276 

Chinhae, 85 

Chinhan, 4-5 

chip. See household 

Ch'oe Che-u, 124 

Ch'oe Kyu-ha, 53-53, 308; elected presi- 
dent, 52 

Ch'oe Nam-son, xxv 

Chohung Bank, 172 

C holla region, xxxii, 273; development 
in, 77; discrimination against people of, 
97; rebelliousness in, 77; rivalry of, 
with KySngsang region, 56, 76-77 



ch'ommin class, 91, 93, 94; shamans in, 
122 

ChomminySn. See Coalition for a Na- 
tional Democratic Movement 

Chdndaehyop. See National Association of 
University Student Councils 

Chondogwan (Evangelical Church), 126 

Ch'ondogyo (Teachings of the Heavenly 
Way), 90, 124-26; number of adher- 
ents, 128 

Ch'ongch'on River, 4 

Ch6ng Chu-yong, 262 

Chdng Ho-yong, 56, 228 

ChSngjo (King), 11 

Ch'6ngju, 182 

Chong Mong-ju, 16 

Chong Mung-jun, 149 

Chongsin Girls' School, 107 

ChSng Yag-yong, 1 1 

ChSn'gyojo. See National Teachers Union 

Chonju Yi, 102 

Chon Ky6ng-hwan, 169-70 

Chonnam University, 55 

ChSnnohyop. See National Council of Labor 
Unions 

Cho Pyong-ok, 37 

Chosen soren (General Association of 
Korean Residents in Japan), 6 

Choson Dynasty, 9-15, 323; art in, 15; 
Chinese influence in, 16; deforestation 
in, 167; education during, 114; founded 
by Yi Song-gye, 8-9, 272; genealogy 
in, 19, 92; Japanese attacks on, 10; 
Manchu attacks on, 10; medicine in, 
130; natural disasters in, 11; neo- 
Confucianism in, 88, 123; problems in, 
10; reforms in, 9; revolts in, 11; 
secularism in, 10; shamanism in, 106; 
ties of, with United States, 25; urban 
population in, 81; yangban in, 20, 91 

Choson ilbo, 248 

Choson Kingdom, 4; isolationism in, xxiv 
Christian Broadcasting System, 247, 248 
Christian Farmers Association, 239 
Christianity, xxvii, 11, 123-24; growth of, 
124; influence of, 90; prohibition of, 
124; Protestantism, 124; Roman Ca- 
tholicism, 123 
Christians: concept of minjung promoted 
by, 99; missionaries, 123, 124; num- 
ber of, 124, 127; persecution of, 124; 
as political radicals, 53; resistance by, 
to Japanese occupiers, 110, 124; role 
of, in modernization, 124 



383 



South Korea: A Country Study 



Chun Doo Hwan, xxix, 77, 228, 316; at- 
tempt to assassinate, 304; coup d'etat 
of, xxxvii, 53, 54, 307, 308; elected 
president, 56; government of. See Fifth 
Republic; investigation of Park by, 52; 
public apology by, 225; purges under, 
57-58, 220; reaction of, to Kwangju 
uprising, 56; self-exile of, 208, 225 

Chungang ilbo, 248, 249; strike against, 
249-50 

Ch'ungch'ong provinces: stereotype of, 
77 

Chun government (Fifth Republic), xxix- 
xxx, 249, 310, 317; banks under, 58; 
censorship under, 247; compromise 
and reform under, 215-19; control of 
news by, 247; crackdown on journalists 
under, 236; crackdown on protesters 
by, 54-55; demise of, 61-63, 199; econ- 
omy under, 59; effect of Kwangju 
uprising on, 241 ; emphasis of, on edu- 
cation, xxv-xxvi; human rights viola- 
tions under, 244; junta committee, 56; 
military under, 278-79; military spend- 
ing under, 279; modernization of armed 
forces under, 269; purge of bureaucracy 
by, 212, 230; purge of Korean Central 
Intelligence Agency in, 312; reeduca- 
tion program of, 58, 240; Saemaul 
Movement under, 169; ties of, with 
Reagan administration, 59-60; vio- 
lence used by, 240 

Chun government corruption: committee 
investigating, 224; convictions of offi- 
cials in, 224; effects of hearings into, 
224-25; hearings investigating, 200, 
212-13, 225, 233 

chungin class, 16, 91, 93 

Chungsanggyo, 126 

Ch'usok (Autumn Harvest Festival), 104 

CIC. See Army Counterintelligence Corps 

CIS. See Commonwealth of Independent 
States 

cinemas, 250 

Civil Code, 324 

civil defense, 288 

Civil Defense Law, 288 

civil service {see also yangban), 211-14; cor- 
ruption hearings on and prosecution of 
officials in, 212-13; examinations for, 
213; management of, 213; number of 
employees in, 213; prestige of, 211-12; 
qualifications for, 91; recruitment for, 
213; reform of, 212 



Cleansing Committees, 58 
climate, 72-75 
clinics, 131 

Coalition for a National Democratic Move- 
ment (Chomminyon), 233 

Code of Criminal Procedure (1954), 203, 
324, 328 

Cold War, xxiv; effect of Korean War on, 
33; revisionist view of, 62-63 

Combat Air Command, 285 

Combat Police, 310, 318, 321; conscrip- 
tion of, 321; as military obligation, 322; 
personnel, 322; responsibilities of, 321 

Command and General Staff College, 291 

Commercial Bank, 172 

Commercial Code, 324 

Committee for Peaceful Reunification of 
the Fatherland (CPRF), 259, 262 

commodity: structure, 188-89; trade vol- 
ume, 137 

Commonwealth of Independent States 

(CIS), xxxiv 
Conference of Supreme Court Justices, 

210 

Confucianism {see also neo-Confucianism): 
dominance of, xxvii, 7, 123; hierarchy 
in, 89; influence of, on art, 16, 69-70; 
influence of, on education, 114; num- 
ber of adherents to, 127; as a political 
theory, 89, 124; revival of, xxvii; as so- 
cial ethic, 128 

Confucius (Kong Zi), 88, 89 

conscription, xxxviii, 279, 279, 280, 288, 
289; rejection for, 288; role of, in de- 
velopment, 96 

Conscription Law of 1949, 279 

conscripts: assignment of, 288-89; basic 
training of, 290; rights of, xxxviii 

constitution (see also under individual consti- 
tutions): drafting of, 201-2; perception 
of, 201 

constitution of 1948, 31; amended, 33; re- 
vised in 1960, 37 

constitution of 1962, 39; amended, 39; 
presidential power under, 39 

constitution of 1972 (yusin constitution), 
40, 42, 244, 307; presidential power 
under, xxx; revised in 1987, xxx 

constitution of 1980, 53, 57, 202, 204, 
206, 207, 310; presidential power 
under, 57 

Constitution of 1987, 202-5, 325; amend- 
ment process, 204-5; drafting of, 216; 



384 



Index 



due process under, 202-3; elections 
under, 221; foreign policy under, 
250-51; National Assembly in, 202, 
221-22; neutrality clause in, 202; out- 
line of, 202-3; people's duties and 
rights in, 202-4; presidential power un- 
der, 202, 207; separation of powers in, 
204; unification policy in, 202 
constitutional framework, 200-205; his- 
tory of, 200-201; of Sixth Republic, 
201-2 

constitutionalism: difficulties in adapting 
to South Korea, 201 ; as focus of politi- 
cal strife, 201; idea of, 201 
constitutional review, 211 
Constitution Court, 211, 328, 329 
construction industry, xxviii, 142, 160- 
61; domestic, 160; in Middle East, 160, 
177; overseas, 160 
consumer goods: imports of, 189; low 

production of, 45 
consumption patterns, 177-78 
Council for Promotion of Democracy, 
231, 232 

Counterespionage Operations Command, 
283 

counterinsurgency program, 275 
Court Organization Law (1949), 210, 223 
courts. judiciary; see also under individual 
courts 

CPRF. See Committee for Peaceful Re- 
unification of the Fatherland 

CPV. See Chinese People's Volunteers 

credit policies, 172, 173 

credit associations. See kye 

crime, 325 

Criminal Code, 324 

criminal justice system, 322-30; acquit- 
tal rate, 326; amnesty in, 329; appeal, 
328; arrest, 326; bail, 326-27; Chinese 
influence on, 323; Confucian values in, 
323; detention, 326; hearings, 328; key 
features of, 323-24; political prisoners 
in, 329; probation in, 329-30; public 
prosecutors, 325; rights of accused, 
202, 324-25, 327; right to legal coun- 
sel under, 324-25, 327-28; sentences, 
244; summary indictment, 326; West- 
ern influence on, 323 

criminal procedure, 325-30 

culture: Chinese influence on, xxiv, 18; 
as element in ethnic identity, 75; re- 
pression of, under Japanese rule, 23; 



role of hut in, 123; under Three King- 
doms, 15-18; United States influence 
on, xxiii; Western influence on, xxiv 

Cumings, Bruce, 140 

curb market, 155 

currency: devaluation of, 43; revaluation 
of, 188 

current account balance: in 1988, 149; in 

1989, 149 
Curzon, George (Lord), 71 

Daeduk Science Town, 191 

Daewoo, 147, 157, 160, 257, 258; defense 

production by, 296 
death: causes of, 129; rate, 128 
defense industry, 160, 295-97; aircraft 
produced by, 285; coproduction ar- 
rangements in, 160, 269, 277-78, 279, 
285, 286; domestic, 277, 295-96; li- 
censed production in, 277; research and 
design in, 279; role of chaebol in, 149; 
technical assistance in, 211-1$ 
Defense Industry Bureau, 277 
Defense Security Command (DSC), 
xxxix, 54, 61, 228, 240, 247, 283, 307, 
310, 313, 314-17; corruption in, 316; 
political activities of, 316-17; reform of, 
xxxviii 

defense spending, 146, 271, 293-95; an- 
nual budgets for, 293; under Chun, 
279; National Assembly review of, 294; 
in 1965, 277; in 1970s, 293; as opera- 
tional costs, 295; as percentage of gross 
national product, 293; on weapons, 295 

Defense White Paper, 1988, 279-80 

Demarcation Line, 70 

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), 70, 269; es- 
tablished, 276 

Democratic Alpine Club, 231 

Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea, 
xxxvi, 262 

Democratic Declaration, 40 

Democratic Justice Party (DJP), xxx, 
199, 204, 228, 317; loss of majority by, 
222-23; political alignments in, 230; 
Roh's restructuring of, 229; student ac- 
tivity against, 242 

Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), 230, 
313; coalition, xxxii; creation of, xxxi 

Democratic Party (DP), 34, 37; creation 
of, xxxii 

Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 
See North Korea 



385 



South Korea: A Country Study 



Democratic Press Movement Association, 
236 

Democratic Republican Party (DRP), 41, 
230; established, 39; revival of, 53 

demonstrations (see also student demon- 
strations), 245; by farmers, 226, 305; 
against martial law, 55; police response 
to, 310; against Roh government, 221; 
of spring 1987, 271; statistics on, 311; 
against United States, 30 

Department of Local Affairs, 214 

dissidents (see also student dissidents), 226; 
arrested, 227, 311, 314; associations of, 
236; detained, 311, 312; police attacks 
on, 270; prosecution of, 312 

divorce, 105 

DJP. See Democratic Justice Party 
DLP. See Democratic Liberal Party 
DMZ. See Demilitarized Zone 
domestic capital market: liberalization of, 
185 

domestic market, 138-39, 184; liberaliza- 
tion of, 235, 239 
domestic savings, 185 
Dong Ah Construction Company, 161 
DP. See Democratic Party 
DPRK. See North Korea 
droughts, 75 

DRP. See Democratic Republican Party 
drug abuse, 130, 325 
DSC. See Defense Security Command 
due process of law, 243 

Eastern Europe: exports to, 257; revolu- 
tions of 1989 in, xxxiii; ties with, xxxiii, 
252; trade with, xxxii, 188, 257 

Eastern Learning Movement. See Tonghak 
Movement 

economic depression, 10 

economic development: under constitu- 
tion, 204; effect of industrial growth on, 
155; financing of, 153-55; government 
role in, 140-46; under Japanese rule, 
22, 139-40; under Park, 43-45, 141, 
143, 234; population density as a fac- 
tor in, 81; problems caused by, 59; role 
of chaebol in, 141, 147 

Economic Development Cooperation 
Fund, 264 

economic development plans (see also five- 
year plans), 43, 143, 149; emphases of, 
142 



economic growth, xxviii; under Chun, 59; 
class structure altered by, 96; under 
constitution, 204; under Fifth Five- 
Year Economic and Social Develop- 
ment Plan, 59, 137; influence of edu- 
cation on, 1 15; Japanese influence on, 
140; under Park, 41, 44, 45, 137 

economic modernization, 96 

Economic Planning Board, xxvii, xxviii, 

45, 79, 81, 144; established, 43, 141- 
42; role of, 142, 209 

economic policies: influence of, on urbani- 
zation, 35; of Park, 38, 43-45 

economic recession, 41, 145 

economic restructuring, 139; role of chae- 
bol 'in, 141; role of public enterprises in, 
141 

economic services, 146 

economic stabilization measures, 45; under 
Chun, 59; for prices, 44 

economic structure: transformation of, 
under Park, 137; transition of, to tech- 
nology-oriented, 194 

economy: under constitution, 204; decline 
in, 155-56; future of, 193-94; indus- 
trial, 142; inflation, 29, 145; under 
Chang, 37; under Chun, 59; under 
Japanese rule, 21-22, 29; postwar, 36; 
problems in, 29; purchasing power in, 
177; under Roh, 177; under United 
States occupation, 29-30 

education, 114-22; centralized control of, 
115; during Choson Dynasty, 114; 
Christian influence on, 90; under 
Chun, 120; Confucian influence on, 
69-70; government expenditure on, 
115-16, 146; influence of, on economic 
growth, 115; influence of, on job op- 
portunities, 46; influence of, on politi- 
cal awareness, 35; influence of, on 
population growth, 78; influence of, on 
social system, 35, 116; influence of 
modernization on, 96; under Japanese 
occupation, 114, 140; as key to social 
mobility, 98; management of, by 
women, 107; as reason for urban 
migration, 85; reforms of, 120; under 
Rhee, 114-15, 35; social importance of, 

46, 98-99; United States influence on, 
xxiii, 114; of women, 107 

education, higher, 118-21; attendance, 
46, 115, 118-19, 120; changes in, xxvi; 
emphasis on, xxv-xxvi; entrance ex- 
aminations for, 118; faculty in, 213; 



386 



Index 



hierarchy of universities in, 98; in- 
fluence of, on political patterns, xxvi, 
244; necessity of, for social mobility, 
116; overseas, 98; required failure 
quotas in, 121; science and technology 
programs in, 191, 192; for women, 107 

Education Law, 236 

Ehwa Woman's University, 98, 107, 118 

Eighth Army, 301 

elections, National Assembly: of 1960, 37; 
of 1967, 39; of 1971, 39; of 1978, 41; 
of 1985, xxx; of 1988, xxxi, 199, 222; 
of 1992, xxxii 

elections, presidential, 206; of 1956, 34; 
of 1960, 34; of 1967, 39; of 1971, 39; 
of 1987, xxx-xxxi, 199, 216, 218-19 

electric generation, 149, 152-53; energy 
used in, 163; under Japanese occupa- 
tion, 139; nuclear, 153; for rural areas, 
47; under United States occupation, 29 

electronics industry, xxviii, 156, 157; de- 
pendence of, on Japanese components, 
157; exports, 157, 189; government em- 
phasis on, 142, 144; growth of, 157; 
overseas production in, 157; production, 
157; role of chaebol in, 149; value of, 157 

elite (see also yangban), 91-92, 97 

Emergency Measure Number Nine, 40, 
42, 232, 307; revoked, 52, 308 

emergency measures, 40, 206-7, 307 

emergency preparedness, 280-81 

Emergency Prepared Resources Manage- 
ment Law, 281 

emigration: to Africa, 88; to Canada, 88; 
to China, 86; to Europe, 88; to Hawaii, 
86; to Japan, 86; to Latin America, 88; 
to Manchuria, 86; to Middle East, 88; 
reasons for, 86, 88; to Soviet Union, 
86; to United States, xxiii, 86, 88 

emigres, 86, 88, 95, 258 

energy, 162-63; in electric generation, 163; 
imports for, 162; inadequacy of, 162; 
nuclear, 163 

enlightenment movement (kaehwa) 
reformers, 243 

entertainers. See kisaeng 

ethnic identity (see also culture; Korean 
people), xxv, 18, 108-14; under Chi- 
nese rule, 18; elements in, 75; influence 
of geography and history on, 3, 5; 
under Japanese rule, 21; search for, 70; 
sense of, 70 

European Community, 264 



examination hell, 118, 119-21 

examinations: objectivity of, 120; for 
secondary school, 117; for higher edu- 
cation, 118; for yangban, 20, 91 

examinations, civil service, 213; Confu- 
cian, 94 

exogamy, law of, 100, 102 

Export-Import Bank of Korea, 174 

export markets, 189 

exports, 188-90; of armaments, 160; of 
automobile industry, 158; by chaebol, 
148-49; of chemicals and pharmaceu- 
ticals, 162; under Chun, 59; decrease 
in, 155-56; to Eastern Europe, 257; ef- 
fect of, on economic development, 155; 
effect of growth in, 45; of electronics, 
157; encouraged under Park, 43, 44, 
144; expansion of, 44, 147; under Fifth 
Five- Year Economic and Social De- 
velopment Plan, 59; of footwear, 161; 
growth of, 188; incentives for, 142; in- 
creased level of, 142, 143; under Park, 
148; of textiles, 161; to Soviet Union, 
257; to United States, 190 

export targets, 141 

external debt, 184 



factories: 156; under United States occu- 
pation, 29 

family: economic relations in, 103-4; 
gender status in, 103; importance of, 
19, 100, 104; nuclear, 69, 103, 104 

Family Court, 211 

Family Law (1977), 105 

family life, traditional, 99-102; decline of, 
102-3; filial piety in, 99; role of first son 
in, 100 

family life, urban, 102-3, 104 

family planning: abortion, 79; activities, 
78; agencies, 78; cultural attitudes 
toward, 79; impact of, xxvii; incentives 
for, xxvii, 79; under Rhee, 78; sterili- 
zation for, 78-79; success of, 78 

farmers: demonstrations by, 226, 305; in- 
come of, xxix, 46, 47, 168; indebted- 
ness of, xxix, 168; under Japanese 
occupation, 94; lifestyle of, xxix, 47; 
political strength of, 170, 239; protests 
by, 239; and Saemaul Movement, 47, 
97; tenant, 97, 169, 204, 243; timber 
as fuel for, 167 

farmers' associations, xxxii-xxxiii, 170, 
243 



387 



South Korea: A Country Study 



Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger- 
many), 44, 157, 295 

Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives, 
239 

Federation of Artistic and Cultural Or- 
ganizations of Korea, 236 

Federation of Korean Industry, 234 

Federation of Korean Trade Unions 
(FKTU), 220, 237, 238 

Federation of Small and Medium Indus- 
tries, 234 

Federation of Textile Industries, 234 

fertility rates, 79 

Fifth Republic. See Chun government 
filial piety (hyo or xiao), 99 
films, 250 

financial sector: changes in, 154, 155; 

components of, 172 
First Army, 281, 283 
First Bank, 172 

fishing, 168; exports, 168; labor force in, 
45; population, 168; products, 168; 
share of, in gross national product, 193 

Five-Province Administrative Bureau, 31 

Five Relationships (o ryun or wu lun), prin- 
ciple of, 19-20, 89, 99 

Five Steps to Peaceful Unification, 217 

five-year plans: First Five- Year Economic 
Development Plan (1962-66), 137, 144, 
185; Second Five- Year Economic De- 
velopment Plan (1967-7), 144; Third 
Five- Year Economic Development Plan 
(1972-76), 144; Fourth Five- Year Eco- 
nomic Development Plan, (1977-81), 
144-45; Fifth Five- Year Economic and 
Social Development Plan (1982-86), 59, 
145, 172; Sixth Five- Year Economic 
and Social Development Plan (1987- 
91), 145, 153; Seventh Five-Year Eco- 
nomic and Social Development Plan 
(1992-96), 145 

FKTU. See Federation of Korean Trade 
Unions 

flooding, 72, 75 

folk art, xxvi 

Folk Village, xxvi 

food, 165 

footwear industry, 161 

Force 868 (special weapons and tactics 

squad), 321 
Force Improvement Plan, 277 
Foreign Affairs Research Institute, 251 
foreign aid, 36, 183-86, 188; from Japan, 



60; as percentage of budget, 36; as per- 
centage of gross national product, 183; 
from United States, 36, 43, 141 

Foreign Capital Inducement Act, 184-85 

foreign credit, 153 

foreign debt, 60; build-up of, 143; for eco- 
nomic development, 153; reduction in, 
138, 191 

foreign economic relations, 183-86, 188- 
90 

foreign exchange earnings, 44, 45, 188 
foreign investment, 137, 143, 154, 183- 
86, 188; concessionary loans, 183-84; 
control policy, 185; equity, 184; in- 
crease in, 186; by Japan, 185-86; lib- 
eralization policy, 185; prohibition 
against, 184-85; in stock market, 185; 
by United States, 185-86 
foreign loans, 183-86, 188 
Foreign Military Sales program, 277 
foreign policy, 250-52, 254-65; accom- 
plishments of, 252, 254-55; goals of, 
251-52, 254-55; organization and 
operation of, 250-51; prospects for, 
264-65 

foreign service: examinations for, 213; 
missions abroad, 251; recruitment for, 
213 

forestry: share of, in gross national pro- 
duct, 193 

forests, 167-68; deforestation of, 167; 
ownership of, 167; reforestation of, 72, 
167; used for fuel, 167 

Four Eastern Districts, 4 

Fraternal Association of National Revi- 
talization, 217 

Free and Subsidized Medical Aid Pro- 
gram, 131 

gangs, 325 
gangsters, 130, 325 

genealogy: counterfeit, 93; destruction of, 
93; importance of, 19, 92, 93; for yang- 
ban, 92 

General Association of Korean Residents 
in Japan. See Chosen soren 

General Banking Act (1954), 172 

geography: coastlines, 70-72; influence 
of, on ethnic identity, 3, 5 

GNP. See gross national product 

Golanov, Vladimir, 258 

Gorbachev, Mikhail S., 256, 302; Kras- 
noyarsk speech of, 257; New Thinking 



388 



Index 



of, 256-57; summit of, with Roh, 259; 
Vladivostok speech of, 257 

government (see also under individual 
branches; individual presidents): budget, 
145-46; civil service, 211-14; control 
of business, 141; control of media, xxx; 
cooperation of chaebol with, 148; dis- 
satisfaction with, xxx; executive, 206-8; 
executive agencies, 207-8; judiciary, 
210-11; legislature, 205-6; misconduct, 
xxxi; pensions, 133; Presidential Sec- 
retariat, 210; prime minister, 209; 
revenues, 145-46; spending, 145-46; 
State Council, 208-10; under Japanese 
occupation, 140 

government, local, 214-15 

Graegert, Edward, 94 

Great Collection of Korean Prescriptions 
(Hyangyak chipsongbang), 130 

Great Collection of Medicines and Pre- 
scriptions (Uibang yuch'wi), 130 

Great Man-Made River Project (Libya), 
161 

Green Party, 233 

gross domestic product, 155; agriculture 
as percentage of, 165 

gross national product (GNP): agricul- 
tural as percentage of, 193; business as 
percentage of, 174; contribution of bus- 
iness to, 174; defense spending as per- 
centage of, 293 ; under Fifth Five- Year 
Economic and Social Development 
Plan, 59; fishing as percentage of, 193; 
foreign aid as percentage of, 183; for- 
estry as percentage of, 193; government 
budget as percentage of, 146; growth 
in, 143, 190; in 1950s, 36; in 1980s, 
177; in 1990s, 177, 190; projected, 193; 
ratio of domestic savings to, 137; share 
of industry in, 193; share of primary 
sector in, 193; share of service indus- 
try in, 193 

Guomindang (Nationalist Party), 27, 274 

Haeinsa Temple, 128 
Hamgyong Province, 77 
Hanahoe (One Mind Society), 316 
hancha (Chinese ideograms), 112 
Han Dynasty, 4, 5-6 
Hanguk ilbo, 248 

han'gul (Korean script), 12, 112-13; de- 
velopment of, 10, 17, 112 



Hangyore simmun (One Nation News), 249, 
250 

Hanil Bank, 172 

Hanism Unification Party, 218 

Han River, xxxix, 4, 72 

Hansik (Cold Food Day), 104 

Han Yong-un, 23 

Heartless, The (Yi Kwang-su), 22 

heavy industry, 141; developed under 
Japanese occupation, 139; expansion of, 
44, 189; exports by, 144, 189; govern- 
ment emphasis on, 142, 144; growth in, 
144, 149 

High Court, 211 

high-technology industry, xxviii, 145, 
192; growth in, 149; shift toward, 156 

high-technology transfers, 257 

hirropon (methamphetamine), 130, 325 

Ho Chong, 36-37; transitional govern- 
ment, 37 

Hodge, John R., 27, 28 

Ho Kyun, 17 

holidays, 104 

Holy Spirit Association for the Unifica- 
tion of the World Christianity. See Uni- 
fication Church 

Home (Yi Ki-yong), 23 

Homeland Reserve Force, xxxviii, 279, 
280, 287; established, 288; mission of, 
288; number of personnel in, 281 

homosexuality, 129 

Honam plain, 72 

Hong Suk-cha, 218 

hospitals, 131 

Ho Tarn, 258, 262 

household (chip or jip), 100-101 ; big house 
(k'unjip) in, 100; little house (chagunjip) 
in, 100 

housing, 85, 103 

Howaldswerke Shipbuilding Corporation, 
297 

human rights, 243-46; newspaper cover- 
age of, 250 

Hun River, 6 

Hwanghae Province, 77 

hwarang (Flower Knight), 272 

Hyangyak chipsongbang (Great Collection of 
Korean Prescriptions), 130 

hyo. See filial piety 

Hyundai, 147, 157, 150; defense produc- 
tion by, 296; strike against, 226, 242; 
student activity against, 242 

Hyundai Heavy Industries, 149 



389 



South Korea: A Country Study 



Ilche Party (Unified Party), 218 
IMEMO. See Soviet Institute of World 
Economy and International Relations 
Imjin River, 72 

imports: of agricultural products, xxix, 
170; under Chun, 59; of coal, 162, 189; 
of consumer goods, 189; for energy, 
162; of food, 165, 189, 257; liberalized, 
145; of oil, 162, 189, 257; under Park, 
43, 145; structural pattern of, 189; of 
timber, 189; from United States, 190; 
value of, 188 

Im Su-kyong, 263 

Inch'on, 32, 81; administration of, 214; 
landing at, 276; population of, 84; pub- 
lic transportation in, 181 

income {see also wages): disparity, 137, 239; 
distribution, 99, 177, 225; of farmers, 
xxix, 46, 47 , 168; growth in per capita, 
137; of manual workers, 175-76; in 
rural sector, 168, 239; from Seoul Olym- 
pics, 171, 188; in urban sector, 168, 176 

independence: campaign for, 12, 30; 
choice for, over unification, 30; of 
judiciary, 210, 223-24, 329; United 
Nations recognition of, 30 

Independence Hall, 110 

Independent Club, 12 

India, 15 

Indonesia, 264 

industrialization: class structure altered 
by, 96; effect of, on society, 45, 244; 
industrial policies, 143-44 

Industrial Manpower Supply Program, 
xxviii 

industrial sector: government emphasis 
on, 137, 142; growth of, 36, 143, 155; 
share of, in gross national product, 193; 
structure, 138; under Park, 144 

industry (see also under individual industries), 
xxviii, 155-62; associations, xxxiii, 
234-35; corruption in, 147; develop- 
ment of, 95; intelligence agents in, 238; 
location of, 156; secondary, 45; under 
United States occupation, 29 

infant mortality rate, 128 

inflation: under Fifth Five- Year Economic 
and Social Development Plan, 59, 138; 
under Fourth Five- Year Plan, 145; 
after Korean War, 36; in 1980s, 138; 
under Park, 41, 45; resulting from 
balance of payments surplus, 186; 
under United States occupation, 29 

infrastructure: development of, with for- 



eign aid, 141; development of, under 
Japanese occupation, 94, 139; govern- 
ment's emphasis on, 138, 142, 146; in- 
vestment in, 138 
Injo (King), 273 

intellectuals: campaigns by, to amend 
1972 constitution, 40; concept of min- 
jung promoted by, 99; as followers of 
Kim Dae Jung, 53; opposition of, to 
normalized relations with Japan, 51; 
opposition of, to Park government, 46; 
restrictions on, 40 

interest groups, 233-39 

International Atomic Energy Agency, xli 

International Broadcast Center, 249 

International Monetary Fund, 184 

intelligence agencies (see also Agency for 
National Security Planning; Defense 
Security Command), 311-17 

investment, 59; foreign, 137, 143, 154, 
183-86, 188; in industry, 158, 162; 
overseas, 186; savings for, 154; trust 
corporations, 155 

invisible receipts, 190 

invisible trade account, 186 

Iran-Iraq war, 189 

Ireland, 157 

Irkutsk, 274 

Ishibashi Masashi, 260 

Italy, 12 

Japan: aid from, 183; attacks by, on 
Choson Dynasty, 10; contrast with, 
110-11; dependence of South Korean 
industry on, 157; financial diplomacy 
with, 43-44; influence of, xxiv, 70; in- 
fluence on, 71; interest in Korea by, 
110; invasions by, 15-16, 272-73; in- 
vestment by, 143, 150; Koreans living 
in, 86-88; Mongol-Koryo invasion of, 
8; penetration by, 11-12; as rival, 109- 
111; Soviet declaration of war against, 
24; surrender by, in World War II, 24; 
textbook controversy, 110; trade with, 
7, 189; "unequal treaty" imposed by, 
xxiv; Western influence in, 11 
Japanese gangsters. See yakuza 
Japanese Imperial Army, 243, 274 
Japanese occupation, xxiv, 14-15, 20-24, 
323; art under, 22; assimilation policy 
under, 23-24, 110; business associa- 
tions under, 234; cultural repression 



390 



Index 



under, 23; development of infrastruc- 
ture under, 94, 139; diet under, 22; 
economy under, 21-22; education 
under, 114; government in exile dur- 
ing, 201, 243; human rights ideas in, 
243; industrial development under, 95; 
Korean identity under, 21 ; land survey 
under, 94; legacy of, 95; literature 
under, 22; media under, 246; reforesta- 
tion efforts under, 167; reforms under, 
14; resistance to, 24, 273-74; Russian 
influence on, 14; social transformation 
under, 94; treatment of Koreans under, 
20, 95; urban population during, 81; 
United States endorsement of, 14 
Japanese-South Korean relations, 50-51, 
60, 259-60; and abduction of Kim Dae 
Jung, 40, 51; financial, 50, 51, 60; and 
fishing rights, 50; foreign ministerial 
conferences, 259; normalized, 39, 50, 
150; and reparations paid by Japan, 50; 
role of Nordpolitik in, 259; in Seoul 
Olympics, 259, 271; trade deficit and, 
259 

Japan Export-Import Bank, 150 

Japan Socialist Party, 259-60 

Jilin Province, 260, 274 

Jindo, 189 

jip. See household 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, xxxix, 283 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Defense Intelligence 
Command, xl 

Joint Military Provost Marshal, 314; 
under Park, 315 

Joint Security Investigations Headquar- 
ters, 227 

journalists, 244, 247; crackdowns on, 236; 
detained, 312; prosecuted, 312; purged, 
250, 308 

judges: appointment of, 210, 326; num- 
ber of, 328; qualifications of, 328; re- 
quirements for promotion, 328-29; 
training of, 328 

Judicial Research and Training Institute, 
328 

judiciary, 210-11; appointments to, 210; 
courts, 210-11; examinations for, 213; 
independence of, 210, 223-24, 329; in- 
telligence agents stationed in, 313; 
recruitment for, 213; reshuffle of, 223; 
revolt by, 200; used for political pur- 
poses, 244 

Jurchen tribes, 18 



justices, Supreme Court: appointments 
of, 210, 329; chief, 328; term for, 210 

Kabo Reforms (1894-95), 94, 323 

Kaebyok (Creation), 126, 246 

kaehwa. See enlightenment movement {kaehwd) 

reformers 
Kaesong, 8 
Kanghwa Island, 71 
Kangnam Shipbuilding Corporation, 297 
Kangwon Province: population density 

of, 81; stereotype of, 77 
KATUSA. See Korean Augmentation of 

the United States Army 
KBS. See Korean Broadcasting System 
Kaya, 5 

KCIA. See Korean Central Intelligence 
Agency 

KECO. See Korea Electric Company 

KEPCO. See Korea Electric Power Cor- 
poration 

Khubilai Khan, 8 

Kia Machine Tool, 296 

Kia Motors, 160 

Kim Chae-gyu, 42, 307 

Kim Chi-ha, 108-9 

Kim Chin-wu, 111-12 

Kim Chong-p'il, xxxi, 42, 53, 222; ar- 
rested by Chun, 55, 230; campaign of, 
216, 217; as director of Korean Cen- 
tral Intelligence Agency, 38, 306, 312; 
political agenda of, 220; purged by 
Chun, 58 

Kim Dae Jung, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, 55, 60, 
128, 199, 215, 219, 222, 231; abduc- 
tion of, 40, 51 , 232; arrested by Chun, 
55; campaign of, 216, 217-18; career 
of, 231-32; death sentence of, 232; fol- 
lowers of, 53-54; formation of PPD by, 
232-33; placed under house arrest, 232; 
political agenda of, 220; released from 
house arrest, 52 

Kim Dong-jo, 51 

Kim Duk-choong, 193-94 

Kimhae Kim, 102 

Kim II Sung, 31, 41, 86, 226, 277 

Kim Ku, 27, 30 

Kim Kyong-Dong, 96 

Kim Kyu-sik, 27, 28, 30; United States 
backing of, 30-31 

Kim Man-jung, 17 

Kim Ok-kyun, 243 



391 



South Korea: A Country Study 



Kimp'o International Airport, 182, 283 

Kim, Se-Jin, 307 

Kim Son-jok, 218 

Kim Soo Hwan, 262 

Kim So-wol, 23 

Kim Yong-ch'61, 223 

Kim Young Sam, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, 53, 
199, 219, 222, 232; campaign of, 216, 
217; career of, 230-31; challenge to 
government, 41-42; desire of, for re- 
unification, 41-42; as leader of New 
Democratic Party, 53; ousted from Na- 
tional Assembly, 42; placed under 
house arrest, 231; political agenda of, 
220; surveillance of, 313; visit of, to 
Moscow, 258 

kindergarten, 116-17 

kinship system {see also family; genealogy; 
lineage): ancestor worship in, 100; clan 
{tongjok or pongwan), 102; decline of, 
102-3; household {chip or jip), 100-101; 
lineage (p'a) in, 101; line of descent in, 
101; mourning group {tangnae) in, 101 

kisaeng (female entertainers), 93, 106 

Kitan Liao tribe, 7-8, 18 

Koguryo Kingdom, xxiii, 5; conflict of, 
with Sui Chinese, 7; destruction of, by 
Tang Chinese, 7; expansion of, 6-7; 
military in, 271-72; ruled by Han 
Chinese, 6; tomb painting in, 15, 123 

Kqje Island, 158 

Kojong (King), 20, 273 

Kongmin (King), 272 

Kong No-myong, 259 

Kong Zi. See Confucius 

Kor-Am Bank, 172 

Korea {see also North Korea; South Korea): 
division of, 24-25; factions in, 12; in- 
fluence of, on Japan, 71; provisional 
government in, 25; Soviet invasion of, 
24; trusteeship in, 25, 27, 28, 274; 
unification by Silla of, 7; Western in- 
fluence in, 12 
Korea Advanced Institute of Science, 191 
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, 
191 

Korea Development Bank, 174 
Korea Development Institute, 98, 142, 
191, 193 

Korea Electric Company (KECO), 152, 
163 

Korea Electric Power Corporation 
(KEPCO), 150, 152-53 



Korea Exchange Bank, 174 
Korea Federation of Peasants, 239 
Koreagate, 51, 59 
Korea Herald, 249 
Korea Housing Bank, 174 
Korea Institute of Family Planning, 78 
Korea Institute of Science and Technol- 
ogy, 191 

Korea Long-Term Credit Bank, 174 
Korea Military Academy, 98, 226, 290; 

alumni of, 228 
Korean Air, 182, 279; defense production 

by, 296 

Korean Air (KAL) 858 bombing, 61 , 254, 
270, 304 

Korean Augmentation of the United 
States Army (KATUSA), 288-89 

Korean Atomic Energy Commission, 191 

Korean Bar Association, 236 

Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), 247, 
249 

Korean Catholic Farmers Association, 
170, 239 

Korean Central Intelligence Agency 
(KCIA) {see also Agency for National 
Security Planning), 38, 42, 58, 311-12; 
abduction of Kim Dae Jung by, 40, 50, 
232; censorship enforced by, 247; led 
by Chun Doo Hwan, 54, 58, 312; led 
by Kim Chong-p'il, 306, 312; scandals 
in, 38, 58; violence used by, 240 

Korean Chamber of Commerce and In- 
dustry, 234 

Korean Communist Party, 27-28 

Korean Democratic Party, 28, 30 

Korean Federation of Education Associ- 
ations, 236 

Korean Fighters Program, 160 

Korean Institute for Human Rights 
(United States), 232 

Korean-Japanese Parliamentary Confer- 
ence on Security Affairs, 51 

Korean language, 12, 18, 111-14; Chi- 
nese loanwords in, 113; dialects, 113- 
14; as element in ethnic identity, 75; 
and English vocabulary, 113; govern- 
ment policy on, 210; hierarchy reflected 
in, 112; history of, 111-12; similarities 
of, with Japanese, 111-12; standard, 
113; suppressed under Japanese occu- 
pation, 110, 246; United States influ- 
ence on, xxiii; written, 112-13 

Korean Language and Education 
Research Association, 113 



392 



Index 



Korean National Police, 289, 305, 313, 
317-19, 321-22; Combat Police of, 
310, 318, 321; duties of, 319; illegal be- 
havior of, 322; improvements in, 318; 
investigations by, 325-26; organization 
of, 318; personnel, 318-19; quality of, 
319; recruitment of, 319; responsibili- 
ties of, 318; special weapons and tac- 
tics squad (Force 868), 321; stations 
and substations of, 318-19; training of, 
319, 321; transportation for, 321; 
weapons of, 321; women in, 321 
Korean National Railroad, 181 
Korean National Tourist Corporation, 
171 

Korean Newspaper Association, 236 
Korean Newspaper Editors' Association, 
236 

Korean Peninsula (see also Korea): borders 
of, 70; Chinese influence on, 4; as cul- 
tural bridge, 71; land area of, 71; 
topography of, 71-72 

Korean people (see also ethnic identity): 
diversity of character in, 89-90; 
homogeneity of, 70, 75; identity of, 18; 
origins of, 4; regional differences 
among, 76; stereotypes of, 77 

Korean People's Republic, 27, 28 

Korean Provisional Government: organi- 
zation of, 27; recognition of, 27 

Korean script (see also han 'gut) , 12, 112-13; 
development of, 10, 17, 112 

Korean Shipbuilding and Engineering, 
296 

Koreans living overseas, 254; population 
of, 86, 88 

Korean Standard Industrial Classifica- 
tion, 185 

Korean Stock Exchange, 155; foreign in- 
vestment in, 185 

Korean Trade Promotion Corporation 
(KOTRA), 258 

Korean Volunteer Army in China, 32 

Korean War, xxiv, 31-33; armistice of, 
276, 301; cease-fire in, 32; deforesta- 
tion caused by, 167; dislocation caused 
by, 84; effects of, 32-33, 35; legacy of, 
for role of military, xxxviii-xxxix; role 
of United States in, 32 

Korea Strait, 72 

Korea Tacoma, 296 

Korea Times, 249 

Korea Traders' Association, 234 



Korea University. See Koryo University 

Korea Year 2000, 193 

Koryo Dynasty, 7-9, 323; art in, 15; 

Buddhism in, 10, 123; land reform 

under, 9; 2nd Mongol Empire, 8, 272; 

neo-Confucianism in, 88; yangban in, 91 
Koryo University (Korea University), 98, 

118, 214 

KOTRA. See Korean Trade Promotion 

Corporation 
Kumgang-san Dam (North Korea), 72 
Kum River, 72 
Kum River basin, 72 
k'unjip (big house). See household 
Kuomintang. See Guomindang 
kut (shaman services). See shamanism 
Kuznets, Paul W., 140 
Kwanggaet'o (King), 6, 271 
Kwangju, 77; administration of, 214; 

demonstrations in, 271; population of, 

84, 85 

Kwangju uprising, 55-56, 61, 77, 217, 
232, 252, 270, 308; anti-American sen- 
timent resulting from, 241, 299; 
crushed by army, 55, 240; effect of, on 
Fifth Republic, 241; investigation of, 
224; resolution of, 220; role of United 
States forces in, xxxvii, 56, 60, 241, 
256, 298-99, 301; United States report 
on, 299, 301 

Kwon Hui-gyong, 258 

kye (credit associations), 107 

Kyongbuk High School, 229 

Kyonggi Province: employment in, 156; 
population density in, 81; stereotype of, 
77 

Kyonghyang simmun, 249 
Kyongsang region: development in, 77; 
rivalry of, with Cholla region, 56, 76-77 

labor disputes, 238 

labor force, 46, 175-78; in agriculture, 
45, 163; in fishing, 45 

labor unions, 98, 237-38, 243, 248; con- 
cept of minjung promoted by, 99; 
government hostility toward, 97-98, 
237; history of, 237; infiltration of, 241; 
political agenda of, 220; rights of, 237; 
strikes by, 175, 226 

land reform: effect of, on Buddhism, 
9-10; under Japanese occupation, 94; 
in Koryo Dynasty, 9; repercussions of, 



393 



South Korea: A Country Study 



9-10; under Rhee, 35, 165; after World 
War II, 95 

land survey, Japanese, 94 

language. See Korean language 

Latin America, 189 

Ledyard, Gari K., 112 

Lee, Ki-baik (Yi Ki-baek), 11, 110 

Legislative Council for National Security, 
57, 308 

Liaodong Basin, 4 

Liaoning Province, 274 

Liao River, 6, 271 

Liberal Party, 33, 36 

Libya, 161 

life expectancy, 120 

light industry: exports by, 189; govern- 
ment emphasis on, 142 

lineage (p'a), 101-2; continuity of, 100; 
descent of, 101; importance of, 19, 100; 
male heir in, 100 

literacy, 244; under Japanese occupation, 
140; rate, 115 

literature: folk tales, 17-18; under 
Japanese rule, 22; p'ansori, 17; poetry, 
16-17; social and political themes in, 
22; socialist influence on, 22-23; ver- 
nacular, 17 

living conditions, 176 

living standard: population density as a 
factor in, 81 

Logistics Base Command, 382 

Lolang (Nangnang), 4, 5 

lower class, 273; rural, 97; urban, 97; 
women, 108 

Lucky-Goldstar, 147, 157, 258; defense 
production by, 296 

Lyuh Woon Hyung (Yo Un-hyong), 28, 
30 



MacArthur, Douglas, 32, 276, 298 
McCormick, Gavan, 140 
Macdonald, Donald S., 139, 154, 185 
McDonnell Douglas, 160, 296 
Mahan confederation, 4, 5 
Malaysia, 264 

Manchuria, xxiv; Soviet invasion of, 24 
Manchus, 10, 18 

Mandate of Heaven, doctrine of, 90 
manufacturing sector {see also industriali- 
zation; industrial sector; industry), 149; 
growth in, 44, 137 
March First Movement, 20, 246 



marine corps, xxxix, 286-87 
Marine Corps Command, 286 
marriage: arranged, 103; interviews (son 

pogi) for, 103; love-match (yonae), 103; 

traditional purpose of, 100; women's 

rights in, 105, 107; women's role in, 

104-5 

martial law, 307; declared by Park, 40, 
307; declared in Pusan, 42; declared by 
Rhee, 33, 314; demonstrations against, 
55 

Martial Law Command, 55, 56, 58, 308, 
310 

Masan: as fishing port, 168; population 
growth in, 85; student demonstrations 
in, 42 

materiel: air force, xxxix; army, 284-85; 
coproduction of, 269, 277-78, 279, 285, 
286, 295; domestic production of, 
295-96 

Maternal and Child Health Law (1973), 
79 

media, 246-50; censorship of, 40, 246, 
247, 31 1 ; criticism by, of government, 
199, 244; government control of, xxx, 
xxxvii, 39, 246; increased coverage by, 
248; opinion polls in, 248; ownership 
of, 249; purged by Chun, 58; reformist 
tendencies of, 246 

medical: facilities, 131; insurance pro- 
gram, 131-33; personnel, 131 

medicine: modern, 130; shamanism as, 
122; traditional, 130-31 

Mencius, 89; philosophy of, 89, 90, 99, 
100 

mental health, 129 

middle class, 46, 96, 97; average family 
in, 176-77; necessity of higher educa- 
tion for entering, 116 

Middle East: construction projects in, 
160, 177, 189 

migration, urban, xxv, 81; attempts to 
stem, 84; effect of, on urban popula- 
tion, 84; under Park, 46, 47; to Seoul, 
29; of women, 108; after World War 
II, 29, 96; of young people, 169 

military: academies, 290, 291; academy, 
in Silla Kingdom, 272; basic training 
in, 290; under Chun, 278-79; duties, 
280; effect of, on social system, 35; elite, 
96; equipment, xxxviii; headquarters 
moved to Taejon, xxxix, 85; increase in, 
269; insignia, 292; mobilization plans, 



394 



Index 



294; modernization of, xxxviii, 273, 
277; under Park, 276; personnel, 290- 
91; in politics, 39-43, 276-77, 314; 
population, xxxviii; preparedness, 
280-81; purges in, 37; ranks, 291; re- 
forms, xxxviii; reorganized, 278; 
resource management plans, 294; 
under Rhee, 276; role of, xxxvii, 202, 
279-81; schools, 274, 289-90; security 
regulations, 290; spending, xxxviii; sta- 
tus of, 20, 96, 272, 273; surveillance in, 
xxxviii; in Three Kingdoms period, 
271-72; troops, 32, 269; uniforms, 293; 
weapons, xxxviii 
Military Armistice Commission, xl, 276, 
301 

Military Installation Protection Law, 279 
military installations: living conditions on, 

280, 290; relocation of, 280 
Military Manpower Agency, 288-89 
Military Manpower Law, 280 
Mindan (Association for Korean Resi- 
dents in Japan), 86 

Ming Dynasty, 8, 272, 323 
minhwa painting, 16 
mining, 29, 162 

Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
xxix 

Ministry of Culture, 209-10 

Ministry of Culture and Information, 

209, 247; Office of Public Information 

Policy, 247 
Ministry of Education, 115, 117, 118, 

120, 210, 236-37 
Ministry of Environment {see also Office 

of Environment), 210 
Ministry of Finance, 142, 185 
Ministry of Government Administration, 

213, 351 

Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 78, 

129, 131, 210, 325 
Ministry of Home Affairs, 78, 167, 169, 

281j 306, 317, 321; Department of 

Local Affairs in, 214; political influence 

of, 307 

Ministry of Justice, 313; Supreme Prose- 
cution Administration, 325 
Ministry of Labor, 142, 241 
Ministry of National Defense, 240, 279, 

281, 283, 321; budget management sys- 
tem of, 293-94; Defense Industry 
Bureau in, 277, 295; Office of Military 
Manpower Administration in, 280; re- 



organized, 278; responsibilities of, 281 
Ministry of Science and Technology, 191 , 
192, 193 

Ministry of Trade and Industry, 142, 155, 
174 

Ministry of Transportation, 181, 281 
minjok (race). See ethnic identity 
minjung (the masses), 99, 121 
Minjung Culture Movement Association, 
236 

minorities, 75 

Molotov cocktails, 226, 241, 242; penal- 
ties for using, 227 
monarchy: weakness of, 19 
Monetary Board, 172 
Mongol Empire, 8, 272 
Mongols; invasion of Koryo by, 8, 272 
Moon, Sun Myong (Rev.), 126-27 
motor vehicles, 178, 181 
mountains, 71 
Mount Halla, 71 

Movement for the Eradication of Nuclear 

Power Plants, 163 
mudang. See shamans 
Mun Ik-hwan, 262, 263 
Munjong (King), 272 
Mun Son-myong. See Moon, Sun Myong 



Naemul (King), 5 
Naewoe Press, 249 
Nakasone Yasuhiro, 60 
Naktong River, 5, 72 
Naktong River basin, 72 
Nangnang (Lolang), 4, 5 
Nanjing, 274 

National Agricultural Cooperatives Fed- 
eration, 174 

National Assembly, 205-6, 228, 244, 274, 
294, 311, 317; business leaders in, 149; 
conduct of foreign policy by, 251; dis- 
solved by Park, 40, 307; distribution of 
seats in, 215; electoral districts for, 222; 
Foreign Affairs Committee of, 251; in- 
telligence agents stationed in, 313; legal 
immunity of members of, 205; mass 
resignation in, 307; representation in, 
222; rights of, xxx 

National Assembly Election Law, 221-22 

National Assembly elections, xxx, xxxi, 
xxxii; of 1948, 31 

National Assembly hearings on Fifth 
Republic, 223 



395 



South Korea: A Country Study 



National Assembly Law, 308 
National Association of Farmers, 170 
National Association of University Stu- 
dent Councils (ChondaehySp), 226, 
242 

National Conference for Unification, 40, 
52, 56 

National Constabulary, 274 

National Council of Labor Unions (Chon- 
nohyop), 238 

National Council of Trade Unions, 238 

National Defense College, 291 

Nationalist Party. See Guomindang 

National Maritime Police, 318, 321 

National Police College, 321 

National Police Headquarters, 214, 318 

National Security Act, xxxvi, 199, 203, 
244, 245, 262, 277, 305, 307, 308, 
310-11, 313, 314, 327; arrests under, 
227, 237; attempts to amend, 228; cen- 
sorship enforced under, 247; student 
organizations suppressed by, 241; surge 
in prosecutions under, 245 

National Security Council, 207; conduct 
of foreign policy by, 251; responsibili- 
ties of, 281 

National Teachers Union (NTU) (Chon'g- 
yojo), 117, 236, 237 

National Technicians Law, 279 

National Unification Board, 314 

Naval Academy, 290 

Naval Amphibious Command, 287 

Naval Aviation Command, 287 

navy, xxxix, 286-87 

Navy Security Unit, 315 

neo-Confucianism, 11, 88; filial piety in, 
99; Five Relationships in, 89, 99; in- 
fluence of, on political system, 243; in- 
fluence of, on social system, 69-70, 88; 
in mid-1500s, 89; revival of, 114; self- 
control in, 89; social relations in, 88-89 

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commis- 
sion, 276 

New Democratic Party (Simmindang), 41, 
53-54, 230; creation of, xxxii, 37; and 
Kim Dae Jung, 53; and Kim Young 
Sam, 41-42, 53, 230-31 

New Democratic Republican Party, 222, 
225, 230; members of, 230; merger of, 
with Reunification Democratic Party, 
xxxi 

New Elders Group, 229-30 
New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP), 
216, 231, 232, 270 



newspapers, 250; censorship of, 246, 247; 

circulation of, 248-49; closed, 246; 

under Sixth Republic, 248 
New Year's, 104 
Nigeria, 264 

Nine Cloud Dream, The (Kim Man-jung), 
17 

Nippon Steel, 150 

Nixon, Richard M., 160, 277 

NKDP. See New Korea Democratic Party 

Nonaligned Movement, 264 

Nordpolitik (northern policy) (pukpang 
chongch'aek), xxxiii, 61, 256; accom- 
plishments of, 254; Chinese view of, 
260; objectives of, 252; prospects for, 
265; under Roh, 254-55; trade rela- 
tions under, 252; United States reac- 
tion to, 256 

Northeast People's Revolutionary Army, 
274 

northern policy. See Nordpolitik 
North Korea: creation of, 3, 31; family 
meetings in, 261; humanitarian aid to 
South Korea by, 75, 261; insurgency, 
274-75; invasion of South Korea by, 
32, 275-76; joint projects with, xxxv; 
military buildup in, 31-32; nuclear 
weapons development by, xli; political 
organization in, 31; prime ministerial 
talks with, xxxvi; propaganda by, 304; 
refugees from, 95; relations with, 
xxxiv-xxxvi; Soviet influence in, 27; 
talks with, xxxv, xxxvi; terrorism by, 
against South Korea, xxxv, xxxvi, 269, 
270, 288; trade with, 262; visits to, 226, 
227, 262, 263, 271 
North Korean intelligence system, 303-4 
North Korean military: buildup of, 269; 
equipment, 32; number of troops, 32, 
269 

North Korean Provisional People's Com- 
mittee, 31 

North Korean- South Korean relations, 
50, 261-63; attempts to mprove, 225; 
dialogue in, 262, 269-70; increased 
contacts in, 261; Nordpolitik, 251-52; 
overtures in, 261-63; proposals for 
unification, 50 

North Korean threat, 302, 303-5; as 
justification for authoritarian govern- 
ment, 303, 307 

North Korean Workers' Party, 31 

North-South Coordinating Committee, 
xxxv 



396 



Index 



NTU. See National Teachers Union 

nuclear facilities, xli, 163 

nuclear weapons: North Korean, xli; 

withdrawal of United States from 

Korean Peninsula of, xli 

Oceania, 189 
O Cha-bok, 317 

Office of Environment (see also Ministry 

of Environment), 210 
Office of Forestry, 167 
Office of the High Prosecutor General, 

326 

Office of Information, 317 
Office of Military Manpower Administra- 
tion, 280 

Office of Public Information Policy, 247 
Office of the President, 142 
Office of the Prime Minister, 209, 214 
Office of the Prosecutor General, 313, 327 
Office of the Supreme Prosecutor Gen- 
eral, 326 
Officer Candidate School, 277 
officers: commissioned, 290-91; noncom- 
missioned, 291 
oil: exploration, 162; imports of, 162, 
189, 257; shocks of 1970s, 41, 44, 138, 
153 
Okp'o, 158 

Olympic Committee, 228 

Olympics, 1988 Seoul, xxv, 228, 249; as 
catalyst for Nordpolitik, 254; effect of, 
on political conflict, 224; income from, 
171, 188; participation in, xxxiii; pro- 
posal to cohost with North Korea, 
xxxvi, 220-21; security for, 271, 302 

Opium War, 11 

opposing political forces. See chaeya seryok 
Ordinance Number Eighty-Eight, 246 
o ryun. See Five Relationships 
overseas investment, 186 



Pacific Economic Cooperation Confer- 
ence (PECC), 264 

Paehwa Girls' School, 107 

Paekche Kingdom, xxiii, 5; art in, 15; 
military in, 271; rivalry of, with Silla 
Kingdom, 77 

paekchong class, 93 

Paek Ki-wan, 218, 262 

Pak Chi-W6n, 17, 92 



Pak Chong-ch'61, 63, 244, 270, 311 

Pak Ch6'r-6n, 258 

Pak T'ae-son, 126 

Pak Tong-jin, 257 

Pak Yong-hyo, 243 

P'anmunjom, 32 

p'ansori, 17 

Park Chung Hee, 77, 96, 229; assassina- 
tion of, 42, 278, 299, 307; assassina- 
tion of, effect of, 52; attempted 
assassination of, 40, 288, 304; coup 
d'etat of, xxxvii, 38, 96, 140, 277, 312; 
election of, 39, 277; martial law 
declared by, 40, 307; national emer- 
gency declared by, 39-40; obsession of, 
for development, 42-43 

Park Chung Hee government: agricul- 
tural economy under, 46; banks under, 
141; business under, 43; censorship 
under, 246-47; economic development 
under, 43-45, 137, 141, 234; economy 
under, 38, 41, 143, 171; emergency 
measures of, 40; family planning pro- 
gram under, 78; human rights vio- 
lations under, 244, 306; industry 
restructured under, 144; military 
under, 276, 277; objectives of, 277; op- 
position to, 46; provost marshal under, 
315; purge of bureaucracy by, 212; 
revival of Confucianism under, xxvii; 
Saemaul Movement launched by, 84; 
society under, 45-47; student opposi- 
tion to, 54; violence used by, 240 

Park Chun-kyu, 229 

Park Tong Sun, 51 

Park Yung-chul, 154 

Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD), 
xxxi, 199, 219, 222, 225; formed, 232- 
33; groups in, 233 

Peace Dam (South Korea), 72 

PECC. See Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Conference 

people's committees, 27 

periodicals: censorship of, 246, 247; under 
Sixth Republic, 248 

Perry, Matthew C, 11 

Persian Gulf conflict, xxiii 

Peru, 264 

petrochemical industry, 144, 162 
Philippines, 14 

physicians: population per physician ratio, 

131; women as, 106 
Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea, 

78 



397 



South Korea: A Country Study 



poetry. See sijo 
P'ohang, 85, 152 

Pohang Institute of Science and Technol- 
ogy, 192 

Pohang Iron and Steel Company 
(POSCO), 150, 152, 156, 192 

police {see also Korean National Police): 
attacks by, on dissidents, 270; purges 
in, 37; strong-arm tactics of, 306, 311; 
used for political purposes, 244, 307; 
weapons, 227 

police boxes, 318-19; attacks on, 227 

Police Consolidated Training School, 321 

political compromise, xxxi 

political institutions, 19-20 

political protest; tradition of, 90 

political unrest, 41; xxx; under Chang, 
37; in June 1987, under United States 
occupation, 29-30 

political values: Christian influence on, 90 

politics: military in, 39-43 

pollution, 86, 129 

p'ongnyokpae (gangs), 325 

population, 77-81; age distribution of, 84; 
density, 79-81; elderly, proportion of, 
xxvii, 190; factors affecting growth rate, 
78; under fifteen years, 78; homogen- 
eity of, 70, 75; of Koreans living over- 
seas, 86, 88, 254; male-female ratio in, 
xxvii; median age of, 78; minorities in, 
75; policies, xxvii; projected, 79, 81; 
rural, 84 

population, urban (see also population of 
Seoul), 84; in Choson Dynasty, 81 ; de- 
fined, 84; density, 81; effect of migra- 
tion on, 84, 85; growth rate, 85; 
increase in, 35-36, 45-46, 85; under 
Japanese occupation, 81; effect of 
migration on, 84, 85; in 1940, 81; in 
1945, 81; in 1985, 81; projected, 84 

population growth rate, xxvii, 29, 77-78, 
79, 85 

population of Seoul, 84, 85; in eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, 81; growth 
rate, 85; in 1985, 85; in 1990, xxv 

population of South Korea: in 1949, 77; 
in 1985, 77, 84; in 1989, 78; in 1990, 
xxv 

POSCO. See Pohang Iron and Steel 

Company 
poverty, 143, 177 

PPD. See Party for Peace and Democracy 
practical learning. See Sirhak Movement 



precipitation, 75, 165 
president, 206-8; conduct of foreign pol- 
icy by, 251; elections for, xxx-xxxi, 39, 
206; legal immunity of, 206; power of, 
xxx, 39, 206-7, 209; succession of, 206; 
transfer of power between, 201 
Presidential Election Law (1987), 206 
Presidential Secretariat, 207, 209, 210 
Presidential Security Force, 41 
press. See media 

Press Ethics Commission Law, 246-47 
Primakov, Yevgeni, 258 
prime minister, 209 
prisons, 329 

Proclamation of Independence, 20 

professional associations, xxxii, xxxiii, 
200, 235-36 

Proletarian Artists' Federation, 22-23 

Protestant Farmers Association, 170 

public enterprises: areas of, 149; cate- 
gories of, 150; employment in, 150; 
privatization of, 150; purged by Chun, 
58; role of, 149-50; role of, in economic 
restructuring, 141 

public health, 128-31, 133 

public safety, 312-13 

Pukhan River, 72 

pukpang chongch 'aek. See Nordpolitik 

Pulguksa Temple, 15, 128 

purges: under Chun, 57-58, 212, 220, 
312; of journalists, 250, 308; of Korean 
Central Intelligence Agency, 312; 
under Park, 212, 316; under Roh, 212 

Pusan: administration of, 214; demon- 
strations in, 271; martial law declared 
in, 42; population of, 84; population 
density of, 81; population growth in, 
85; religious believers in, 127; student 
demonstrations in, 42 

P'yongan Province, 77 

P'yongminyon. See Study Group for Peace- 
ful and Democratic Reunification 

P'yongt'aek coastal plain, 72 

P'yongyang, 6 

Pyonhan confederation, 4, 5 

Qin Dynasty, 4, 323 
Qing Dynasty, 11, 14 
Qin Shi Huangdi, 4 

race (minjok). See ethnic identity 



398 



Index 



radio, 182-83, 250; censorship of, 246; 
under Sixth Republic, 248 

railroads, 181-82; Blue Train, 182; under 
United States occupation, 29 

Rangoon bombing, 270, 304 

RDP. See Reunification Democratic Party 

Ready Made Life (Ch'ae Man-sik), 22 

Reagan, Ronald, 52; support by, for 
Chun, 56 

Red Banner Bandits, 8 

reeducation programs, 58, 240, 308 

reform movement (1898), 12 

refugees, 84; number of, 95; after World 
War II, 95 

religion (see also under individual religions), 
122-28; ancestor worship, 11; commit- 
ment to, xxvi-xxvii; new religions, 
124-27, 128; role of, 128; shamanism, 
122-23 

repatriation, 86, 88, 95, 258 
Republic of Korea. See South Korea 
Republic of Korea-United States of 

America Mutual Defense Treaty, 

297-98 

research and development, 191; in 
defense industry, 279; government em- 
phasis on, 146; in science and technol- 
ogy, 191 

Research Institute of Industrial Science 

and Technology, 192 
reserve forces, 287 

Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), 
290 

retail trade, 171 

reunification (t'ongil), 250; basic princi- 
ples of, 261-62; choice for, over in- 
dependence, 30; desire for, 109; ethnic 
identity as element in desire for, 75; of 
families, xxxv; Kim Young Sam's 
views concerning, 41-42; policy, in 
constitution, 202; Roh's proposal for, 
xxxvi; strategy for, 314 

Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), 
199, 216, 219, 222, 225, 258; merger 
of, with New Democratic Republican 
Party, xxxi; young politicians in, 231 

Rhee, Syngman, xxxvii, 12, 25; cam- 
paign by, for independence, 30; elected 
president, 31, 33-34; exiled, 37; fam- 
ily planning program under, 78; as 
head of provisional government, 27; 
and military involvement in intelli- 
gence, 314; society under, 35-36 



Rhee government: businesses under, 147; 
corruption in, 147; difficulties in, 33; 
education under, 114-15; human rights 
violations under, 244; internal security 
policy of, 306; legacy of, for economic 
development, 141; martial law declared 
by, 33; media censorship by, 246; mili- 
tary under, 276; overthrow of, 240; 
political environment under, 33-34; re- 
elected, 33; violence by, 239-40, 244 

Ricci, Matteo, 123 

rivers, 3, 72 

roads, 178, 181 

Roh government (Sixth Republic), 225; 
Agency for National Security Planning 
under, 313; arrests for political offenses 
under, 245; constitutional framework 
of, 201; demonstrations against, 221; 
four-way talks in National Assembly 
during, 223, 225; labor unrest under, 
175; political appointments in, 221; 
press freedom under, 248; purge of 
bureaucracy by, 212; reform under, 
199; rehabilitation of those purged by 
Chun, 221; violence used by, 240 

Roh Tae Woo, xxx, 63, 199, 247, 316; 
campaign of, 216; career of, 228; as 
member of Chun junta committee, 56; 
political goals, 219-20; public relations 
campaign of, 216-17; speech of, to 
United Nations, 255; summit of, with 
Gorbachev, 259 

ROK. See South Korea 

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 24 

ROTC. See Reserve Officer Training 
Corps 

rural sector: age distribution in, 84; de- 
velopment in, 137, 138; income in, 168, 
239; living conditions in, 176; women 
in, 106 

Russia: influence of, 14; treaty with, 12 
Russo-Japanese War, 14, 273 

Saemaul Movement (Saemaul undong) 
(New Community Movement): agricul- 
tural productivity under, 47; under 
Chun, 57, 58, 169; deterioration of, 
169; established, 44, 47; focus of, 47; 
impact of, on class structure, 97; im- 
pact of, on farmers, 47, 97; under Park, 
84; projects of, 169; reforestation in, 
167, 169 



399 



South Korea: A Country Study 



Saemaul undong. See Saemaul Movement 

Sammint'u. See Struggle Committee for 
the Liberation of the Masses, the At- 
tainment of Democracy, and the Unifi- 
cation of the Nation 

Samsung Group, 147, 157, 192, 249; 
defense production by, 296 

sangmin class, 91, 93 

Ssangyong Motors, 160 

sanitation, 129 

savings, domestic: growth, 44; for invest- 
ment, 154; in 1960-62, 153; in 1970- 
72, 153; in 1975, 153; in 1979, 153; in 
1980, 153; in 1987, 153; in 1989, 154; 
ratio of, to gross national product, 137 

school, middle, 46, 47, 115 

school, primary, 115, 116; teachers, 116 

school, private (sdwdri), 114 

school, secondary, 46, 47, 115, 116, 117 

science and technology: access to, 279; de- 
velopment of, 145; programs in higher 
education, 191, 192; promotion of, 192; 
research and development in, 191 

SCNR. See Supreme Council for National 
Reconstruction 

SCNSM. See Special Committee for Na- 
tional Security Measures 

Sea of Japan, 5 

seasons, 75 

Second Army, xxxix, 282 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 
155 

securities market, 172 

security, internal, 303-8, 310-11 

Security Consultative Meeting, in 1989, 

302-3; in 1990, xl 
Segye ilbo, 127 
Sejong (King), 10, 112 
Sekai nippo, 127 

Self-Strengthening Society (Chaganghoe), 
200 

semiconductor industry, xxviii 

Seoul: administration of, 214-15; air ser- 
vice in, 182; core zones in, 85; demon- 
strations in, 271; employment in, 156; 
migration to, 81, 85; population of, in 
1990, xxv, 85; population density of, 
81; public transportation in, 181; reli- 
gious believers in, 127; student demon- 
strations in, 42; temperature in, 75 

Seoul Area Federation of Student Coun- 
cils (Soch'ongnyon), 242 

Seoul Bank, 172 



Seoul Chamber of Commerce and Indus- 
try, 234 
Seoul Criminal Court, 313 
Seoul Imperial University, 118 
Seoul Metropolitan Rapid Transit Com- 
pany, 181 

Seoul National University, 98, 118, 214 
service industry, 145, 170-72, 174-75; 

elements of, xxviii; growth in, xxviii; 

share of, in gross national product, 193 
Seven-Year Economic Development Plan, 

36 

shamanism, 90, 122-23; on Cheju Island, 
106; in Choson Dynasty, 106; influence 
of, on social system, 70; kut (services) 
in, 122, 123; revival of, xxvi 

shamans (mudang), 93, 106, 122 

Shin-Han Bank, 172 

shipbuilding industry, 156, 157-58; 
coproduction in, 277-78; decline in, 
158; defense production by, 296; 
government emphasis on, 142, 144; 
new orders for, 158; projected expan- 
sion of, 158 

sijo (poetry), 16-17 

Silla Dynasty, 7, 123 

Silla Kingdom, xxiii, 5, 7; art in, 15; mili- 
tary in, 271, 272; rivalry of, with 
Paekche Kingdom, 77 

Simmindang. See New Democratic Party 

Sin Chong-il, 218 

Sin Hyon-hwak, 54 

Sin Ik-hui, 34, 37 

Sino-Japanese War, First, 14, 273 

Sino-Japanese War, Second, 21, 23 

Sino-Russian treaty (1896), 14 

Sin tonga (New East Asia) magazine, 250 

Sirhak Movement (practical learning), 1 1 , 
123 

slavery, 93, 94 

Sobaek Range, 5, 71 

So Chae-p'il, 12, 243 

Soch'ongnyon. See Seoul Area Federation 

of Student Councils 
social class, 96-99; influence of education 

on, 116 
Social Democratic Party, 218 
social institutions, 19-20 
socialism: influence of, on literature, 22- 

23 

socialist countries: ties with, 252; trade 

with, 254 
Social Purification Campaign, 308 



400 



Index 



Social Safety Act, 311 
social security insurance programs, 133 
social services: government spending on, 
146 

social structure, 88-96; Confucian in- 
fluence on, 69-70; inequality in, 97; in- 
fluence of urbanization on, 69 

social values, 88-91; population density 
as a factor in, 81 

society: military in, 279-81; under Park, 
45-47; under United States occupation, 

29- 30 

SOFA. See Status of Forces Agreement 

Sogang University, 193-94 

Sokkuram Grotto, 15, 128 

So Kyong-won, 263 

Somjin River, 72 

Song Dynasty, 8, 323 

Songgyungwan, 114 

Songui Girls' School, 107 

Sonjo (King), 273 

Soul simmun, 249 

South Korea: establishment of, xxiv, 3, 

30- 31 

South Korea-Japan Ministerial Meeting 
(1969), 160 

South Korean Interim Legislative Assem- 
bly, 28 

South Korean Workers' Party, 28, 305-6 
Soviet-American trusteeship, 25, 27, 28, 
274 

Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Indus- 
try, 258 

Soviet Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations (IMEMO), 258 

Soviet Ministry of Light Industry, 189 

Soviet Union (see also Commonwealth of 
Independent States; Russia), 30; as 
agent in diplomatic affairs, 258; decla- 
ration of war against Japan by, 24; in- 
vasion of Korea and Manchuria by, 24; 
joint venture with, 189; Koreans living 
in, 86; occupation by, xxiv, 27; role of, 
in Korean War, 32; support of, for 
North Korea, 302; ties with, xxxiii- 
xxxiv, 61 , 252; trade office of, in Seoul, 
258; trade with, xxxii, 188, 189, 257 

Soviet Union-South Korean relations, 
256-59 

sowon. See school, private 

Special Committee for National Security 
Measures (SCNSM), 56, 308 

Special Forces, 240, 308 



Special Warfare Command, 228 
Stalin, Josef V., 24 

State Council (cabinet), 207, 208-10; con- 
duct of foreign policy by, 251; Roh's 
appointments to, 221 

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 
xl-xli 

steel industry, xxviii, 139, 141, 156-57; 

government emphasis on, 144, 150 
Steinberg, David I., 97, 98, 143, 147, 177 
sterilization, 78-79 

Story of Lady Sa, The (Kim Man-jung), 17 

strikes, 175, 226, 242, 249-50, 305; gov- 
ernment policies restricting, 238-39; by 
Hyundai workers, 226, 242; in late 
1980s, 175, 220 

Struggle Committee for the Liberation of 
the Masses, the Attainment of Democ- 
racy, and the Unification of the Nation 
(Sammint'u), 241 

Student Defense Corps, xxxvii; abolished, 
xxxviii, 280 

student demonstrations, 54, 121-22, 226, 
307, 308; as cause of Chun's demise, 
62; under Chang, 37; in Choson Dy- 
nasty, 121; against Chun, 63; against 
Japanese rule, 20, 121; in Kwangju, 
55, 241, 308; for new constitution, 53; 
against Park, 121; against relations 
with Japan, 39; against Rhee, 121; 
against Roh, 221; tradition of, 90, 114, 
121; against United States, 63; violence 
during, 240-41; women in, 107-8; after 
Y.H. Incident, 42 

student dissidents, xxvi, 62, 241-43; cam- 
paigns by, to amend 1972 constitution, 
40; concept of minjung promoted by, 99, 
121; conscripted as punishment, 240, 
279-80; detained, 314; folk drama by, 
17; as followers of Kim Dae Jung, 53; 
hypothesized control of, by North 
Korea, 304-5; police treatment of, 322; 
political agenda of, 221; public sympa- 
thy for, 62; released by Ch'oe, 52; re- 
strictions on, 40; revisionist history of, 
62-63; Rhee government overthrown 
by, 240; violence by, xxxiii, 241-43 

students, xxxvii; limited job opportuni- 
ties for, 116, 119; in 1980, 54; opposi- 
tion of, to Chun, 54; opposition of, to 
Park government, 46, 54; as percentage 
of population, xxvi; political demands, 
54; status of, 114; violence renounced 
by, 242 



401 



South Korea: A Country Study 



Study Group for Peaceful and Democratic 
Reunification (P'yongminyon), 233 

suicide, 119-20 

Sui Dynasty, 7, 272 

Sunkyong, 147, 258 

Supreme Council for National Recon- 
struction (SCNR), 38, 246-47, 306, 
312 

Supreme Court, 211, 223-24, 313, 323, 
329; appointment of justices to, 206, 
210 

Supreme Prosecution Administration, 
325 

surnames, 102 

Tacoma Boatbuilding Company, 277-78, 
297 

Tactical Air Control Center, 286 

T'aebaek Range, 5, 71 

Taedong River, 4, 7 

Taegu, 77; administration of, 214; popu- 
lation of, 84; religious believers in, 127; 
student demonstrations in, 42 

Taegu Seven Stars, 316 

Taejo (King), 272 

Taejon: administration of, 214; govern- 
ment agencies moved to, xxv; military 
headquarters moved to, xxxix, 85; 
population of, 84 

Taejong-gyo, 109, 126 

Taft-Katsura Agreement, 14 

Tale of a Yangban (Pak Chi-won), 17, 92 

Tale of Hong Kil-tong, The (Ho Kyun), 17 

Tang Dynasty, 7, 272, 323 

Tan'gun, 109; worship of, 109, 126 

teachers, 116, 117, 118; examinations for, 
213; union for, 117-18, 236 

teachers' associations, 236 

Team Spirit exercises, xl 

Tears of Blood, 22 

technology. See high-technology industry; 

science and technology 
Tekhsnabeksport, 258 
telecommunications, 182-83; industry, 

141, 149 
telephones, 182 

television, 182-83, 250; in rural areas, 47; 

under Sixth Republic, 248 
temperature, 75 

terrorism: by North Korea against South 
Korea, xxxv, xxxvi, 269; against United 
States representatives in South Korea, 



60, 221; measures to counter, 280 
textile industry, xxviii, 161; exports by, 
161, 189 

Third Army, xxxviii-xxxix, 281-82, 283 
Third Military Academy, 290, 291 
Three Kingdoms period (see also Koguryo 
Kingdom; Paekche Kingdom; Silla 
Kingdom), xxiii, 4-7, 76, 323; central 
government in, 19; cultural expression 
under, 15-18, 19-20; religion in, 123; 
society under, 15-20; stratified social 
system in, 19 
timber, 167-68, 257 
TK Division (TK Mafia), 229 
Tonga ilbo (East Asia Daily), 246, 247, 

248, 250 
Tonga Press, 250 

Tonghak Movement (Eastern Learning 

Movement), 124, 243 
Tonghak Rebellion, 12, 14, 273 
t'ongil. See reunification 
T'ongilgyo. See Unification Church 
Tong-nip simmun (The Independent), 12 
Tongui University incident, 226, 227 
torture, 243, 244, 311, 322 
tourism, 171 

trade, foreign: under constitution, 204; 
dependence on, 184; disputes over, 
186; diversification of, 252, 254; poli- 
cy, 188; record, 254; surplus, 188, 255; 
value of, 188 

trade deficit, 183 

traditional culture: attraction of, 108-9; 
government use of, 109; revival of, xxvi 

transportation systems, 178, 181-82; bus 
system, 181; civil aviation, 182; rail- 
roads, 181-82; roads, 178-81; sub- 
ways, 181-82 

Trans-Siberian Railway, 14, 181 

Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, xli 

Treaty of Portsmouth, 273 

Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), 14 

Truman, Harry S, 24 

Tumen River, 3, 70, 272 

Turkey, 157 

typhoons, 75 



Uibangyuch'wi (Great Collection of Medi- 
cines and Prescriptions), 130 
Ullung: land area of, 71 
Ulsan, 85, 157, 162, 168 



402 



Index 



Unification Church (Holy Spirit Associ- 
ation for the Unification of the World 
Christianity), 126-27 
Unified Party (Ilche Party), 218 
United Democratic Youth Association, 
218 

United Nations, 30, 32; activities in, 
263-64; admission to, xxxvi; bid for ad- 
mission to, 264 

United Nations Command, xl, 298, 301 

United Nations forces, 276 

United Nations General Assembly: Roh's 
speech to, 255 

United Nations Korean Reconstruction 
Agency, 36 

United Nations Temporary Commission 
on Korea, 30 

United States: cooperation, 302-3; 
emigration to, xxiii; foreign aid from, 
36, 43, 141, 183; influence of, on edu- 
cation, xxiii, 114; influence of, in South 
Korea, xxiii; Koreans living in, 86; 
liberation of Korea by, xxiv; Philip- 
pines occupied by, 14; policy toward 
Korea, 25-26; role of, in Korean War, 
32; role of, in Kwangju uprising, 256; 
terrorist attacks against, 60, 221, 241, 
242; ties of, with Choson Dynasty, 25; 
treaties with, 12 

United States Air Force: aircraft patrols, 
301-2; assignments, 301; personnel, 
301 

United States Army Military Govern- 
ment, xxiv, 27, 243, 246, 274, 324; 
demonstrations against, 30 

United States Army Special Warfare 
School, 228 

United States Department of the Treas- 
ury, 188 

United States forces in South Korea, xxiii, 
xxxvii, 255-56, 297, 298-99, 301-2; 
financial support for, xl, 256; proposed 
reduction of, xl, xli, 51, 256; role of, 
in Kwangju uprising, xxxvii, 56, 60, 
241, 256, 298-99, 301-2; role of, in 
Olympic security, 271, 302; strategic 
planning by, 301; withdrawal of, 51, 52 

"United States Government Statement 
on Events in Kwangju, Republic of 
Korea, in May 1980," 299, 301 

United States Information Service 
(USIS), 241, 242 

United States Marine Corps, 302 



United States Military Airlift Command, 
302 

United States Navy, 302 

United States occupation, xxiv, 25-31; 
withdrawal of forces under, 31, 274 

United States Pacific Command, 302 

United States Pacific Fleet, 302 

United States-Republic of Korea Com- 
bined Field Army, xl, xli, 301 

United States-Republic of Korea Com- 
bined Forces Command (CFC), xxxix, 
xl, 298; structure of, 298 

United States-Republic of Korea Ground 
Component Command, xl 

United States-South Korea military rela- 
tions, xxxvii, 255; assistance in, 51; 
grant aid from, 293; coproduction of 
materiel in, 269, 277-78, 285, 286, 
295; improvement in, 277 

United States-South Korea relations, 232, 
255-56; under Chun, 59-60; economic, 
xxvii; effect of Koreagate on, 51; his- 
tory of, 255; political, 256; trade, xxiii, 
189, 190, 255 

United States-Soviet joint commission, 
25, 26 

Urban Industrial Mission, 128 
urbanization, xxv, 81, 84-86; class struc- 
ture altered by, 96; effect of economic 
policies on, 35; influence of moderni- 
zation on, 96; influence of, on mental 
health, 129; influence of, on population 
growth, 78; influence of, on social struc- 
ture, 69, 244 
urban sector: development in, 138; in- 
come in, 168, 176; living conditions in, 
176 

USIS. See United States Information 

Service 
USSR. See Soviet Union 
utilities industry, 141 

Vantage Point, 249 

Vietnam War: troops to fight in, 39, 51, 
277 

Village Forestry Associations, 167 
violence: against government, 240; gov- 
ernment use of, 239-40; political, 270; 
by p'ongnyokpae, 325 
voting: for president, 33 



WAC. See Women's Army Corps 



403 



South Korea: A Country Study 



wages: average, 175; in business, 174; in- 
creases in, in late 1980s, 176; for manu- 
al workers, 175; necessary, 175; for 
semi-skilled workers, 175-76; for un- 
skilled workers, 176 

Wang Kon, 7 

Washington Times, 127 

weapons: acquisition of new, 271, 295; 
coproduced, 160, 286, 295; domes- 
tically produced, 160, 295-96 

Wei Dynasty, 5, 323 

Western Europe: coprOduction of materiel 
with, 269; trade with, 189 

Western influence, xxiv, 12, 273; banned, 
11; campaign for independence from, 
12; in China, 11; in Japan, 11; on legal 
system, 323; on social system, 70 

West Germany. See Federal Republic of 
Germany 

wholesale trade, 171 

Wickham, John A., Jr., 56 

women: in the army, 284; changing role 
of, 104-8; of Cheju Island, 77, 106; 
comportment of, 107; crimes against, 
325; discrimination against, 97, 104; 
duty of, to provide male heir, 104; edu- 
cation of, 107, 119; in family relations, 
103, 105; household duties of, 107; in 
Korean National Police, 321; in neo- 
Confucianism, 104; in politics, 221; 
powers of, 106; rights of, 105; segre- 
gation of, 105-6; as shamans, 122; sta- 
tus of, in Choson Dynasty, 104; status 
of, in Koryo Dynasty, 104; urban 
migration of, 108 

women as workers, xxvii; in agriculture, 
106; constitutional protection of, 203-4; 
demonstrations by, 41; in factories, 
106; influence of, on population 
growth, 78; in lower class, 108; after 
marriage, 108; number of, 108; in 
offices, 106; opportunities for, 119 

Women's Army Corps (WAC), 284 

won. See currency 

Wonbulgyo (W6n Buddhism), 126 

workers: constitutional protection of, 
203-4; demonstrations by, 41; in indus- 
try, 96, 156; under Japanese occupa- 
tion, 95 

working conditions, 175; in chaebol, 147; 
hours, 175, 176; industrial safety in, 
178 

World Bank, 184 



World Youth and Student Festival, 226, 
263 

World War II, 24-25 

wu bin. See Five Relationships 



xiao. See filial piety 



yakuza. ^Japanese gangsters 

Yalta Conference, 24 

Yalu River, 3, 4, 5, 70, 271, 272 

yangban (scholar-official elite), 10, 91, 94, 
273; entry into, 20; families, 91-92; 
honorary, 92; under Japanese occupa- 
tion, 94; neo-Confucianism and, 89; 
power of, 20; requirements for, 92; vir- 
tues, 77; women, 105-6 

Yellow Sea, 72 

Yen, 4 

Y.H. Incident, 41, 42 

Y.H. Industrial Company, 41 

Yi Chong-ch'an, 230 

Yi Dynasty. See Chosn Dynasty 

Yi Hwang (Yi T'oe-gye), 88 

Yi Il-kyu, 223 

Yi In-jik, 22 

Yi Ki-baek (Ki-baik Lee), 11, 110 

Yi Ki-bung, 34 

Yi Ki-mun, 111 

Yi Ki-t'aek, xxxii 

Yi Ki-y6ng, 23 

Yi Kwang-su, 22 

Yi 6-yong, 210 

Yi Py6ng-ch'6l, 249 

Yi Sang-hun, 303 

Yi Sang-hwa, 23 

Yi Se-ho, 316 

Yi S6ng-gye, 102, 272; Choson Dynasty 
founded by, 8-9; reforms by, in Koryo 
Dynasty, 9 

Yi Su-kwang, 11 

Yi Sun-gi, 258 

Yi Sun-sin, xxvi, 110, 272 

Yi T'oe-gye (Yi Hwang), 88 

Yongjo (King), 11 

Yongsan plain, 72 

Yonhap News Agency, 247, 249 

Yonse University, 98, 118, 214 

Yosu, 85, 162 

Y6su-Sunch'6n rebellion, 31, 305 
Y6 Un-hyong (Lyuh Woon Hyung), 28, 
30 



404 



Index 



Yuan Dynasty, 272, 323 yusin (revitalization) constitution. See Con- 
Yugoslavia, 264 stitution of 1972 
Yun P'il-yong incident, 316 

Yun Po-sSn, 37, 38, 40 Zhu Xi, 11, 88 



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